Governance of listed state-owned enterprises in China : the rise of a new state-led model? by Fu, Jian Rong Jenny
Governance of Listed State-owned 
Enterprises in China: The Rise of a 
New State-led Model? 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the 
Australian National University 
Jian Rong (Jenny) Fu 
January 2014 
DECLARATION 
Except where due acknowledgment has been made, I declare that I am the sole author of 
this thesis. The work has not been submitted previously, in whole or part, to qualify for 
any other academic award. 
Sign,ru« of CandidatC' ... 7 .. ~ ..... 
Date: 22 January 2004 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The thesis could not have been completed without the guidance, encouragement and 
support of many persons, to each of them I would like to express my deepest gratitude. 
First and foremost, I would like to thank Professor Peta Spender and Professor Veronica 
Taylor, my primary and secondary supervisors, for their wise counsel , constructive 
feedback and unfailing interest in this research. I am also greatly indebted to Professor 
Roman Tomasic and to Professor Neil Andrews for their participation in my 
supervisory panel. These two distinguished law academics had introduced me into the 
world of corporate governance many years before, and kindly involved me in a large 
Australian Research Council-funded project on corporate governance within the 
Chinese top 100 listed companies. Data collected from the project formed the basis for 
part of this thesis. 
My sincere appreciation also goes to a number of colleagues. In particular, Dr Geoffrey 
Nicoll and Dr John Gilchrist at the School of Law, University of Canberra, have 
provided me with mentoring and encouragement throughout my candidature. I also 
thank the ANU College of Law, for its generous conference funding support, and the 
School of Law, University of Canberra for the flexible teaching arrangements it has 
made to allow me to complete this thesis. 
I am greatly indebted to my family and friends for their constant love and support. In 
particular, my husband Zhou Liang' s in-depth understanding of the Chinese political 
economy has always made him the first person I clarified ideas with during this project. 
I acknowledge and appreciate the professional assistance provided by Ms. Debbie 
Phillips in formatting this thesis. 
Several chapters of the thesis have been published or presented as follows: 
• A previous version of Chapter 6 was presented at the inaugural Australia-China 
Investment Relations Conference, Canberra, 30-31 July 20 I 2, and published as: 
Jenny Fu, 'The Governance of SOEs in China' in Geoffrey Nicoll et al (eds), 
The Australia-China Investment Relationship: Law, Governance and Policy 
(Australian Centre on China in the World, the Australian National University, 
2013) 147 
lll 
• Chapter 7 was published as: Jenny Fu, ' Governance of Listed State-owned 
Enterprises in China: An Investor, Stakeholder or New State-led Model' , paper 
presented at the Corporate Law Teachers Association Annual Conference, 
Australian National University, 5 February 2013. 
• Part of Chapter 9 was published as: Jenny Fu, The China Milk Scandal and the 
Role of the Government in Corporate Governance in China, paper presented at 
the 2009 Australian Corporate Law Teachers Association Conference, 1-3 
February 2009; Jenny Fu and Geoffrey Nicoll , 'The Milk Scandal and Corporate 
Governance in China' (2011) IO (3) Canberra Law Review l 03. 
• Chapter IO was presented at the Second Australia-China Investment Relations 
Conference, Beijing, China, 18 September 2013. 
iv 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ACEF 
ACFTU 
ACLA 
ARC 
CAO 
CASS 
CCP 
CMEs 
CNPC 
CSRC 
Central 
SOEs 
GFC 
IIF 
LLSV 
LMEs 
NAO 
OECD 
PRC 
QFII 
SAFE 
SAQSIQ 
SASAC 
SINOPEC 
SOE 
All-China Environment Federation 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
All China Lawyers ' Association 
Australian Research Council 
China Aviation Oil 
China Academy of Social Science 
Chinese Communist Party 
Coordinated Market Economies 
China National Petroleum Corporation 
China Securities Regulatory Commission 
Central Government-affiliated State-owned Enterprises 
Global Financial Crisis 
Institute oflntemational Finance 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
Liberal Market Economies 
National Audit Office 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
People's Republic of China 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
State Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
China Petrochemical Corporation 
State-owned Enterprise 
V 
SPC Supreme People's Court 
VoC Variety of Capitalism 
vi 
ABSTRACT 
China introduced major reforms to its decade-old Company Law and Securities Law in 
October 2005. The aim of this thesis is to (re)interpret China's post-2005 legal and 
regulatory reforms concerning governance of listed SOEs and explore whether these 
reforms have given rise to a new model of corporate governance. The developments are 
examined through the lens of state capitalism and institutional change. In doing so, the 
thesis draws upon three strands of literature, namely, comparative capitalism, 
comparative corporate governance and law and capitalism, particularly Milhaupt and 
Pistor's postulation of the role of the state in conditioning the interaction between legal 
and economic changes in state-led economies. 1 
While corporate governance is a vast area, this thesis focuses on the evolution of 
Chinese law and practice concerning three sets of company relations central to the 
former state-led model of corporate governance. These are state-manager relations, 
investor protection and non-shareholder stakeholder (including employee) protection. 
Commonly adopted in the post-war state-led economies until the late 1980s, this model 
was also reflected in the governance of Chinese listed SOEs prior to the 2005 corporate 
law reforms. 
This thesis argues that China's post-2005 regulation of these three sets of relations has 
undergone significant changes. However, these changes have not Jed to a greater 
convergence in the governance of Chinese listed SOEs with the Anglo-American 
outsider-based model, as widely suggested in the literature. What has emerged from 
China' s post-2005 reforms is a new state-Jed model that can be called ' a state-Jed 
stakeholder' approach. While state involvement in corporate affairs remains strong, this 
model pays equal attention to strengthening monitoring of managers and the protection 
of minority shareholders and other non-shareholder stakeholders, including, but not 
limited to employees. Although difficult to reconcile with the outsider-based model, the 
rise of this new model in China cannot be separated from its efforts to maintain the 
Chinese form of state-led economic development, while grappling with the increasing 
demands made on the state for protection by investors and other stakeholders. 
Curtis Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about l egal Systems 
and Economic Development around the World (University of Chicago Press, 2008) ch 2. 
Vil 
The emergence of this new state-led model has been better reflected in the Chinese 
post-2005 regulatory framework, than the reality of corporate governance in listed 
SO Es. The lack of more radical changes in the latter respect has been, in part, caused by 
various disadvantages associated with the state as essentially the sole guardian of this 
new governance model. 
The long-term viability of this model is likely to hinge on the balance between the will 
and capacity of the state to adjust its competing goals and the diverse interests within 
listed SOEs, and the risk of lax internal controls that persists at the corporate level. 
However, due in part to its general congruence with the Chinese state-led economic 
development, the continued evolution of this model is likely to be incremental. As such, 
the articulation of the state-led stakeholder model of corporate governance makes a 
significant contribution to our understanding of not only Chinese corporate governance, 
but also comparative corporate governance and comparative capitalism more broadly. 
Vlll 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
[The] free-market tide bas now receded. In its place bas come state capitalism, a system 
in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily 
for political gain. This trend has stoked a new global competition, not between rival 
political ideologies but between competing economic models. 1 
China introduced major reforms to its Company Law and Securities Law in October 
2005. The 1993 Company Law2 and 1998 Securities Law,3 preoccupied with facilitating 
the corporatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), largely ignored corporate 
governance issues such as the protection of minority shareholders. With the adoption of 
'more traditional corporate governance objectives' , 4 the 2005 amendments 5 were 
generally commended as having significantly modernised or Westernised the Chinese 
systems of corporate law and corporate governance.6 
The aim of this thesis is to (re)interpret China's post-2005 legal and regulatory reforms 
concerning the governance of listed SOEs (or state-controlled listed companies), and 
explore whether these reforms have given rise to a new model of corporate governance, 
or simply indicate that the Chinese system has moved one step closer to the Anglo-
American outsider-based/shareholder model, as widely suggested in the literature. As 
will be illustrated in Chapter 2, these companies have remained the dominant force on 
the Chinese stock market, despite the rapid expansion of the private sector. 
Ian Bremmer, ' State Capitalism Comes of Age' (2009) 88 Foreign Affairs 40, 41 . 
( <p$}.. fia:J1ifl]Jl,10 js] J't)) [Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (People's Republic of China) 
National People' s Congress Standing Committee, 29 December 1993. 
(( <)' $ }..fia:J1if0 00 iiE#i't )) [Securi ties Law of the Peopl e' s Republic of China] (Peopl e's Republi c of China) 
National People's Congress Standing Committee, 29 December 1998. 
' Roman Tomasic, 'Looking at Corporate Governance in China ' s Large Companies: Is the Glass Half Full or Half 
Empty?' in Guanghua Yu (ed) The Developmenl of 1he Chinese Legal Sys1em Change and Challenges 
(Routledge, 201 0) 182, 195 . 
(( <)'$ J.. fia :J1ifl] 00 0js] J't )) [Company Law of the People' s Republic of China] (People's Republ ic of China) 
National People' s Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2005 ('2005 PRC Company Law' ); ((<)'$}.. fia;l¾ 
fO OOiiE# i't)) [Securities Law of the People' s Republic of China] (People' s Republic of China) National 
People's Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2005. 
6 See, eg, James V. Feinerman, 'New Hope for Corporate Governance in China?' in Donald Clarke (ed) China 's 
Legal System: New Developmenls, New Challenges (Cambridge Universi ty Press, 2008) 36, 57; Baoshu Wang 
and Hui Huang, 'China' s New Company Law and Securities Law: an Overview and Assessment ' (2006) 19 
Australian Journal of Corpora te law 229, 239; Gu Minkang, Understandh1g Chinese Company Law (Hong 
Kong University Press, 2010), 4, 367-375; Nicholas Howson, 'Corporate Law in the Shanghai People's Courts, 
1992-2008: Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State' (20 10) 5 £as/ Asia Law Review 303, 327; 
Cheng Wei-qi, ' Protection of Minori ty Shareholders after the New Company Law: 26 Case Studies ' (20 10) 4 
International Law and Management 283, 283. 
This research was inspired by a perceived disjuncture between two growing strands of 
literature on China. As Chapter 2 will further illustrate, on the one hand, consistent with 
the supremacy of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance at least until the 
recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC), research on Chinese corporate governance has 
mainly focused on how the mechanisms of that model could be emulated to improve the 
governance of listed companies, primarily listed SOEs, in China. Two questions have 
underlined this strand of research, namely, how can we make the governance of listed 
SOEs more similar to the Anglo-American model? If we cannot, what are the main 
obstacles? 
On the other hand, in contrast with the ongoing primacy of the outsider-based model in 
research on Chinese corporate governance, there have been some signs of change in the 
literature on the Chinese model of economic development. Until the early 2000s, the 
Chinese approach to economic growth and development had been generally considered 
an incremental approach, in contrast to the various 'big bang' strategies adopted by the 
former Soviet Union and East European countries in their transfonnation from a 
planned state to market economy. 7 However, instead of portraying China as ' a way-
station on the road to liberal capitalism', 8 recent political economic studies highlight a 
distinct model of economic development employed by Chinese policy makers, namely 
' state-led capitalism' or its short form 'state capitalism' .9 
The term ' state capitalism' has no universally agreed meaning. Lenin distinguished two 
types of state capitalism, each based upon the combination of the state with monopoly 
capital. The first is the state monopoly capitalism as the highest stage of capitalism. It 
denotes a phenomenon where a bourgeois government controls the whole economic 
system for the benefit of the capitalist class. 10 The second is state directing capitalist 
Minxin Pei, China's Trapped Transition: the limits of Developmental Autocracy (Harvard University Press, 
2006) 25-27. For an account of the Chinese gradualist reforms in its early refonn stages, see Ron Duncan and 
Yiping Huang (eds) Refom , of State-owned Enterprises in China: Autonomy, Incentives and Competition (NCDS 
Asian Paci fi c Press, 1998); Barry Naughton, Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996); Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (The MIT 
Press, 2007). 
Derek Bacon, ' Emerging-market Mulrinationals: The Ri se of State Capitali sm', The Economist (on line) (2 1 
January 20 12) <http://www.economist.com/node/2 l 542930>. 
9 Ibid. See also Ian Bremmer, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations? 
(Portfolio, 201 0) 4-5 ; G. John Ikenberry, ' The Future of the Liberal World Order' (20 1 I) 90 Foreign Affairs 56, 
57. 
10 H. Ray Buchanan, 'Lenin and Bukharin on the Transi tion from Capitalism to Socialism: The Meshchersky 
Controversy, 19 I 8' (I 976) 28 Soviet Swdies 66, 67. 
2 
undertakings as a mechanism for the transi tion :from capitalism to socialism. 11 State 
capitalism took on many new forms after World War II. These included the East Asian 
'developmental states' , in which the state coordinated closely with large private firms to 
promote economic growth and development, state ownership of certain industries in 
Western European countries, and the indi cative planning in France and India. 12 As 
noted by Lin, ' the degree and variation of state capitalism can be distinguished by two 
dimensions: '( l) the extent to which the state owns the means of production; and (ii) the 
extent to which the state dictates or coordinates with big firms (national champions) and 
unions in the market place' .13 All forms of state capitalism, however, entail a system 'in 
which the state plays a significant and visible role ' to promote economic development. 14 
By labelling China as state capitalism, the recent political economic literature appears to 
suggest that the governance of listed SOEs, as the chief embodiment of the Chinese 
form of state capitalism, has some logic of its own. 
Indeed, the nexus between state capitalism and a state-led model of corporate 
governance is not entirely new to comparative corporate governance researchers. In 
their 2001 seminal work The End of History for Corporate Law, Hansmann and 
Kraarkman famously observed that a state-oriented model of corporate governance 
existed in post-World War II state-led economies such as France, Japan and some other 
Asian countries (the 'former post-war state-led economies'). 15 For these former post-
war state-l ed economies, rather than maximising financial return to shareholders, 
corporate governance was often an instrument of the state to promote rapid economic 
development through intervening in the affairs of large companies. 16 
Strong support for Hansmann and Kraakman's observation can be found in the 
comparative capitalism (or 'varieties of capitalism') literature. Particularly, a number of 
studies have identified state capitalism as a distinct capitalist prototype in addition to 
the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs, represented by US and the UK) and the 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs, exemplified by Germany and post 1980s 
11 Ibid, 69-70. 
12 /;)JJf,UJl, ,<lj;/;,a)l , i}k,lpjlj [Hu Leming, Liu Zhiming and Zhan Jiangang], '§si ~!lf:;$::t;i(.!a;cpl'l,Jffi~ •[State-
capitalism and Ch inese Model] (2009) 11 i'£l/flilfJi: Economic Research 31 , 32-33. 
13 Nan Lin, ' Capitalism in China: A Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and Its Future' (2010) 7 Management 
and Organisation Review 63 , 69. 
14 Ibid 68. 
15 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2001 )89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439, 446-7. 
16 Ibid. 
3 
Japan). 17 As further illustrated in Chapter 3, put together, these studies have not onl y 
shown that corporate governance is an integral component of the institutional mix of a 
given economic system, but also that state capitalism is associated with a state-led 
model of corporate governance. Despite considerable country-specific variations, thi s 
model, in the former post-war state-led economies, was typicall y associated with close 
state-corporate manager relations, the muted voice of minority shareholders and poor 
protection of other non-shareholder stakeholders except employees whose firm-specific 
skills were often considered as valuable assets of their companies (the ' former state-led 
model ' ). 
Does this former state-led model, derived from the experiences of the post-war state-led 
economies, have any application to China? In particular, does it describe the governance 
of Chinese li sted SOEs? On the one hand, thi s model may have some application to 
these companies, as suggested by Hansmann. 18 On the other hand, there are some strong 
forces that propel China to move away from this model. Indeed, as Chapter 8 will 
illustrate, the dynamic international and domestic challenges faced by Chinese policy 
makers today are far more pressing than those experienced by the fo rmer post-war state-
led economies several decades ago. 
While state capitalism might be used as an alternative pris~ to look at governance of 
Chinese SOEs, it should be noted that state capitalism is not static. Institutional change, 
including corporate governance change, in state-led economies is shaped by the 
interaction between the role of the state and international and domestic forces for 
change, such as economic globalisation and the pluralisation of interests within 
domestic society. In this respect, the mainstream variety of capitalism (VoC) literature 
has been criticised for failing to provide a satisfactory account fo r change. 19 A more 
17 See, eg, Vivien A Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2002) 183; Richard 
Whitley, Business Systems and Organizational Capabilities: The Institutional Stnicwn·ng of Competitive 
Competences (Oxford University Press, 2007); David Coates, Models of Capitalism: Growth and Stagnation in 
the Modern Era (Polity Press, 2000); Bruno Amable, The Diversity of Modern Capitalism (Oxford Uni versity 
Press, 2003) 15. Robert Boyer, ' How and Why Capitalism Differs' (2005) 34 Economy and Society 520, 530; 
Nahee Kang, 'Globalisation and Institutional Change in the State-led Model: The Case of Corporate Governance 
in South Korea' (20 10) 15 New Political Economy 519, 521. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the distinction 
between Liberal Market Economies and Coordinated Market Economies was first made by Hall and Soskice. See 
Peter Hall and David Soskice, 'An In troduction to Varieti es of Capital ism' in Peter Hall and David Soskice (eds), 
Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 
2001) I. 
18 Henry Hansmann, ' How Close ls the End of History?' (2006) 31 Journal of Corporate law 745, 748. 
19 See, eg, Bob Haneke, Martin Rhodes and Mark Tiiatcher (eds), Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, 
Contradictions, and Complementarities in the European Economy (Oxford Univers ity Press, 2007)7 ; Colin 
Crouch, Capitalist Diversity and Change - Recombinant Governance and Institutional Entrepreneurs (Oxford 
University Press, 2005) 30-3 I, Gregory Jackson and Richard Deeg, ' How Many Varieties of Capitali sm: 
4 
dynamic view has, however, been expressed by Milhaupt and Pistor. In their important 
2008 book Law and Capitalism, the authors discussed the role of the state and economic 
changes in changes in law, as a particular type of institution, in legal systems of 
different organisational features which, in return, correspond to the countries ' economic 
models. In doing so, the authors divided national legal systems into ' centralised 
systems' which are typically found in countries ' characterised by strong government 
coordination' , 20 and 'decentralised systems' where non-state actors have strong 
involvement in law making and enforcement. 21 These authors envisaged a highly 
interactive relationship (described by the authors as 'rolling relations') between legal 
and economic changes in all systems, which usually begin with changes in economic 
conditions.22 Economic changes may eventually narrow the scope for state intervention. 
However, in 'centralised systems', the state may mitigate the impact of economic 
changes on changes in law by utilising several sets of tools to enhance its coordinating 
capacity, at least up to a certain point. 23 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, these include 
limiting the extent to which the formulation and implementation of law may be 
contested by private actors, and substitution of demand for law with extra-legal means 
such as norms. 
While not underestimating the above tools, this thesis will shed light on another set of 
tools that may be utilised by a centralised state to enhance its coordinating capacity. 
This set is to be found in market forces including mechanisms usually employed in 
decentralised systems. In the area of corporate governance, this refers to governance 
mechanisms utilised in advanced market economies and international best practices. 
The adoption of these tools will inevitably lead to a certain degree of hybridisation in 
the model of corporate governance previously present in a centralised state. However, it 
does not necessarily lead to a fundamental systemic transformation. 
1.2 Research questions 
Using state capitalism and institutional change as an analytical frame, this thesis traces 
the development of corporate governance law and practice in China in the lead up to 
Comparing the Comparative lnstitutional Analyses of Capitali st Diversity' (MPlfG Discussion Paper No. 06/2, 
I I April 2006) 24,37 <http: //ssm.com/abstract=896384>. 
20 Curtis Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, l aw and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems 
and Economic Development around the World (University of Chicago Press, 2008) 14 7. 
21 Ibid 6. 
22 Ibid 28. 
23 Ibid 7-8, 38-39. 
5 
and after the 2005 corporate law reforms. By critically assessing and interpreting the 
main changes and continuities thereof, the thesis will answer the following main 
research question: 
Main research question 
Does the evolution of law and practice concerning the governance of listed SOEs in 
China through the 2005 corporate law reforms and the relevant regulatory reforms 
suggest the emergence of a new model of corporate governance? 
While corporate governance is a vast and elastic area, three sets of company relations 
central to the former state-led model of corporate governance will be considered in this 
research. As noted earlier, these are: (1) state-manager relations, or state involvement in 
corporate decision-making and monitoring of managers; (2) legal protection of minority 
shareholders/investors and (3) legal protection of other corporate stakeholders including 
employees. Further, a focus on the law and practice relating to these three sets of 
relations leads to the development of four sets of subsidiary questions which will assist 
in addressing the main research question: 
Subsidiary research questions 
1. Why did Chinese policy makers embrace the notion of corporate governance? 
What was the concept of corporate governance embraced by them? 
2. What were the main features of and problems with corporate governance m 
listed SOEs prior to the 2005 corporate law reforms? 
3. What are the major changes, and continuities, in the regulation of state-
managers relations, investor protection and non-shareholder stakeholder 
protection since the 2005 major corporate law reforms? How can we interpret 
those changes, and continuities, from the perspective of state capitalism and 
institutional change? 
4. What are the major changes, and/or the lack thereof, in relation to the underlying 
practice of corporate governance in listed SO Es post-2005? How can we explain 
the changes and/or the lack thereof? 
The answers to these questions are critically important. First, while not ignoring the 
international and domestic pressures for change, the contextualisation of the governance 
of listed SO Es in the Chinese state-led model of economic development will deepen our 
6 
understanding of the internal logic for corporate governance development in China. 
Chinese corporate governance has been widely considered as riddled with 
contradictions. As the review of current research on Chinese corporate governance in 
Chapter 2 will illustrate, despite increased convergence towards the Anglo-American 
outsider-based model in fonnal law, the underlying practice has remained an insider-
based system, with state-appointed top corporate managers exercising the real control 
over the governance process. 24 Commentators have so far mainly attributed these 
contradictions to historical, cultural, political and ideological factors. Given China's 
long history and its unique cultural and political traditions, these factors will no doubt 
continue to shape the governance of listed SOEs for a long time, and in many important 
ways. However, as the opening quote from Bremmer suggests, the recent resurgence of 
state capitalism in several emerging economic powers, including China, has 
significantly altered the nature of global competition, as its focus switches from rival 
political ideologies towards economic models.25 As this competition has been predicted 
to accelerate, 26 the search for alternative underpinnings of Chinese corporate 
governance, by linking its law and practice to the Chinese state-led economic 
development strategies, has become important. In other words, if state capitalism and 
institutional change can serve as an alternative analytical frame, then perhaps some of 
the arrangements in Chinese corporate governance can be viewed as strategic decisions 
made by policy makers to facilitate pre-determined goals, rather than simply a 
manifestation of China's failure to fully engage with the outsider-based governance 
systems. 
Second, if Chinese corporate governance can be seen as a new variant of the former 
state-led model, this research will contribute to comparative corporate governance 
literature by providing new evidence of the resilience of state-led corporate governance. 
The former state-led model, according to Hansmann and Kraakman, has lost most of its 
intellectual attraction and empirical validity, due to the widespread collapse of state 
socialism and the stagnation of the East Asian economies since the 1990s.27 In light of 
24 On Kit Tam, The Development of Corporate Governance in China (Edward Elgar, 1999) 75 ; Roman Tomasic 
and Jian Fu, ' Legal Regulation and Corporate Governance in China's Top 100 Listed Companies' (2006) 27 The 
Company Lawyer 278-87; Alice De Jonge, Corporate Governance and China 's H-Share Market (Edward Elgar, 
2008) 82. 
25 Bremmer, 'State Capitalism Comes of Age' , above I. 
26 National Intelligence Council (U.S.), Global Trends 2025: A Tra nsfo rmed World (U.S. Executi ve Offi ce of the 
President, 2008) <www.aicpa.org/ .. ./cpahorizons2025/globalforces/ .. ./globaltrends.pdf>. 
27 Hansmann and Kraakman, above n 15 , 447. 
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the rethinking of the role of the state in economic development and corporate 
governance generated by the GFC, the articulation of the model of corporate 
governance currently employed in China will facilitate a greater recognition of the 
diversity in international corporate governance systems. Given the fast expansion of 
SOEs outside China over the past few years, it may further provoke research into the 
interaction between the Chinese system, and the Western market-based systems of 
corporate governance. 
Third, although located within the realm of legal analysis of corporate governance, this 
study will also make some contribution to comparative capitalism research. This is 
because of the interrelatedness of the two spheres. As comparative capitalism suggests, 
there are varieties of corporate governance systems which support diverse national 
economic models. The converse is also true. By examining the interrelationship 
between the Chinese form of state-led capitalism and corporate governance in listed 
SOEs, this thesis will not only present new evidence of state capitalist practices, but 
also provide an example of how institutions, particularly corporate governance 
institutions, may evolve in state capitalism under strong international and domestic 
pressures for change. To date, this strand of literature has mainly focused on the former 
post-war state-led economies. 
1.3 Research methodology 
This study undertakes qualitative research to answer a number of specific questions in 
relation to governance of state-controlled listed companies in China. In doing so, the 
study utilises a combination of methods. First, the examination of the official adoption 
of the concept of corporate governance and the evolution of the corporate governance 
law and regulation in China will be mainly based on conventional documentary 
analysis. This involves analysis of primary source materials such as legislation, 
administrative regulations, voluntary guidelines and policy statements relating to 
Chinese corporate governance, as well as relevant secondary source materials. Further, 
as discussed below, a mixture of research methods, including face-to-face interviews, 
literature review and case study, will be utilised to address the second and fourth sets of 
subsidiary research questions which concern past and present practices in the 
governance of Chinese listed SOEs. 
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1.3.1 Pre-2005 governance practices in listed SOEs: face-to-face interviews 
The analysis of corporate governance in Chinese listed SO Es pre-2005 will be primarily 
based on data collected through a large Australian Research Council (ARC) - funded 
research project ('ARC project'). The ARC project, carried out during 2002 and 2004, 
was led by Professors Roman Tomasic and Neil Andrews. 28 It investigated a broad 
range of issues concerning governance of Chinese top 100 listed companies, based on 
the listing of the top 100 companies published by Fortune magazine from 2001 to 2004. 
A list of these companies, most being state-controlled companies, 29 is provided in 
Appendix 1-1. The primary data from the project has been made avai lable by the chief 
investigators for use in this thesis. 
During the three-year project, 108 face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
company officers, regulators, corporate law academics and practitioners involved in the 
governance of the Chinese top I 00. A summary of the ARC project interviews by 
location and type of interviewees is provided in Appendix 1-2. Each interview took 
between one and two hours. 30 A questionnaire of 47 questions covering various aspects 
of the governance of these large Chinese companies was administered in all interviews. 
A copy of the project interview schedule is at Appendix 1-3. The interviews were 
conducted by the two project leaders in English, through an interpreter where an 
interviewee was a non-English speaker. Interview notes were taken by both project 
leaders in English. As the Principal Legal Research Officer, this author participated in 
25 interviews in December 2004 and was responsible for collation and transcription of 
all interview data from the entire project. 
About 25 questions (marked with an asterisk ' *') in the interview schedule are directly 
relevant to this research. Some of these questions allowed the interviewees to offer 
personal views on their understanding of the concept of corporate governance, and 
comment on the levels of importance attached to corporate governance by company 
directors and officers. Others allowed them to comment on the ro les of various internal 
and external actors and other stakeholders in the governance of Chinese top 100. These 
28 A number of articles and one book based on the data have been published by various researchers involved in the 
ARC project. 111ese indude Jia and Tomasic, above n 24; Roman Tomasic and Neil Andrews, 'Minority 
Shareholder Protection in China 's Top 100 Listed Companies ' (2007) 97 Australia11 Joumal of Asia11 Law 88; 
Neil Andrews and Roman Tomasic, 'Directing China's Top 100 Listed Companies: Corporate Governance in an 
Emerging Market Economy' (2005) 2 The C01porate Governance Law Review 245; Tomasic and Jian Fu , above 
n 24~ Roman Tomasic and Jenny Jian Rong Fu, 'Government-owned Companies and Corporate Governance in 
Australian and China: Beyond Fragmented Governance' (2006) 3 Corporate Ownership and Control 123. 
29 See further di scussion on this point in Chapter 3. 
30 Tomasic and Andrews, 'Minority Shareholder Protection in China' s Top 100 Listed Companies', above n 28, 95. 
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include the general meeting, minority shareholders, the board of directors (and the 
Chairman), the board of supervisors, employees, the regulatory authorities such as the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the stock exchanges, courts and the 
Communist Party (the Party). The interviewees were specifically asked to comment on 
the impact of the state as a dominant shareholder on corporate governance practices. 
They were also asked to identify the most important stakeholders in Chinese listed 
companies. The responses to these questions helped to shed light on the three sets of 
relations within large listed SOEs prior to the 2005 corporate law reforms. The relevant 
data have been written up, coded, and summarised in a way to allow the major themes 
from the interviews to emerge. 
1.3.2 Governance practices in listed SOEs post-2005: literature review, informal 
discussions and case study 
A study similar to the ARC project as discussed above would be the best means to 
investigate governance practice in Chinese listed SOEs following the 2005 corporate 
law reforms. However, as pointed out by Tomasic, the ARC project might not be 
replicated now due to the difficulty in eliciting the same degree of cooperation inside 
China.31 Similar to undertaking empirical studies into corporate governance elsewhere, 
there is always a 'problem of obtaining access to business and other elites for research 
purposes' in China.32 However, under the current social and political climate in China, 
an additional obstacle is the enormous public controversy surrounding large SOEs. As 
Chapter 8 will further illustrate, these companies have become the focus of mounting 
social tensions associated with the Chinese form of state-led economic development, as 
their power and wealth expand. 
That said, several efforts have been made by this author to update the ARC project 
interview data. These included reviewing company annual reports and media reports, 
formal and informal exchanges with a number of Chinese academics, corporate 
executives, regulatory officers and legal practitioners involved in the governance of 
listed SOEs. These exchanges took place in various forums over the past few years. The 
forums included two Australia-China Investment Relations Conferences jointly hosted 
by University of Canberra and China University of Political Science and Law in 2012 
31 Conversation with Professor Tomasic on 30 November 2011. 
32 Tomasic, 'Looking at Corporate Govemance in China..' s Large Companies', above n 4 , 190. 
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and 2013 ,33 and a one-day workshop on corporate governance that this author facilitated 
in 2011 for a Chinese delegation. The delegation comprised an official from the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and 16 senior and 
mid-level managers from over ten SASAC-administered SOEs. Formal and informal 
exchanges undertaken in these forums allowed this author to gain substantial inside 
knowledge on various aspects of governance practices in Chinese listed SO Es. 
In addition to information gained from the above avenues, this thesis will utilise several 
recent studies on Chinese corporate governance, including audit reports issued by the 
National Audit Office (NAO), to examine governance practice in listed Chinese SOEs 
post-2005. Most of these studies (except the NAO reports) were based on publicly 
available information, such as company annual reports and media releases. However, 
put together, they shed some light on the current state of corporate governance in 
Chinese listed SOEs. 
In the absence of more detailed empirical work, a case study on the Chinese 
government's involvement in the 2008 milk scandal and its aftermath will be utilised to 
illustrate the internal working of corporate governance in listed SO Es post-2005. A case 
study of the milk scandal serves this purpose from several perspectives. First, while a 
single case study often runs the risk of being unrepresentative, the scandal provides us 
with rare insight into state involvement in corporate governance at a broad industry 
scale. 34 The scandal caused injury to nearly 300,000 infants, including six deaths. 35 
Primarily a food incident, it was also a major corporate governance scandal that 
implicated almost all large and medium-sized producers in the Chinese dairy industry.36 
Sanlu, the group of companies at the epicentre of the scandal, was an unlisted privately-
controlled corporate group converted from a former SOE. However, a number of other 
companies implicated in the scandal, including the one that was used by the government 
to rescue Sanlu, were listed SOEs. Second, due to its large magnitude and profound 
33 The inaugura l Australia-China Investment Relations Conference was held in <;:anberra on 30-31 July 20 I 2. TI1e 
second conference was held in Beijing on 18 September 2013.The Australian APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation) Centre at RMIT, Melbourne also co-hosted the second conference. 
34 There have been a small number of case studies on the involvement of the state in the governance of individual 
companies or group of companies. See, eg, De Jonge, above n 24; Neil Andrews, ' When the CEO Vanished in 
Spin: lnforrnation Disclosure, Corporate Governance and the Bank of China (Hong Kong) Holdings Ltd.' (2004) 
17 Australian Journal of Corporate l aw 71 ; Milhaupt and Pi stor, above n 20, 125-48. 
35 
'Two Executed in China over Tainted Milk Scandal' Xinhua Net News Story (24 November 2009) 
<http:l/news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-1 l/24lcontent_ 12530798.htrn>. 
36 
'China Seizes 22 Companies with Contaminated Baby Milk Powder' Xinhua Net News Story (1 7 September 
2008) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/ I 7/content _ l 0046949.htrn>. 
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social, economic and political implications, the scandal also provides a remarkable 
platform to examine the interaction of state power, corporate governance, and forces of 
economic globalisation and the rise of interest group politics within Chinese society. 
Third, as an 'extraordinary event ' , a corporate scandal may not be representative of the 
day-to-day governance practices in Chinese companies.37 Nor is it a good illustration of 
all the positive aspects of China' s post-2005 corporate governance reforms. However, 
as Milhaupt and Pistor pointed out, a study of corporate failures may 'expose features 
and weakness of a system that were beneath the radar when it was functioning 
smoothly' . 38 
Materials on the case study were collected from publicly available information, such as 
news reports and media releases, which is supplemented by this author's informal 
discussions with a local judge involved in the bankruptcy of Sanlu and two fonner 
Chinese Supreme People's Court judges. 
1.4 Main arguments of the thesis 
The thesis will argue that China' s post-2005 legal and regulatory reforms have not 
taken the governance of listed SO Es a step closer to the Anglo-American outsider-based 
model. What has emerged from these reforms is a new state-led model which can be 
called a 'state-led stakeholder' approach. This approach originated from the Chinese 
pre-2005 state-led model of corporate governance which, to a large extent, overlapped 
with the former state-led model. Without the state loosening ultimate control over the 
affairs of listed SOEs, this approach has, however, significantly shifted away from the 
former state-led model by taking on a far more measured and inclusive approach. 
Through drawing upon mechanisms from prevailing international corporate governance 
models, including the Anglo-American outsider-based/ shareholder model and the 
broader stakeholder model, China's post-2005 regulation of corporate governance has 
intensified measures to strengthen monitoring of corporate managers, as well as to 
improve the protection of minority shareholders and other stakeholders including, but 
not limited to, company employees. This new state-led model is difficult to reconcile 
with the Anglo-American outsider-based model. However, it may be explained from the 
perspective of China's efforts to maintain its state-led economic development, amid 
strong international and domestic pressures for change faced by Chinese policy makers. 
37 Milhaupt and Pi stor, above n 20, I 0. 
38 Milhaupt and Pistor, above n 20, I 0-11. 
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The emergence of this new state-led model has been more evident in China' s post-2005 
regulatory framework, rather than the reality of corporate governance in listed SOEs. 
The lack of more radical changes in the latter respect has been, in part, due to various 
disadvantages associated with the state as essentially the sole guardian of this model. 
However, as its continued evolution is likely to be incremental at best, the articulation 
of this model has important implications for our understanding of not only corporate 
governance in Chinese listed SOEs, but also of comparative corporate governance and 
comparative capitalism more generally. 
It should be noted that, at the time that the draft of this thesis was concluded, China 
experienced a key power transition. A new generation of leaders, led by President Xi 
Jinping, has announced its decision to 'comprehensively deepen' the Chinese economic 
and social reforms.39 However, as wi ll be briefly discussed in Chapters 2, 6 and 8, the 
various reform tasks outlined by the new leadership have not altered the state-led 
stakeholder model of corporate governance expounded in this thesis to any significant 
extent. 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis consists of ten chapters which are divided into three parts. Part One 
(Chapters 1 to 3) lays the foundation for the study by identifying the rationale, setting 
out the research questions, research methodology and the theoretical framework. Part 
Two (Chapters 4 to 9) addresses each set of the subsidiary research questions. Part 
Three (Chapter 10) concludes the thesis by summarising and reflecting on the main 
findings. An outline of the thesis is provided as follows. 
Chapter 1 introduces the research topic, main research question and subsidiary research 
question sets. It also sets out the research methodology and methods. This is followed 
by an outline of the main arguments and the structure of the thesis . Chapter 1 concludes 
with the definition of the key terms used in this thesis and the thesis cut-off date. 
Chapter 2 illustrates the need for a state capitalism and institutional change approach to 
the governance of listed Chinese SOEs. This is undertaken through identifying the 
disjuncture between two strands of literature, namely, the Chinese model of economic 
development and corporate governance in China. ln examining the first strand, the 
39 (( 'P :!¾ 'P 3< '!s T 3'i: ffij Ilic ft i:!l: :,¥,: if 'f .fil: j( 1"1 /!2 81 tic )E )) [The Decision on Major Issues Concern ing 
Comprehensivel y Deepening Reforms], adopted at the Third Plenum of the I 8"' Central Committee of th e 
Chinese Communist Party, 12 November 201 3. 
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chapter provides an overview of the rise of state capitalism as a characterisation of the 
Chinese model of economic development. This is followed by a discussion of the key 
features of this model as suggested in the literature. In reviewing current studies on the 
governance of listed SOEs, Chapter 2 examines three main analytical approaches 
employed in this strand of literature. These are the conventional agency theory of the 
firm-based analysis, path dependence analysis and the interest groups politics approach. 
The contributions and limitations of studies adopting these three main analytical 
approaches will also be considered. Chapter 2 then reviews current research that has 
adopted a state capitalism approach to the study of aspects of Chinese corporate 
governance and discusses its limitations. The chapter concludes by highlighting the 
main argument of the chapter. 
Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical framework for the research. A state capitalism and 
institutional change approach to the governance of Chinese li sted SOEs post-2005 
requires the consideration of three theoretical questions. First, is there a linkage between 
national systems of corporate governance and national economic development models? 
If that question can be answered in the affirmative, second, in what ways state 
capitalism, as a particular model of economic development, shape the system of 
corporate governance in a given country? And finally, how may the role of the state in a 
state-led economy shape changes in corporate governance as-international and domestic 
environments evolve? Chapter 3 addresses these questions (and in that order) by 
drawing upon three interrelated strands of literature. These are comparative capitalism 
(including the theory of the developmental state), comparative corporate governance, 
particularly corporate governance in the former post-war state-led economies, and law 
and capitalism, particularly Milhaupt and Pistor's postulation of the interaction between 
legal and economic changes within state-led economies and the role of the state in that 
interaction.40 
Chapter 4 sets the scene for the analysis of the evolution of corporate governance in 
Chinese listed SOEs by addressing the first set of subsidiary research questions. To 
examine the rationale behind China's official adoption of the concept of corporate 
governance in 1999, Chapter 4 first reviews the two early stages of Chinse SOE refonn . 
The chapter then analyses the actual content of the concept that first appeared in the 
Party's 1999 Decision on Several Important Issues Concerning the Reform and 
40 Milhaupt and Pi stor, above n 20, ch 2. 
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Development of State-owned Enterprises.41 The chapter concludes by highlighting the 
importance of understanding the purpose served by corporate governance in China to 
the interpretation of legal and regulatory changes concerning the governance of listed 
SOEs. 
Chapter 5 addresses the second set of subsidiary research questions by examining the 
law and practice concerning governance oflarge state-controlled listed companies in the 
lead up to the 2005 corporate law reforms. It first sets the background by providing a 
brief overview of the Chinese pre-2005 regulatory environment for corporate 
governance, and the key regulatory and market actors involved in that envirorunent. The 
chapter then examines China's pre-2005 law and practice concerning state-manager 
relations, investor protection and other stakeholder (including employees) protection 
(and in that order) within large listed SOEs. 1n each section, the main features of the 
relevant legal and regulatory framework are examined. This is followed by empirical 
evidence on how the respective framework played out in the reality of corporate 
governance in China's top 100 listed companies. The various problems underlying the 
law and practice concerning each set of company relations are also identified and 
discussed. The chapter concludes by summarising the main findings and their 
implications for interpreting China's post-2005 corporate governance reforms. 
Chapters 6 to 8 address the third set of subsidiary research questions. Through 
examining and interpreting the changes and continuities in China's post-2005 legal and 
regulatory reforms of the governance oflisted SOEs, the three chapters explore whether 
the post-2005 framework gives rise to a new model of corporate governance. In doing 
so, Chapter 6 focuses on the identification of changes, and/or the lack thereof, in 
China' s post-2005 regulation of state-manager relations within listed SOEs, Chapter 7 
on investor and other stakeholder protection. As Chapter 7 will discuss, these latter two 
sets of company relations are often seen as mutually exclusive in the Anglo-American 
outsider-based model of corporate governance, therefore requiring separate treatments. 
However, this is not necessarily the case with other corporate governance models. This 
is particularly so with the former state-led model, where both minority shareholders and 
non-shareholder stakeholders (excluding employees) were considered company 
outsiders. As China's pre-2005 regulation of investor and other stakeholder protection 
" «'f'~'f'Y<~'fllilff:1£ '11:rll(liL¥1l;/,t/lHFF_jji_:k1oJ@(t,Jl;IOi::)) (Decision of the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communi st Party on Several Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of State-owned 
Enterprises] , adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the 15'h Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 22 
September 1999. 
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resembled some key features of the fonner state-led model, a combined discussion of 
Chinese post-2005 reforms concerning these two sets of company relations will help to 
illustrate the changes, and continuities, in both aspects. This will also help to illuminate 
any new corporate governance model that may have emerged from those changes. 
Chapter 8 interprets changes and continuities in China's post-2005 regulation of 
corporate governance from the perspective of state capitalism and institutional change. 
Chapter 9 addresses the fourth set of subsidiary research questions by examining the 
impact of China's post-2005 legal and regulatory reforms on the reality of corporate 
governance in listed SOEs. Drawing upon recent studies on the governance of listed 
SOEs, Chapter 9 first identifies the changes and continuities in the governance practice 
in these companies post the 2005 corporate law refonns. To provide some further 
insight into this area, the chapter also provides a case study of the central and local 
govenunents ' involvement in the lead up to the 2008 tainted milk scandal and the 
handling of its aftennath. Chapter 9 then explores the reasons behind the changes, and 
the lack thereof, in the reality of Chinese corporate governance post-2005. ln doing so, 
this chapter draws upon Ho 's analysis of the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
state-centric corporate social responsibility.42 Chapter 9 concludes with a summary of 
the main findings of the chapter. 
Chapter IO summarises the main findings in previous chapters and reflects on their 
implications. It begins with a summary of the answers to each set of the subsidiary 
research questions developed in Chapter I. It then outlines the contribution of the thesis 
to Chinese corporate governance, comparative corporate governance and comparative 
capitalism research more generally. The limitations of the study, and issues for future 
research, will also be canvassed. Chapter 10 concludes by highlighting the main 
arguments of the thesis. 
1.6 Definition of key terms 
State capitalism: The absence of one single uniform definition of this term has been 
discussed above. In this thesis, the term is used in its broadest sense, namely, a model of 
economic management and development in which 'the state plays a significant and 
42 Virginia Harper Ho, 'Beyond Regulation: A Comparative Look at State~Centric Corporate Social Responsibility 
& the Law in China' (20 13) 46 Vanderbilt Journal o/Transnationa/ law 375, 43 1-7. 
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visible role' .43 The adoption of this broad definition also means that the thesis does not 
involve itself in the debate whether China is a capitalist or socialist economy.44 
Corporate governance: Although generally referred to as 'a system by which companies 
are directed and controlled' ,45 the term also lacks one uniform and precise definition. 
According to Clarke, the very many definitions of corporate governance generally 
concern two issues: (1) agency problems between investors and management, i.e. , the 
question of ownership and control and (2) shareholder versus stakeholder theories, that 
is, for whose interests the corporations should operate.46 
The definition used in this thesis draws from Williamson who defines corporate 
governance as the relationship between the firm and its constituencies: labour, capital , 
suppliers, customers, the community and management.47 To that mix of constituencies 
this thesis adds the state. This definition serves the purpose of this research for two 
main reasons: its broad coverage of the participants of corporate governance and the 
non-discriminatory approach it takes to the relevant importance of each of those 
participants. The broad coverage of this definition, to a certain extent, is also reflected 
in the definition of corporate governance provided in the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance. 48 The OECD's definition, however, appears to prioritise the 
relationship between shareholders and managers. 
In relation to the definition of 'state,' the Weberian definition, which has been utilised 
by most developmental state theorists, focuses on non-political party institutions such as 
bureaucratic, legal and coercive institutions.49 However, when the definition is applied 
to the Chinese context, it must be widened to include the Chinese Communist Party (the 
43 Lin, above n I 3, 68. 
44 For this debate, see Peter Nolan, Transforming China: Globalization, Transition and Developmenl (Anthem 
Press, 2004) 45-76. 
45 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004 edition). 
46 Donald Clarke, 'Nothing but Wind' ? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance' (20 11 ) 59 
Amen·can Journal of Comparative Law 75, 79. 
47 Oliver Williamson, The Economic lnstillltions of Capitalism (New York: Th e Free Press; London: Collier 
Macmillan Publishers, 1987) 298. 
48 The OECD defines corporate governance as '[ involving] a set of relationships between a company's 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
perfonnance are determined. OECD Principles ofCo,porate Governance (2004 edition). 
49 Theda Skocpol , 'Bringing the State Back in : Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in Peter B. Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back in (Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
7; Max Weber M, Economy and Society (Bedminster Press, 1968 ) Vol 1 cited in Christopher Pierson, The 
Modern State (Routledge, 1996)7. 
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Party). With its governing party position entrenched in the Chinese Constitution, the 
Party has remained the source of political power in China, and its objectives are carried 
out through state apparatus such as government departments and the court system. so As 
demonstrated throughout the thesis, the leading position of the Party in directing the 
Chinese economic development and transformation has been particularly manifested in 
the reform ofSOEs. 
State-controlled companies: In relation to a joint stock company including listed 
company, the term 'controlling shareholder' is defined in the 2005 Chinese Company 
Law as a shareholder who holds more than 50 per cent of the issued shares in a 
company, or a shareholder who holds less than 50 per cent of the shares, but whose 
shareholding in the company is sufficient to allow the shareholder to 'have a vital 
bearing' on the resolutions of the general meeting.51 In relation to state-controlled listed 
companies, the same definition of 'controlling shareholder' is adopted in this thesis. 
Companies controlled by state-controlled companies are also state-controlled 
companies. 
Stakeholder: Edward Freeman, a pioneer in the development of stakeholder theory, 
defines stakeholders as ' those groups who have a stake in or claim on the firm ' which 
' include suppliers, customers, employees, stockholders, and the local community, as 
well as management in its role as agent for these groups ' . 52 This broad notion of 
corporate stakeholders is adopted in a number of authoritative codes and guidelines 
including the Australian Standard on Corporate Social Responsibility (AS 8003-
2003).53 It should be noted that in legal analysis of corporate governance, shareholders, 
including minority shareholders, are not usually grouped with stakeholders. This is 
because of the way that corporate law constructs power relationships between the 
shareholders and directors as insiders and stakeholders as outsiders.54 The broad notion 
50 
«'t'$Aflc ,iHll 005t$)) [Consti tu tion of the People' s Republic of China] Preamble. For the relationship 
between the Party and the state organisation under Chinese constitutionalisrn , see Larry Cata Backer, 'Party, 
People, Government and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legi timacy of the Chinese State-Party Ruic of 
Law System' (2012) 30 Boston University International l aw Journal 33 1. 
51 2005 PRC Company law art 2 I 7 (2). 
52 Edward Freeman, 'Stakeholder Theory of the Modem Corporation', in T. Donaldson and P. Werhanc (eds.), 
Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach (Prentice Hall , Englewood Cli ffs, 2002, 7'h ed) 38, 39. This 
broad definition is also followed by some other authors. See, cg, Bryan Horrigan, Corpora te Social 
Responsibility in the 2 / st Cenlllry: Debates, Models and Practices Across Government, l aw and Business 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 44 . 
53 Horrigan, above n 52 . 
54 Indeed, while shareholder and stakeholder groups are not necessarily dichotomous, most corporate governance 
theorists tend to include shareholders in their discussion of corporate governance but not stakeholders. 
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of stakeholders is, however, adopted in this thesis. As Chapter 8 will discuss, this broad 
notion is also reflected in a number of Chinese regulatory documents on corporate 
social responsibility. 
Institutions: This term is defined by Douglass North as ' the rules of the game of a 
society, or more formally ... the human devised constraints that structure human 
interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether 
political, social or economic' .55 According to North, this definition has three elements, 
formal written rules such as statute law, common law and regulations, informal rules 
such as conventions, norms of behaviour and voluntary codes of conduct, and the 
effectiveness of related enforcement mechanisms.56 North also distinguishes institutions 
from organisations which are ' groups of individuals ' (such as political, social or 
educational bodies) 'bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives' .57 Therefore, 
organisations are not institutions, although they operate under the institutional 
framework of a society and also create their own formal and informal rules. 58 North 's 
definitions of institutions and organisations are also fo llowed by comparative capitalism 
theories such as Hall and Soskice, although the latter's definition of institutions appears 
to have ignored the quality of enforcement of formal and informal rules.59 Based on 
North's definition, the central focus of this thesis is the Chinese statutory law, 
regulations and policy statements, and their implementation, concerning the three sets 
of company relations examined in this research. 
1. 7 Cut-off date 
The laws and regulations referenced in this thesis are current as of20 January 2014. 
55 Douglass North, lnstillltions, Institutional Change and Economic Perfonnance (Cambridge Univers ity Press, 
1990) 3. 
56 Ibid 3-4. 
57 Ibid 5. 
58 Natalia Boliati and Kudret Topyan, 'Conceptualizing Insti tutions and Organizations: A Critical Approach' 
(2007)5 Journot of Business and Economic Research 1, 3. 
59 Hall and Sosk.ke define institutions as 'a set of rules, forma l or informal , that actors generall y follow, whether for 
normative, cogniti ve or material reasons' , and organisations as 'durable entities with fonnally recognised 
members, whose ru les also contribute to the institutions of the political economy'. See Hall and Sask.ice, above n 
17, 9. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter illustrates the need for a state capitalism and institutional change approach 
to the governance oflisted state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China by highlighting the 
gap between two growing strands of literature: namely, studies of the Chinese form of 
state capitalism and corporate governance. In doing so, this chapter will show that 
despite the proliferation of analytical approaches, the main approaches adopted in the 
study of Chinese corporate governance have not contextualised the governance of listed 
SOEs within China' s state-led model of economic development. Although a small 
number of studies have begun to do so, they suffer from several important limitations 
due, in part, to their piecemeal nature. A systemic and in-depth analysis of the evolution 
of the law and practice concerning corporate governance in these companies, through 
the lens of state capitalism and institutional change, has remained absent. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. In examining current 
research on the Chinese state-led capitalism, section 2.2 first reviews the rise of state 
capitalism as a characterisation of the model of economic management and 
development employed in China. This is followed by a discus_sion of the key features of 
this model as identified in the literature. Section 2.3 reviews current studies on Chinese 
corporate governance, particularly corporate governance in listed SOEs. It first 
examines the three main analytical approaches adopted in this strand ofliterature. These 
are the conventional agency theory of the firm, path dependence analysis and the 
interest groups politics approach. The contributions and limitation of these three 
analytical approaches to the understanding of Chinese corporate governance will also be 
considered. The section then reviews current studies that have adopted a state capitalism 
approach to the study of aspects of corporate governance in listed SOEs and identifies 
their limitations. Section 2.4 concludes by highlighting the main argument of this 
chapter. 
2.2 Current research on state capitalism in China 
With China' s double-digit growth over the past three decades, the Chinese model of 
economic management and development has captured worldwide attention. In the 
political economic literature in the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese model was typically 
described as an incremental approach, which is in contrast to the various 'big bang' 
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strategies adopted by the former Soviet Union and East European countries in their 
transformation from a planned state to market economy. This approach denotes the 
gradual, sequenced and step-by-step withdrawal of the state from various spheres of the 
economy, with the parallel introduction of market forces including the private sector. 1 
As Naughton observed, 'the economy gradually grew out of the plan, as both the plan 
itself and the state sector as a whole became less dominant elements in the economy as 
a whole' .2 However, there have been some strong signs of change in the literature since 
the mid-2000s. 
2.2.1 State capitalism as a characterisation of the Chinese economic development 
model 
As noted in Chapter I , instead of being a keen fo llower of market capitalism, China has 
been increasingly viewed as ' state-led capitalism' , or its short form ' state capitalism ', in 
recent political economic literature.3 Indeed, a special issue of the Economist magazine 
in 201 2 named China as a leading example of this growing phenomenon among 
developing economies, including Russia and Brazi l.4 
The Chinese form of state capitalism has been expressed by Western researchers in 
different terms, such as ' state-directed capitalism',5 'centrally-managed capi tali sm',6 
'developmental state' 7or 'new mercantilism' .8 Despite their nuanced differences, the 
various taxonomies highlight a system that bears some resemblance to the post-war 
Minxin Pei, China's Trapped Transition: the Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Harvard University Press, 
2006) 25-27. For an account of the Chinese gradualist reforms in its early reform stages, see Barry Naughton, 
Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1996); Barry 
Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (The MU Press, 2007). 
Naughton, Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, above n I, 13. 
3 Derek Bacon, 'Emerging-market Multinationals: The Rise of State Capitalism' The Economist (online) (21 
January 2012) <http: //www.econornist.com/node/21542930>; lan Bremmer, The End of the Free Market: Who 
Wins the War between States and Corporations? (Portfolio, 2010) 129; G. John lkeoberry, ' The Future of the 
Liberal World Order', (2011) 90 Foreign Affairs 56, 57; Barry Naughton, 'The Transformation of the State 
Sector. SASAC, the Market Economy and the New National Champions' in Barry Naughton and Kellee Tsai 
(eds) China 's S,a,e Capitalism: Growih and Crisis (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) 
<"~vw.cctr.usLhkimaterials/ ... /Naugbton-SASAC-paper-20110824.doc>. 
4 Ba.con, above n 3. 
5 Stefan Halper, The Beiji11g Consensl/S (Basic Books, 2010) 113; Yasheng Huang, Capitalism wi1h the Chinese 
Characleristics (Cambridge University Press) xvii. 
6 Nan Lin, 'Capitalism in China: A Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and Its Future' (2010) 7 Management 
and Organisation Revi.ew 63. 
Gordon Wbiie 'Developmental States and Socialist Industrialisation in the Third World ' (1984) 21 Journal of 
Development Studies 97; Gordon White and Robert Wade, ' Developmental States and Markets in East Asia: An 
Introduction ' , in Gordon White (ed), Developmental Stales i11 East Asia (Macmillan Press, 1988)1 ; Phil Deans, 
'The People' s Republic of China: The Post-Socialist Developmeotal State' in Linda Low (ed}, Developmental 
States: Relevancy, Redundancy or Reconfiguration? (Nova Science, 2004) 133; Alvin Y. So, ' Introduction' in 
(2002) 35 The Chinese Economy 3, 5. 
' Jonathan Holslag, ·China's New Mercantilism in Central Afuca' (2006) 5 African and Asian Studies 133. 
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state-led economies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and France prior to the late 
1980s. As will be further discussed in Chapter 3, the state played a leading role in 
promoting economic growth through association with or intervention in businesses, 
especially large businesses, in those economies.9 
Another taxonomy concerning the Chinese economic development model, that has 
gained increasing appeal among Chinese scholars, is 'the China Model'. It is widely 
believed that this taxonomy was derived from the 'Beijing Consensus' (as opposed to 
'Washington Consensus'), a term coined by Ramo who recommended the Chinese 
model as an alternative for the third world. 10 Some scholars inside China have used 
'state capitalism' to describe the Chinese form of state-led economic development. 11 
However, many others have used the term 'the China model' instead, 12 as they see 'state 
capitalism' as a contradiction in ideology with 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' , 
the official expression for the unique path to socioeconomic development adopted in 
China. First put forward by Deng Xiaoping in 1982,13 the term 'socialism with Chinese 
characteristics' has been generally interpreted as 'grounding in the Chinese indigenous 
conditions, but utilising all mechanisms available (including mechanisms of capitalism) 
to achieve economic development and socialist modernisation' .14 
Different Chinese scholars have defined 'the China model' and described its features in 
different ways. The term is generally considered a very broad notion that entails a 
distinctive set of theories, systems and practices which span political , economic, social 
and cultural spheres, and have been the key to the remarkable economic success 
9 Nan Lin, above n 6, 69. 
10 Joshua Ramo, The Beijing consensus (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004). 
11 /i!Hf-8.Jl, y1j~8Jl, %':~!iltl [Hu Leming, Liu Zh iming and Zhan Jiangang], '['i,]:@'.Jli;;js:::l::5/.Ei'PIIl{l!J'\:' [State-
capitalism and Chinese Model] (2009) 11 t}il'f !iJl:/1: Economic Research 31, 33. 
12 According to Fang, a search of the CNKI (China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database), a leading database 
on Chinese journal articles, found that 194 papers published in 2009, and 3 I 9 in 20 I 0, contain the phrase ' the 
China model' in their titles. See J1J75 [Liu Fang], "'P!Iltl!J'\:'liff:/1:~r.'!:/uiltlr' [Hot Issues of Research on the 
'China Model '] (2013) 1 ~t)i(ffJ&cjl:IIJtcJl:1fl. Jo11rnal of Beijing Administrative College 55, 58. 
13 Ytlz,B.Jl [Liu Zhiming], ''P !Iltl!J'\:T-:ii!:!Illl<'.lli;;js:::1::5(' ['China Model ' is not State Capitali sm] (2009)15 UM! 
Jt;fr,lj Red Flag Manuscripl 11,14; ¼]i [Qin Xuan], ' !Ilfff-t.!t!ll-Jcp(EJ "'PIIlrJJ'\:"---JIH(!;cp['!,]<l\f~t±~:±.:X. □{J 
['i,]il,j;Jj!J Ol'iJ' [International Perspective of the Ch ina Model---Al so on the Socialism with Ch inese Characteri stics 
and its International Influence] (2008) 4 'POO Af\:::k'Ji:cJl:W. Journal ofRenmin University of China 9, 9-10; :J'i 
/JJ( [Qi Bing], ' ~lltr~ 'f'P!IltJJ'\:(E)liff:/Ei£iW' [Current Research on 'China Model ' ] (2009)3 ,1!1i{);~f1j 
Journal of Socialist Theory Guide. The tenn 'socialism wi th Chinese characteristics' was first used by Deng 
X iaoping at the I 2'h National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in J 982 . 
14 :J'i/;j( [Qi Bing] , above n 13; See also ¼'.Q'. [Qinxuan], ',tjcp\l,l!f;l'@.H4l':t5((r),111j1,\!l,~' [Some Thoughts on 
Socialism with Chinese Characteri stics] (2005)2 'P 00 !f;l' @, t± 4l' :± .:X. !iJI :IE Socia lism wilh Chinese 
Characteristics Research 5, 9. ;Zljz,B.Jl [Liu Zhiming], above n 13. 
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achieved by China over the past few decades. 15 The capitalism versus socialism 
ideological debate aside, most researchers who subscribe to the notion of 'the China 
model', however, recognise two basic features of the Chinese fonn of state capitalism 
outlined below. 
There have been different views concerning the timing of the emergence of state 
capitalism in China. Huang argued that state capitalism began to emerge in China in the 
early 1990s, where the Chinese reform strategy shifted away from a bottom-up 
approach with a focus on rural reform and private entrepreneurship, to a top-down one 
that focused on the capacity building of the central government and development of 
large SOEs in urban areas. 16 The bottom-up pattern of economic reform in the 1980s 
was generally considered as having 'run its course' by I 993, 17 as despite high economic 
growth, the pattern generated problems such as overheating, runaway inflation and the 
declining capacity of the central government to maintain macro-control over the 
economy. 18 Prudent re-centralisation was regarded as necessary to carry out the tougher 
institutional reforms in key economic areas, including institutional reform of SO Es. 19 
For Naughton, the rise of the Chinese fonn of state capitalism was, however, best 
evidenced in the emergence of ' a distinctive industrial system' dominated by large and 
profitable central government-affiliated SOEs ('central SOEs'_, often referred to as the 
'national champions' in the literature). 20 This phenomenon did not occur until the 
establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) in 2003 to consolidate state power over the then nearly 200 central SOEs. At 
the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (the Party) in late 2002, the 
Party put forward two guiding principles for further reforming management of state-
owned assets in industrial and commercial SOEs. The first was the separation of state 
investor functions among different levels of government to 'give full play to the 
15 
~Ii\'~. ~Ufil [Zhao lingyun, Zhao Hongxing], ' i'f:'P ll>H:lhl:IY-JA~.\!l,<\!',5:~51.• [The Implications of the 
'China Model ' to the History of Human Thoughts] (2011 )5 i/ill~U±~l'!~ Hubei Social Science 5; Jtl 7'J [Liu 
Fang], above n 12. 
16 Huang, above n 5, 168-9. 
17 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, above n I , 90. 
18 Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (Palgrave Macmillan, 200 ed, 2004) 243; Tianbiao Zhu, ' Building 
lnstiturional capacity for China's New Economic Opening' , in Linda Weiss (ed), States in the Globalisation: 
Bringing domestic Institutions Back in (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 142, 147-8; 
19 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, above n I, I 00; Saich, above n 18, 243. 
20 Naughton, 'll1e Transformation of the State Sector', above n 3. 
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initiative of both the central and local authorities'. 21 Hence, the central government 
would forthwith retain its state investor functions over SOEs that 'have bearing on the 
national economic lifeline and state security and enterprises in such fields as important 
infrastructures and natural resources' 22 and hand over all other enterprises, usually the 
less strategic or less profitable ones, to governments at provincial and municipal level s. 
Second, a state-owned assets supervision and administration agency was to be 
established at each government level to centralise the management of state-owned 
assets in commercial entities, and to provide a leading government agency to further 
reform the state sector. Consequently, SASAC was established under the State Council 
to exercise central government ownership role over the then 196 large SOEs previously 
controlled by various ministries. For enterprises in the financial sector that fell outside 
SASAC's purview, Central Huijin Investment Limited (which was merged into China 
Investment Corporation, China's largest sovereign invest fund in 2007) was established 
to hold state shares in major financial institutions including the four largest Chinese 
commercial banks. As discussed in Chapter 6, within a few years, SASAC has emerged 
as a strong government regulator through taking over many powers from other 
government departments as well as being granted some new ones by the State 
Council.23 
Of course, there are other taxonomies of the Chinese model of economic development. 
For example, political scientists such as Oi and Schortgen argued that the Chinese state 
can be best described as 'local state corporatism ' or a ' decentralised developmental 
state' in contrast to the uniform top-down 'developmental state'. 24 For these authors, 
although the central government still retains a certain degree of control over the key 
sectors and core enterprises, local governments have gained substantial autonomy over 
local development strategies. lndeed, alongside an emerging state capitalist account of 
the close relations among central government departments, state-owned banks and the 
21 FuLI Text of Jiang Zemin's Report at the 16"' Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (18 November 2002) 
<http://english.people.eom.cn/2002 I 1/1 8/eng2002 I 118_106983.shtmJ>. 
22 { 'f'ij,A 13'.~.'fll OO:l'i':~ OO'A J1ii"'i2' » [Law of Enterprise State-owned Assets of the People's Republic of 
China] (People 's Republic of China) National People's Congress, 28 October 2008, art 4. 
23 Such as powers to appoint certain corporate executives, to collect dividends from central SOEs and to approve 
their budgets and major investment plans. 
24 Jean Oi, The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy' (1995) 144 The China Quarterly 1132, 
1132; Francis Schongen, "A Contextual View of Chinese Enterprise lntemationalisation ' in Ilan Alon et al (ed), 
China Rules: Globalization and Political Transfom,ation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) I 5. 
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large SOEs,25 there has been a growing body of literature documenting state-business 
cooperation at local levels. 26 In this literature, local officials have been perceived as 
standing 'at the forefront of establishing symbiotic interactions with private firms and 
undertaking direct developmental interventions' .27 This is despite the fact that strong 
local initiatives have at times tended to limit the reach of central government policies. 
This is particularly where the interests of local governments conflict with those of the 
central state. 28 In a less positive appraisal , Pei argued that the Chinese model has 
devolved from a developmental state to a 'decentralised predator state' , due to ever 
increasing decentralisation of state power coupled with rampant rent-seeking and 
corruption at local levels. 29 Furthermore, the diverse political, economic and cultural 
factors that shape the Chinese political economy at its central and local levels have led 
McNally to postulate the emergence of a hybrid form of capitalism in China. It 
combines state-led capitalist development from the top with ' network capitalism' 
(clusters of small businesses based on family or Guan.xi ties) in the Chinese fast 
growing private sector, but is also influenced by the world capitalist system represented 
by the US and Britain.30 
However, most of these alterative taxonomies outlined above do not contradict the 
leading role played by the central state in the overall Chinese economy. As McNally 
stated, '[u]nmistakably, China' s industrial capitalism remains heavily shaped by the 
hand of the state'. 31 Indeed, as will be shown in Chapter 9, local officials ' obsession 
with high local economic growth has, to a large extent, been generated by strong 
incentives provided by the central government. 
25 Larry Cata Backer, 'Sovereign investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State 
Owned Enterprises and the Chinese Experience' (2010) 19 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 3; 
Ronald Gilson and Curti s Milhaupt, 'Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies' 
(2011) 59 American Journal of Comparative law 227-288; Barry Naughton, 'China's Distincti ve System: Can it 
be a Model for Others?' (2010) 19 Journal of Contemporary China 437. 
26 A lex_ius A. Pereira, State Collaboration and development Strategies in China: The Case of China-Singapore 
Suzhou In dustrial Park (1992-2002) (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Andrew Walder, ' Local governments as 
Industrial Finns: An Organizational Analysis of China's Transitional Economy' ( 1995) 101 American Journal of 
Sociology 263; Jean Oi, above n 24; Jane Duckett, The Entrepreneurial State in China: Real Estate and 
Commerce Departments in Reform Era Tianjin (Routledge, 1998); Barbara Krug and Hans Hendrischke, 
' Framing China: Transformation and Institu tional Change th rough Co-evolution' (2008) 4 Management and 
Organization Review 81. 
27 Christopher A. McNally, 'The Institu tional Contours of China' s Emergent Capita lism' in Christopher A. 
McNally (ed) China 's Emergent Political Economy: Capitalism in the Dragon 's lair (Routledge, 2008) I 05, 11 8. 
28 Ibid 11 7-8. 
29 Pei, above n I, 132-3. 
JO McNally, above n 27, I 07-20. 
J I Ibid, 116. 
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2.2.2 Key features of the Chinese form of state capitalism 
Although all forms of state capitalism entail a leading role of the state in economic 
management and development, the Chinese form may be distinguished from the former 
post-war state-led economies in two important aspects. As Chapter 8 will illustrate, both 
aspects have shaped China' s legal and regulatory reforms of the governance of listed 
SOEs post-2005 . 
The first is the large size and scale of state ownership oflarge enterprises.32 According 
to Professor Wang Yong, Chinese SOEs serve three main functions . First, they have a 
monopoly over fundamental resources and key economic sectors on behalf of the state. 
Second, they help to channel large volumes of state investments upon which the 
economy relies for development. And third, they provide an important source of 
funding for various formal and informal operations of state bureaucracies. 33 
State ownership of enterprises was also present in some former post-war state-led 
economies such as France and Taiwan.34 The size and scale of state ownership in China 
is, however, unprecedented. Despite successive waves of corporatisation and 
diversification of state shares since the early 1990s, there were 144,700 state-owned or 
state-controlled enterprises ( excluding enterprises in the financial sector) in China by 
the end of 2011.35 SOEs, especially central SOEs, have continued to dominate sectors 
considered by the state as 'strategic' or 'pillar industries'. These include, but are not 
limited to, energy and resources, finance, telecommunications, transportation, 
machinery and information and technology.36 
32 Huang, above n 5, 278-81; 1~1X!f. [Zheng Yongnian], '001l-f-:tii:!lf1!trol 9' (r,J9'00t:il: 'i'I:' [The Chinese Model of 
Development : An International Perspective] (2009) 5 9' 00:i±~'M,$: Chinese Social Science 20; ~el' ii:, ~il!i!. 
[Zhao lingyun , Zhao Hongxing], above n 15; ,ti]½' [Liu Fang], above n 12, 56. 
33 Wang Yong, ' Progress on SO Es Means Answering Political Questions' Caixin Magazine (on line) (22 May 201 3) 
<http://english.caixin.com/20 13-05-22/ I 005 31336.html>. 
34 Neil and Fligstein and Jianjun Zhang, ' A New Agenda for Research on the Trajectory of Chinese Capitalism' 
(20 11 )7 Management and Organization Review 39, 51; McNally, above n 27, 116. 
35 3::JJi [Wang Yong], '00%-illt.¥'r 00 1fJblk~lj;.!j,lt)lif1'tl'/1ll. (r,Jtll.~· · [Report of the State Council on State-
owned Enterprises Reform and Development '] (Delivered at the 29'h Meeting of the National People' s Congress 
Standing Committee, 24 October 2012) <http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2012-10/26/content_ l 740994.htm>. 
36 According to a li st released by the State Counci l in 2006, seven sectors are considered as strateglcally important 
and therefore the state should maintain full or absolute control. These are defence, power generation and 
distribution, oil and petrochemical s, telecommunications, coal , av iation and shipping. Several other industries are 
designated as 'bas ic and pi llar industries' in which the state should maintain abso lute or re lati ve controlli ng stake. 
TI1ese industries, often considered as competitive businesses in the West, include: machinery, automobile, 
infonnation technology, construction, steel , basic metal s, chemicals, land surveying and research and 
development. See Mikael Mattlin , 'The Chinese Government's New Approach to Ownership and Financial 
Control of Strategic State-owned Enterprises' (Bank of Finland, Institute for Economics in Transition, BOFIT 
Discussion Paper No I 0/2007, October 2007) 16 <http://papers.ssm.co,n/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_ id~ I 001617>. 
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The dominance of state ownership is also reflected on the Chinese stock market. By the 
end of 2012, state-controlled companies accounted for 38.5 per cent of the around 1700 
companies listed on the Chinese stock market, and over 50 per cent of the total market 
capitalisation.37 A proportionally large listed company is more likely to be controlled by 
the state. In 20 12, the combined capitalisation of the Chinese top I 00 accounted for 
about 60 per cent of the total market capitalisation of all listed companies in China.38 
Eighty-four of these companies had the state, often in the form of a wholly state-owned 
parent SOE, as their largest shareholder.39 A list of China's top 100 listed companies in 
2012, ranked by market capitalisation, is at Appendix 2-1. 
There has been little sign of state withdrawal from large and strategic listed SOEs. This 
is despite that the new Chinese leadership has announced its intention to diversify 
ownership in wholly-stated owned enterprises. As noted in Chapter 1, at the Third 
Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013 , China' s new President Xi 
Jinping outlined the Party's vision for ' comprehensively deepening reforms' . 40 Xi 
pointed out that further reform should enable markets to play 'a decisive role' in 
allocation of resources (although the role of the government in microeconomic control 
should also be strengthened). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, in relation to the 
continuing refonn of the state sector, a number of market-oriented strategies have been 
announced by Xi. These include further promotion of the concentration of state-owned 
capital in 'major industries and key areas relating to national security and national 
economic lifelines ' 4 1 and encouraging 'mixed ownership ' in wholly state-owned 
enterprises (except those vital to 'national security') by introducing private investments. 
However, similar to his predecessor Hu Jintao, Xi stressed that public ownership should 
37 
'Jl,j~~ ' /Jot:lc:kl\!!ll,J:1£~j,$:J:.$zl,fx,' (SASAC: Speed up Full Listing of Large State-contro lled Entetpri ses), 
China Net News Story ( 11 January 201 3) <http://finance.china.com. cn/stock/zqyw/20130 111 /1 23 1788.shtml>. 
38 Protiviti and Chinese Academy of Social Science, (( 2 012 tpll,JJ:.$0'aJ-EB!ilf□"r!llvl'ifrlll:\!i)) [Cotporate 
Governance of Chinese top I 00 Chinese listed companies 20 I 2 Report] 2 <http://www.proti viti .com/zh-
CN/Pages/zh-CN-Cotporate-Governance-Assessmen I-Summary-Report-on-the-Top- I 00-Chi nese-Li sted-
Companies.aspx>. 
39 Ibid 11. 
40 (( tp:/!ctjo::i< ~'f:i:il.ililiHt i&;f:f5 T'lii:k (0],!lifr,Jl;ioi0 [Decision on Several Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening Refonns], adopted at the Third Plenum of the I 8'h Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party, 12 November 201 3 (' Decision on Deepening Refom1s' ). 
41 The principle of focus ing state-owned capital on 'major industries and key areas relating to nat ional securi ty and 
national economic lifelines' was first put forward by the Party in 1999. These industries include industries 
relating to national securi ty, natural monopoly industries, industries providing public products and services, pillar 
industries and key enterpri ses in high-and-new-technology industries. See (( $:Ile 'f' ;lc~'f ll,Jff :1£'1i'i&,f;fa:t;I: 
/l:f5'f.!l!:k(a],!li(I'"1Jc)E)) [Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communi st Party on Several 
Major Issues Concerning the Refonn and Development of State-owned Enteipri ses], Adopted at the Fourth 
Plenum of the I S'h Central Committee of the Chinese Communi st Party, 22 September 1999. 
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remain the mainstay of China's socialist market economy, and that the Party should 
' unwaveringly consolidate and develop the public sector' to 'enhance its vitality' and 
'capacity to leverage and influence the economy'. 42 These pronouncements are 
consistent with the Chinese 12th Five-year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development (2011-2015) which includes the following objectives: to improve the 
strength and quality of central SOEs and foster them into 'internationally competitive 
and world top class enterprises' .43 
Recent literature has also highlighted a second feature of the Chinese form of state 
capitalism that distinguishes China from the former Soviet style planning state. This is 
the remarkable ability of the Party-state to combine state power with market-based 
means to achieve policy goals. 44 Indeed, this feature has led Bremmer to define state 
capitalism as 'a system in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and 
uses markets primarily for political gain' .45 In his examination of the unique features of 
China's industrial system, Barry Naughton showed that: 
[t]he Chinese model ... combines two characteristics that are not normally regarded as 
bedfellows. Firstly, there is a ubiquitous (and pluralistic) state, which is highly active 
and involved in multifarious ways in the economy (and society). Secondly, there is a 
powerful commitment to the market and a very strong belief in competition.46 
The combination of state planning and market forces has been -viewed by many scholars 
as the greatest innovation of the 'China model' , as it bridges the divide between the 
state and market as two mutually exclusive spheres in neoliberal economics. 47 For 
many Chinese scholars, this flexible adaptability and creativity of 'the China model' 
finds its full expression in 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' .48 
42 
Decision on Deepening Refom1s, above n 40. Full text of Hu Jintao's Report at the I gth Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party ( 17 November 2012) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-
43 
I I/I 7/c_ 13198 I 259.htm>. 
((cp ije}\.fic:JUOOOOOl'ict:£/.i'f ,fOti¾~/lUf,-j·=-t-1:i)J:: Ji.W:\!J)i:flljll)) [Outline of the Twelfth Five-year Plan on 
National Economic and Social Development] , adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the I I •h National People's 
Congress, 16 March 2011. 
" Bremmer, Th e End of the Free Market, above n 3, 23 ; ')$,j("f: (Zheng Yongnian], above n 32; i/lc!i7-J [Zhang 
Weiwei], '~-t-i'lj-il!r(nt1)t/r , cpjl,] ffiJ'.t&;let;:@:.:X.' (2011) 6 IT/iJtiC'fiili Red Flag Manuscript 4, 6. 
45 Ian Bremmer, 'State Capitalism Comes of Age' (2009) 88 Foreign Affairs 40, 41. 
46 Martin Jacques, ' How China Will Change the Way We Think: The Case of the State' (Transatlantic Academy 
Paper Series, February 2011) 4 <http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/how-china-will-change-way-
we-thinkthe-casc-state>; Naughton, 'China's Distinctive System: Can it be a Model for Others?', above n 25. 
47 See, eg, Halper, above n 5, xiii; i/lclt:'15 [Zhang Jianjun], ''P~ffi'i'.t □{]ttltiiz'.m.lajJ.!11~B1)!/fr ' [The Transit ion 
Logic and TI1eoretical Innovation of the 'China Model'] (2008) IO t±¾t-'1-cJtli'<i% Social Science Front 82. 
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Some commentators also believe that this second feature of the Chinese economic 
model is built on China's unique political system, that is, an authoritarian but growth-
favouring government under the Party's leadership. 49 Zheng Yongnian argued that 
political systems serve different objectives in different countries. Rather than promoting 
democracy, the current political arrangements in China are geared towards maintaining 
social and economic conditions (such as social stability, the protection of property 
rights and social justice) necessary for economic reform and development. 5° For 
commentators such as Zhang Weiwei and Pan Wei, this system is deeply rooted in 
China's ancient history and the traditional Chinese preference for a strong government 
to guide national development and maintain social order. 51 As Chapters 6 and 7 will 
demonstrate, the remarkable ability of the Chinese state in combining state power with 
market forces has underlined China's post-2005 legal and regulatory reforms of 
corporate governance in listed SOEs. 
This chapter has so far considered the rise of state capitalism as a characterisation of the 
Chinese model of economic development. Chapter 8 will discuss the increasing 
challenges faced by China's policy makers in maintaining this model, due to 
globalisation of markets and the pluralisation of interests within Chinese society. As 
examined next, despite the proliferation of analytical approaches to Chinese corporate 
governance, a systemic and in-depth investigation of the law-and practice concerning 
the governance of listed SOEs from the perspective of comparative capitalism and 
institutional change has remained largely absent. 
2.3 Current research on corporate governance in China 
Despite its short history, 52 Chinese corporate governance, especially governance of 
listed SOEs, has generated enormous attention both within and outside the country. 
49 /i/1\it [Hu Jian], '$-ii'; cpft,JcpOOffiJ't , f'J ilti , !M'.¢.i:fll .il'i:5<.' [China Model in Debates: Contents, Characterist ics 
and Significance] (201 0) 6 t±¾W~ Social Science 3; 7-8; 'lc~7j(_ :qc [Zheng Yongnian] , ' 'P OO ffiJ't(t,)1$: ,1'., fd ti. 
?' (2010) 12 t±¾'l!il~ Socia/Observation 87, 88. 
50 
'lc~1X'F [Zheng Yongnian] , '00 f;j;;Jt)if1', Jai 'P ft,J 'P 00:ffiJ't' , above n 32, 22-23. 
51 ;,Ji: mT,J [Zhang Weiwei] , above n 44, 6-7; lll\ m [Pan wei) ' cpOOffiJ't- cp !J"t,j< iµ1J(t,j§£/J'fi!l(i'i,t±¾l!'Hfr' ['China 
Model ' : An analysis of the Chinese Economic, Political and Social System) (2009) 5 ~t:fr(:k~ 'POOEitt!J'HiJlti. 
cp,i',,liJl'Jt,J'll_ Research Reports of the Beijing Uni versity China and the World Centre, 5 
52 As will be further discussed in Chapter 4, China did not commence large scale corporatisation and li sting of 
SO Es until the early l 990s, and the concept of corporate governance was officially introduced into China only in 
1999 at the Fourth Plenum of the I 5th Party Congress. 
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Three main analytical approaches, which significantly overlap with each other, may be 
identified from a rapidly growing body ofliterature.53 
2.3.1 Agency theory of the firm-based analysis 
As the study of corporate governance is centrally concerned with whether a particular 
form of corporate governance would better promote company performance than other 
forms, economic theories of the firm have traditionally dominated comparative analysis 
of national systems of corporate govemance. 54 Two broad strands of scholarship have 
informed this analysis, namely, agency theory and transaction cost economics. 55 Of 
these two strands, agency theory has served as ' the dominant force in the theoretical 
understanding of corporate governance' around the world. 56 This is associated with the 
strong economic performance of the Anglo-American outsider-based model of 
corporate governance since the late 1990s. 
Agency theory was developed by Jensen and Meckling to address problems of corporate 
governance associated with separation of ownership and control, a widespread 
phenomenon in Anglo-American modem large corporations which was first observed 
by Berle and Means.57 The contractual theory of the firm views a company as a nexus 
of contracts among different resource holders such as investors and managers. 58 Jensen 
and Meckling extended this analysis by describing the r~lationship between the 
investors and managers as an agency relationship and articulating the motivational 
divergence between them. The self-seeking shareholders, as principals, incur agency 
53 Of course there are other approaches to the Chinese corporate governance. For example, in a recent study on 
Chinese corporate governance, Chen applied an institutional analysis by drawing upon new institutional 
economics. In doing so, she focused on the interaction between various governance mechanisms and its impact 
on corporate governance enforcement and the development of the stock market in China. See Ding Chen, 
Corporate Governance, Enforcement and Financial Development: The Chinese Experience (Edward Elgar, 
2013). 
54 Thomas Clarke, ' Introduction: Theories of Governance- Reconceptual ising Corporate Governance Theory after 
the Enron Experience' in Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical 
Foundations of Corporate Governance (Routledge, 2004) I, 7; Also see William Bratton and Joseph Macahery, 
' Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: the Case Against Global Cross-Reference ' 
(1999) 38 Columbia Journal of Transnmional Law 213, 235; Nei l Fligstein and Jennifer Choo, ' Law and 
Corporate Governance' (2005)1 Annual Review of law and Social Science 61 , 6. 
55 Roman Tomasic, Stephen Bottomley and Rob McQueen, Corporations law in Australian (the Federation Press, 
2"' ed, 2002) 56. 
56 Thomas Clarke, ' Introduction' above n 54 , 4; Also see Donald Clarke, 'Nothing But Wind? The Past and Future 
of Comparative Corporate Governance' (20 11 ) 59 American Journal of Comparative law 75 , 84. 
57 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modem C01poration and Private Property (Transaction Publishers, 1932); 
Michael C Jensen and William H. Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure' ( 1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305; Also see Eugene Fama, ' Agency Problems 
and the Theory of the Firm ' (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 228; Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, 
'Separation of Ownership and Control ' ( 1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 30 I. 
58 Jensen and Meckling, above n 57, 310-31. 
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costs in supervising the managers (agents) who, motivated by their own interests, may 
not always act in the best interests of the shareholders.59 The main task of corporate 
governance is therefore to minimise agency costs by providing mechanisms that can 
substitute for investor monitoring.60 Thus, a wide range of internal mechanisms (such as 
mandatory disclosure of information, independent directors and executive 
remuneration) have been suggested by various researchers to complement the external 
mechanisms (such as market for corporate control, labour market and outsider 
participation). 61 The rise of institutional investors since the late 1990s has also been 
seen as an important mechanism of corporate governance.62 
In addition to the agency problem between the shareholders and managers, recent 
agency analysis of corporate governance has discussed a second agency problem, 
namely the potential exploitation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. 
This agency problem has been referred to as the 'horizontal agency problem', in 
contrast to the 'vertical agency problem' between shareholders and managers. 63 The 
horizontal agency problem has been generally considered as more serious in companies 
with controlling shareholders. The shareholder in de facto control of the affairs of the 
company may extract private benefits of control through various means such as 
'tunnelling' at the expense of minority shareholders.64 
Adherents of agency analysis have generally regarded the Anglo-American outsider-
based model as a more effective one than the German-Japanese insider-based model 
(The main features of these two models will be discussed in Chapter 3). This is because 
the former provides mechanisms to resolve the vertical agency problem, while 
attempting to avoid the horizontal problem. 65 This is despite the fact that the two 
59 Ibid 313. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Roberta Romano, 'Corporate Law and Corporate Governance' (1996) 5 Industrial and Corporate Change 277, 
278; Tomasic, Bottomley and McQueen, above n 55 , 57-58. 
62 G.P. Stapleton, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Clarendon Press, 1996). 
63 Donald Clarke, ' the Ecology of Corporate Governance in China ' (GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 433; 
GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 433, 29 August 2008) 4 
<http://ssm.com/abstract= 1245803,4>; Mark J. Roe, 'The Institutions of Corporate Governance' (Harvard 
University, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No. 488, Aug. 2004) 2-3 
<http://ssm.com/abstract=6 I 2362>. 
64 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Si lanes, Andrei Sh lei fer, 'Corporate Ownership Around the World ' 1999 
(54) Journal of Finance 7 1; Simon Johnson et al, 'Tu1melling' (2000) 90 American Economic Review 22; 
Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, ' Private Benefits of Control : An International Comparison' (2004) 59 
Journal of Finance 537; Mara Faccio, Larry H.P. Lang and Lesli e Young, ' Dividends and Expropriation ' (2001) 
91 American Economic Review 54, 55. 
65 Alan Dignam and Michael Galanis, Th e Globa/iza1ion ofCorpora/e Governance (Ashgate, 2009) 46. 
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models, as proponents of transaction cost economics argue, function according to 
different principles. While the Anglo-American model has prioritised the agency 
problem, the Gennan-Japanese insider-based systems tend to focus on the reduction of 
transaction costs through building long term and stable intra and inter-firm relations.66 
The enlarged agency problems associated with state ownership of companies have also 
been well documented in the literature. Certain arguments identify the positive aspects 
of the state as a dominant shareholder. For example, a 'publicly spirited' bureaucrat 
may take a more long-term view about the development of enterprises with state 
investment.67 Therefore, it may improve the efficiency of the enterprises by controlling 
their decision-making. State-owned or controlled enterprises are, however, generally 
regarded as less efficient than their private sector counterparts in the Anglo-American 
literature. 68 This has partly been attributed to the 'complex chain of agents 
(management, board, ownership entities, ministries, the government)' , coupled with the 
passive and absentee ultimate owners (the whole people). 69 The incentives for the 
government to monitor SOEs are seen as 'uncertain', since unlike an individual, the 
whole people (as the principal) are unable to write an explicit contract with the 
government (as the agent) to align their interests.7° Furthermore, the multiple objectives 
of the state may allow non-profit maximising considerations to continue to be a factor 
when company decisions are made. 71 
Within the broad agency theory of the firm-based analysis, the law and finance analysis 
(the 'law matters thesis'), represented by the work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV), has been highly influential. 72 While recognising the 
66 Karl Kestrel , ' American and Japanese Corporate Governance: Convergence to Best Practice?' in Suzanne Berger 
and Ronald Dore (eds), National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 1996) 107, 108; 
Peter Gourevitch, 'Corporate Governance: Global Markets, National Politics' in Mi les Kahler and David A. Lake 
(eds), Governance in a Global Economy (Princeton University Press, 2003)305 , 308-9. 
67 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ' A Survey of Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 737, 
767. 
68 Ibid~ Roman Tomasic and Jenny Jian Rong Fu, 'Government-owned Companies and Corporate Governance in 
Australian and China: Beyond Fragmented Governance' (2006) 3 Corporate Ownership and Control 123-4. 
69 OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Ente1prises (2005) , Preamble, 10. 
70 Andrew Yuen and An ming Zhang, 'An Economic Perspective on Recent Corporate Governance Developments in 
China with Comments on Chapters by Yang, Gu and Wang ', in Masao Nakamura (ed), Changing Corporate 
Governance Practices in China and Japan: Adaptations of Anglo-American Practices (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008) 63, 73. 
71 Michael Whincop, Co,porate Governance in Government Corporations (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2005) 7-
11 ; Ross Grantham, 'The Governance of Government Owned Corporations' (2005) 23 Companies and Securities 
LawJournal 181, 189-91. 
72 See, eg, Rafael La Porta et al, 'Legal Determinants of External Finance' ( 1997)52 Journal of Finance 11 31; 
Rafael La Porta et al , ' Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economics 
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agency problem between shareholders and managers, the law matters thesis places the 
role of law at the centre of solutions to that problem. LLSV assert that legal protection 
for investors, which includes not only the law and regulations in the books but also the 
quality of their enforcement, plays a central role in understanding the variation in 
ownership concentration as an important aspect of corporate governance in different 
countries. 73 Based on this rationale, the authors recommend countries with poor investor 
protection to move into a more protective regime (namely, the common law system) 
through legal (which requires the introduction of radical legal changes) or functional 
convergence (by, for example, liberalisation of domestic capital market). 74 LLSV's law 
and finance analysis has not only reinforced the superiority of the Anglo-American 
outsider-based model in world systems of corporate governance, but also played a 
pivotal role in driving various law and economic development programs carried out by 
international financial institutions (for example, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund) towards developing countries. 75 
Transaction cost economics has been employed in some studies on the governance of 
SOEs. For example, Keister adopted this approach in her study of 40 largest business 
groups in China and found a positive correlation between financial performance of 
group member firms and group formation, intra-group finance and exchange 
networks. 76 However, due in part to the popularity of the outsider-based governance 
model (and the associated agency-based analysis) among Chinese researchers as 
di scussed next, transition costs economics has never become influential in corporate 
governance studies in China.77 
Many scholars favouring agency-based analysis have been associated with international 
economic organisations and financial institutions. Apparently, in prodding China to 
move towards the outsider-based model, these institutions have incorporated the "good 
3; Rafael La Porta et al, ' Law and Finance' ( 1998) I 06 Journal of political Economy 11 13; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Si lanes and Sh lei fer, above n 64. 
73 La Porta et al , 'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance', above n 72, 5. 
74 Ibid 20-23; For the distinction between legal and functional convergence, see Joh n Coffee, 'The future as 
History: the Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications' (1999) 93 
Northwest University Law Review 631 
75 Curtis Milhaupt and Katherine Pistor, law and Capiwlism: What Corporate Crisis Reveal about Legal systems 
and Economic Development around the World (Chicago University Press, 2008) 20. 
76 Lisa Keister, Chinese Business Groups: The Structure and Impact of lnrerfinn Relations during Economic 
Development (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
77 Jian Chen, Co,porate Governance in China (RoutledgeCurzon, 2005) 22. 
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governance" agenda into their organisational agendas. 78 Various aspects of corporate 
governance in listed SO Es, such as shareholding structure, board of directors, corporate 
disclosure and the regulation of capital market, have been analysed, or more 
specifically, critiqued by researchers from the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD),79 the World Bank,80 the International Institute of Finance 
(IIF)8 1 and international credit rating agencies such as Standard and Poor's.82 
Agency-based analysis has also been adopted by many other researchers from Anglo-
American countries and Chinese scholars subscribing to the outsider-based model.83 To 
these researchers, the adoption of this model would be a natural consequence of the 
advent of market-oriented reforms in China that began in the late 1970s. 
For example, focusing on the agency problems associated with the state as a 
shareholder, many researchers have regarded state retaining the controlling 
shareholdings in listed companies as a major obstacle for China to achieve international 
standard of good corporate governance. For these researchers, state involvement in 
companies seems to lead to various problems, such as the lack of board independence 
and accountability, poor disclosure and transparency and weak protection for outsider 
shareholders.84 There is also a sizable law and finance analysis, preoccupied with how 
78 Jude Howell, ' Reflections on the Chinese State' (2006) 37 Development and Change 273 , 277. 
79 The OECD has been engaged in a policy dialogue on corporate governance with the Chinese government. For 
more infonnat ion on the dialogue see OECD website, 
<http: //www.oecd.org/document/6 l/02340,en_2649 _34813 _349708 13_ 1 _ 1_ 1 _ 1,00.html>. 
so Stoyan Tenev and Chunlin Zhang with Loup Brefort, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: 
Building the Institutions of Modern Markets (The World Bank, 2002); The World Bank, China 's Management of 
Enterprise Assets: The State as Shareholder (The World Bank, 1997). 
81 Lnstitute of International Finance, Task Force Report Corporate Governance in China: An Investor Perspective 
(March 2006) <www. iif.com/download. php?id= lmgJLeELuYo=>. 
82 Katrina Tai and Calvin R Wong, 'Standard and Poor's 2003 Country Governance Study: Corporate Governance 
in China' <http://icf.some.yale.edu/researchfchinalnewpaper/cn/feature/mainland/corporate>. 
83 See, eg, Jian Chen, above n 77; Donald Clarke, 'Corporate governance in China: an review' (2003) 14 China 
Economic Review 494; Shanghai Stock Exchange, China Corporate Governance Report 2003: Executive 
Summary <edu.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/researchlbooks/books20030601 c.pdf>; Qiang Qu, 'Corporate 
Governance and State-owned Shares '(2003) 14 Journal of Asian Economies 771 ; Xiao Nian Xu and Yan Wang, 
'Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies' ( 1999) IO China Economic 
Review 75; Ma Zhong and Cai Lin, 'The Ownership Structure and In ternal Capital Market in Chinese Business 
Group Affiliation of Listed Corporations' (2004) 17 Australian Joumal of Corporate law 33; Jin-qian Qiu, 
'Corporate Governance in China: from the Protection of Minority Shareholder Perspective ' (2006) 2 Corporate 
Governance Law Review 311; Yingyi Qi an, 'Government Control in Corporate Governance as a Transitional 
lnstitucion: Lessons from China', In Joseph Stigl itz and Shahid Yusuf (eds), Rethinking the East Asian Miracle 
(Oxford University Press, 200 I) 295 . 
84 For example, in China Corporate Governance Report 2003: Executive Summary, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
noted that controllers of Chinese listed companies were 'governed by political incentives and individual utility 
maximization instead of shareholders' value'. See Shanghai Stock Exchange, China Corporate Governance 
Report 2003: Executive Summary, above n 83 ; See also Donald Clarke, 'The Independent Director in Chinese 
Corporate Governance' (2006) 31 Delaware Jou ma I of Corporate law 125, 143; Jian Chen, above n 77, 26, 148; 
Institute of international Finance, above n 8 1. 
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to improve different aspects of the Chinese systems of corporate law and corporate 
governance, by drawing upon experience of Anglo-American countries, primarily the 
us_ss 
Not surprisingly, the assessment of corporate governance in China through the lens of 
agency theory has led to various reform recommendations based on governance 
mechanisms of the outsider-based model, including withdrawing the influence of the 
state from companies. For example, in a 2002 assessment of China's progress in 
corporate governance and enterprise reform, three World Bank economists urged 
Chinese policy makers to address the agency costs of government ownership through, 
among other means, separating government control rights from cash flow rights (for 
example by allowing private, including foreign, institutional investors to manage listed 
state shares) and reducing state ownership (such as by fostering institutional 
investment). Consistent with the outsider-based model , other recommendations of the 
World Bank included establishing credible penalties for failure through strengthening 
the enterprise bankruptcy system, delisting and hostile takeover laws, promoting board 
independence, professionalising corporate directors, empowering shareholders 
(including institutional shareholders) and developing capital markets that reward good 
corporate governance.86 The IIF has also recommended withdrawal of the state from 
companies. For example, the IIF stated in its 2006 evaluation of Chinese corporate 
governance: 
The government 's recent steps to improve corporate governance, important as they are, 
do not provide a long term solution for the major corporate governance problems in 
China. To bring about real effective change, it is necessary that the government reduce 
its role and influence in Chinese companies.87 
Some agency theorists do recognise a continued role for the state in Chinese corporate 
governance. In doing so, they stress that the legal and market institutions are 
underdeveloped in China, which may undermine the effective functioning of Anglo-
American market-based mechanisms of corporate governance. These deficiencies 
85 See, eg, Jian Chen, above n 77; Hui Huang, 'the Statutory Derivat ive Action in China: Critical Analys is and 
Recommendations for Reform ' (2007) 4 Berkeley Business Law Journal 227; S. H. Goo and Anne Carver, ' Low 
Structure, High Ambiguity: Selective Adaptation of International Norms of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
in China', in Masao Nakamura (ed), Changing Corporate Governance Practices in China and Japan (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) 206. 
86 Tenev and Zhang with Brefort, above n 80, 127-60. 
87 institute of lnternat-ional Finance, above n 8 1, 3-4. 
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therefore require state involvement as a ' second-best response ' .88 For example, rejecting 
a wholesale transplantation of the outsider-based model of corporate governance into 
China, Tam proposed a ' self-enforcing model' that seeks to empower various corporate 
organs and actors, including the state, in the governance oflisted SOEs.89 
However, these researchers generally consider that state involvement in companies 
should be confined to a shareholder role, thereby supporting the 'withdrawal of the 
state' view.90 This view is also reflected in the OECD Guidelines on the Corporate 
Governance of State-owned Enterprises .91 The Guidelines, while encouraging the state 
to act as ' an informed and active owner', 92 call for 'a clear separation between the 
state's ownership function and other state function s that may influence the conditions 
for state-owned enterprises, particularly market regulation. ' 93 
2.3.2 Path dependence analysis 
Given the distinctiveness of China 's historical and institutional background, path 
dependence analysis has also been a popular approach to the study of various aspects of 
Chinese corporate governance, ranging from corporate disclosure, 94 board 
governance,95 corporate and stock market regulation,96 to the impact of overseas listing 
on the governance practices in Chinese SOEs.97 
Path dependence analysis has been associated with a longstanding debate over the 
convergence or divergence of national systems of corporate governance. The rise to 
prominence of the Anglo-American outsider-based model in the 1990s generated a 
widespread prediction that national systems of corporate governance would converge 
into one single most efficient model , namely, the outsider-based model as the ' standard 
88 See, eg, Qian, above n 83, 299. Cindy A. Schipani and Junhai Liu, 'Corporate Governance in China, then and 
now' (2002) Columbia Business Law Review 1, 28-32; Katharina Pi stor and Chenggang Xu, 'Governing 
Emerging Stock Markets: Legal vs Administrative Governance' (2005) 13 Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 5,6; On kit Tam, Th e Development of Corporate Governance in Ch ina (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, I 999) 97. 
89 Tam, above n 88. 
90 Ibid I 04; Schipani and Liu, above n 88. 
91 OECD Guidelines on the Co,porate Governance of State-owned Enterprises (2005). 
92 Ibid 5. 
93 Ibid 4. 
94 Jane Fu, Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Governance in China (Wolters Kluwer, 2010). 
95 Angus Young, Grace Li , and Alex Lau, 'Corporate Governance in China: The Role of the State and Ideology in 
Shaping Reforms' (2007) 28 77,e Company u,wyer 204. 
96 Chenxia Shi , Political Detem1inants of Corporate Governance in China (Routledge, 2012). 
97 Alice De Jonge, Corporate Governance and Chino 's H-Share Market (Edward Elgar, 2008). 
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model'. 98 The convergence theory is, however, in doubt, after the high profile corporate 
collapses and scandals (for example, Enron and WorldCom) in the US during the early 
2000s, 99 and the more recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) which exposed many 
failures of outsider-based systems. 100 
Nevertheless, the convergence theory has been significantly enriched by a debate about 
the analytical approaches to comparative corporate governance studies. Chief among 
these is path dependence analysis that has served as the dominant theoretical foundation 
for the divergence thesis. The notion of path dependence 101 was first introduced into 
comparative corporate law research by Roe, who argued that, instead of simply being 
determined by market forces, a country's system of corporate governance is shaped by 
the system it had in place at earlier times. 102 In other words, history matters. 103 In his 
later work with Bebchuk, the two authors focused on the self-reinforcing effects of two 
main factors for path dependence, namely, corporate ownership structures and corporate 
rules of a given country. 104 These authors, however, did acknowledge some other 
elements for path dependence, such as differences in economic and market conditions, 
culture and political ideology. These factors were not considered to be 'rooted in path 
dependence,' but they could 'set up the initial conditions' for path dependence. 105 
Following Bebchuk and Roe, other factors that may engen_der path dependence m 
corporate governance have also been identified. These have included politics, 106 
98 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakrnan, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (200 I) 89 Georgerown law 
Journal 439, 443 ; Brian Cheffins, 'Corporate Governance: Lesson s from Australia ' (2002) 16 The Transnational 
lawyer 13, 16; Thomas Clarke, ' Introduction: l11eories ofGovernance-Reconceptualising Corporate Governance 
Theory after the Enron Experience', above n 54, I I; Dignam and Galanis, above n 65, 45-47. 
99 Thomas Clarke, ' Introduction ', above n 54, 14. 
100 Roman Tomasic and Folarin Akinbami 'Towards a New Corporate Governance after the Global Financial Crisis' 
201 I (22) International Company and Commercial Law Review 237; Roman Tomasic, ' Looking at Corporate 
Governance in China 's Large Companies: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?' in Guanghua Yu (ed), The 
Development of the Chinese Legal System Change and Challenges (Routledge, 2010) 182, 192. 
10 1 The notion of path dependence was seen by Farrar as 'to some extent an application to law and economic 
phenomena of a metaphor taken from mathematics, physics and biological science'. John Farrar, Corporate 
Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2004) 462. 
wi Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton 
University Press, 1996) 275-81. 
103 Reinhard Schmidt and Gerald Spindler, ' Path Dependence and Complementarity in Corporate Governance ', in 
Jeffrey Gordon and Mark J. Roe (eds), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 114, 114. 
'
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in Jeffrey N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe (eds), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 69. 
'°' Ibid 109. 
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37 
culture, 107 legal systems, 108 and industrial organisation. I09 The categories do not seem to 
be closed. Perhaps for that reason, studies focusing on the influence of wider social, 
political and cultural institutions on corporate governance, including the interest groups 
politics approach to be discussed later, have often been treated as path dependence 
analysis. 110 
Researchers that apply path dependence analysis to the study of Chinese corporate 
governance, while often conscious of the various advantages of the outsider-based 
model , tend to focus on elements in the Chinese indigenous conditions that prevent the 
country from fully embracing that model. 111 According to various authors, these 
obstacles include China's socialist ideology, 112 the legacy of its former Soviet-style 
planned economy, 113 inadequate institutions involved in the enforcement of corporate 
governance rules 114 and the Chinese collectivist cultural traditions including the 
'traditional Chinese view of the corporation as a kinship group' .11 5 
Politics, particularly the Chinese Party-state's reluctance to relinquish its power over 
large companies, has featured strongly in this analysis. 116 For example, linking the 
Chinese institutional capacity to the common complaints about the lack of enforcement 
of corporate governance rules in China, Clarke examined the roles played by various 
state-based and non-stated-based institutions such as the ChiDa Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), the stock exchanges, the accounting and legal professions and the 
financial media. The examination led him to conclude that ' the state for political 
10
' Amir N. Licht, 'The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems' (200 I) 26 Delaware Journal of Corporate law 147,147. 
108 Bernard S. Black, 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets' 2001 (48) UCLA 
law Review 781. 
'
0
' Ronald Gilson, ' Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do In stitutions Matter?' I 996 (74) 
Washington University law Quarterly 327, 334-5. 
11 0 Licht,aboven 107, 162-3 
111 See, eg, Jane Fu, above n 94, 305-9. 
112 Chao Xi, Corporate Governance and l egal Reform in China (Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing, 2009) 14- 15, 
34. 
113 Aron Viner, 'Corporate Governance in China', in Joseph CF Lufkin (ed), international Corporate Governance: 
Strategic Action Plans/or Management and Investors (Euromoney Books, 2003) 137, 153-4. 
11 4 For a discussion of these institutions, see Donald Clarke, 'The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China,' 
above n 63 , 15-55. 
115 Ruskola Teemu , 'Conceptuali zing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a 
Chinese Perspective' in (2000) 52 Stanford law Review 1599, 1599. 
11 6 Peter A Gourevitch and James Shinn , Political Power and Corporate Control (Princeton University Press, 
2007)192-9; De Jonge, above n 97, 12-13; Viner described Chinese corporate governance as 'birdcage corporate 
governance', referring to the state's continuing control of the development of the financial markets and market 
economy in China. See Viner, above n 113. 
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reasons prefers to leave enforcement to state regulatory bodies ' .11 7 Unfortunately, the 
enforcement by these state regulatory bodies has not been strong. This is, in part, due to 
various limitations suffered by these bodies such as the dual role of the CSRC as a 
regulator and market promoter, and the lack of independence of the courts from local 
governments. On the other hand, according to Clarke, China's ' repression of civil 
society institutions is so severe that even a modest relaxation could have substantial 
benefits'. 118 Furthermore, the adoption of path dependence analysis has led Shi to 
observe little change to the pervasive role played by the state in the development of 
corporate legislation and regulation of the stock market. As Shi stated, 'the social, 
economic and, particularly, political conditions under which Chinese corporate 
governance evolves offer little support for the prospect of full convergence within 
international models and practices' .119 
2.3.3 The interest group politics approach 
With China's rapid economic development and the pluralisation of interests both within 
and outside the state bureaucracies, a third approach, namely, the political, or interest 
group politics approach, has been adopted by commentators such as Xi. 120 Political 
analysis of corporate governance began with William Cary 12 1 and was developed by 
Romano, 122 Roe 123 and Gourevitch and Shinn. 124 Often treated as a subset of path 
dependence analysis, the political approach has, nevertheless,- provided some distinct 
analytical frames of its own. 
Researchers in the politics school have generally adopted an interest groups politics 
approach in their analysis of the attributes of politics and how it works to shape share 
ownership structure, as a central component of corporate governance. For example, Roe 
focused on class conflict between capital and labour (i.e. shareholders and employees) 
and the role of ' social democracy', meaning 'employee pressures ', in the settlement of 
117 Donald Clarke, 'The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China,' above n 63, Abstract. 
11 8 Ibid. 
11 9 Shi, above n 96, 19. The tension between central and local governments' powers over businesses fonned part of 
Alice De Jonge 's analysis of corporate governance of the first nine main land companies listed in Hong Kong. See 
De Jonge, above n 97. 
12° Chao Xi, above n 112, 187-9. 
121 William L. Cary, ' Federalism and Corporate Law: Refleccions upon Delaware' 1974 (83) Yale law Journal 663 ; 
Licht, above n 107 , 161. 
122 Roberta Romano, 'The Policical Economy of Takeover Staru tes ' 1987 (73) Virginia law Review 11 1. 
123 Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance, above n I 06. 
124 Peter A Gourevitch and James Shinn , Political Power and Corporate Control (Princeton Uni versity Press, 2007). 
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that conflict. 125 He found that countries with strong democracy tend to be associated 
with concentrated share ownership or the vice versa, diffused ownership. 126 Roe's 
political analysis has been taken on by Gourevitch and Shinn whose conceptualisation 
of interest group politics is far more complex and dynamic.127 While Roe focused his 
political explanation on the share ownership structure in major industrialised countries, 
Gourevitch and Shinn sought to test their model against corporate governance in a 
larger number of countries including developing countries such as China. 
Focusing on the legal reform of board governance in Chinese listed companies, Xi 
argues that the formulation of the relevant provisions in the 2005 Company Law has 
been shaped by the interplay between socialist ideology and dynamics of interest group 
politics. The latter involve parities such as the controlling shareholders, senior 
managers, independent directors, members of the supervisory board and the workers ' 
union. Taking the system of independent directors as an example, the initial version of 
the draft rules, mirroring relevant CSRC guidelines, was far more detailed and 
rigorous. 128 These draft provisions were, however, removed and replaced by a broadly 
worded article in the new Company Law that defers the power of the legislature to 
formulate more detailed rules in the area to the central government. 129 This was 
attributed by Xi to the battle of interest group interests, particularly strong opposition 
from powerful actors such as SASAC, and leaders of large SOEs. 130 The interest group 
politics approach has also been employed by Xi in his analysis of the transplantation of 
the Anglo-American doctrine of 'piercing the corporate veil ' into the 2005 Company 
L 131 aw. 
125 Roe, above n I 06, 24. 
126 This is because in strong social democracies, managers are pressed to unite with employees instead of 
shareholders. Shareholders have to seek other means to control managers, resulting in concentrated share 
ownership. See Roe, above n I 06, 8. 
127 Unlike Roe who focused on only one viable, namely, labour power, and two players, owners and managers, 
Gourevitcb and Shinn saw politics as entailing both political institutions and interest groups inc1uding owners, 
labours, as well as managers as a group in its own right. Interest groups advocate policies that promote their 
interests. In doing so, they may form different coalitional lineups along different cleavages such as class conflict 
and sectoral models. Political institutions then aggregate preferences or interests of the winning coalitions into 
policy outcomes, which in tum shape incentives leading to the ultimate structure in corporate governance system. 
SeeGourevitcb and Shinn, aboven 124, 15-16. 
128 {:¥-:'t'ttJ:1Ti0EJ,t:,'zj.<Jtfz::i:'!l'ili'J/Jl't¥Jf,j-'if~J),1,)) [Guidelines for the Introduction of Independent Directors 
into Listed Companies] (People's Republic of China) China Securities Regulatory Commission, 16 August 2001 . 
129 {cj,$}dc1o~;f!l§l0E]i't} [Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (People's Republic of China) 
National People's Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2005, art 123. 
130 Xi, above n 112, 204-7. 
"' Chao Xi, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: How did We get There?' (20 11) 5 Journal of Business Law 413 
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The three approaches to the analysis of Chinese corporate governance discussed above 
have offered many valid and useful interpretations of the role of the state in corporate 
governance in China. Agency analysis highlights the fact that the very notion of 
corporate governance was borrowed from the Western advanced market economies, 
especially the US and the UK. The path dependence and the interest group politics 
approaches illuminate the multiple indigenous factors that shape the evolution of 
Chinese corporate governance, as the country shifted from a fonner Soviet-style 
command system towards a more market-oriented one. 
However, these three approaches have one significant limitation. An important 
determinant of corporate governance, namely, the Chinese form of state-led economic 
development, appears to be missing in all three approaches. By presupposing 
shareholder-oriented benefits as the sole objective of corporate governance, agency 
analysis overlooks the diverse functions served by corporate governance in different 
economic models. 132 As illustrated in Chapter 3, national systems of corporate 
governance cannot be separated from their economic systems. The post-war French and 
Japanese corporatist systems during the 1950s to the 1980s have demonstrated that large 
businesses may be vital tools of the state for economic development. Indeed, agency 
analysis has already encountered difficulty in interpreting corporate governance in 
China. As the review of the literature on the Chinese form of state capitalism in section 
2.2 suggested, the 'withdrawal of the state from enterprises' type of advice, offered by 
many Anglo-American researchers, seems to be at odds with the increased rather than 
loosened state-business ties in China over the past few years. 
On the other hand, while path dependence analysis helps explain the persistence of state 
control of large companies, this historical and political ideological-oriented approach 
appears to have downplayed a rather proactive and innovative aspect of the role played 
by the state in Chinese economic and enterprise refonns. As also discussed in Chapter 
2.2, this aspect is an important feature of the Chinese form of state capitalism. 
Similarly, this aspect of the role of the state has also been buried in Xi ' s interest group 
politics approach to the Chinese corporate governance. In his analysis, the various 
actors in Chinese corporate governance are autonomous and discrete elements which 
interact with each other in the policy making process on the basis of self-interest. 
132 Gordon Redding, 'The Conditional Relevance of Corporate Governance Advice in the Context of Asian Business 
Systems' in Thomas Clarke and Marie Dela Rama (eds), Co rporate Governance and Globalisation (Sage 
Publications, 2006) Vol 2, 98, 102. 
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2.3.4 State capitalism and institutional change as an alternative approach 
Outside these three main approaches to the Chinese corporate governance, an emerging 
body of studies has, either implied or explicitly, linked aspects of corporate governance 
in listed SOEs with the Chinese state-led economic development. As discussed below, 
while these studies have provided some inspirations, or lent support, to the analytical 
approach employed in this thesis, they are not without limitations, due in part to their 
piecemeal nature. 
Within this small body of literature, Milhaupt and Pistor' s characterisation of the 
Chinese corporate governance has provided some insights for this research. In their 
2008 book Law and Capitalism, 133 Milhaupt and Pistor used the Chinese government 
and the parent company' s involvement in the collapse of China Aviation Oil (CAO, a 
Hong Kong-listed company) as one of their country case studies to illustrate a larger 
theme. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this is the role of the state in the interaction 
between changes in law, as a particular type of institution, and economic changes. In 
doing so, the authors argued that Chinese corporate governance ' can be best described 
as an administrative model' 134 Hence, consistent with the role of law in China as an 
instrument of state control and coordination of the economy and society, 135 corporate 
governance 'perforrn[s] mainly coordinating functions ' .136 In other words, unlike the 
investor protection function served by corporate governance in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions, this model is primarily a tool of the state (and state holding companies) for 
coordination of interests among favoured groups (such as state bureaucracies, 
enterprises, and foreign institutional investors) while holding the rights of outsider 
shareholders in check. 137 According to Milhaupt and Pistor, this model resembles 
corporate governance in some East Asian former state-led economies, such as South 
Korea. 138 The need to attract foreign investors and to improve the governance in 
Chinese companies has prompted the government to adopt more shareholder protection-
oriented rules. This, however, did not alter the primary function served by corporate 
133 Milhaupt and Pistor, above n 75. As will be explained in Chapter 3, the term 'state capitalism' is not used by the 
authors but can be impl ied. 
134 Ibid 139. 
135 Ibid 144. 
136 Ibid 139. 
13 7 Ibid 139, 147. 
138 Ibid 147. 
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governance.139 As the authors concluded, ' [p]lainly, the protective function of law is 
still a work in progress in China' .140 
Milhaupt and Pistor's characterisation of Chinese corporate governance as ' the 
administrative model ', as well as their interpretation of the role of the state in the 
interaction between legal and economic changes in state-led systems, was instrumental 
to the formulation of the analytical framework for this research. Nevertheless, their 
study has some limitations. The limitations of their analysis of the role of the state in 
legal changes will be discussed in Chapter 3. In relation to corporate governance, their 
study of the CAO' s case has not provided a full account of the evolution of China' s 
state-led corporate governance with socioeconomic changes over the past few years. 
Firstly, with a strong emphasis on the impact of the interaction between state power and 
economic changes on the development of the law and practice concerning state 
( controlling shareholder)-manager relations and investor protection in listed SO Es, the 
authors have overlooked non-shareholder stakeholder protection, as a third set of 
company relations central to the former state-led model of corporate governance. This 
limitation may have been contributed by the methodology adopted by the authors. A 
single case study on Chinese corporate governance obviously limits the range of issues 
that could be dealt with. Secondly, the 'administrative model ' was posited by Milhaupt 
and Pistor based on Chinese corporate governance law and practice up until 2006. As 
Chapters 6 to 8 wi ll illustrate, significant changes in international and domestic 
environments have since taken place, and led to further reforms of corporate 
governance in China. 
Some other more recent studies have also lent support to a state capitalism perspective 
to the governance of Chinese listed SO Es. First, in a working paper entitled ' We are the 
(National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China' , 
Lin and Milhaupt sought to unpack the 'institutional ecology' of central SOEs, seen by 
the authors as the 'full expression of state capitalism in China' .141 In doing so, Lin and 
Milhaupt provided a detailed account of the intra-group structures of central SO Es and 
the various mechanisms that tie these large groups to SASAC as their ultimate 
controller. 
139 ibidl44, 187-8. 
140 Ibid 144. 
141 Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt, ' We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State 
Capitalism in China ' (Columbia Law school Working Paper No.409, I November 2011) 5 
<http://ssm.com/abstract= 1952623>. 
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Also, the links between China's state-led economic development and Chinese central 
and local governments' recent efforts on promoting corporate social responsibility have 
been considered by Ho and Lin. 142 In an article published by Ho in 2013 , she 
distinguished between the state-centric model of corporate social responsibility in China 
from a market-driven (which prevails in the US), and a relational approach (represented 
by Germany and other Western European countries) in Western economies. ln the 
market-driven model, companies' impetus for advancing corporate social responsibility 
is mainly derived from market forces, civil society and business self-regulation. 
Therefore, beyond traditional regulatory spheres, the governments, at both national and 
local levels, tend to play an indirect role through leading by example and adopting 
collaborative programs that encourage corporate commitment to social responsibility.143 
Compared to the market-driven model, the relational model attaches more importance to 
state partnership with businesses and non-government organisations in formulating and 
implementing shared policy agendas. 144 Yet, a similarity shared by the two models is a 
strong direct role played by market forces, civil society and business self-regulation in 
promoting corporate social responsibility.145 This feature, according to Ho, stands as a 
sharp contrast to the Chinese state-centric model in which the state plays a dominant 
role in the formulation and implementation ofrelevant policy, rules and guidelines. 146 
By highlighting the relationship between the Chinese form- of state-led economic 
development and state-led corporate governance, these more recent studies shed further 
light on a state capitalism approach to Chinese corporate governance. However, these 
studies have their own limitations. While the analysis of this theoretical foundation is 
quite thin (With respect to Lin and Milhaupt's and Ho ' s studies, there is no more than a 
reference to state capitalism), each of these three studies has focused on particular 
aspect of corporate governance in listed SOEs in China. While Lin and Milhaupt 's work 
focused on state-manager relations in central SOEs, Ho' s and Lin 's articles solely 
concern corporate social responsibility. Therefore, none of these studies has offered a 
full account of the law and practice concerning all three sets of relations (state-manager 
142 Virginia Harper Ho, ' Beyond Regulation: A Comparati ve Look at State-Centric Corporate Social Responsibili ty 
& the Law in China ' (2013) 46 Vanderbilt Journal of TransnaLional Law 375; Li-Wen Lin , 'Corporate Social 
Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Structural Change?' (20 I 0) 28Berke/ey Journal of International 
Law 64. 
143 Ho, above n 142, 388-9 I. 
144 Ibid 391-5. 
145 Ibid 425-6. 
146 Ibid 424-5. 
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relations, investor protection and non-shareholder stakeholder protection) in Chinese 
listed SOEs, let alone the impact of the interaction between state power and growing 
international and domestic pressures for change on the evolution of those relations. 
Indeed, as Chapter 8 will illustrate, these forces had become particularly pressing in the 
lead up to the 2005 corporate law reforms. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the need for a state capitalism and institutional approach to 
the governance of Chinese listed SOEs by identifying the gap between two important 
strands of literature on China, namely, the Chinese form of economic development, and 
Chinese corporate governance. Despite China being increasingly labelled as state 
capitalism, this trend in political economic literature has been significantly under-
represented in studies on Chinese corporate governance. None of the main analytical 
approaches adopted in the literature has contextualised the governance of listed SOEs 
within the Chinese state-led economic development model. 
This chapter has also shown that a linkage between these two spheres has been reflected 
in a small number of studies on Chinese corporate governance. These few studies, 
however, suffer from a number of limitations due to their piecemeal nature. In addition 
to insufficient analysis of the theoretical foundation, they have focused on particular 
aspects of corporate governance in Chinese listed SOEs, mainly the extent of state 
control over corporate managers and investor protection. These studies have therefore 
failed to provide a broader analysis of the impact of the Chinese form of state capitalism 
on all three sets of relations central to state-led corporate governance. A third limitation 
is that most of these studies have not paid sufficient attention to the rapid changes in 
international and domestic environments faced by Chinese policy makers in maintaining 
its state-led economic development, and the impact of those changes on more recent 
corporate governance reforms in China. These deficiencies, as this chapter has argued, 
call for a detailed and comprehensive study of corporate governance in Chinese listed 
SOEs through the perspective of state capitalism and institutional change, by taking into 
account the interaction between the role of the state and international and domestic 
forces for change. Chapter 3 begins this analysis by setting out the theoretical 
framework for this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
A state capitalism and institutional change approach to the governance of listed state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in China requires the consideration of three theoretical issues. 
First, is there a linkage between national systems of corporate governance and national 
economic development models? If that question can be answered in the affinnative, 
second, in what ways does state capitalism, as a particular economic development 
model, shape the system of corporate governance in a given country? And finall y, how 
may the role of the state shape changes in corporate governance in state-led economies 
as international and domestic conditions evolve? 
This chapter addresses these three questions by drawing upon three interrelated strands 
of literature. These are comparative capitalism, comparative corporate governance, 
particularly governance of large companies in post-World War II East Asian state-led 
economies, and law and capitalism, particularly Milhaupt and Pistor's postulation of the 
role of the state in the interaction between legal and economic changes within state-led 
• I 
economies . 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of 
comparative capitalism and the analytical approaches utilised in this field . The section 
then demonstrates the interrelationship between models of capitali st economic 
development and corporate governance by drawing upon Hall and Soskice, 2 whose 
varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach has served as the dominant analytical framework 
in comparative capitalism. As Section 3.2 will illustrate, Hall and Soskice classify 
capitalist systems into the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and Coordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs) according to their firm-centred institutional arrangements, which 
shows the correlation between national economic and corporate governance models.3 
Section 3.3 illustrates the interrelationship between state capitalism and state-l ed 
corporate governance. While Hall and Soskice' s analysis helps to establish the linkage 
Curtis Mi\haupt and Katharina Pistor, Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems 
and Economic Development around the World (University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
2 Peter Hall and David Soskice, ' An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism' in Peter Hall and David Soskice (eds), 
Varieties of Capitalism: the institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 
2001 ) I. 
3 Ibid. 
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between models of capitalism and corporate governance, their firm-centred framework 
largely ignored the role of the state in capitalist economic development. This section 
will show that by bringing the state back into the institutional analysis, several more 
recent studies have not only articulated state capitalism as a distinctive capitalist 
prototype, but also established the necessary linkage between state capitalism and the 
state-led model of corporate governance. Together with a sizable literature on corporate 
governance in the post-war East Asian developmental states, this group of studies has 
further highlighted the main features of the state-led model centred on three sets of 
relations, namely, state-manager relations, investor protection and other stakeholder 
including employee protection. 
Section 3 .4 considers the role of the state in shaping the interaction between corporate 
governance and socioeconomic changes in state-led economies. Two prevailing 
socioeconomic forces pertinent to the recent development of corporate governance in 
China will be considered. These are economic globalisation and the pluralisation of 
interests within domestic society. In this respect, the VoC studies, represented by Hall 
and Soskice, have been widely criticised for failing to provide a satisfactory account for 
change. As section 3.4 will demonstrate, a much more dynamic view has, nevertheless, 
been put forward by Milhaupt and Pistor through their exposition of the role of the state 
in the interaction between legal and economic changes within state-led economies.4 
Section 3.5 considers the advantages and limitations of the three-component framework 
proposed in this chapter for the research . As the section will suggest, state capitalism 
and institutional change provides a conceptual basis for the understanding of the major 
changes and continuities in the regulation of corporate governance in China. Despite its 
various limitations, this framework is able to capture the dominant form of capitalism in 
China, without ignoring the complex international and domestic dynamics being faced 
by Chinese policy makers. 
3.2 Comparative capitalism and corporate governance 
Comparative capitalism, or comparative studies of capitalist diversity, are a vast and 
'eclectic field' 5 that draws upon political science and sociology in the study of 
M ilhaupt and Pistor, above n 1. 
Terrence Casey, ' Mapping Stabi lity and Change in Advanced Capital isms' (2009)7 Comparative European 
Politics 255, 257. 
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economic phenomenon. 6 These studies can be traced back to the I 960s, when Shonfield 
provided a detailed account of the French post-war system of long-term national 
planning (indicative planning) and recommended its adoption in Britain.7 Later in the 
1980s, the strong economic performance of Germany and Japan led to further 
characterisation of distinct forms of capitalism outside the US and the UK.8 Studies in 
this field have, however, been synthesised only recently with the publication of Hall and 
Soskice's edited book ' Varieties of Capitalism' .9 As Hall and Soskice's analysis quickly 
became the dominant analytical framework, 10 the two terms, 'comparative capitalism' 
and 'varieties of capitalism', have been used interchangeably by scholars in the field. 11 
Starting from Hall and Soskice, an important strand of the varieties of capitalism (VoC) 
literature has been concerned with the classification of national models of capitalism 
according to their institutional arrangements. 12 As institutionalists, the Voe scholars 
share the new institutionalists ' basic assertion about the importance of institutions in 
shaping behaviour of firms and other economic actors (such as employees and the 
government). However, instead of prioritising one single set of institutions, such as the 
Anglo-American institutions, for economic growth, these scholars see the distinctive 
institutional configuration in a given economy as generating 'a particular systemic logic 
of economic action'. 13 Following that rationale, different Voe scholars attempt to 
6 Gregory Jackson and Richard Deeg, ' How Many Varieties of Capitalism? Comparing the Comparative 
Institutional Analyses of Capitalist Diversity ' (MP lfG Discussion Paper No. 06/2, 11 April 2006) 5 
<http://ssm.com/abstract=896384>. 
7 Andrew Shonfield, ' Modem Capitalism' in David Rei sman (ed), Theories of the Mixed Economy (William 
Pickering, 1994); Vi vien Schmidt, ' Putting the Poli tical Back into Political Economy by Bring the State Back in 
Yet Again ' (2009) 61 World Politics 5 I 6,5 18 
8 These include Michel Albert 's distinction between a ' Rhine model' (represented by Germany) and the 'Neo-
American Capitalism', Ronald Dore's Stock Market Capitalism (typified by the US) versus Welfare Capitalism 
(represented by Germany and Japan). Furthermore, incorporating the ' developmental state' thesis, David Coates 
observed that by the end of l 990s, at least three capitali st model s can be discerned based on the interrelations 
between labour, capital and the ro le of the state. These are market-led (represented by US), negotiated 
(represented by Germany and the Scandinavian economies) and state-led (typified by Japan and South Korea). 
See Michel Albert, Capitalism against Capitalism (Whurr, 1993); Ronald Dore, Stock Market Capitalism: 
Welfare Capitalism (Oxford Uni versity Press, 2000); David Coates, Models of Capitalism: Growth and 
Stagnation in the Modern Era (Polity Press, 2000) 9-10. 
Hall and Soskice, above n 2. 
10 Chris Howell , ' Varieties of Capitalism: And Then There was One?' (2003) 36 Comparative Politics 103, 103; 
Nahee Kang, 'Globalisation and Institutional Change in the State-led Model: The Case of Corporate Governance 
in South Korea' (2010)15 New Political Economy 519, 522. 
11 For example, while the term 'comparative capitalism' is used by Gregory Jackson and Richard Deeg, the term 
'variety of capitalism' is used by Wofgang Streeck in his review of a similar set of li terature. See Jackson and 
Deeg, above n 6; Wolfgang Srreeck, '£ P/uribus Unum? Varieties and Commonalities of Capitalism (MPlfG 
Discussion Paper I 0/12, October 20 I 0) <www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp l 0-12.pdl>. 
12 Nick Wailes, Jim Kitay and Russell D. Lansbury, 'Varieties of Capitalism, Corporate Governance and 
Employment Relations Under Globalisation' in Shelley Marshall , Richard Mitchell and Ian Ramsay (eds) 
Varieties of Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Employees (Melbourne University Press, 2008) 19, 19-20. 
13 Jackson and Deeg, above n 6, 6; Wai les, Kitay and Lansbury, above n 12, 20-2 l . 
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differentiate national models of capitalism according to their institutional configurations 
and the interrelationship between the subsystems of those configurations (also called the 
' institutional domains ' or 'domains of economic activity' which can be subdivided into 
institutions). 14 
These attempts have led to the development of a nwnber of analytical frameworks to 
allow for international comparison of capitalist variety on a much broader scope. 15 
Despite different understandings about the composition of the institutional domains and 
the interrelationship between them, corporate governance has been treated as an 
essential component in most of these frameworks, in addition to financial systems, 
labour relations, the role of the state, inter-finn relations and innovation systems. 16 As 
Marshall et al stated: 
While the VoC debate generally ranges across a broad spectrum of different questions 
and topics, the issues of corporate governance and labour management, and the 
relationship between them, appear crucial, if not decisive, in how different systems are 
characterised and typified. 17 
Under the broad definition of corporate governance adopted in this research, labour 
management can be seen as part of corporate governance. 
Further, while the nexus between national models of capitalism and corporate 
governance has been identified by most VoC scholars, Hall and Soskice's framework 
has been widely commended as having 'achieved a level of theoretical sophistication, 
explanatory scope and predictive ambition that has rapidly made it close to hegemonic 
in the field' .18 As discussed below, the limitations of Hall and Soskice's framework, 
particularly the apolitical approach it adopts, have inspired the formulation of other 
alternative frameworks, which led to the articulation of state capitalism as a distinct 
capitalist prototype. 
14 Jackson and Deeg, above n 6, 12. 
15 Ibid 21-28. 
16 Ibid 12- 13; Shelley Marshall , Richard Mitchell and Ian Ramsay, ' Variet ies of Capitalism, Corporate Governance 
and Employment Systems in Australian ' in Shelley Marshall , Richard Mitchell and Ian Ramsay (eds), Varieties 
of Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Employees (Melbourne University Press, 2008) I, 4. 
17 Marshall , Mitchell and Ramsay, above n 16. 
18 Howell , above n 10, 103. 
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In devising their framework for the analysis of capitalist diversity, Hall and Soskice see 
national economic systems as production regimes, 19 and focus on how cross-country 
differences are reflected in micro-behaviour at the firm levei.20 In doing so, the authors 
place the firm at the centre of their analysis,21 since they concede firms as not only 'the 
crucial actors in a capitalist economy,' but also key agents of economic adjustments.22 
Adopting a relational view of the firm, 23 and a 'rational actor' intuitionalist 
perspective,24 Hall and Soskice argue that companies in all market economies are faced 
with coordination problems in four interrelated spheres (institutional domains) that 
shape their incentives and constraints: financial systems and corporate governance, 
industrial relations, inter-company relations, vocational training and education 
systems.25 
Based on their observation of how the coordination problems in those four spheres were 
solved in advanced OECD countries during the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, Hall and 
Soskice allocate the countries on a spectrum with the opposite ends of Liberal Market 
Economies (LME) and Coordinated Market Economies (CME).26 In the LME systems, 
including countries such as the US, Britain and Australia,27 companies coordinate their 
activities among firms, and with other economic actors, primarily through corporate 
hierarchies and competitive market arrangements.28 By contrast, in the CME systems, 
such as Germany and Japan,29 companies rely more on cooperation through non-market 
institutions such as business networks to interact with other economic actors within and 
outside the finn. 30 
19 In doing so, Hall and Soskice drew upon Hollingsworth and Boyer' s notion of 'social systems ofproducrion ' . See 
Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, 'Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production ' 
in Robert Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer (eds), Contemporary Capitalism: Th e Embeddedness of Institutions 
(Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1999) I, 2. 
20 Jackson and Deeg, above n 6, 21. 
21 Hall and Soskice, above n 2, 5. 
22 [bid, 6. 
23 [bid. 
24 lbid. 
25 Ibid 6-7. 
26 Ibid 8. 
27 Ibid 19. 
28 Ibid 8, 19. 
29 [bid 19. 
30 Ibid 8, 19. 
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Thus, the LME systems are typically characterised by market-based equity financing 
and the outsider-based/shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance that is 
attractive to dispersed investors. These features are further associated with market-
based arrangements in other spheres of company relations. These include highly fluid 
labour markets (which do not seek to maintain long-term employee commitments), 
general education and training and strong inter-firm competition. 31 By contrast, the 
CME systems are characterised by long term-oriented bank-based corporate financing 
and an insider-based model of corporate governance that prioritises network monitoring 
and exchange of infonnation among business networks. Congruent with these features, 
the CME systems are also associated with close inter-firm collaboration, cooperative 
industrial relations and high-levels of vocational training that cultivates firm-specific 
skills and promotes long term employee commitrnents.32 
By illuminating different types of institutions at work in shaping company interaction 
with its insider and outsider stakeholders, Hall and Soskice establish that the corporate 
governance system of a given economy is not separated from its broader socioeconomic 
setting. In doing so, they also provide a strong counter thesis for the primacy of the 
Anglo-American outsider-based corporate governance view. This later view has tended 
to see the importance of only one set of institutions, namely the market-based 
institutions. Indeed, by employing the notions of ' institutional eomplementarities' and 
'comparative institutional advantage' (as will be discussed in section 3.4), Hall and 
Soskice demonstrate that neither the LME nor the CME systems are inherently superior 
to the other. Both models are capable of sustaining outstanding economic 
performance. 33 
Indeed, through linking corporate governance with national economic institutional 
arrangements, comparative capitalism, including Hall and Soskice' s framework, has 
laid the theoretical foundation for a popular comparative capitalism approach to 
comparative corporate governance studies. As Kang and Moon observed, 'the VoC 
31 Ibid 27-33. 
32 Ibid 21-27. 
33 Ibid 21. 
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approach provides a way of understanding the firm in a structural and institutionalist 
manner, i.e., giving micro-foundations to macro-societal phenomenon ' .34 
On the other hand, Hall and Soskice's VoC approach has not been immune to criticism. 
Chief among these, the framework has been criticised for its 'very lack of variety' (with 
only two models of capitalism being distinguished by the authors),35 and its neglect of 
the role of the state.36 In Hall and Soskice's dualist approach, the role of the state is 
lumped together with other non-market-based institutions and does no more than 
' inducing economic actors to cooperate more effectively with each other'. 37 This is 
mainly undertaken through state regulation and construction of mechanisms compatible 
with the institutional setting of the relevant type of capitalism.38 The state is therefore 
neither an independent economic actor nor has objectives of its own. This 'weak state' 
conception is more consistent with the LME systems. This conception, however, has 
been widely criticised for its failure to distinguish different coordinative mechanisms at 
work in different CME systems.39 As will be discussed later, some prime examples of a 
'strong state', that have informed the identification of state capitalism as a distinct 
capitalist prototype, have been the post-war East Asian state-led economies or the 
'developmental states' .40 
3.3 State capitalism and corporate governance 
This chapter has so far considered the interrelationship between models of capitalism 
and corporate governance through reviewing Hall and Soskice's VoC approach. By 
bringing the role of the state into the institutional analysis, several approaches in the 
34 Nahee Kang and Jeremy Moon, ' Variations and Change in CSR from a Varieties of Capitalism Perspecti ve' 
(Paper presented at the Oxford-Archill es seminar on CSR, Said Business School, University of Oxford , 11 
February 20 I 0)7 <www.xijz.co. uk/ .. ./Ox ford-A chi I les%20Seminar%20Paper%20-%20>. 
35 Nahee Kang, above n I 0, 523; Colin Crouch, Capitalist Diversity and Change: Recombinant Governance and 
Institutional Entrepreneurs (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005) I ; Bob Haneke, Martin Rhodes and 
Mark Thatcher, ' Introduction ' in Bob Haneke, Martin Rhodes and Mark Thatcher (eds), Beyond Varieties of 
Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and Complementarities in the European Economy (Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 3, 7. 
36 Haneke, Rhodes and Thatcher, above n 35, 8; Chris Howell , above n 10, 110. In identifyi ng the LME and CME 
dichotomy, Hall and Soskice did mention in passing a third type of capitalism which they labelled 
' Mediterranean ' but failed to theori se. 1l1is model includes countries such as France and Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece. Noting the overly restrictive nature of LME and CME dichotomy, but remaining working within Hall 
and Soskice's framework, Haneke et al adopted the notion of 'M ixed Market Economies' to capture some central 
and Eastern European economies that combine certain elements of market, business networks with state-
coordination. See Hall and Soskice, above n 2, 21 ; Haneke, Rhodes, and Thatcher, above n 35 , 13-14. 
37 Hall and Soskice, above n 2, 45. 
38 Ibid 46. 
39 Haneke, Rhodes, and Thatcher, above n 35, 14-1 5. 
40 Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalism, above n 7, 108-9. 
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VoC literature have gone beyond Hall and Soskice's LME/CME dichotomy by 
establishing state capitalism as a distinct capitalist prototype. As will be further 
explained below, through elucidating the interrelationship between different 
institutional domains, such as corporate governance, labour management and the role of 
the state in coordinating firm level activities in state-led economies, these studies have 
further identified a state-led model of corporate governance that may be distinguished 
from both the Anglo-American outsider-based and the German-Japanese (post-1980s) 
insider-based models. 
Much of the analysis of state capitalism has been based on empirical work on the post-
World War II state-led economies, known as the 'developmental states'. The term was 
first coined by Johnson, who saw the developmental state as a 'plan rational ' state41 that 
combines the US-style private ownership of economy with the Soviet Union style state 
planning and guidance.42 The ownership of the economy largely remains in the hands of 
the private sector. The state, however, plays an active role in guiding the process of 
economic development and industrial transformation, using rigorous industrial policy 
and extensive policy tools to pick winners and losers.43 The 'developmental state' has 
been primarily associated with the thirty-year post-war economic growth miracle in 
East Asia, particularly Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The term, however, has also 
been used to explain state-led economic development in other countries such as 
France.44 According to Radice, by around 1990, the notion of 'the development state' 
had become the 'main ideological rallying-point' for those challenging the Western 
free-market model as the ideal solution for developing countries.45 
Johnson's vision of the state-led economic development inspired a considerable body of 
literature that '[relates] economic performance to institutional arrangements centred on 
the state' .46 This literature has been collectively labelled as the 'developmental state 
41 Chalmers Johnson, MIT/ and the Japan ese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford 
University Press 1982) 17 
42 fbid 19; Chalmers Johnson, ' the Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept', in Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed), 
The Developmental State (Cornell University Press, 1999) 32, 32. 
43 Johnson , MIT] and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, above n 41 , 19; Alice H. Amsden, 
Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation (Oxford University Press, 1989). 
44 Michael Loriaux, 'The French DS as Myth or Moral Ambition ' in Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed), The 
Developmental State (Cornell University Press, 1999) 235 . 
45 Hugo Radice, 'The Developmental State under Global Neoliberalism• (2008) 29 Third World Quarterly 1153, 
1153. 
46 Moon and Prasad define the developmental state theory as 'a collection of theories, descriptions and assertions 
which relate economic perfom,ance to institutional arrangements centered on the state'. See Chung•in Moon and 
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theory'.47 Underlying most strands of this theory, such as Wade's ' governed markets ',48 
Evans' 'embedded autonomy of the state' 49 and Weiss' 'governed interdependence,' 50 is 
a strong state motivated by economic growth-oriented objectives and close relations 
between the state and businesses especially large businesses. 51 Furthermore, often 
associated with the East Asian developmental states is a corporatist state-society 
relationship, characterised by an authoritarian state and weak civil society. State 
corporatism allows the state to act as a ' Janus-faced entity ' ,52 that is, to privilege its ties 
with businesses, especially large businesses, on the one hand, while containing other 
societal groups, such as outsider investors, consumers and local communities (whose 
short term demands may not be consistent with long-term goals of the state) on the 
other.53 
This strong and centralised conception of the state in the developmental state theory has 
been reflected in several analytical frameworks developed by comparative capitalism 
scholars. As discussed below, by linking state capitalism with state-led corporate 
governance, these frameworks provide the micro corporate governance foundation for 
the theory of the development state. 
Rashemi Prasad, ' Networks, Poli tics and Institutions', in Steve Chan, Cal Clark and Danny Lam (eds), Beyond 
the Developmental State: East Asia 's Political Economies Reconsidered (St. Martin ' s, 1998) 9, 9. 
47 Ibid. 
48 In formulating this theory, Wade focu sed on the market guidance rol e of the state. Sec Robert Wade, Governing 
the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian industrialization (Princeton Uni versity 
Press, 1992). 
49 Evans argued that while elite bureaucracy provides the state with the requisite autonomy, the state would have no 
means to obtain current information and suppon for formu lation and implementation of economic policies 
without itself being sufficiently connected to businesses. See Peter Evans, The Embedded Autonomy: States and 
industrial Transformation (Princeton University Press, 1995) 12. 
50 According to Weiss, in this relationship, government and businesses are more akin to equal partners in the 
process of economic development. Both the state and the pri vate actor maintain their autonomy, but negotiate 
with each other and then work on agreed goals originally formulated and monitored by the state. See Linda 
Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Polity Press, 1998) 34-39. 
51 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Susan Young, ' Introduction: State Capacity in East Asia' in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard 
and Susan Young (eds), State Capacity in East Asia (Oxford Uni versity Press, 2000) I, 3-4; Meredith Woo-
Cumings, 'Introducti on: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development' in Meredith Woo-
Cumings (ed), Th e Developmental State (Cornell University Press,1999) 1, 16; Ha-loon Chang, 'The Economic 
Theory of the Developmental State', in Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed), the Developmental State (Cornell 
Uni versity Press, 1999) 183 , 192; Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State, above n 50, 45. As highlighted by 
Evans, in post-war Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, this type of relations were reflected in the dense fonn al and 
informal networks that link government and large businesses in the processes of infonnation exchange and policy 
formulation and implementation . See Evans, above n 49. 
52 Woo-Cumings, ' Introduction', above n 51 , 21 
53 Wade, above n 48 , 27 . 
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3.3.1 State capitalism as a capitalist prototype 
The various frameworks, which have been developed by other comparative capitalism 
theorists to address the limitations of Hall and Soskice's approach, vary in their 'level 
of analysis, methodologies and the distinguishing traits of capitalism'. 54 They, however, 
share some common traits. Centrally concerned with corporate governance and labour 
relations, these alterative frameworks see an important role played by the state, among 
other factors such as norms, in shaping institutional configurations and actor 
behaviour. 55 
One of the most influential typologies generated by these alternative frameworks has 
been Schmidt's classification of European capitalism. Schmidt distinguishes three types 
of capitalism in Europe from 1950s to 1980, namely, market (represented by Britain), 
managed (exemplified by Germany) and state-led (exemplified by the post-war France 
and to a lesser extent, Italy), which was based on her observation of the role of the state 
in three sets of business-centred relations (namely, business-business which include 
inter-firm relations and relations between industry and finance, business-government 
and industrial or labour relations). 56 While market capitalism and managed capitalism in 
this typology are akin to Hall and Soskice's LME and CME systems respectively, state 
capitalism may be differentiated from both type of systems, due to its high degree of 
state coordination of finance, state direction of management and state-coordination of 
employee relations.57 
54 Casey. above n 5, 258. 
55 Jackson and Deeg, above n 6, 24; Casey, above n 54. Among scholars adopting the governance approaches, 
Amable grouped 21 advanced economics into fi ve capitalist models, namely 'market-based ', 'continental 
European ', 'social democratic', "Mediterranean ' and 'Asian capitalism'. The ' Asian Model' in Amable's 
typology has been observed by Lane as a variant of the state-led capitali sm previously characterised by Coates. In 
a simi lar vein, Boyer distinguished between four types of capitalism. These include a state-led model that 
revolves around the crucial role played by national , regional , or local state authoriti es in spheres such as 
production, industrial relations, competition and corporate finance. Furthermore, adopting a 'national business 
systems' approach to the study of diversity in national capitalist models, Whitley distinguished four ideal types of 
institutional regimes governing market economies, namely, 'anns' length ', 'dominant developmental state', 
'business corporatist' and 'inclusive corporati st'. The 'dominant deve lopmental state' regi me in Whitley's 
typology shares most of the key features of the state-led model developed by Schmidt, particularly state-
managers relations and the influence of the state on finn interaction with employees and shareholders. See Bruno 
Amable, The Diversity of Modern Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2003) 14. David Lane, ' Post-State 
Socialism: a Diversity of Capitalism? ' in David Lane and Martin Myant (eds), Varieties of Capitalism in Post-
Communist Countries (Palgrave, 2007) 13, 19; David Coates, 'Model s of Capitalism" in the New World Order: 
the UK Case ( 1999) XLVII Political Swdies 643, 651 ; Robert Boyer, ' How and Why Capitalism Differs ' (2005) 
34Economy and Society 520, 530. Richard Whitley, Business Systems and Organizational Capabilities: the 
Institutional Strncturing of Competitive Competences (Oxford University Press, 2007) 
56 Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalism, above n 7, 112-8. 
57 Ibid 116-7; Vivien Schmidt, 'French Capitali sm -Transformed, yet Stil l a Third Variety of Capitalism' (2003) 32 
Economy and Society 526, 530. 
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Hence, in devising her framework, Schmidt viewed the state not only as an independent 
coordinator of economic activity (similar to the markets in the LME and corporate 
networks in the CME systems on the Hall and Soskice's model), but also as playing a 
distinctive role in different models of capitalism, that is, 'regulatory' in market 
capitalism, 'enabling' in managed capitalism and ' interventionist' or 'developmental ' in 
state-led capitalism. 58 The characterisation of the role of the state in state-led capitalism 
as 'developmental' also allowed Schmidt to include East Asian developmental states, 
such as South Korea and Taiwan, in this model.59 As discussed next, Schmidt' s state-led 
capitalism has been interpreted as implying a state-led model of corporate governance. 
3.3.2 State capitalism and corporate governance 
State capitalism has been interpreted by comparative corporate governance scholars, 
such as Hansmann and Kraarkman and Kang, as being associated with a 'state-oriented ' 
or ' state-led model' of corporate governance.60 Rather than shareholder or stakeholder-
oriented objectives, in this model, the economic development-oriented goals of the 
state are promoted, through insulating the 'top owner - managers from the short-tenn 
pressures - in the forms of return on investment and wage demands - which the 
stakeholders would otherwise have exerted on the firm in a more liberal setting' .61 
This fundamental role has led to some distinctive features of corporate governance in 
state-led economies. As Kang and Moon pointed out, the state-led model shares many 
key features of the insider-based corporate governance in the CME systems. However, 
there is a critical difference between them. In the state-led model, the state, instead of 
corporate networks, plays the central role in coordinating firm interaction with its 
insider and outsider stakeholders, including managers, investors, employees and other 
stakeholders.62 The following features of corporate governance have been observed by 
various authors based on experiences of the post-war state-led economies. 
State-manager relations in the state-led model have often been portrayed as very close. 
Some variations of this type of relations did exist in different state-led economies. For 
example, in post-war France, where state-ownership of large firms was prevalent, 
58 Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalism, above n 7, 5; Kang, above n I 0 , 524. 
59 Schmidt, The Futures a/European Capitalism, above n 7, 108-9. 
60 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Krnakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2001) 89 Georgetown law 
Journal 439, 446-7; Kang, above n I 0, 533. 
01 Kang, above n I 0, 521. 
62 Ibid 532. 
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government-business relationship was described by Schmidt as 'state-directed', with the 
government 'influencing business development through planning, industrial policy or 
state-owned enterprises'. 63 By contrast, in South Korea where the control of most 
chaebols (large family-controlled business groups) remained in the hands of their 
owner-managers, state-business relations were characterised as 'strong managerialism, 
but one that is infused with national interest '. 64 That said, state influence in major 
investment decisions of large firms appeared to be quite common in all fonner state-led 
economies. For example, in post-war Japan, in addition to state-controlled bank 
financing and various deliberating councils and industrial or trade associations that 
facilitated exchange of information and negotiation of interests between government 
and large businesses, 65 state intervention in business decision-making was carried out 
through 'administrative guidance' (infonnation directions given by government 
ministries to large businesses) and the widespread practice of 'amakudari' , namely, 
'descent from heaven' of retired bureaucrats to board positions in large private sector 
companies. 66 As many commentators on the East Asian developmental state and 
corporate governance have suggested, the presence of these dense government-business 
networks inevitably diminished the boundaries between the state and businesses.67 
In addition to close state-manager relations, state-led corporate governance has been 
associated with weak shareholder rights. This is because the state-led model assumes 
that outsider shareholders would have limited influence over company management 
decision-making, and would prioritise long-term shareholding over short- term profits.68 
For Hansmann and Kraakman, weak shareholder rights are an instrument of the state to 
perpetuate state control of corporate affairs. As the authors observed: 
63 Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalism, above n 7, 116. 
64 As Kang put it, 'Within the broad confines of the state directives regarding large-scale investment decisions and 
production targets , the owner-managers enjoyed a significant degree of freedom.' See Kang, above n I 0, 532. 
65 Weiss, The A1yth of the Powerless State, above n 50. 
66 Cunis Milhaupt and Mark West, Economic Organisations and Corporate Governance in Japan: the Impact of 
Formal and fnformal Rules (Oxford University Press, 2004) 16-17; Woo-Cumings, ' Introduction' above 51 , 2 1; 
Meredith Woo-Cumings, 'Diverse Paths towards 'the right institutions': Law, the State, and Economic Refonn in 
East Asia ', in Linda Weiss (ed), States in the Global Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 200, 206-10. 
67 See, eg, Mark Beeson, ' the Rise and Fall (?) of the Developmental State: The Vicissitudes and Implications of 
East Asian interventioni sm' in Linda Low (ed), Developmental States: Relevancy, Redundancy or 
Reconfiguration? (Nova Science Publi shers Inc, 2004) 29, 31 ; Meredith Woo-Cumings, The Developmental State 
(Cornell University Press, 1999); Moon and Prasad, above n 46; Lilian Miles, 'Transferring the Anglo American 
System to South Korea: At What Cost, and Are There Alternatives?' (2008) 20 Bond Law Review 71, 71; Takeo 
Hoshi , 'Japanese Corporate Governance as a System', in Klaus K. Hopt et al (eds), Comparative Corporate 
Governance: the State of the Art and Emerging Research (Clarendon Press, 1998) 847, 868-9; Kong Yam Tan 
(ed), Asian Economic Recovery: Policy Options for Growth & Stability (World Scientific, 2002) 142, 145-6. 
68 Kang, above n I 0, 532; Schmidt, The Fulures of European Capitalism, above n 7, 116. 
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The principal instruments of state control over corporate affairs in corporatist 
economies generally lie outside of corporate law. They include, for example, 
substantial discretion in the hands of government bureaucrats over the allocation of 
credit, foreign exchange, licenses, and exemptions from anti-competition rules. 
Nevertheless, corporate law also plays a role by, for example, weakening shareholder 
control over corporate managers (to reduce pressures on managers that might operate 
counter to the preferences of the state) and employing state-administered criminal 
sanctions rather than shareholder-controlled civil lawsuits as the principal sanction for 
managerial malfeasance (to give the state strong authority over managers that could be 
exercised at the government's discretion).69 
Similar to the relations with outsider shareholders, company relations with other non-
shareholder stakeholders in the state-led model are often dictated by the policy goals of 
the state. For example, state-led corporate governance in the post-war developmental 
states has been observed by commentators, such as Kang and Moon, as associated with 
a state-led model of corporate social responsibility. 70 On the one hand, the state may 
play an active role in promoting corporate social responsibility. On the other hand, the 
type of responsibilities promoted by the state rarely went beyond the promotion of 
labour peace and long-term employee commitments. 71 Thus, in contrast to the high 
levels of employee protection, civil law suits from consumers and other corporate 
stakeholders against government and large companies were suppressed to the extent of 
non-existence. 72 
The state-led model of corporate governance has lost much of its attraction since the 
late I 990s. Following the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the strict loan conditions 
imposed by international financial institutions have compelled most of the former 
developmental states to move away from the state-led model in favour of the Anglo-
69 Hansmann and Kraakman, above n 60. 
70 In doing so, they saw corporate social responsibility as a complementary institution to corporate governance. 
Nahee Kang and Jeremy Moon, 'Institutional Complementarity between Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Social Responsibility: a Comparative Institutional Analysis of Three Capitalisms' (2012) IO Socio -Economic 
Review 85, 93-95 ; Jeremy Moon, Nahee Kang and Jean-Pascal Gond, 'Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Government in Western Europe and Northeast Asia from a National Governance Systems perspective' 
(International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility Research Paper Series No. 56-2010) 11-1 3 
<http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/JCCSR>; Dirk Matten and Jeremy Moon, "'Implicit" and "explicit" 
CS R: a Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility' (2008) 33 
Academy of Management Review 404, 408. 
71 Nahee Kang and Jeremy Moon, ' Institutional Complementarity between Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Social Responsibility ' above n 70, 94-95 ; 
72 Frank Upham, ' Ideology, Experience and the Rule of Law' in Meredith Jung-en-Woo (ed), Neolibera/ism and 
lnstil!ltional Reform in East Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 35, 54. T. J Pempel, 'llie Developmental Regime 
in a Changing World Economy', in Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed), The Developmelllal State (Cornell University 
Press, I 999) 140. 
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American outsider-based systems. 73 Ln a large body of literature reflecting on that 
Crisis, the developmental state has been generally equated with the deprecating term 
'crony capitalism' , in which state support for businesses led to 'corruption, nepotism 
and excessive bureaucratic rigidity' , the precipitation of the Asian Financial Crisis.74 
Notwithstanding its various weaknesses, the significance of the state-led model of 
corporate governance to the thirty-year East Asian economic miracle should not be 
understated. 
3.4 State capitalism and institutional change 
If the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis could be viewed as some extreme pressure from 
outside the system ('external shock' in VoC terms) ,75 to what extent and in what ways a 
strong and interventioni st state may condition the interaction between changes in 
corporate governance, and socioeconomic changes, that fall short of such extreme 
pressure? As discussed below, these forces may come from both outside and the 
domestic society. 
3.4.1 Forces for institutional change 
First, economic globalisation, as manifested in the rapid internationalisation of the 
fin anci al and product markets, has been widely considered as 'sweeping away all 
national differences in its path '.76 The various models of capitaljsm worked relatively 
free from major international pressures until the early 1980s. 77 However, with the 
advent of globalisation, the international environments faced by companies in 
interacting with their internal and external stakeholders (including the state) have 
significantly altered . 
For the radical globalists, at least before the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC), 
globalisation leads to the convergence of national economic models , as all nation-states 
are fo rced to adopt a similar set of neo-liberal policies and practices. 78 1n the area of 
73 Miles, above n 67; Aj it Singh and Ann Zammit, 'Corporate Governance, Crony Capitalism and Economic Crisis: 
Should the US Business Model Replace the Asian Way of ' Doing Business '?' (Centre for Business Research, 
Un iversity of Cambridge Working Paper, No.329. June 2006) 1 <www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdfi'WP329.pdf>. 
74 Chalmers Johnson, • Economic Crisis in East Asia: The Clash of Capitalisms' (1998) 22 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 653, 654; Brodsgaard and Young, above n 51, 6. 
75 Hall and Soskice, above n 2, 62. 
76 Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalis m , above n 7, 15 -2 1; Jackson and Deeg , above n 6, 5, 38. 
77 Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalism, above n 7, 107-9; Schmidt, 'French Capitali sm' above n 57; 
Jackson and Deeg, above n 6, 5. 
78 Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalism above n 7, 1. 
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corporate governance, as globalisation increases the free movement of capital, 
governments are under increasing pressures to conform to certain international 
standards of good corporate governance, namely the Anglo-American standards. This 
has led scholars, such as Hansmann and Kraakman, to predict the 'end of the history for 
corporate law' .79 
Nevertheless, globalisation has not been the sole pressure for convergence of national 
models of capitalism towards the free market model. The congruence between state-led 
economy and a corporatist type of state-society relationship has been discussed earlier. 
Associated with economic development and the global spread of neo-liberal ideas, the 
pluralisation of interests within domestic society may, however, significantly undermine 
the necessary foundation for a state-led system.80 This is because pluralism sees the real 
source of good decision-making as lying in the participation of interest groups in a 
diversified civil society, rather than the state.8 1 The rise of pluralism may be caused by 
many factors, such as increased mobility of ordinary citizens, improved access to 
information technology and education,82 and the emergence of 'middle classes' that are 
'no longer fully content with the blind acceptance of the hegemonic project of growth 
for its own sake' .83 In the area of corporate governance, as diffused share ownership and 
institutional investment continue to grow, the rise of a public shareholder class has been 
seen as an important source of interest group influence. 84 
3.4.2 Comparative capitalism and institutional change 
Comparative capitalism has been criticised for failing to provide a satisfactory account 
for institutional change within given economic systems. The VoC scholars, such as Hall 
and Soskice, do not reject the idea that globalisation leads to institutional change, 
including change in national system of corporate governance.85 Nonetheless, as noted 
by Jackson and Deeg, their notions of ' institutional complementarities' and 
79 Hansmann and Kraak:man, above n 60, 439; Henry Hansmann, ' How Close Is the End of History?'(2006) 3 I 
Journal of Corporation Law 745, 745. 
80 Brodsgaard and Yong, above n 51, 5. 
81 Christopher Pierson, The Modern State (Routledge, 2004) 71-72. 
82 Brodsgaard and Yong, above n 51 , 5. 
83 Pempel, above n 72, 18 I. 
" Hansmann and Kraakman, above n 60, 451-3. 
85 Hall and Soskice, above n 2, 54; Also see Peter Hall and Kathleen Thelen, 'Institutional change in varieties of 
capitalism ' (2009) 7 Socio-Economic Review 7. 
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' comparative institutional advantages' provide strong disincentives for radical 
changes.86 
Most comparative capitalism scholars, including Hall and Soskice, believe that with the 
presence of 'institutional complementarities' (i .e., the mutually reinforcing effect of 
coherent institutions), 87 distinct institutional configurations provide 'comparative 
institutional advantage'. 88 That is, different institutional configurations may have 
distinct strengths for particular types of activities. 89 In that sense, the comparative 
capitalism literature has also been interpreted as giving rise to a theory of 'institutional 
path dependence' .90 In the absence of extreme 'external shocks' ,91 institutional changes 
are likely to take place in an incremental fashion at best, allowing limited room for 
path-shifting changes.92 
Hall and Soskice' s account of institutional change has been criticised by various 
researchers as overly static and deterministic. 93 These researchers called for more 
emphasis on explaining the dynamics of change. For example, pointing to Hall and 
Soskice' s overemphasis on the effect of institutions, Crouch drew attention to the 
creative and innovative role played by actors, including the state, in bringing about 
radical changes.94 As discussed next, relevant to the study of regulatory changes in 
Chinese corporate governance over the past few years, a more nuanced analysis has 
been provided by Milhaupt and Pistor. 
3.4.3 Milhaupt and Pistor's exposition of the role of the state in conditioning law and 
economic changes 
Milhaupt and Pistor's analysis was particularly relevant to the role of the state in 
changes in the fonnulation and implementation of law, including corporate governance 
86 Jackson and Deeg, above n 6, 37. 
87 Hall and Sask.ice, above n 2, 17. 
88 Ibid 37. 
89 Ibid 37-41. According to Hall and Soskice, while Jhe LME systems are better at supporting industries dictated by 
radical innovation, finns in the CME systems are likely to prosper in industries that require incremental 
innovation. This is because compared to the CME systems, the combination of external shareholder markets and 
high level of fluid labour markets make it easier for finns in the LM E systems to switch resources rapidly to new 
and profitable firms and business areas. 
90 Jackson and Deeg, above n 6, 5. 
91 Hall and Soskice, above n 2, 62. 
92 Jackson and Deeg, above n 6, 6. 
93 Haneke, Rhodes and Thatcher, above n 35, 7; Crouch, above n 35 , 30-31, Jackson and Deeg, above n 6, 24, 37; 
Wailes, Kitay and Lansbury, above n 12, 19, 27; Jonathan Perraton, 'Varieties of Capita li sm and Institutional 
Change ', in (2007)24 Comparative Social Research 205, 248. 
94 Crouch, above n 35, 2-3. 
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rules, as a particular type of institution, in state-led economies. In their important book 
Law and Capitalism published in 2008,95 using the fonnulation and implementation of 
corporate governance rules as an example, Milhaupt and Pistor considered the role of 
the state in the interrelationship between changes in law and economic changes in 
different types of legal systems which correspond to national economic models. In 
doing so, the authors divide six legal systems under their country case studies into 
'centralised' and 'decentralised' systems, based on the degree of state coordination and 
state enforcement of legal rules. 96 The term 'state capitalism' , or 'state-led economy' , 
was not used in this book. However, its coincidence with the centralised systems can be 
deduced from the authors' frequent association of the centralised systems with countries 
generally considered as state-led economies, including Russia, China and 'other 
countries in East Asia that were traditionally characterised by strong government 
coordination such as South Korea' .97 
Unlike Hall and Soskice, whose VoC approach tends to see very limited room for 
institutional , including legal, change changes, Milhaupt and Pistor envisaged a highly 
interactive relationship between legal and market changes, described by the authors as 
the 'rolling relationship' .98 As these authors put it, market changes of all types (such as 
technology changes and changes in the relative power of the economic actors) may 
create a demand for new law to address the uncertainty and restore equilibrium. Once 
the new rules are supplied by the law makers, they are taken up by the market players 
who use the rules to the limits in maximising their interests. This creates further issues 
of uncertainty that need to be addressed by law.99 This 'rolling relationship' between 
law and markets can be intensified with increasing economic complexity and the 
globalisation of the markets, as actors who lack access to existing legal system demand 
for protection of their interests. 100 
Nevertheless, according to Milhaupt and Pistor, this highly interactive process does not 
exclude the involvement of political economy, including the role of the state. This is 
especially so with centralised systems. In these systems, consistent with the role of the 
95 Milhaupt and Pi stor, above n I. 
96 Ibid 6. These seven countries are US, Germany, Japan, China, Singapore and Russia. 
97 Ibid, 147, 183, 187. 
98 Ibid, 28. 
99 Ibid. 
,oo Ibid 42-43. 
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state as a chief coordinator of economic activity, the law primarily plays a coordinative 
function rather than protection of individual rights. 101 By calling upon two important 
sets of tools in the formulation and enforcement of law, a strong state may exert 
significant control over the pace and extent of decentralisation of the country's legal 
system. 
First, a highly centralised legal system provides the state with great leverage in 
detennining the extent to which law may be contested by private actors. 102 According to 
Milhaupt and Pistor, while a decentralised legal system tends to rely upon self-
organised groups and individuals to mobilise the system, a highly centralised system 
favours 'state-vetted interest groups and actors' . 103 Where the law fonnulation and 
enforcement powers are allocated to a few key interest groups, those benefiting from the 
existing system are unlikely to press for radical changes. However, for the marginalised 
outsiders who have limited access to the law making and enforcement processes, their 
ability to voice demands for legal change can be significantly constrained. 
Second, the state may substitute the demand for law from private actors with extra-legal 
devices such as norms. 104 Such non-legal alternatives may be preferred by both the state 
and private actors for various reasons. One reason is that they often offer cheaper and 
more effective solutions than legal means. 105 As the authors po_inted out, the market 
players ' can be expected to opt out of the legal system whenever non-legal alternatives 
are available at lower economic or social cost to them' .106 This is especially so with 
marginalised outsiders who are afforded little protection in the legal system. 107 
Norms can also serve some other functions in state-led economies. As Pistor and 
Wellons suggested in their earlier study, from the perspective of an interventionist state, 
a legal system that allows a wide scope for norms to operate gives the state much 
discretionary power. 108 This idea can be reinforced by the close state-large business 
10 1 Ibid 32-34. 
102 Ibid 7. 
103 Ibid 8. 
10
' Ibid 38-39. 
'°
5 lbid40. 
106 Ibid 41. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Katharina Pistor and Philip Wellons, The Role of law and l egal lnstillitions in As fon Economic Development, 
1960-1995 (Oxford University Press, 1999) 53. 
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relations in a state-led economy. For effective state-business collaboration to take place, 
the state bureaucracies need to have sufficient flexibility sustained by broadly-drafted 
laws. 109 Indeed, as pointed out by Milhaupt, at least prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, 
the important private benefits conferred by norms on the parties involved in the 
Japanese state-bank-large business coalition greatly tapered demand for corporate 
governance reform. 110 
By pointing to the tools that may be utilised by the state in centralised systems, 
Milhaupt and Pistor provide useful insights into the role of the state in shaping the 
pattern of legal change, including corporate law change, in state-led economies. The 
authors' analysis also shows that as these tools may be utilised in both the formulation 
and enforcement of law, while a rapid convergence of the law-in-books in state-led 
economies towards other systems is unlikely to occur, changes in the law-in-practice are 
likely to take place at an even slower pace. Substantial changes to the fonnal law may 
be introduced by the state in response to pressures from globalisation and interest group 
politics. Other devices, such as limitation of the contestability of law and norms, may, 
however, continue to operate in the implementation of changes in the formal law, and 
mitigate the effect of those changes. This is also consistent with Pistor and Wellons ' 
findings in their earlier study oflegal developments in six Asian economies. They found 
that different parts of those systems took different paths in development ('path 
differentiation ' in the authors' term). While strong signs of convergence towards the 
Western model were present along the allocative dimension (that is, the contents) of the 
law, the procedural dimension, namely the application and enforcement of law, tended 
to be more path dependent. 111 
However, focusing on the traditional instruments of an interventionist state as discussed 
above, Milhaupt and Pistor seem to have overlooked one other important set of tools 
that may be utilised by the state to shape legal changes in state-led economies. This set 
of tools can be found in market forces, including mechanisms from the decentralised 
109 Tom Ginsburg, ' Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia ' (2000) 34 law and 
Society Review 829, 83 7; According to Ginsburg, broad administrative discretion, based on broadly worded 
legislation , was one of the essential feature of the legal systems in Northeast Asian state-led economies from the 
early post-war period to the late 1980s. See also Tom Ginsburg, ' Law and the Liberal Transfonmation of the 
Northeast Asian Legal Complex' in In Terrence Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm Feeley (eds) Fighting/or 
Political Freedom (Hart Publishing, 2007) 43, 48-49; See also Frank Upham, law and Social Change in Post-
war Japan (Harvard University Press, 1987). 
110 For a detailed account of the operation ofnonns in Japanese corporate governance, see Curtis Milhaupt, 'Creative 
Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance' (2001) 149 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 2083, 2094. 
11 1 Pistor and Wellons, above n 108, 285. 
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systems. In Milhaupt and Pistor' s analysis, the ever-intensification of market changes in 
centralised systems seems to be an unfortunate phenomenon that the state has to accept 
and tolerate, rather than providing an instrument for strengthening state capacity. The 
two dimensional legal system matrix developed by the authors appears to suggest that, 
as a centralised legal system continues to decentralise under growing market forces , 
much of its coordinati ve capacity will be lost and replaced by the protective function. 
This prediction is consistent with the authors' hypothesis of the 'rolling relations ' 
between law and market changes. It, however, overlooks one important point: the 
coordinative capacity of the state and market forces are not necessari ly mutually 
exclusive. Market forces can be used as an instrument to extend state power at least 
within certain limits. In other words, market forces can be seen as a double-edged 
sword. The growth of market forces will eventually constrain the room for the state to 
manoeuvre. However, within certain limit, with controlled decentralisation, the state 
may well utili se market forces, including elements of decentralised legal systems, to 
enhance its coordinative capacity. II2 
As states constantly adapt their instruments in response to changing market conditions 
in pursuit of policy goals, 113 it is important to recognise this latter set of tools. Indeed, 
the capacity of an interventionist state to flexibly adapt has been emphasised by a 
number of scholars, in their attempt to formulate a ' new developmental state ' in the 
aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. For example, Trubek argues that for a 
developmental state facing challenges of globalisation and competition, a more 
participatory approach to decision-making is necessary for the state to not only gather 
information and ideas from various societal groups, but also to mobilise broader social 
support. 114 In a similar vein, Brodsgaard and Young argued that the need for 
reconciliation of pluralism with sufficient social unity forms an integral part of the task 
of the developmental state in maintaining a pro-growth environment. It is therefore 
necessary for the state to shift towards a more cooperative, participatory and equitable 
approach in its interaction with the wider society beyond businesses, although this may 
112 Linda Weiss, 'Is the State being 'Transformed' by Globalisation?' in Linda Weiss (ed), Stales in the Global 
Economy: Bring Domestic Institutions Back In (Cambri dge University Press, 2003) 293, 296-8. 
113 Ibid 297. 
114 David M Trubek, ' Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political Economy of 
Development and Law' (University of Wisconsin Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. I 075, October 201 OJ I 0-12 <http://ssrn.com/abstractccl 349163>; Also see Mark Robin son and Gordon Wh ite 
(eds), The Democratic Developmental State: Political and institutional Design (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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ultimately undermine the developmental state.11 5 Indeed, without seeing this enabling 
aspect of market forces, it is difficult to understand the position of the Singaporean 
system, treated by Milhaupt and Pistor as an 'anomaly' on their legal system matrix. 
The system was described by the authors as both highly coordinative (centralised) and 
protective (of individual rights). 116 As will be illustrated in Chapters 6 to 8, this 
enabling aspect of market forces is also important to understand the role of the state in 
China's post-2005 regulation of corporate governance in listed SO Es. 
One other point missing from Milhaupt and Pistor's analysis, which this thesis will seek 
to address, is the interaction between changes in law, including corporate governance 
law, with wider societal changes beyond economic changes. As noted earlier, Milhaupt 
and Pistor focused on the relationship between legal and economic changes which in 
tum leads to changes in the demand of economic (or market) players. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, this focus led the authors to conclude that Chinese corporate governance 
mainly perform a coordinative function, that is, a tool of the state to coordinate the 
interests of government agencies and key economic players involved in listed 
companies, such as their parent SOEs, the listed companies' managers and investors, 
particularly institutional investors. While these categories of players are important to 
corporate governance in China, a single focus on the interaction between law and 
economic changes ignores the evolution of Chinese corporate governance in response to 
demands made on the state for protection by other actors, such as non-shareholder 
stakeholders. Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapter 8, rapid societal changes that go 
beyond economic changes have also shaped the evolution of corporate governance in 
listed SOEs in China over the past few years. 
3.5 Strengths and limitations of the framework 
This chapter has so far set out a three-component theoretical framework for a state 
capitalism and institutional change approach to the analysis of China' s post-2005 legal 
and regulatory reforms concerning the governance in listed SOEs. First, drawing upon 
literature on comparative capitalism, with Hall and Soskice' s VoC approach in 
particular, this chapter has illustrated a well-established link between national economic 
and corporate governance models in the literature. Second, drawing upon scholarship in 
state capitalism, theory of the developmental state and studies of corporate governance 
115 Brodsgaard and Young, above n 51 , 5. 
11 6 MilhauptandPistor, aboven I, 14 7, 183 . 
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of the post-war state-led economies, the chapter has shown that state capitalism plays a 
major part in shaping the role and features of corporate governance in a state-led 
economy. Third, concerning the role of the state in conditioning the pace and direction 
of institutional change, particularly corporate governance change, in state-led 
economies, the chapter has shown that corporate governance in these economies will 
change over time, in response to pressures such as globalisation and the pluralisation of 
interests within society. The state, however, has an important role to play in these 
intertwined processes. This is especially so with centralised legal systems in which the 
state may employ multiple sets of tools, including market forces, in shaping the 
trajectory of changes in the formulation and implementation of corporate law. The 
employment of the multiple tools opens further the door for hybridisation of legal 
systems, with the centralised systems taking on elements of the decentralised ones. 
This, however, does not necessarily lead to a fundamental systemic transformation. 
It is important to point out some limitations of this framework. First, in addition to the 
lack of variety and difficulty to account for change, the VoC literature has been 
criticised for its overemphasis on system cohesion and unity, while downplaying the 
conflicts and contradictions within and, among institutions. 11 7 Indeed, the notion of a 
strong and autonomous state relied upon in the development state theory has been 
suggested by some commentators as a 'myth'. 118 This is because- this notion disguises 
the far more fractured nature of the state even in countries such as post-war Japan as the 
main empirical basis for the developmental state theory. 119 Second, the state capitalism 
literature has also been criticised for its overemphasis on institutional arrangements at 
the national level, while underestimating dynamisms in state-business interactions at 
local levels. 120 Third, while the VoC literature, and Milhaupt and Pistor' s law and 
capitalism analysis, have highlighted the distinctive institutional arrangements in state-
led economies, these studies have largely ignored the quality of enforcement. The lack 
of an enforcement analysis may lead to the impression that 'actors somewhat 
voluntarily follow the formal and informal rules for normative, cognitive or material 
117 Crouch, above n 35, 30-32; Moon and Prasad, above n 46, I 1-12. According to McNally, thi s is especially so 
with transitional economies 'where institutional arrangements are in continuous flux'. See Christopher A 
McNally, ' China's Capitalist Transition: The Making of a New Variety of Capitali sm' (2007) 24 Comparative 
Social Research 177, 179. 
118 Moon and Prasad, above n 46, 12; Sam Teffensen, ' The Weak State of Japan ' in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and 
Susan Young (eds), State Capacity in East Asia (Oxford Uni versity Press, 2000) 17, 36. 
11 9 Moon and Prasad, above n 46, 12; Sam Teffensen, above n 118. 
120 Moon and Prasad, above n 46, 17. 
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reasons ' .121 The quality of enforcement is, however, a key element in explaining the 
divergence between the law-in-the-statute books and the law in practice. For example, 
illustrating the presence of a state-centric model of corporate social responsibility in 
China, Ho showed that various weaknesses associated with state-centred enforcement, 
including the lack of will and/or capacity of state agencies and government officials for 
legal enforcement, may have contributed to the lack of substantial changes in the reality 
of corporate social responsibility performance in China. 122 Ho's analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages of state-led reform of corporate social responsibility is 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
Nevertheless, the three-component framework illustrated in this chapter serves the 
purpose of this research well for several reasons. First, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, the framework provides a solid theoretical foundation for the 
interconnectedness between national systems of corporate governance, and their 
economic development models. Second, as discussed in chapter 2, without ignoring the 
possibility for the existence of a hybrid type of capitalism in China, state capitalism 
captures the dominant economic development model in China. And third, as the 
discussion of state capitalism and institutional change in section 3 .4 suggested, a state-
led capitalism approach to the governance of Chinese listed SOEs does not need to 
ignore the international and domestic dynamics for change at work 
Given these limitations of comparative capitalism as an analytical framework, it is 
conceivable that the governance practice in each listed SOE is likely to be more 
diversified than the stylised account provided in this thesis. However, the main 
objective of this thesis is to explore a conceptual model that may have emerged from 
China's post-2005 legal and regulatory reforms of corporate governance in listed SOEs. 
This objective necessitates a focus on principles and structures of corporate governance 
at the national level, rather than the nuanced differences among individual companies in 
different localities. 
12 1 Natalia Boliari and Kudret Topyan, 'Conceptualizing Institutions and Organizations: A Crit ical Approach ' (2007) 
5 Journal of Business and Economic Research I , 7. 
122 Virginia Harper Ho, 'Beyond Regulation: A Comparative Look at State-Centric Corporate Social Responsibility 
& the Law in China' (2013) 46 Vanderbilt Journal o/Transnationa/ La w 375, 432. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework for a state capitalism and 
institutional change approach to the interpretation of corporate governance development 
in Chinese listed SOEs. Despite its various limitations, this framework serves the 
purpose of this research for a number of reasons, including that it captures the dominant 
economic development model in China without ignoring the international and domestic 
forces for change faced by Chinese corporate governance. 
Different components of the framework will be employed in this research in the 
fo llowing ways. The first two elements, namely, the linkages between national models 
of capitalism and corporate governance, and between state capitalism and the state-led 
model of corporate governance, will be utilised to examine the rationale behind the 
official adoption of the concept of corporate governance in China during the course of 
Chinese SOE reform (the first set of subsidiary research questions to be discussed in 
Chapter 4). These two elements will also be used to analyse the main features of and 
problems with corporate governance in Chinese listed SOEs prior to the 2005 corporate 
law reforms (the second set of subsidiary research questions to be discussed in Chapter 
5). To identify and interpret the model of corporate governance derived from China's 
post-2005 regulation of corporate governance in listed SOEs (the third set of subsidiary 
research questions to be addressed in Chapters 6 to 8), this thesis will draw upon and 
extend Milhaupt and Pistor' s analysis of the role of the state in conditioning legal and 
economic changes in state-led economies. 123 In doing so, this thesis will illustrate 
market-based corporate governance mechanisms and international best practices as a set 
of tools that have been utilised by Chinese policy makers to refract pressures and 
strengthen the coordinative capacity of the state to retain state-led corporate 
governance. 
Finally, to assess the impact of China's post-2005 legal and regulatory reforms on the 
reality of corporate governance in listed SOEs (the fourth set of subsidiary research 
questions to be addressed in Chapter 9), this thesis will draw upon Ho's analysis of the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of state-led reforms of corporate social 
responsibility 124 to supplement Milhaupt and Pistor's theorisation. Chapter 4 proceeds 
123 Milhaupt and Pistor, above n I. 
124 Ho, above n 122, 431-8. 
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by examining the history behind China's official adoption of the concept of corporate 
governance. 
70 
CHAPTER 4 OFFICIAL ADOPTION OF THE CONCEPT OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter traces the official adoption of the concept of corporate governance in 
China. As discussed in Chapter 2, comparative corporate governance researchers often 
use the Anglo-American outsider-based model as the benchmark for assessing corporate 
governance in Chinese listed state-owned enterpri ses (SOEs). In doing so, they appear 
to assume that Chinese policy makers had adopted the Anglo-American concept of 
corporate governance for the same shareholder-oriented objectives, as China embarked 
on corporatisation of SOEs in the early 1990s. However, in setting out the theoretical 
framework for this study, Chapter 3 showed that rather than merely maximising 
financial returns to shareholders, corporate governance in a state-led economy is often 
an instrument of the state to promote economic development through intervention in 
and/or coordination with large businesses. As such, the analysis of the evolution of 
corporate governance in listed SOEs in China requires two interrelated questions to be 
addressed: why did Chinese policy makers embrace the concept of corporate 
governance? And what was the actual concept embraced? 
To answer these two questions, this chapter reviews China's 20-year SOE reform prior 
to the official introduction of the corporate governance concept in 1999. Chinese SOE 
reform before that year may be divided into two stages. The initial stage (1979-1992) 
was characterised by expanding managerial autonomy and incentives within the 
established system of state ownership of enterprises. The second stage, which began 
with the Third Plenum of the 14th Central Committee of the Party in November 1993, 
and lasted till the early 2000s, focused on the transformation of traditional SOEs into 
large corporations and rationalising the state sector. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, 
this trend of institutional reform of SOEs has continued during the third (and current) 
reform stage. This latter stage, which had its inception in the 16th Party's National 
Congress in 2002 (and the subsequent establishment of the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in early 2003), has been mainly 
focused on reforming the system for management of state-owned assets. A timeline for 
Chinese SOE reform over the past three decades is at Appendix 4-1 . 
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Through reviewing the first two stages of SOE reform, this chapter will show that 
instead of the Anglo-American shareholder-oriented objectives, the concept of 
corporate governance in China was adopted mainly to raise the efficiency of 
corporatised SOEs through improving their management. Although the concept had 
been promoted by academics inside China since the early 1990s, official adoption of the 
concept did not occur until the late 1990s, when a number of other measures to reform 
loss-making SOEs had been tried, but achieved limited success. 
Through examining the actual wording of the concept that first appeared in a 1999 Party 
policy document on the reform and development of SO Es, 1 this chapter will also show 
that the concept of corporate governance originally embraced by Chinese policy makers 
was primarily concerned with improving management of corporatised SOEs through 
solving the agency problem between the state and corporate managers without 
removing ultimate state control. As such, in contrast to its Anglo-American counterpart, 
the concept embraced by Chinese policy makers was a state-centred one. 
As will be demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, this concept of corporate governance has 
since evolved. The concept has been enlarged with the incorporation of more investor 
and other stakeholder-friendly principles and structures into Chinese regulatory 
framework. However, the fundamental role of corporate gove1_11ance in promoting 
economic-oriented policy goals has largely remained the same. In that sense, the 
concept continues to align the governance oflisted SOEs in China with the former post-
war state-led model. 
4.2 Official adoption of the concept of corporate governance 
As a matter of socialist ideology and economic practicability, China strictly followed a 
Soviet-style centrally planned economy after the founding of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) in 1949. By 1954, almost all Chinese enterprises had become wholly state-
owned, with their primary function dedicated to implementing state compulsory plans, 
and their needs for funds met by budgetary grants. This state-owned and state-run 
system meant that SOEs had little vitality. Towards the end of 1970s, the whole Chinese 
«'Pfr'P:9c;JcT00fliEIJJ,:r,li::1j!i,f(]'./,:/!U'i'f.llt::kfaJ/l.i!li11Jc)E)) [Decision of the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party on Several Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of State-owned 
Enterprises], Adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the I S'h Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 22 
September 1999 ('1999 Decision'). • 
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industrial economy was on the verge of bankruptcy, which propelled the policy makers 
to embark on a course of market-oriented reforms. 2 
4.2.1 Initial reform efforts 
Initial reform measures focused on improving the operational mechanisms through 
expanding managerial autonomy without disturbing the system of state ownership of 
enterprises. This was in part due to the political and ideological constraints associated 
with privatisation of SOEs, and, in part, that the policy makers did not have a blueprint 
at the outset of the reform.3 As suggested by Wu Jinglian, a leading Chinese economist, 
a basic diagnosis of the problems of SOEs led to the belief that separating state 
ownership from control of enterprises, without abandoning the basic institutional 
framework, could be the solution.4 
Hence, guided by the principle of separation of state ownership from control , initial 
reform measures saw SOE managers granted a wide range of operational decision-
making powers, spanning production planning, employee recruitment, wages and 
bonuses, and imports and exports.5 To provide managers with additional incentives to 
maximise profits, an 'enterprise contract responsibility system' was also introduced 
during the second half of the l 980s.6 Under this system, business operations in most 
industrial and commercial SOEs were contracted to their management or top managers.7 
After fulfilling the contract terms including paying to the government a fixed amount or 
2 In 1978, China had 83,000 SO Es and a large number of urban and rural collectives. The output value of the state-
owned industrial enterprises accounted for 80.80 per cent of the total industri al output in Chin a. For 
commentaries on PRC SOEs in their prc-refonn stage, see Yiping Huang and Ronald Duncan (eds) Refo rm of 
State-o wned Ente1prises in CMna: Autonomy, Incentive and Competition (Asia Pacific Press, 1998). 
3 Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2"d ed, 2004) 242 . 
4 Wu Jinglian, Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform (Thomson South-Western, 2005) 142. 
From 1979 to the early 1990s, a series of regulations were passed by the central government to grant various 
operational rights to enterprise managers. See, cg, ((;)s 'fj)';);:JJ,lgiill::&ill:Ii' I'i"lflJl1eL±:l'R O(];/l' =H.Ji!i'E )) 
[Several Regulations on the Expansion of Operational and Managerial Autonomy of State-run Industrial 
Enterprises) (People 's Republic of China) State Council , 13 July 1979; (( ;)s 'ft:ll, i,!l;JJ,i-s'Iill::&ill:ll',ll'El'ltr"tli' 
IEliief!l~ittt/i'l l3 ll'/ i!ffl tJ-1t(t,J~f'H.!i! i'E)) [Provisional Regulations on Increasing the Depreciation Rate of 
Fixed Assets in State-run Enterprises and Improving the use of Depreciation Payments] (People 's Republic of 
China) State Council , 13 July 1979; (( ;Is 'f itt - :/t Jr- :k 00 fr I ill: :il': ill: El .:!:: tR (J{J ~ ff t.!i! l'E )) [Interim 
Regulations on Further Expanding the Autonomy of State-owned Industrial Enterpri ses] (People's Republi c of 
China) State Council, 10 May 1984; ((:i:fic/i}ifl"flilj i ill:JEill:~J/k~f';;/Jlijjlj~ 171j)) [Regulations on the 
Transfonnati on of the Operational Mechanism of the Enterprises Owned by the Whole People] (People's 
Republic of China) State Council , 30 June 1992. 
«ct<'fi!s{t {l>ill: ~ li[, ii'l l_ill{i>ill: f.'ijJ$(j ;!l'=f(!c)'E)) [Several Decisions on Deepening Enterpri se Reform and 
Invigorating Enterprise Vitality)(People ' s Republic of China) State Council, 5 December 1986. 
7 By the end of 1988, about 95 per cent of SO Es adopted the enterprise contract responsibili ty sys tem. See 9' 9c~J 
g,~_\j;,J,;fttJ-0'.!ic [Office of the Communist Party Centra l Finance and Economic Committee], (( cj,jEcj,9c;)s 
'fOOfl"JEill:~ li[ 'fO,'ft l!![;/l'=f_ill_ :k1oJ /lli(J{J(!c)'E $3Jtili .\r-iJt ~ )) [Speeches on Studying the Decision of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Major Issues Concerning the Refonn and 
Development of State-owned enterpri ses ) (A f\c l±lfJH± [People's Publishing House], 1999) 35. 
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percentage of profits, these managers were allowed to retain the surplus to reward 
themselves and employees. 8 To further encourage decentralisation of state power to 
enterprise managers and profit sharing between the state and enterprises, the principle 
of separation of state ownership and control of SOEs was codified by the Law on 
Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People enacted in 1998. 9 The 1998 Law 
also created the legal person status for SOEs10 for the first time, and required a 'factory 
top manager responsibility system' to be implemented in all industrial SOEs. 11 
The various managerial autonomy expansion-oriented measures adopted during this 
initial stage of SOE reform were complemented by reforms in other areas. These 
included the replacement of budgetary grants with state bank loans (which further laid 
the foundation for the reform of Chinese banking and financial sector that began in 
1993),12 and the introduction of enterprise income tax to replace the profit remission 
system. 13 A dual-track (plan and market) pricing system was also introduced, which 
allowed SOEs to sell to the markets their above-plan outputs. 14 Furthermore, from the 
late 1970s, the central government allowed the non-state sector, comprising collective, 
private and foreign-invested enterprises, to develop alongside SOEs. The rapid growth 
of the non-state sector imposed additional pressure on SOEs to refonn and improve 
their performance. 15 
10 
(( :'E B': /fr fl ili rJ I .ill'. '.iE .ill'. 1J 'elf;,_ Jg ffl: ff ilirJ 'gr fr %c 1Ji1j )) [Interim Regulations on Contract Management 
Responsibility System in Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People] State Council, 27 February 1988, 
art 8. 
((:'EB':/ififfjj;1JI.ill'.J£.ill'.1!)) [Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People] (People 's Republic of 
China) National People's Congress, 13 April 1988, art 2(2); Wu Jinglian, above n 4, 152. 
((:'E B': JifrffilirJ I.ill'.{E.ill'./!)) [Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People] art 2(3). 
11 Ibid art 7. 
12 Yun Chen, Transition and Development in China: Towards Shared Growth (Ashgate, 2008) 132. The Four major 
state-owned banks, as in 1994, were Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank and Agricultural bank. The implementation of the policy of separation of policy and 
commercial banks led to the establishment of several policy banks such as China Development Bank, 
Agricultural Development Bank and China Imports-export Bank were established in 1994. 
13 For the first step, SOEs were also allowed to retain a share of profits and to sell above plan output. The 
Regulations on Enterprise Income Tax was finally introduced by the State Council in 1993. (('t'$A B':1¾l000 
'.i'E.ill'.Jifrfi,f£'gffr %:1JirJ )) [Interim Regulations on Enterprise Income Tax] (People 's Republic of China) State 
Council, 26 November 1993. 
14 Doug Guthrie, China and the Globalisation (Routledge, 2006) 45-46. 
15 Leng Jing, Corporate Governance and Financial Reform in CMna 's Transition Economy (Hong Kong University 
Press, 2009) 44. 
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These initial reform efforts produced some mixed results.16 One of the most significant 
achievements, as Naughton pointed out, was that they allowed the command system to 
be gradually eroded without 'a catastrophic economic decline ' .17 However, the lack of 
efficiency of SOEs persisted, due in part to ambiguity in the construction of their rights 
and responsibilities. As the administrative power over these enterprises remained 
fractured among various government agencies at central and local levels, the expansion 
of managerial decision-making did not prevent bureaucratic interference in the affairs of 
enterprises. 18 Nor did the 'enterprise contracting system' meet the expectation of policy 
makers, as 'managers and workers only took the upside of profit increases', but were 
unable to bear the consequences of their failures. 19 Furthermore, the short-term nature 
of the management contracts encouraged managerial opportunism in various forms, 
ranging from relentless pursuit of production outputs while neglecting inputs to outright 
stripping of enterprise assets.2° From 1986, the need to improve the efficiency of SO Es, 
and to expand their equity financing, propelled the central government to pilot the 
Western idea of corporatisation in selected cities and enterprises.21 This further paved 
the way for the second stage of Chinese SOE reform, namely, the transformation of 
traditional SOEs into corporations and the rationalisation of the state sector. 
4.2.2 Corporatisation, partial listing and restructuring the state sector 
The second stage of SOE reform had its inception at the Third Plenum of the 14th 
Central Committee of the Party in 1993, which also marked a turning point in China's 
approach to its overall economic reform. At the Third Plenum, the Party decided to 
establish a 'socialist market economy' , defined as 'giving the basic role of allocation of 
resources to the market forces but under state macroeconomic control' (the 1993 
16 Andrew Yuen and Aning Zhang, 'An Economic Perspective on Recent Corporate Governance Developments in 
China with Comments on Chapters by Yang, Gu and Wang' in Masao Nakamura (ed), Changing Corporate 
Governance Practices in China and Japan (Palgrave macmillan, 2008) 63 , 64. 
17 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (TI1e MIT Press, 2006) 325. 
18 
.!1,fl(lfoj [Ma Junju] «JJM~:1£'1t~1-i!HJi1j)l'liJl')t)) [A Legal System for Modem Enterpri ses] (~ l!lt :±l/1&1± [China 
Law Press], 2000) 52. 
19 Leng, above n 15, 42-43. 
'
0 9':RJ!;tfH!ll.\l<iJ,t.lJ.;/}0~ [Office of the Communist Party Central Finance and Econom ic Committee], above n 
7, 20; Jian Chen, Corporate Governance in China (RoutledgeCurzon, 2005) 39. 
21 Ross Garnaut, Ligang Song, Yang Yao, ' Impact and Significance of State-Owned Enterprise Restructuring in 
China' in Belton Fleisher el al (eds), Policy Reform and Chinese Markets: Progress and Challenges (Edward 
Elgar, 2008) 38 , 40; «okr il1HtJEill'.i&lit, tl!il!iiJE-'1tmfJB~05-'f(kJ'E}) [ Several Provisions on Deepening the 
Enterprise Reform and Enhancing Enterprise Vitality] (People's Republic of China) Stale Council , 5 December 
1986. 111is document allowed local governments to select large to medium-sized local SOEs to pilot the 
shareholding system. 
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Decision).22 As such, as noted in Chapter 2, the 'bottom-up' approach employed in the 
first stage of SOE reform, based on gradualism, experimentalism and decentralisation, 
gave way to a more 'top-down' approach that focused on capacity building of the central 
state and development oflarge SOEs.23 
At the same Plenum, the Party also announced that the 'modem enterprise system ', 
essentially the corporate system, was to be established in SO Es. 24 The system was 
considered a crucial component of the 'socialist market economy' , and was described as 
having the following four major aspects: (1) clearly established property rights; (2) 
clearly-defined powers and responsibilities (among parties involved in the management 
of SOEs, so that each enterprise could be genuinely responsible for its own profit and 
losses); (3) separation of enterprise from government, and ( 4) scientific management.25 
This description of the 'modem enterprise system ' has been regarded by some Anglo-
American researchers as the official endorsement of the Western concept of corporate 
governance in China. For example, in a World Bank commissioned report in 2002, 
Tenev et al saw the concept of 'modem enterprise system' entail : 
[t]he corporate structure, governance, and management based on the principle of 
corporatisation, and with the provisions for full separation of the state's exercise of 
ownership rights from the enterprises' exercise of legal person property rights.26 
A similar observation was also made by Tam, who believed that the policy emphasis of 
the 'modem enterprise system' was 'on establishing a desired fo rm of arrangements for 
corporate governance' . 27 
However, according to Wu Jinglian, the 1993 Decision did not 'give a specific 
definition for modem corporate governance' .28 As the reinvigoration of SOEs through 
separation of state ownership and control of enterprises continued to dominate the 
22 
«9':l¾9':9<9<-'fili1z:U¾±:5<'.rli JMf/J'ff;jcjj;1J;f§'f fo]/lfila<J1/c)E)) [Decision of the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party on Some Major Issues Concerning the Establishment of the System of Socialist 
Market Economy], Adopted at the Third Plenum of the 14•h Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 
14 November 1993 (' /993 Decision ' ). 
23 Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 168-9; /999 Decision, above n I. 
24 J 993 Decision, above n 22. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Stoyan Tenev and Chunlin Zhang with Loup Brefort, Corporate Governance and Eme,prise Reform in China 
(The World Bank and the Internati onal Finance Corporation, 2002) 16. 
27 On kit Tam, The Development of Corporate Governance in China (Edward Elgar, 1999) 7. 
28 Wu Jinglian, above n 4, 152. 
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thinking of policy makers, the 1993 Decision focused more on corporatisation as a tool 
to expand the autonomy of SOEs, rather than the actual governance of these 
enterprises. 29 
Indeed, as pointed out by some other Chinese commentators, including Zhou 
Xiaochuan, fonner Chairman of the China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC), 
the term 'corporate governance' was not officially adopted by the Party until 1999.30 
This notion, if was present at all in the minds of Chinese policy makers at the onset of 
the corporatisation reform, was nothing more than 'promotion of higher efficiency 
through better management' _31 As discussed in section 4.3, the subsequent adoption of 
the concept by the Party was for a similar purpose. 
As corporatisation was officially endorsed as the new direction for the reform of SO Es, 
a number of more specific measures were quickly implemented. First, from 1994, the 
central government selected 100 large SO Es to pilot the modem enterprise system.32 
Another 2600 SOEs were also selected by local governments. This was followed by the 
Party's call to establish the 'modem corporate system' in all large and medium-sized 
SO Es in 1997. 33 Second, the first PRC Company Law34 was introduced in 1993 to 
facili tate corporatisation of SOEs, and to provide the ' legal underpinnings for the 
concept of a modem enterprise system'. 35 The Company Law provided three types of 
companies that could be utilised by incorporated SOEs, namely, wholly-state owned 
companies, limited liability companies (with no more than 50 shareholders, similar to 
the definition of proprietary companies under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 
29 !,!; 11/E ii!,: [Wu Xiaobo] «!J!:1/i!l liHtnl [The Biography of Wu Jinglian] (9'1§ t!J~:/-1 [CITIC Publishing House], 
20 10) 76. 
30 cp['l,1 )1.RJtHffr-l<s:JliH,JI [ [People's Bank of China President Zhou, Xiaochuanl, ' fE'l°fl' _l:.r!I0i'i'Jiitlfil t!N!:il'i 
.its:r!I¼.:l<:!lli' [lmproving Corporate Govemance of Listed Companies to Promote Development of the Capital 
Market] (Speech delivered at the China Forum: Capital Market and Corporate Governance, I December 2004) 
<http: //www.china.eom.cn/chinese/OP-c/7 18350.htm>; Also see Jane Fu, Corporate Disclosure and Corporate 
Governance in China (Kluwer Law International , 20 10) 4. 
31 Donald Clarke, 'Corporate governance in China: An Overview' (2003) 14 China Economic Review 494, 497; 
Roman Tomasic and Jenny Jianrong Fu, 'Government-owned Companies and Corporate Governance in Australia 
and China: Beyond Fragmented Governance' (2006)3 Corporate Ownership and Control 123, 124. 
32 :!!i fJZ'lil [M a Junju], above n 18, 57. 
33 i'.I/'t-1'\'; [Jiang Zemin], «'i'E'P OO;!=!;i"":Jtm+IiJj:,i,l'l,lf\'.$:::k¾ J:(J{}tl,l.'a )) [Report at the I 5'h Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party] (12 September 1997) 
<hrtp: //cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64 168/64568/65445/4526285. hanl>. 
34 
«cpi/")\.i'\';;l=!;fl] \l,10i'i'Ji't)) [Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (People's Republi c of China) 
National Peopl e's Congress Standing Committee, 29 December 1993 (' /993 PRC Company law' ). 
35 Tenev and Zhang with Brefort, above n 26. 
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(Cth) 36 ) , and joint stock companies (similar to the public companies under the 
Australian Corporations Act37). It also specified the corporate organs, including the 
general meeting, the board of directors and the board supervisors, and stated their 
respective functions within each type of company. Third, the Shanghai and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were established in 1990 and 1991 respectively. In 1998, 
the two exchanges were taken over by the CSRC from their local governments to 'serve 
better the needs of the nation' .38 As will be further illustrated in Chapter 5, the two 
stock exchanges, as subdivisions of the CSRC, have since served as a main source of 
equity financing for reforming SOEs. In a similar vein, the first PRC Securities Law 
was enacted in 1998.39 
As stated above, the purpose of corporatisation of SOEs was not privatisation. 
Therefore, a split share structure was devised to allow the state to retain a controlling 
shareholding in most joint stock companies which had been converted from SOEs. 
Under this scheme, shares in incorporated SOEs were divided into three types according 
to the nature of ownership: namely, state shares, (state) legal person shares and 
individual or public shares.40 State shares are shares converted from the total assets of 
the former SOEs, and vested in responsible government departments or authorised state 
investment bodies. The latter include parent SOEs of large state-owned enterprise 
groups authorised by the State Council to hold shares in their subsidiaries on behalf of 
the state. Legal person shares are shares acquired by SOEs with their own capital. Only 
individual shares issued to the public were allowed to be traded on stock exchanges.4 1 
Hence, the state, through state and state legal person shares, retained about two thirds of 
non-tradeable shares in the vast majority of listed companies. Indeed, under the 1993 
Company Law, non-tradeable shares in a listed company could amount to up to 85 per 
36 Corporations A ct 200 I (Cth) s 113 ( I). 
37 Ibid sl 12 ( ! ). 
38 Jian Chen, above n 20, 35. 
39 (( 9'$./\Ji';~f[]l'i,li}E~$)) [Securities Law of the People's Republic of China] (People's Republic of China) 
National People's Congress, 29 December 1998. 
40 The distinction between state, state legal person and indi vidual shares has been stipulated in a number of official 
documents , eg, (( ffitfjj-,j;1J{t'1J,i,t¢.i;/J-$ )) [Measures on the Experiment of Joint Stock Companies] (People's 
Republ ic of China) State System Reform Commission, State Planning Commi ssion, Ministry of Finance, 
People's Bank of Ch ina and State Council Production Office, 15 May 1992. 
41 Ibid. 
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cent, where the company had a registered capital above RMB400 million 
(approximately AUD66 million).42 
Concentrated share ownership in listed SOEs was also contributed to by a system of 
quota control over public issue of shares and partial listing of parent SO Es. The system 
of quota control was introduced in 1994, and was designed to ensure the quality of 
Chinese listed companies by creating incentives for central and local authorities to bring 
the best companies onto the stock market. 43 Under the system, annual share issue quotas 
were allocated to different provincial governments and ministries. This, however, 
encouraged the latter to grant quotas primarily to SOEs under their control rather than 
enterprises in the private sector. 44 Nevertheless, riddled with bad debts and non-
performing loans, the vast majority of SOEs could hardly satisfy the criteria of three 
consecutive years ' profits for listing set in the 1993 Company Law.45 Thus, rather than 
listing the parent enterprise, most SOEs took advantage of a concession offered by the 
Company Law that allowed issuers restructured from SOEs to use pro-forma profit 
records,46 and split a profitable line of business or 'dressed up' an existing subdivision 
for the specific purpose of listing.47 This practice was also encouraged by the central 
government, because it was regarded as a practical solution to the problem of SOEs.48 
The concentrated ownership structure in listed SOEs has sine~ continued. This is 
despite the removal of the quota system in late 2000, and the 'split share structure 
reform' in 2005 that converted all non-tradeable shares into tradeable shares.49 A listed 
SOE is usually controlled by an unlisted, and typically wholly state-owned, parent SOE. 
42 1993 PRC Company law art 152(4). 
43 Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, ' Governing Emerging Stock Markets: Legal vs. Administrati ve 
Governance' (2005) 13 Corporate Governance: An International Review 5, 8. 
44 Yuwa Wei, 'China's Capital Market and Corporate Governance: the Promotion of the External Governance 
Mechanism' (2007) 4 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 325, 337. 
45 /993 PRC Company law art 152(3) 
46 Ibid art 152(3). 
47 Tenev, Zhang with Loup Brefort, above n 26, 75. 
48 See, eg, 1999 Decision above n I; «~'fm:it:kl\!1Jt'1l'.1:IHlJi,':.~Iif □~:!e:!Jil. )) [Opinions on Deepening the 
Experiment with Large Enterprises Groups] (People's Republi c of China) State Planning Commission, the State 
Economic and Trade Commission and the State System Refonn Commission, 8 April 1997. Similar Guidelines 
have also been issued by provincial governments. 
49 « ~ 'f __t rli 0 ii! !llt ,\l( 5r ',i <& .1fi iA #.. 11 ~ fii] ~ 8'I ii!Ha )) [[Notice on Relevant Issues concerning the Pilot 
Reforn1 of Split Share Structure in Listed Companies] (People's Republic of China)China Securi ties Regulatory 
Commission, 29 Apri l 2005, s 3 (4); 0< T ..t.Jti0 ii!/llt1"(5rr./.c:li. .1fiB'lnl ~:l#..')il.)) [Guiding Opinion on 
Reforming the Split Share Structure in Li sted companies] (People's Republic of China) China Securiti es 
Regulatory Commission, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, Ministyy of Finance, 
People' s Bank of China and Ministry of Commerce, 23 August 2005 . 
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Indeed, as Chapter 5 will illustrate, group affiliation was one of the main factors 
affecting the governance practice in listed SOEs prior to the 2005 corporate law 
reforms. 
During the second stage of the SOE reform, a process that went hand-in-hand with 
corporatisation was the state-led formation of large state-controlled enterprise groups.50 
With the trial of corporatisation underway, the Party soon realised that it was not 
beneficial either economically or practically for the State to retain ownership in the 
majority of SOEs. By 1996, there were approximately 305,000 SOEs in China. 51 
However, the largest 1000 accounted for about two-thirds of the total assets held by all 
industrial SOEs and more than 70 per cent of sales revenue, profits, and tax receipts of 
all SOEs in China.52 The remainder of the state sector was permeated by 'too many too 
small' enterprises, exacerbating the overall inefficiency of the Chinese industrial 
economy.53 
Hence, at the Fifth Plenum of the 14th Central Committee of the Party in September 
1995, the Party announced a policy to reorganise the state sector by following the 
principle of 'grasping the large and letting go of the small' (Zhuada Fangxiao). 54 This 
meant that the state would set free the small SOEs through various means, from leasing 
to full privatisation. It would, however, retain control of the larg~ ones and transform 
them into 'highly competitive modem enterprise groups'. 55 The subsequently released 
national Ninth Five-Year Plan (I 996-2000) stated that the central government would 
'grab and re-invigorate' 1,000 large SOEs to be selected. 56 Provincial governments 
were also called upon to grasp and develop their local key SOEs. 57 Apart from 
'° As Wei observed, the SOE reform "enabled the government to corporatise SO Es on one hand, and assemble them 
into corporate groups on the other'. Yuwa Wei, Comparative Corporate Governance, A Chinese Perspective 
(Kluwer Law Internati onal , 2003) 60. 
SI The World Bank, China 's Management of Enterprise Assets: The Stale as Shareholder (The World Bank, 
1997) 5. 
52 Ibid; Garnaut, Song and Yao, above n 21, 40 
53 China had I, 11 8 automotive enterprises in 1994. TI,e total assets (the bulk of which were state-owned) and sales 
volume of these enterprises, however, amounted to only 5.89 per cent and 7.26 per cent of General Motor, and 
5.26 per cent and 8.94 per cent of Ford. See %}!;/ffi [ JiXiang Zhang], ((i;i,)fj"~/Jlt0"1!ll!it!:.i '.et li!lt )) [Theory 
and Practice on State Holding Companies] (i:iiJ'fr4"¥= tl:l l\&U [Economic Science Press], 1999) 80. 
54 lii't[I'; [Jiang Zem in], ((i'£j,;[J{] -j- lZ!l f,f,1icj,3':~ _t::0%/1ii'i)) [Speech at the Fifth Plenum of the Fourteenth 
Party Central Committee] (16 October 1995). 
55 Ibid. 
56 (( cj, $ .A. ti'; ;l=!c ;fai;i,Ji;i,) ti';i:i>/J'flot±~a~•jL1i'it:JVJ:f[] 2 0 l 0 !f.izL:;1: § f;j; !lig~ )) [Outline of the Ninth Five-
Year Plan on Nat ional Economic and Social Development and Strategic Vision and Main Targets for 2010), 
Adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the Eighth National People's Congress, 17 March 1996. 
57 Ibid. 
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consolidating the state sector, the fonnation of large state-owned corporate groups 
served a number of auxiliary purposes, such as maintaining employment levels by 
allowing larger and better performing SOEs to absorb other smaller and poor-
performing ones. 58 However, the project took on a new urgency towards the end of the 
1990s, due in part to China's much-anticipated WTO accession that eventuated in late 
2001 . Accordingly, the goal of establishing 'a team of internationally competitive large 
corporate groups' was incorporated into the PRC 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005).59 ln 
this regard, the impressive role played by the Japanese and South Korea large corporate 
groups, during their post-war high economic growth period, had greatly inspired 
Chinese policy makers. 60 
Consistent with the state-led approach to corporatisation, top-down transplants were 
also utilised in fostering large enterprise groups. The various paths to group fonnation 
fell under two broad categories. The first was government-arranged mergers of loss-
making SOEs with larger or better performing ones. At the national level , previously in 
1991 , the central government launched a project to form around I 00 large enterprise 
groups, and 57 large SOEs were selected for the trial. 61 The number was increased to 
120 in 1997.62 In addition to the 'national team' , every province also organised its own 
'provincial team'. 63 
The second category involved the conversion of government departments and industrial 
bureaus into state holding companies. Under the planned system, China had about 30 
line ministries in charge of different industries, such as petro-chemical, textile and 
58 Lisa Keister, 'Engineering Growth: Business Group Structure and Firm Performance in China's Transitional 
Economy' ( 1998) I 04 American Journal of Sociology 404, 404. 
59 
«OO f1;Jfilf ;fa l±~ti1:!!Ulli-1'li if:ii-:\\1Jffiill'» [Outline of the Tenth Five-year Plan on National Economic 
and Social Development], adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the Ninth National People's Congress, 15 March 
2001. 
60 Peter Nolan, China and the Global Economy: Na tional Champions, Industrial Policy, and the Big Business 
Revolution (Palgrave Macmillan, 200 I) 15. 
61 
62 
«oo•~m•oo•*• · m••~•- m•~~~~0•~r••-m*lli{t~affimff•~-~~• 
ffi» [Circular of the State Council on Endorsing the Request of the State Planning Commission, System Refonn 
Commission and the State Council Production Administration Office to Select the First Batch of Enterpri ses to 
Experiment the Large Enterprise Group System] (People's Republic of China) State Council , 14 December 199 1. 
((;1crilil f-L*lliiE~a ffi •. siI11cll',J fi: .l\!.» [Opinions on Deepening the Experiment with Large Enterprises 
Groups] (People's Republic of China) State Planning Commission, the State Economic and Trade Commission 
and the State System Reform Commission, 8 Apri l 1997. 
63 Peter Nolan, ' Evaluation of the World Bank's Contribution to Chinese Enterprise Refonn ', (The World Bank, I 
January 2005)http://lnweb l8.worldbank.org 
/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/ DocUNIDV iewFor JavaSearch/C I I 5BD744564229F85256FF00059088C/$fil e/china cae ent 
erprise_refonn.pdf; Aimin Chen and Ping Li , 'The Fonnation, Restructuring, and Performance ofChine-;e -
Enterprise Groups: The Case of Liaoning Province' (2008) 41 Chinese Economy 72. 
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electric power. Through the process of corporatisation, most of the line ministries were 
converted into one or several state holding companies with their administrative 
functions transferred to an umbrella central government agency, namely the State 
Economic and Trade Commission, the predecessor of the State Economic Reform and 
Development Commission.64 Many of China's largest corporate groups, such as China 
Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC), and China Nonferrous Metal Industrial 
Corporation (the predecessor of the Aluminium Corporation of China) were formed in 
this way. 65 Similar arrangements also took place in various municipalities with respect 
to their local line bureaus.66 
Similar to the corporatisation process, the project of building large corporate groups 
was assisted with a broad array of policy supports. These included state-bank loans, tax 
deals, cheap land, privileged listing on international and domestic markets, and 
government procurement policy.67 
The second reform stage set SOEs on the path of growing into globally competitive 
large businesses, which has since remained one of the government's key objectives. 
However, by the end of the 1990s, many SO Es remained financiall y unviable. Among 
the 16,874 large and medium-sized SO Es in 1997, approximately 40 per cent ( or 6,599) 
ran at loss. 68 Furthermore, as a side effect of the reform that substituted budgetary 
grants with bank loans, the average debt-to-equity ratio of SO Es dramatically increased 
from over 30 per cent at the start of the refonn, to more than 65 per cent in 1998.69 
Many SO Es were operating at below half capacity due to serious financial difficulty. 70 
Many factors may have contributed to the continuing inefficiencies of SOEs. These 
included the influence of the traditional system of SOEs under the 40-year planned 
64 
,lU.JiJll! [Zhang Chengyao], ((!!J!i!.w;;ftfl: 'P00:ibll'. i;!(,i!i-ti\,;$Jj{)) [The Carp Jumping over the Dragon 's 
Gate: A Memorandum of Chinese Enterprise Reform] (i's'iJ'ft4# t±l~U [Economic Science Publishing House], 
1999) 45-47; Barry Naughton, ' The State Asset Commission: A Powerful New Government Body' (2003) 8 
China l eadership Monitor I, 4 <http://v,ww.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-mon itor/article/7836>. 
65 **1ill! [Zhang Chengyao], above n 64, 45-7. 
66 i(u,J,1; (Liu Xiaoxuan], ((cpl'l,l¾~.<X!!HR'a (1999-2000) )) [Report of the Chinese Enterprise Development 
1999-2000] (H4ft1f!ji::zllil(t±l/\&U [Social Sciences Academic Press], 2000) 83. 
67 For a discussion on the various industrial policy supports , see Nolan, 'Evaluation of the World Bank's 
Contribution to Chinese Enterprise Refonn ' above n 63 . 
68 
'PJc~;/f;,®\_\,j, ,J,;ft;/}0¥ [Offi ce of the Communist Party Central Finance and Economic Committee], above n 
7, 60. 
69 Ibid 43. 
70 Ibid 42. 
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economy, and the poor adaptation of SOEs to the market that had emerged with the 
overall economic reform. 71 An overemphasis of the corporate form over corporate 
governance has, however, been identified by commentators, such as Wu Jinglian, as an 
important factor.72 According to Hu Angang and Hu Guangyu, the key problem with 
these newly corporatised SOEs was insider control by managers. This was reflected in 
the widespread comingling of the board of directors with senior management, and that 
the board of supervisors 73 was set up merely as a formality. This problem further led to 
serious corruption and rampant depletion of state assets. 74 
Against this background, at the First Plenum of the 15th Central Committee of the Party 
in September 1997, the Party launched an ambitious plan to tum the majority of large 
and medium-sized SOEs from loss-making to profit-making ones within three years, 
and to establish the modem enterprise system among the majority of these 'key SO Es' 
during the same time frame (the '1997 Plan'). 75 Some drastic means were undertaken to 
achieve these goals. These included liquidation of many insolvent enterprises and a 
massive lay off of workers.76 
4.2.3 The 1999 Party decision and the formal adoption of the concept of corporate 
governance 
Against this backdrop, the term 'corporate governance' was formally introduced by the 
Party in its 1999 Decision on Several Important Issues on the Reform and Development 
of State-owned Enterprises adopted at the fourth Plenum of the 15th Party Central 
Committee (the 1999 Decision). 
The promulgation of the 1999 Decision was, in itself, a significant milestone in the 
history of Chinese SOE reform. The Decision reiterated the 1997 Plan, and set out the 
goals for the SOE reform in the next IO years and the relevant guidelines and strategies. 
The Decision made it clear that the state sector would continue to play a leading role in 
71 Ibid2. 
72 Wu Jinglian, above n 4, I 55. 
73 The 1993 PRC Company Law required all joint stock companies to establish a general meeting, a board of 
directors and a board of supervisors. 1993 PRC Company Law arts 102, I 12, 124. 
74 1Vl i/'1iffl, /;Jl :)'(; '¥ [Hu Angang and Hu Guangyu], ''iH1L ll-t J!Jl't'000jjjii,J'll,g(j @]J®i'fO~jj1• [An Overview of 
Chinese Corporate Governance in Transition] , in Hu Angang and Hu Gangyu (eds) ((0 jjj ii,J'll,'t' Jf r~ix)) [A 
Comparative Study on Chinese and Foreign Corporate Governance] (!1'fr$ll\l,lii_t± [Xinhua Publishing House], 
2003) I, 29. 
75 iI/¥ B.'; [Jiang Zemin] , (( J'E't' OO~r '.i<: J,ll+ 1il.X-i:00 1-l:'ilt:k:%Jc s(JJ'~-a-)) [Report at the 15•h Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party] above n 33. 
76 1999 Decision , above n 1. 
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the national economy. And for the first time, it identified several strategic sectors and 
industries that should continue to be controlled by the state. 77 In response to the 
widespread practice of corporatisation only 'in fonn', the 1999 Decision stressed that, 
except for a small number of SOEs that should remain wholly-owned by the state for 
strategic reasons, the rest of the large and medium-sized SOEs should be transformed 
into multiple-shareholder joint stock companies. The Decision also reiterated the 
Party's intention to foster a group of internationally competitive large businesses in the 
state sector. 
The 1999 Decision stressed that the corporate system was an effective means to 
organise the 'modem enterprise system', and went on to state: 
Corporate governance (Faren Zhili Jiegou) is the core of the corporate system. The 
responsibilities of the general meeting, the board of directors and the board of 
supervisors should be clarified, and a system of corporate governance with 
synchronised operations and checks and balances among all responsible corporate 
organs should be established. 78 
Hence, the Party laid central importance on corporate governance. This marked a 
significant shift in the Chinese official thinking about the means to improve the 
management, and therefore efficiency, of SOEs. The over-simplified emphasis of 
separation of state ownership and control of SOEs as one of the predominant 
philosophies underpinning previous reform measures had been replaced by a focus on 
corporate governance to keep the managers accountable to those from whom they 
derive authority. 
4.3 The actual concept of corporate governance adopted 
Studies on corporate governance in listed SOEs in China had preceded the Party's 
formal adoption of the concept in 1999. For example, Wu Jinglian promoted the 
adoption of the Anglo-American concept of corporate governance into China as early as 
August 1993.79 Wu defined corporate governance as : 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
[t]he organisational structure consisting of owner, board of directors and senior 
managers. A check and balance relationship is formed within that structure, through 
which the owner entrusts its capital to the board of directors. The board of directors is 
79 
~ll/i;ilii [Xiaobo Wu], above n 29, 76-77. 
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the highest level of decision-making of the company and has the power to appoint, 
reward, penalise, or dismiss senior managers. 80 
Several other definitions of corporate governance have been offered by various Chinese 
scholars along similar lines.8 1 
At first glance, the concept of corporate governance adopted in the 1999 Decision is not 
significantly different from Wu's definition. An examination of the governance 
structure recommended in the 1999 Decision, however, suggests that the concept 
introduced by the Party was mainly concerned with solving the agency problem 
between the state and managers. The importance of corporate governance as a means to 
protect the interests of minority shareholders, central to the Anglo-American notion of 
corporate governance, was largely ignored. 
The 1999 Decision urged corporatised SO Es to set up an effective structure of corporate 
governance. In doing so, it specified the proper roles for various corporate organs, such 
as the general meeting, the board of directors and the board of supervisors, along the 
lines of the 1993 Company Law. The importance of establishing the related systems of 
monitoring and incentives, such as perfonnance evaluation of the managers, was also 
mentioned. However, there was more. The Decision required such bodies as the Party 
Committee (the enterprise-based grassroots-level Party organisatio_n), the trade union, 
and the employee representative congress to 'perform their roles and responsibilities 
according to the relevant law'. All these latter three bodies are, however, affiliated to 
the Party. For example, a reference to the Trade Union Law would reveal that all 
Chinese trade union organisations come under the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU), the only legal trade union body in China, and subject to the 
leadership of the Party. 82 The trade union organisation is the working body of the 
employee representative congress in a SOE. 83 
Furthermore, the 1999 Decision went beyond the company law stipulations by 
proposing to strengthen the role of the Party in wholly-stated owned and state-
controlled companies. This was to be implemented through a system which has since 
80 Wu Jinglian, The Focus of the Reform in 1995' (in Chinese), mimeograph, citied in On Kit Tam, The 
Development of Corporate Governance in China (Edward Elgar, 1999) 19. 
81 Tam, above n 80. 
82 ((cp$Ai'lo :Jli'fOl'EII~~)) [Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China] (People's Republic of 
China) National People' s Congress Standing Committee, 27 October, 2001 (first introduced on 3 April 1992) arts 
4, 10, 11. 
83 Ibid art 35(2). 
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been referred to as 'bilateral entry and cross appointments' .84 The system encourages 
members of the Party Committee to be appointed as company directors or supervisors. 
It also encourages that the positions of the Party Secretary, as the leader of the 
company-based Party Committee, and the chairperson of the board of directors, be 
assumed by one person.85 
Nevertheless, by contrast with the strong emphasis on improving the management of the 
incorporated SOEs, the issue of investor protection, a central focus of the Anglo-
American outsider-based model of corporate governance, was not particularly 
emphasised in the 1999 Decision. The document briefly stated that 'the board of 
directors should maintain the interests of investors and be responsible to the general 
meeting'. 86 There was, however, no mention of minority shareholder protection. This 
was despite the fact that, as discussed in Chapter 2, the need for investor protection is 
typically greater in companies with concentrated share ownership. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The chapter has traced the Chinese two-stage SOE reform that led to the official 
adoption of the concept of corporate governance in China, particularly through the 
Party's 1999 Decision on Several important issues on the Reform and Development of 
State-owned Enterprises. In doing so, this chapter bas shown that instead of 
shareholder-oriented objectives, the concept was adopted by the Chinese Party-state to 
raise the efficiency of SOEs through improving their management. As such, Chinese 
policy makers did not embrace the full version of the Anglo-American concept of 
corporate governance. 
This chapter has shown that the concept embraced by the Party was two-fold. First, 
consistent with the Chinese form of state capitalism, it was not aimed at removing state 
control of corporatised SOEs, particularly the large SOEs considered to be strategic by 
the state. Second, the concept was mainly concerned with improving the management of 
the large corporatised SOEs through solving the agency problem between the state, as 
the controlling shareholder, and managers. In contrast, the broader agency problems 
84 Oc'r:llll5st'fll~ill9' 3<1£~:lt~I j'),(t,J~J)i'.)) [Opinion on Strengthening and Improving Party Bui lding Work 
in Central Government-affiliated SOEs] (People"s Republic of China)The Organisational Department of the 
Central Party Committee and the Party Committee of lhe State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, 31 October 2004. 
85 1999 Decision, above n 1. 
86 Ibid. 
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between managers and shareholders as a whole, and between the controlling and 
minority shareholders, which are central to the Anglo-American concept of corporate 
governance (as discussed in Chapter 2), was not considered an important concern. As 
Chapter 5 will demonstrate, this two-fold notion underpinned the law and practice in 
relation to corporate governance in Chinese listed SOEs prior to the 2005 corporate law 
reforms. 
As will be illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, this concept of corporate governance has 
evolved over the past few years, and become expressive of forces such as economic 
globalisation and the pluralisation of interests within Chinese domestic society. The 
adoption of more investor and stakeholder-friendly rules and principles has led to a 
much broader notion of corporate governance in China. 
However, in terms of the relevant importance of the state, public investors and other 
stakeholders within listed SOEs, as the ensuing chapters will demonstrate, the 
fundamental role of corporate governance in promoting policy goals has largely 
remained unchanged, and therefore, remains the key factor in aligning Chinese 
corporate governance to a state-centric approach. 
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CHAPTER 5 MAIN FEATURES OF AND PROBLEMS WITH 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN LISTED SOES 
PRIOR TO THE 2005 CORPORATE LAW 
REFORMS 
5.1 Introduction 
Having considered the official adoption of the concept of corporate governance in 
China during the course of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) refonn, this chapter 
addresses the second set of subsidiary research questions by examining the law and 
practice concerning the governance of listed SO Es in the lead up to the 2005 corporate 
law reforms. In doing so, this chapter serves the main purpose of this research from two 
perspectives. First, it tests the applicability of the post-war former state-led model of 
corporate governance to Chinese listed SOEs during this period. Second, it helps to 
elucidate the rationale behind China's post-2005 legal and regulatory refonns 
concerning the governance of these companies. These reforms will be examined in the 
ensuing four chapters. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. To set the background, section 5.2 provides a 
brief overview of the regulatory environment for corporate governance in China prior to 
2005 and the key regulatory and market actors involved in that environment. As will be 
shown in the next two chapters, these actors have largely remained unchanged post the 
corporate law reforms. Sections 5.3 to 5.5 examine China's pre-2005 law and practice 
concerning the three sets of company relations central to the former state-led model, 
namely, state-manager relations, investor protection and non-shareholder stakeholder 
(including employee) protection, within large listed SOEs. The three sections wi ll each 
focus on one set of these relations, and in that order. In each section, the main features 
of the relevant legal and regulatory framework will be examined. This is followed by 
empirical evidence on how the framework played out in reality. The empirical evidence 
will be drawn from original data collected from 2002 to 2004 through an Australian 
Research Council (ARC)-funded project on the governance of China's top 100 listed 
companies (ARC project). The details of the ARC project, including the role of this 
author in it, were explained in Chapter I. As also noted in that chapter, the 
overwhelming majority of these companies were (and remain) controlled by the state. 
The various problems underlying the law and practice concerning each of the relevant 
sets of company relations will also be identified and discussed in sections 5.3 to 5.5. 
88 
Section 5.6 summarises the main findings and their implications for understanding 
China's post-2005 corporate governance reforms. 
This chapter will show that the governance of state-controlled listed companies in China 
prior to the 2005 reforms resembled some key features of the former state-led model. 
Yet, the Chinese model had some characteristics of its own. Similar to the former state-
led model, state-manager relations in listed SOEs were characterised by strong state 
involvement in management decision-making. However, extensive management powers 
vested in the general meeting and the Chairman of the board of directors, coupled with 
lax internal and external monitoring of the exercise of those powers, led to a dual 
governance problem in these companies. Strong state intervention in corporate affairs 
paradoxically co-existed with insider control by senior corporate executives and parent 
SOEs. This dual problem appeared to have undermined not only managerial efficiency, 
but also the effectiveness of state control over these large companies. 
In relation to the protection of investors and other stakeholders including employees, 
similar to the fonner state-led model, China's pre-2005 corporate governance was 
characterised by the muted voice of outsider investors and poor protection of non-
shareholder stakeholders, except employees. Nevertheless, compared to the fonner 
state-led model, exploitation of minority shareholders by parent SOEs appeared to be 
far more common and serious in Chinese companies. This was, in part, contributed by 
the lack of provision for shareholder rights and remedies in the corporate law, and in 
part, the overlapping roles of the state as the controlling shareholder, a stock market 
regulator and adjudicator of securities-related disputes. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 8, China's fostering of internationally competitive large 
enterprises took place in far more dynamic and complex international and domestic 
environments, compared to the former post-war state-led economies. Economic 
globalisation and the pluralisation of interests within domestic society increased 
pressure on the state to improve the governance of listed SOEs. As such, many legal and 
regulatory reforms post-2005 can be better understood as tools to solve various 
governance problems with these companies, including the problems highlighted in this 
chapter, rather than a pure indication of China's greater embrace of any of the prevailing 
international corporate governance models including the Anglo-American model. 
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5.2 Pre-2005 regulatory environment 
The regulatory environment for corporate governance in China prior to the 2005 
corporate law reforms was centred on the state. Most of the key regulatory actors 
involved in this environment were either state-based or otherwise linked with the 
government. As Clarke noted : 
The Chinese state prefers direct regulation by government agencies first, and indirect 
regulation by private litigation in the state's courts next. Regulation by the uncontrolled 
institutions of the market comes a distant third, and indeed it is hard to find such 
institutions in China.' 
As will be discussed next, the initial framework for regulating corporate governance 
was established through the 1993 Company Law2 and the 1998 Securities Law. 3 This 
was despite the fact that the concept of corporate governance was not officially 
introduced into China until the late 1990s (as explained in Chapter 4). 
As the importance of corporate governance took the central stage in China from the 
early 2000s, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was entrusted with 
the responsibility to improve corporate governance in listed companies. As a ministry-
level agency affiliated to the State Council , the CSRC is the central government 
regulator of the stock market and listed companies in China. As section 5.3 will further 
illustrate, two documents issued by the CSRC have remained highly important to 
modernising the Chinese system of corporate governance. These are the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 4 and the Guidelines for Introducing 
Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies.5 Other rules and 
guidelines issued by the CSRC covered a broad range of topics, including the form and 
content of company constitution,6 procedures for conducting shareholders' meetings,7 
Donald Clarke, 'The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China,' (George Washington University Law School 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 433; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 433 , 29 August 2008) 
57 <http://ssm.com/abstracc= 1245803>. 
« tcpijc; A 1'!:.j¾:¥0 ll,I 0,iJ ~)) [Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (People's Republic of Ch ina) 
National People's Congress Standing Committee, 29 December 1993 (' 1993 PRC Company Law' ). 
«'P$Al'l:.j¾fO ~lijE#~ )) [Securities Law of the People's Republic of China] (People's Republic of China) 
National People's Congress Standing Committee, 29 December 1998 (' I 998 PRC Securities law'). 
((tcp§;]J:$0 ,i]fc;ijl ))l\JlU)) [Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China] (Peopl e' s 
Republic of China) China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Economic and Trade Commi ssion, 
7 January 2002 ('CSRC Code of Corporate Governance'). 
O,f-i'EJ:"iti0a'Jill:fiA<ll:fL_li$#ilJ/lt a{]tl,l.\,l~,!li', )) [Guidelines for the Introduction of Independent Directors 
into Listed Companies] (People's Republic of China) China Securities Regulatory Commission, 16 August, 2001 
('Guidelines for Introduction of Independent Directors') 
((J: rp 0a'J lf:l!Hl'i ~[ )) [Guidelines on Article of Association of Listed Compani es] (People's Republic of 
China) China Securities Regulatory Commission, 16 December 1997. 
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specific rules on strengthening the protection of public investors, 8 and information 
disclosure.9 
In addition to the CSRC, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) was a key central government regulator of listed SOEs. As noted 
in Chapter 2, the creation of SASAC has been regarded by commentators, such as 
Naughton, as a critical juncture in the development of state capitalism in China. 10 As the 
central state assets management authority affiliated to the State Council, SASAC was 
also entrusted with the responsibility to strengthen corporate governance in SOEs 
including listed SOEs. 11 As the role of SASAC in this area has become particularly 
evident since mid-2004, 12 the various SASAC-led reforms will be considered in 
Chapters 6 and 7, alongside other post-2005 legal and regulatory refonns of corporate 
governance in listed SOEs. 
Pertinent to the governance of listed SOEs, another two regulatory bodies were the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The two exchanges were officially defined as 
'not-for-profit legal persons' under the 1998 Securities Law.13 However, as noted in 
Chapter 4, they have operated as the de facto subdivisions of the CSRC since 1998, 
when the CSRC took over control of the two exchanges from their respective municipal 
govemments. 14 The listing rules of the stock exchanges set out, among other things, 
((J: nH} j§J JlltJK:k¾~!.i! ru:@:Jll,)) [Opinions on Standardising the General Meeting of Listed Companies] 
(People's Republi c of China) China Securities Regulatory Commission, 15 May 2000. 
((:J<'f/ml!i\t±¾0AJlltJK:l>'..ii/i~'lf'tl'J'6''rt!.i!Ji".)) [Several Provisions on Strengthening the Protection of the 
Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders] (People's Republic of China) China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, 7 December, 2004. 
9 Prior to the 2005 Company law refonn, the CSRC had issued 22 sets of Rules concerning the content and format 
of disclosure by companies issuing securities to the public. «0:fF;/;,:friifl'l'Ii!J0jjj{l§ .'~.1Jli~PJ'i'>'EiM\'1:i'llJ1'J 
.ffi I - 22 ~ )) [Rules No.1 -22 on the Fonnat and Contents of lnfonnation Disclosure by Companies Issuing 
Securities to the Public] (People' s Republic of China) China Securities Regulatory Commission; ((iiEMi:¾:!<'f 
fil ~ JP/JQl!i\ ST, PT 0jjj j]§ ,@,1Jli ~Mi:tl'I Jt'tl'JJfillAfl)) [Circular of the CSRC on Strengthen ing Supervision of 
Disclosure by ST and PT Companies] (People's Republic of Ch ina) China Securities Regulatory Commission, 7 
June 2000. 
'
0 Barry Naughton, 'The Transfonnation of the State Sector: SASAC, the Market Economy and the New National 
Champions' in Barry Naughton and Kellee Tsai (eds) China 's State Capitalism: Growth and Crisis 2 
<http://www.cctr.ust.hk/cgi-bin/cctr.php/event/detai l/33> (Cambridge University Press, forthcom ing) . 
II (( :11': ;ll'.00 1'l' 'i1t t' Mi 'I!} 1'l' !'I, WI fr%: WU )) [Interim Regulat ions on the Supervi sion and Administration of 
Enterprise State-owned Assets] (People 's Republic of China) State Counci l, 13 May 2003, Art 13. 
12 As discussed in Chapter 6 , this was when SASAC introduced the standardised board refonn into parent SOEs of 
listed companies. 
13 /998 PRC Securities law an 109 ( I). 
14 During the ARC project interviews, this view was expressed by a former Chainnan of the CS RC who saw the 
stock exchange Listing Rules as ' part of the overall regulations of the CS RC' (Interview code BJ00530). 
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disclosure responsibilities for listed companies and their officers, such as directors, 
supervisors, senior managers and the board secretary. 15 
The Supreme People's Court (SPC) also played an indirect role in the regulation of 
corporate governance in China. The SPC has issued several opinions concerning the 
application of various provisions of the Company law and Securities Law by local 
courts. 16 As China has followed the continental law tradition, judicial opinions are not a 
primary source of law. However, judicial opinions issued by the SPC are generally 
perceived as either 'binding upon the courts' or 'highly persuasive and likely to be 
followed by the courts' .17 
Chinese courts have been widely perceived as lacking independence from local 
governments. 18 Ginsburg attributed this to 'the fact that that judges are dependent on 
local governments for appointment, promotion and until recently, funding and material 
security ' .19 Another factor is the existence of a political and legal affairs committee 
under the Chinese Communist Party (the Party) Committee at each government levels. 
One of the main roles of the political and legal affairs committees is to oversee the work 
oflocal law enforcement agencies, including the courts.20 
Despite being less visible in the corporate law, the Party was, and remains, a prominent 
actor in corporate governance in China. As will be demonstrated throughout this thesis, 
15 
16 
(( ..t #ii i_iE # 3):: ,,,', /i)i /llt "ff/!, ..t jp #il j.!IJ )) [Shanghai Stock Exchange Listing Rules] (People's Republic of 
Ch ina)Shanghai Stock Exchange, first became effective in January 1998, has s ince undergone several revisions 
with the most recent taking place on 7 July 2012; (( fi(:IJI I i_iE# 3):: ,,,', /i)i /llt "ff/!, ..t jp iJil IJ! lj )) [Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange Listing Rules], first became effective in January 1998, has s ince undergone several revisions with the 
latest taking place on 7 July 2012. 
(( liH/li Al.\':1HJt;1s:'f/!Jii_iEcl'fl.\':~ 9!fift~f'i''l!r:f'f'il:Iirt-.liffi'm)) [Circular on Temporary Non-acceptance of 
Securities-related Civil Compensation Cases] (People's Republic of China) Supreme People' s Court, 2 1 
September 2001 ; «Jili'a'iA l.\':~lli ((;1s:'f'il:IiiiE#lll¼l!Ii£-Ollll!f-i£5! ;\zB91.\':~f:i<t)( ~4~~fHf ;1s:(cJ .IIErt-.liffi 
'm )) [The Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning Accepting Tort Cases Caused by False Statement on the 
Securities Market] (People's Republic of Ch ina) Supreme People's Court, 15 January 2002; ((:/llc/ili},,l.\':~!l,t;is: 
'f 'iii Ii i_iE # lli ¼ ~ .!IH!ll ll!f- i£ 51 1,: (t,J I.\': !Ji 9!fi ft ;j:; 14 rt-] :ll' 'HJil )E)) [Several Provisions on Trial of Civil 
Compensation Cases Arising from Misrepresentation on the Securities Market] (People's Republic of China) 
Supreme People' s Court, 9 January 2003 . 
17 Jiangyu Wang, ' Legal Reform in an Emerging Socialist Market Economy' in Ann Black and Gary Bell (eds) Law 
And Legal Institutions of Asia: Traditions, Adaptations And Innovations (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 24, 
37. 
18 Tom Ginsburg, ' Judicial Independence in East Asia: Lessons for China' in Randall Pcerenboom (ed), Judicial 
Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 247, 
257; Randall Peerenboom, 'introduction ' in Randall Peerenboom (ed), Judicial Independence in China: l essons 
for Global Rule of Law Promotion (Cambridge University Press, 2009) I, 13-16; Liebman Benjamin, ' China's 
Courts: Restricted Reform ' in Donald Clarke (ed) China 's Legal System: New Developments, New Challenges 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) 66, 66. 
19 Ginsburg, above n 18. 
20 Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the Central Party Committee webs ite <http://www.chinapeace.org.cn/>. 
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the Party has not only been the chief supplier of major reform policies, but also been 
deeply involved in the governance of individual companies through, among other 
means, the Party's 'cadre management system' .21 The system allows the Party, through 
the Organisational Department of the Central Party Committee and its local branches, to 
exercise ultimate control over the appointment and evaluation of personnel in leadership 
positions in government organisations, including SOEs.22 
State-controlled listed companies were (and are) no exception. This was despite the 
1993 Company Law's provision for the appointment of top corporate positions. The 
Company Law provided that the Chairman of the board of directors in a joint stock 
company should be elected by the board of directors from directors, 23 and the General 
Manager be appointed by the board. 24 In reality, before SASAC was established in 
2003, the top three positions in central government-affiliated SOEs (central SOEs), 
namely, the Party Secretary, the Chairman and the General Manager, were appointed 
and evaluated by the Organisational Department of the Central Party Committee. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, this situation has not dramatically changed since the creation of 
SASAC. In addition to the appointment of key leadership positions, the role of the Party 
was, and remains, embedded in listed SOEs through company-based Party committees 
and other Party-sponsored organisations, such as the trade union and the women ' s 
federation. 25 
At the corporate level, parent SOEs, usually wholly-owned by a central or local 
government agency, were key actors in the governance of listed SO Es. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the prevalence of parent SO Es among listed companies was associated with 
corporatisation and partial listing of SOEs from the early 1990s. As the review of state-
manager relations in China's top I 00 listed companies below will demonstrate, most 
parent SOEs had strong influence over the governance of their listed subsidiaries 
through multiple avenues. 
21 Barry Naughton , ' China 's Distincti ve System: Can it be a Model for Others?' (20 10) 19 Journal of 
Contemporary China 437, 456-7 . 
22 For a detailed illustration of the system, see John Bums (ed) , The Chinese Communist Party 's Nomenklatura 
System (M. E. Sharp, 1989). 
23 1993 PRC Company l aw art 113(1). 
24 Ibid art 119( 1). 
25 All grassroots including enterpri se-based women 's federation organi sations come under the All China Women 's 
Federation, which is a government agency. « q,iJ', ) d'°;i!c;fil ll,l!El:il: tll..fui. {JiHf:! $)) [Law of the People's 
Republic of Chin a on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women] (People 's Republic of China) National 
People' s Congress Standing Committee, 28 August 2005 , art 6. 
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Public investors oflisted companies, including listed SOEs in China, were mainly made 
up by small individual investors. This is in contrast to the Anglo-American countries 
where large financial institutions, including pension and superannuation funds, 
dominate the investor base. There were over 70 million accounts held by public 
investors on the Chinese stock market in 2006. Most of these accounts holders were 
individual investors.26 
The relatively low percentage of institutional investment was, in part, due to the short 
history of the Chinese stock market, and partly, the predominance of state ownership in 
listed companies in China. In view of the important role played by financial institutions 
in the development of stock market and corporate governance in Western developed 
market economies, China has encouraged institutional investment since the early 2000s. 
The promulgation of the Securities Investment Funds Law in 2003 generated an 
explosive growth of the investment funds industry. 27 National Social Security funds, 
insurance companies and securities companies were also allowed to hold shares in listed 
companies, although under prescribed investment ceilings.28 In addition, since 2002, 
Qualified Foreign Financial Institutions (QFils) have been allocated quotas by the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) to trade shares on the Chinese stock 
market. However, by October 2006, shares held by institutional investors accounted for 
only 30 per cent of the total tradeable shares, or around 10% of total shares issued by 
Chinese listed companies. 29 Therefore, the protection of public investors, particularly 
individual investors was, and remains, one of the most crucial issues in corporate 
governance in China. 
The above analysis shows that similar to the Chinese state-led approach to economic 
development, a large and visible role of the state was present in China's pre-2005 
regulatory environment for corporate governance. However, as the examination of the 
26 Qiao Liu, 'Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects and Institutional Detenninants' 
(2006) 52 CESifo Economic Studies 415, 421. 
27 
«'P:ff.Ai"c:J:t;flll!liIE»tll:~~~yt)) [Securities Investment Fund Law of the People's Republic of Ch ina] 
(People' s Republic of China) National People's Congress Standing Committee, 28 October 2003; Chao Xi, 
' Institutional Shareholder Activism in China: Law and Practice (Part!)' (2006) 17 International Company and 
Co mmercial Law Review 251 , 252. 
28 Zhong Zhang, ' Legal Deterrence: the Foundation of Corporate Governance-Evidence from China ' (2007) I 5 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 741, 744. 
29 Lu Ding and Li Ning, 'China's Market Reforrn: Problems and prospects ' in John Wong and Wei Liu (eds), 
China's Surging Economy: Adjusting for More Balanced Development (World Scientific, 2007) 25 3, 264, 284 ; 
't' l!liiE'tt' llii'~'ll'!!~ .o'! 1l' [China Securities Regulatory Commission] , 2007 '¥'¥W. [2007 Annual Report] 
<http:l/www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhjs/zjhnb/200904lt20090423 _ ! 02465.htm>. As the 2005 'spl it share 
structure refonn ' was carried out in stages, most non-tradcable state and state legal person shares did not become 
tradeable until 2007 . 
94 
Chinese pre-2005 law and practice in relation to three sets of company relations within 
listed SOEs below will suggest, various problems existed in the governance of these 
companies, which appeared to have jeopardised not only their long-tenn development, 
but also the effectiveness of state control over these companies. 
5.3 State-manager relations 
Corporate governance in China has been described as 'a control-based model, in which 
the controlling shareholders - in most case, the state - employ all feasible governance 
mechanisms to tightly control the listed firms'. 30 While the regulatory environment 
reviewed above lends support to this characterisation, it may have exaggerated the 
degree of effective control exerted by the state over corporate managers. As the review 
of the Chinese pre-2005 law and practice concerning state-manager relations in listed 
SOEs below will suggest, despite strong state intervention in corporate affairs, insider 
control oflisted SOEs by their top executives and parent SOEs was prevalent. 
5.3.1 The legal and regulatory framework 
The governance structure introduced by the 1993 Company Law was very hierarchical. 
The structure consisted of a general meeting, defined as the company's 'organ of 
authority' ,31 and two parallel boards mainly elected by the general meeting. These were 
the board of directors, as the company's 'executive organ' , 32 _ and the board of 
supervisors as the 'watchdog'. 33 
With the 1993 Company Law's adherence to the 19th century principle of general 
meeting supremacy, 34 the first avenue for the state to intervene in the affairs of listed 
SOEs was the general meeting. In Anglo-American outsider-based corporate 
governance, the powers of the company, including managerial powers, are generally 
vested in the board of directors. 35 By contrast, the 1993 Company Law conferred a long 
list of management powers on the general meeting of joint stock companies, including 
30 Qiao Liu, above n 26, 418. 
31 1993 PRC Company Law art 102. 
32 Ibid art 112. 
33 Xianchu Zhang, 'Company Law Refonn in China' in John Garrick (ed), La w and Policy for China 's Market 
Socialism (Routledge, 2012) 39, 40; 1993 PRC Company Law arts 124, 126. 
34 John Farrar, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice, (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed 2004) 
69; Robert Art and Minkang Gu, 'China lnconporated: The First Conporation Law of the People 's Republic of 
China' (1999) 20 Yale Journal of International Law 273 , 297; Yongxin Song, 'Some Special Features of the 
Organs of Governance of Chinese Business Corporations' 1995 (24) Capital Univers ity law Review 207, 2 14. 
35 See, for example, the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 198A. 
95 
listed SOEs. These included appointing and remuneration of directors and supervisors, 
making decisions on company's operational guidelines and long term capital investment 
plans, approving annual budget plans and final accounts, and approving corporate 
fundraising through issuing shares and dentures. 36 
Extensive powers vested in the general meeting inevitably limited the role of the board 
of directors. Unlike its counterparts in Anglo-American jurisdictions, the role of the 
board under the 1993 Company Law was 'implemental' in nature. 37 In addition to 
carrying out resolutions of the general meeting, the board was responsible for the 
formulation of various guidelines, plans and reports to be deliberated at the general 
meeting. The limited decision-making powers of the board were mainly concerned with 
the establishment of company day-to-day management structures and systems.38 
Even more marginalised by the supremacy of the general meeting was the board of 
supervisors. This board was made up by shareholder and employee representatives,39 
and carried out their monitoring role mainly through attending meetings of the board of 
directors as non-voting participants and inspecting company accounts. 40 The 
supervisory board has been generally regarded as a transplant from the German two-
tiered board system.41 However, unlike its German counterpart, the Chinese supervisory 
board was given few powers in relation to either information gathe_ring or handling of 
managerial misconduct,42 let alone the power to appoint or remove directors. Explaining 
the 'lost powers' of the Chinese supervisory board, Clarke argued that while this board 
was expected to provide some oversight function, they were not intended to become an 
'extra layer of supervision and bureaucracy between the governmental department in 
36 1993PRCCompany Law art 103. 
37 lI-'F,'$ 00 :3/t [Jiang Ping and Li Guoguang] (eds), ((*l\li0'§Ji't!i<Xt¥50 [Annotated New Company Law] (A 
l'lci'tlBttll)\IH± [The People' s Court Publishing House] , 2005) 304 
38 I 993 PRC Campany Law art 112. 
39 Ibid art 124. The supervisory board consisted members elected by shareholders and employees. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, the minimum percentage of employee representatives was further specified in the 2005 amendment to 
the 1993 Company Law. 
40 1993 PRC Company law art 126. 
41 Donald Clarke, ' Lost in Translation? Corporate Legal Transplants in China ' (GWU Law School Public Law 
Research Paper No. 2 I 3; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2 I 3, July 3, 2006) 5 
<http: //ssm.com/abstracc=913784>; Chao Xi, Corporate Governance and Legal Reform in China (Wildy, 
Simmonds & Hill Publishing, 2009) 185. 
42 Xi, above n 41 , 160. 
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charge of the enterprise and its management' , thereby hindering government 
involvement in corporate affairs.43 
Another, and perhaps more important, avenue for the state to influence corporate 
governance in listed SOEs was the latter' s senior management, particularly the chair of 
the board of directors (commonly referred to in China as the 'Chairman'). As noted in 
section 5.2, this position in joint stock companies, including listed SOEs, was created 
by corporate law. However, it was often appointed by the Party through its 
organisational departments. 
In many respects, the Chairman's role under the 1993 Company Law was quite similar 
to a top manager in a traditional SOE. This is despite the Company Law's provision for 
the General Manager, another senior management position charged with supervising the 
company' s day-to-day operations.44 The Chairman was given a broad range of powers 
and responsibilities. Hence, in addition to convening and presiding over shareholders 
and board meetings, the Chairman was responsible for examining the implementation of 
board resolutions. 45 This person was also the sole person to whom the board could 
delegate part of its functions outside board meetings. 46 Most importantly, as the 
statutory 'legal representative' of the company,47 the Chairman had the sole power to 
represent the company in executing contracts and undertaking lega] proceedings.48 As 
the discussion of the empirical evidence below will suggest, extensive powers and 
responsibilities associated with the Chairman role often led the person in that position to 
overstep the General Manager to become the company's real chief executive officer. As 
further discussed below, this was particularly the case, where the political leadership 
status of the Chairman was reinforced by their concurrent appointment to the 
company's Party Secretary' s role.49 
43 Donald Clarke, 'Lost in Translation?' above n 41 , 8. 
44 1993 PRC Company Law art 119. 
45 Ibid art I 14. 
46 Ibid art 120 (\). 
47 Ibid art I I 3 (2). 
48 
49 
((cpije},_ [1';:J¾ 'f(] i'i,]1'1'}t': im Ji1Ll)) [General Principles of Civil Law of the People"s Republic of China] (People 's 
Republic of China) National People's Congress, I 2 April 1986, art 38. 
((cp:J¾cp:'.lc;J;: r OOff :i1': '1],:i'l(1jc ,fQ1,:)!U'i"f'm::!c: r'aJ /12itr-J!R JE )) [Decision of the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party on Several Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of State-owned 
Enterprises], Adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the 15'h Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 22 
September I 999. 
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As the CSRC took on the leading role of promoting good corporate governance in listed 
companies, it sought to introduce some checks and balances into this general meeting 
and Chairman-centred governance structure through borrowing from Anglo-American 
experiences. First, the CSRC issued the Guidelines for Introducing Independent 
Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies. 50 The Guidelines require all 
listed companies to have at least one-third independent directors, with at least one of 
them being an accounting professional. These directors are required to play an 
important role in monitoring the executive directors, and protecting the interests of the 
minority shareholders. Hence, they must provide independent opinions on certain issues 
of corporate governance in listed companies, such as the nomination, appointment and 
removal of directors and senior managers. They must also certify all major related party 
transactions before submission for board approval. To enable independent directors to 
fulfil these responsibilities, the Guidelines give them some special powers, such as the 
powers to call extraordinary shareholders ' and directors' meetings, and to appoint 
outside auditors and consultants. 
Another initiative introduced by the CSRC was the establishment of the Anglo-
American style specialised board committees within Chinese listed companies. The 
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (The Code of Corporate 
Governance) issued by the CSRC in 2002 recommends the establishment of specialised 
board committees, including the audit committee, the nomination committee, and the 
remuneration and appraisal committee, in listed companies. 51 As will be outlined in 
section 5.4, other provisions of the Code spell out principles on shareholders' rights, 
and lay down some behavioural rules for controlling shareholders. 52 While designed to 
strengthen the protection of investors, these rules may impose additional constraints on 
the conduct of company directors and managers. 
However, these reform measures introduced by the CSRC did not alter the basic 
governance structure established by the 1993 Company Law. As the review of the 
empirical evidence on state-manager relations in China's top 100 listed companies 
during 2002 to 2004 below will suggest, strong state involvement in listed companies 
so Guidelines for introduction of independent Directors, above n 5. 
5 1 CSRC Code of Corporate Governance, above n 4, art 52. For example, the main functions of the nomination 
committee include (I) formulating standards and procedures for the election of directors and make 
recommendations and (2) seeking and reviewing candidates for directorship and management positions and make 
recommendations. See CSRC Code of Corporate Governance, above n 4, art 55. 
52 Ibid, chs I, 2. 
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continued to be facilitated by extensive corporate powers vested in the general meeting, 
and the Chairman who owed their career prospects to the Party-government. 
Nevertheless, as the review of the empirical evidence will further suggest, the 
concentration of management powers in these corporate actors, coupled with poor 
internal and external monitoring of the exercise of those powers, paradoxically led to 
insider control of listed SOEs by their top executives and parent SOEs. This was despite 
strong state intervention. 
5.3.2 Features of and problems with governance practices 
From the ARC project interviews, strong state involvement in corporate affairs was a 
key feature of corporate governance in large listed SOEs during 2002 to 2004. When 
asked to comment on the impact of the state as a dominant shareholder on the 
governance practices of these companies, many interviewees pointed to government 
influence on management decision-making. As the board secretary of a Shanghai-based 
retail company stated: 
In such companies, the State holds the majority shares and so decision-making in these 
companies involves state-owned assets . The company must talk to the government 
before it puts resolutions to the board or AGM (Annual General Meeting). 53 
The Party/government was also perceived by some interviewees as the most important 
stakeholder in large state-controlled listed companies. For example, a former senior 
official of the CSRC remarked, when asked to identify the most important stakeholders 
in PRC listed companies, '[t]he Party, the government, their employees and their 
shareholders (in that order)'. 54 Similarly, a Shanghai-based corporate governance 
consultant stated, ' [w]here there is a large majority shareholder, especially if it is the 
state, this ownership drives decision-making and the mentality of the management'. 55 
In addition to controlling shareholding of the state, Party-government appointment of 
top corporate executives, including the Chairman, was seen by some interviewees as the 
primary source of state interference in corporate affairs. 56 As an in-house counsel of an 
insurance company put it: 
53 Interview code SH08217. 
54 Interview code HK05508. 
55 Interview code SH08020. 
56 For example, the company secretary of a Nanjing-based trading company stated, 'Under the Company Law, the 
Chairman aod General Manager should be appointed by the Shareholder general meeting [The correct organ for 
electing the Board of Directors and the general meeting should be the Board of Directors rather than shareholders 
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Directors of listed companies will first check with controlling shareholders. This is the 
biggest problem for state-controlled listed companies . In most these companies, the 
Chairman and senior management are appointed by the government, so they are very 
careful about issues relating to the government or controlling shareholders .. 57 
As government appointees, it was not unusual for senior executives of state-controlled 
companies to be transferred between large SOEs and government agencies. As a 
Beijing-based accountant remarked, '[i]t is common to see the Chainnan going on to 
become a senior official '. 58 
While the state and parent SOEs were often treated as one (and indeed, the reference to 
'the state as a dominant shareholder' is misleading in itself), the overall impression 
from the ARC project interviews was that the involvement of parent SO Es in the affairs 
of listed companies was far stronger than direct government intervention. This can be 
traced back to the popular practice of ' partial listing' of SOEs as discussed Chapter 4. 
The parent-subsidiary relationship was described by a Hong Kong-based shareholder 
activist as inseparable: 
I think the senior management and the controlling shareholder operate as one. They are 
usually located in the same premises. The listed company is seen as a way to attract 
funds for the group. The listed company should support the group. Decisions are made 
with the full knowledge of the maj ority shareholder.59 
From the ARC project interviews, parent SOEs typically controlled -the appointment of 
all non-independent directors (including executive and non-executi ve directors), 
accounting for about two-thirds of directors in listed companies.60 Parent SOEs also had 
strong influence over the appoinhnent of independent directors and board of supervisors 
in their listed subsidiaries. The candidates for the independent directors were often put 
forward by parent SOEs (or in conjunction with the listed company's senior 
management), and the board of supervisors was typically made up of representatives of 
general meeting---correction added by the author] ln practice, for state-owned or controlled companies, they are 
appointed by the organisational Department of the municipal Party Committee.' (Interview code NJ099 15) 
57 Interview code BJ068 I 7. 
58 Interview code B106917. 
59 Interview Code HK I 06 17. 
60 Most companies interviewed in the ARC project had 1/3 or a litt le over 1/3 independent directors to satisfy the 
minimum requirements provided in the Guidelines for Introduction of!ndependeni Directors (See above n 5). For 
example, the board secretary of a Beij ing-based company stated, when asked about the corporate governance role 
of independent directors, ' According to CS RC regulations, each listed company must have 1/3 independent 
directors on it board. Many listed companies have appointed 4 independent directors to meet this requirement. 
We have 4 independent directors among 12 directors. These 4 are appointed for the needs of our business. One is 
an IT expert, one is an expert in international law and one is a TFT expert. They play an important role in the 
corporate governance of our company' (Interview code BJO 1222). 
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parent SOEs, as well as members of the listed company's Party Committee and 
employee representatives. 61 As discussed earlier, the appointment of top management 
positions in listed SOEs was controlled by the Party.62 However, it was not uncommon 
for the Party organisational departments to appoint candidates to those positions from 
the listed companies' state-owned parents.63 Nor was it uncommon for senior executives 
to hold concurrent positions in listed companies and their state-owned parents. 
This level of parent involvement in the personnel arrangements in listed SOEs had a 
direct influence on the patterns of business decision-making in these companies. For 
example, when asked to comment on the impact of the state, as a controlling 
shareholder, on the governance of listed companies, the board secretary of a logistics 
and transportation company in Shanghai stated: 
. If the board wants to make a decision, it will first contact the parent company. It is 
normal in China, as the parent company has full control of the listed company 64 
A similar observation was made by the company secretary of a Shanghai-based 
construction company: 
There are certain rules, and the Chairman needs to know what kinds of matters need 
prior approval. Some matters just need a memorandum. In my view, parent companies 
have too much involvement in Chinese listed companies. 
Only a few company insiders suggested that their Chairmen or boards of directors had 
autonomy in making business decisions.65 For example, in a Qingdao-based company: 
The Chairman and the General Manager want to make their own decisions. They want 
to gain some benefits from the parent company or the government, but are reluctant to 
61 This was according to a Beijing-based law professor (Interview code BJ00306(c)). Some other interviewees 
observed that most supervisors were company employees or decided by majority shareholders. 
62 The practice was also mentioned by some interviewees including the company secretary of the Nanjing-based 
trading company (Interview Code NJ099 15). A Beijing-based law professor also stated, '[i]n big listed 
companies, the Chairman and General Manager are appointed by CCP organisational department' (Interview 
Code BJOI014). 
63 For example, the company secretary of a power company stated, ' [i]t is difficult for us not to have a chairman 
with an executive job in the parent company. We look for other ways to improve corporate governance' 
(Interview Code BJ00706 (a)). The coincidence of senior executives in listed companies and their parent SO Es 
was quite common among large stated-controlled listed companies in China. As will be explained in Chapter 9, 
the overlapping top executive roles in listed companies and their parent SOEs have largely remained unchanged 
after the 2005 company law reform. 
64 Interview code HK.07947. 
65 For example, the company secretary of a Qingdao-based company stated: 'the Qingdao government is very open 
and never interferes in the governance of our company. The Chairman is appointed by the government' 
(Interview code QD025 I 7). 
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inform them too much. In some extreme cases, the Chairman wants to become the boss 
of the company. 66 
In addition to parent SOEs, the Chairmen played an important role in the governance of 
listed SOEs. This led some interviewees to use the term 'the key man' model to 
describe governance of large listed SOEs in China. This model was described by an 
official of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in the following way: 
If a listed company has a dominant shareholder, that shareholder will control 
everything. So, one person, usually the Chairman, controls everything in the listed 
company. It is the 'key man ' model, the traditional Chinese model.67 
Indeed, the Chairman was frequently mentioned by the interviewees as the top person-
in-charge in a listed company. As an official from the CSRC put it, when asked to 
comment on the level of understanding of corporate governance principles held by the 
General Manager, 'in China, the Chairman is the No.1 person in a company, the real 
CEO. The General Manager is appointed by the Chairman and not like Western 
CEOs'. 68 The company secretary of a Nanjing-based iron and steel company also 
agreed: 
In Chinese companies, usually when the Chairman has signed his name on a document, 
the other directors will follow him and sign. They will never do so if the chairman has 
not signed. Therefore, it is the Chairman who makes the decision. 69 
It was possible to have a situation where the Chairman is merely a figurehead and the 
General Manager is the one in control.70 As a Shanghai-based international corporate 
governance advisor explained, '[i]n general, you have two models of Chairman: one 
where the Chairman's job is political and the individual is a political person. Then you 
have a president or a CEO who is more technocratic' .71 However, as a lawyer in Beijing 
suggested, in large companies, it was more common for the Chairman, rather than the 
General Manager, to be the person in control.72 
66 Interview code QD024 I 7. 
67 Interview code SH09617. 
68 Interview code B102006 (b). 
69 Interview Code SH09806 (a). 
7
° For example, in a Shanghai-based electronics company, '[t]he Party leaders are not very involved in business 
decisions but they may have an opinion on some matters particularly in human resources. Overall , the General 
Manager has control' (Interview code SH035 l 5). 
71 Interview code SH08006 (a). 
72 Interview code B10328. 
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This 'key man model' does not necessarily lead to poor corporate performance.73 As a 
regulator in Hong Kong pointed out, it allows issues at corporate level to be dealt with 
'swiftly and decisively' , which may be translated into strong performance.74 Further, 
according to some interviewees, strong state involvement in the management of listed 
companies may also facilitate the implementation of state economic policies. 75 This, as 
Chapter 3 discussed, is a fundamental role of corporate governance in a state-led 
economy. 
However, as the ARC project interviews suggested, the above practicalities of this 
model may be undermined by many risks associated with this model. The concentration 
of corporate decision-making power in one, or a few, insiders was susceptible to abuse, 
which might further jeopardise effective state control of companies. As an official of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange put it, 'CEOs use a lot of company resources for their own 
benefit, due to lack of monitoring by the state shareholder. They abuse their powers ' .76 
A number of factors may have contributed to the poor monitoring of listed companies' 
executives and their parent SOEs. According to agency theory of the firm as discussed 
in Chapter 2, effective corporate governance depends on the interaction of a wide range 
of internal mechanisms (such as shareholding monitoring, mandatory disclosure of 
information, independent directors and executive remunerati<?n) and external 
mechanisms (such as the market for corporate control, labour market and outsider 
participation). 77 From the ARC project interviews, extensive corporate powers vested in 
the general meeting (essentially the controlling shareholder) and the Chainnan, coupled 
with a situation in which the state is the controlling shareholder, significantly weakened 
the internal and external monitoring environments for the governance of listed SOEs. 
73 Among Chinese state-controlled companies, there had been some examples of a technocratic chainnan who 
turned their companies from loss-making enterprises into world-class large businesses. One such example is Fu 
Chengyu, the Chairman of CNOOC, who led the company' s bid for the Unocal in US in 2004. The importance of 
the quality of Chairman was also pointed out by the company secretary of an electronic appliance company 
'Reta il investors are not doing a lot of research. They want to ask you how much you will report---more of a 
trading question. Institutional investors are willing to have a long term view. The key thing for them is the quality 
of the Chairman and the management. If the Chairman is someone they can trust, they would not be too bothered 
by other things' (Interview code SZ04511 ). 
74 A Hong Kong regulator (Interview code HK0611 7). 
75 For example, a Hong Kong-based regulator observed, 'whi le the government is the majori ty shareholder in the 
company, directors see their role as being accountable to the government' (lnterview code HK05917). 
76 Interview code SH083 17. 
77 For example, G. P Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Clarendon Press, 1996). 
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First, a situation in which the parent SOE is the controlling shareholder, coupled with 
extensive managerial powers conferred on the general meeting and the Chairman, 
overrode the 'typical corporate governance checks and balances'. 78 This problem was 
described by the board secretary of a Qingdao-based electronics company in the 
following way: 
In most organisations even in listed companies, only I or 2 persons make the decisions. 
So transparency talk is superficial. It is mainly big shareholders that control , like a 
private company. 79 
The ARC project interviews suggested that many listed companies did not have an 
effective board. The role of the independent directors was described as 'symbolic' 80 by 
some interviewees, and 'advisory', by some others. 81 The specialised board committees, 
mainly made up of these directors, were described by a Hong Kong-based corporate 
governance advisor as 'only providing a signature'. The role of the board of supervisors 
was seen by most interviewees as even less substantial than the independent directors. 
As a senior official from the CSRC explained, strong influence of the management 
and/or parent SOEs over the appointment of supervisors meant that the latter faced the 
problem of having to bite the hand that feeds them.82 
Ineffective internal governance aside, the state as a dominant shareholder further 
contributed to lax external monitoring of senior executives in listed SOEs. First, 
although the state and the parent SOE were often treated as one, there was a substantial 
divergence of interests between them. This point was made by a former Hong Kong 
stock market regulator (as well as senior advisor to the CSRC), when asked to comment 
on the impact of the state as a dominant shareholder on the governance of listed 
companies: 
78 A Hong Kong-based corporate governance advisor (Interview code HK054 l 7); As an official from the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange also stated, when asked to comment on the impact of single large shareholder control on the 
accountabi lity of directors, ' ln China, members of the board see themselves as only representing interests of the 
dominant shareholder which has nominated them ' (Interview code SH09620). 
79 Interview code QD024 l 5. 
80 Interview code BJ02 l 22; ' A nice vase of flowers on the table' (Interview code SZ04522) and ' trophies for 
directors and the company' (Interview code HK06022) were some of the phrases used by the interviewees to 
describe the role of independent directors in Chinese listed companies. 
81 The company secretary of a Shenzhen-based company expressed a widely held opinion on independent directors: 
'Generally speaking, independent directors in China are more like consultants. They often come from academi c 
backgrounds. They are chosen by the board of directors and approved by shareholders. They usually don 't vote 
against the board. Their role might become more important as the law will be stricter on them. But generally, I 
don't expect that they can play much ofa role' (Interview code SZ04522). 
82 This CSRC official stated, ' [we] were told by some supervisory board members that they face two dilemmas. 
First, as company employees, the supervisors usually do not enjoy equal position with management. Second, as 
paid employees, they cannot be truly independent of the companies' (Interview code SH09206(c)). 
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The parent company is not the state but an interest group interested in staying out of 
trouble with government. The 'state ' is a diffused notion and the regulatory bodies 
reflect it. 83 
This divergence of interests was also observed by the board secretary of a Shanghai-
based phannaceutical company: 
The state as the dominant shareholder affects corporate governance in listed companies. 
Where the state is a shareholder, it lacks representation in the listed companies which 
are controlled by insiders. The parent company will not benefit from dividends received 
from the listed company, as all dividends have to be handed over to the state. So there 
is not enough incentive for the parent company to look after shares in the listed 
companies on behalf of the state. Further, as parent SO Es won' t benefit from managing 
those shares, they always try very hard to profit from abusing other shareholders. 84 
The divergence of interests between the central and local governments was illustrated 
by an insider of a Shanghai-based company: 
The central government does not want the state as a dominant shareholder to have any 
adverse impact on corporate governance. But local govermnents may use their status as 
a state shareholder to manipulate the companies. This is unavoidable. 85 
The 'diffused notion of the state' as expressed in these statements is, in a sense, not 
different from the classical agency problems associated with state ownership of 
enterprises, namely, the 'absentee owners' and 'multiple-agency' relationship. 86 As 
discussed in Chapter 2, these problems, according to agency theorists, pose significant 
obstacles for effective state control and monitoring of managers. 
The diffused notion of the state aside, another factor that affected external monitoring of 
corporate governance was the overlapping and conflicting roles of the state as a 
controlling shareholder, a regulator and developer of the Chinese stock market. First, 
state involvement in business decisions and government protection of companies and 
their managers significantly weakened legal enforcement by the CSRC and the stock 
exchanges. The functioning of these law enforcement agencies was affected by various 
other factors, such as the lack of experience and resources (which were associated with 
83 Interview code HK055 I 7. 
84 Interview code SH0841 7. 
85 Interview code SH09 l I 7. 
86 See Michael Whincop, Corporate Governance in Government Corporations (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 
2005); OECD Guidelines on the Co,porate Governance of State-owned £11te1prises (2005), Preamble, 3. Andrew 
Yuen and Anming Zhang, 'An Economic Perspective on Recent Corporate Governance D evelopments in China 
with Comments on Chapters by Yang, Gu and Wang' in Masao Nakamura (ed), Changing Corporate 
Governance Praclices in China and Japan: Adaptali9ns of Ang lo-American Practices (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008) 63. 
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the underdeveloped nature of the Chinese stock market), and (as will be discussed next) 
their relatively few sanctioning powers. However, where a business decision of the 
listed company was made with the full knowledge or involvement of its state-owned 
parent and other government agencies, there was a practical difficulty for the CSRC to 
ascertain and assign liabilities. As the board secretary of a Shanghai-based company put 
it, '[d]irectors are appointed by the majority shareholders and mainly represent the 
interests of the state'.87 For the CSRC, this meant in order to pursue a director, it 'has to 
fight whoever is behind'. 88 In this respect, as Chapter 6 will further illustrate, the 
Chinese system of 'Party management of cadres', through its pervasive reward and 
sanction mechanisms, provided some rather intrusive means to discipline Party-
appointed managers.89 This system, however, overshadowed the power that the CSRC 
could exercise over those managers. As this point was made by the company secretary 
of a Guangdong-based power company: 
In China, we have a tradition that cadres- including senior managers in state-owed 
companies- are regulated by the Party. Most senior management members are 
appointed by the organisational department of the central or local Party Committees. 
Therefore the CSRC has little role to play in the appointment and regulation of senior 
management members. 90 
Second, weak legal enforcement was also contributed to by the dual role of the CSRC 
as a corporate regulator, as well as developer of the stock market in China. This latter 
role mainly stemmed from the original design of the Chinese stock market, namely, to 
raise funds for corporatised SOEs. To achieve rapid and stable development of the 
market, the CSRC needed from time to time to assist the central government to adjust 
the market through various policy tools91 including selective legal enforcement. This 
was especially so during prolonged bearish markets. The adoption of these tools 
inevitably diminished the rigor of the CSRC in disciplining the market and corporate 
managers. This was pointed out by a Hong Kong-based corporate governance 
researcher, when asked to comment on the degree of flexibility in CSRC's enforcement 
of its rules against directors: 
S7 Interview code SH08440. 
88 Statement made by the board secretary ofa li sted bank (Interview code HK04240). 
89 Barry Naughton, 'China "s Distincti ve System ' above n 21 , 45 6. 
90 Interview code GZ I 0232. 
91 M:l'tt'F, 'W:~ [Zou Gangxiang and Zhang Yong], 'iiEfilI~:!'xi/tl]\'911(',ntiiflU'fi &•~B1sfZ.il'i1E1~AilI' [CS RC 
Considering Policy to Save the Market: RMBI0 billion to be Injected into the Market if Necessary] Financial 
Observer (on line) (22 January 2005) <http: //finance.sina.eom.cn/stock/y/20050I22/1642 1314883.shtml>. The 
article provided a li st of various measures undertaken by the CSRC in rescuing the market since the 
establishment of the stock market in China. · 
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It is partly a political answer. A couple of years ago, they did go after a number of 
directors. But since the bubble burst and market fell , CSRC has been very defensive. 
CSRC gets blamed if the market fa lls etc. So, people do not like to work there if they 
want to climb the ladder in China. CSRC does see itself as nurturing the market and so 
coming out hard on directors may be seen as unfair. The incentive is to take a 'softly-
softly' approach.92 
This dualism in the roles of bodies such as the CSRC, which simultaneously needed to 
support the state economic policy and engage in law enforcement, appeared to be a 
recurring theme in the ARC project interviews. As law enforcement agencies, the 
CSRC, the stock exchanges, and the courts, shouldered the responsibility to discipline 
listed companies and to protect investors from corporate/managerial malfeasance. Yet, 
as part of the government apparatus, all three bodies had to support the state' s economic 
policy, including the policy to promote development of the Chinese stock market as an 
important source of equity financing for SOEs. This dualism may have played an 
important role in promoting the rapid growth of the stock market in China, which 
significantly outpaced other emerging economies such as Russia. 93 However, it 
diminished the willingness of various law enforcement agencies to discipline corporate 
managers and parent SOEs, which may further undermine good corporate governance in 
listed SOEs. 
The above analysis showed that state involvement in corpor~te management was an 
important feature of the law and practice concerning state-manager relations within 
large listed SOEs in China prior to 2005. Indeed, backed by a situation in whi ch the 
state was the controlling shareholder and Party-state appointment of top corporate 
executives, state intervention in corporate decision-making in Chinese listed SOEs 
seemed to be far more evident than the former post-war state-led model of corporate 
governance. Nevertheless, as this section has also demonstrated, the paradoxical co-
existence of state intervention and insider control may not have served the two-fold goal 
of the state in relation to these large companies, namely, to improve corporate 
management without the state losing ultimate control. As Chapter 6 will illustrate, the 
search for an effective solution to these problems, particularly the problem of insider 
92 Interview code I-IK05440; An even more negative view was expressed by the company secretary of Beijing-based 
resource company, 'Corporate governance is not a hot topi c for CS RC now, as no higher-ranking official s talk 
about it any longer. 'A ' share listed companies are not under pressure and the investors are not mature' 
(Interview code 8101 637). This comment was made in the context of a prolonged bearish market that had its 
inception in the release of the Temporary Measures on Raising Social Security Fund through Reduction of State 
Shares on 14 June 200 I and the subsequent experiment of reduction of state shares through securities market. See 
!J~:l'U+, 51'!/l [Zou Gangxiang and Zhang Yong], above n 91. 
93 Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, 'Governing Emerging Stock Markets: Legal vs. Admini strative 
Governance' (2005) 13 Corporate Governance: An fnt er~ational Review 5, 6. 
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control, underpinned many Chinese post-2005 legal and regulatory reforms concerning 
state-manager relations in these companies. 
5.4 Investor protection 
Having considered state-manager relations, this section and section 5.5 examine the law 
and practice concerning minority shareholder and other stakeholder protection in listed 
SOEs prior to the 2005 corporate law reforms. The two sections will show that, while 
China's pre-2005 legal and regulatory frameworks concerning these two areas reflected 
some key features of the former state-led model, poor protection of investors was far 
more common and serious in Chinese listed SOEs. 
5.4.1 The legal and regulatory framework 
Consistent with the fonner state-led model, minority shareholder protection was a 
priority for neither the 1993 Company Law nor the 1998 Securities Law. 94 This was 
despite the fact that 'to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the shareholders' 
was one of the pronounced legislative aims in both statutes.95 
On the surface, the two statutes stipulated some broad powers for shareholders. For 
example, the 1993 Company Law provided that shareholders, as capital contributors, 
'shall have the rights to enjoy capital gains, make major policy decisions and select 
management personnel' in proportion to their shareholdings.96 The 1993 Company Law 
also provided shareholders with some other rights such as the right to vote at 
shareholder meetings in person or by proxy, and to make recommendations about 
company operations. 
Most of these broad powers were, however, more relevant to the controlling 
shareholders than the small public investors. This was, in part, due to the lack of 
provision in the Company Law on how those powers could be exercised by shareholders 
and, in part, to the absence of effective shareholder remedies. Among the few 
provisions relevant to the latter, Article 111 broadly provided that shareholders had the 
right to sue where 'a resolution of the shareholders meeting or the board of directors has 
violated the law, administrative decrees or encroached upon the legitimate rights of 
94 Baoshu Wang and Hui Huang, 'China 's New Company Law and Securities Law: an Overview and Assessment ' 
(2006) 19 Australian Journal of Corporate law 229, 230. 
95 1993 PRC Company Law art I ; J998PRCSecurities lawart I. 
96 1993 PRC Company Law art 4 (!). 
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shareholders' .97 This Article, however, provided little relief to an aggrieved shareholder. 
The only actionable wrongdoings under Article 111 concerned general meeting and 
board resolutions, and the only court order the shareholder could seek was ' to stop the 
infiingement' .98 This remedy has, therefore, been described by Zhang as 'focusing more 
on safeguarding the market order of the state, rather than on effective compensation to 
injured individual shareholders'.99 Further, Article 123 broadly provided for directors' 
liability to compensate the company for their conduct in breach of the law, 
administrative regulations or the articles of association. This provision was, however, 
silent on any remedies that may be sought by aggrieved shareholders where their 
company is unable or refuses to sue the wrongdoer(s). 100 Neither an Australian-style 
shareholder derivative action 101 nor an oppression remedy 102 was available under the 
1993 Company Law. 
A similar approach was adopted by the 1998 Securities Law in relation to the issue of 
investor protection. Article 3 of the Securities Law broadly provided that 'securities 
issue and transaction shall adhere to the principles of openness, fa irness and 
impartiality' .103 This was complemented by Article 4 which stated that, ' [t]he parties 
involved in the issuing and trading of securities shall have equal legal status and adhere 
to the principles of voluntariness, compensation and good faith ' .104 Article 59 required 
any documents prepared for public offering and listing of securities to be ' truthful , 
accurate and complete, and does not contain any false or misleading statement or 
material omission '. 105 The 1998 Securities Law also made some provisions for 
corporate disclosure. This included both periodic (namely, annual and half-year 
financial reports), and continuous disclosure on major events that may materially affect 
the company's share price. 106 In addition, the Law prohibited certain securities market-
97 Ibid art 111. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Xianchu Zhang, ' Practical Demands to Update the Company Law' ( 1998) 28 Hong Kong l aw Journal 248, 252 
'
00 The CSRC Code of Corporate Governance supplements thi s provision by providing that ' the shareholders shall 
have the right to request the company to sue for such compensation in accordance with law' Code of Corporate 
Governance, above n 4, art 4. 
"' Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 236, 237. 
"' Ibid s 232. 
103 1998 PRC Securities Law art 3. 
'
04 Ibid art 4. 
"' I 998 PRC Securities Law art 59. 
106 Ibid arts 58-94. For a more detai led overview of the regulation of disclosure by Chinese listed compan ies, see 
Jane Fu, Corporate Disclosure and Co,porate GovernanCe in China (Waites Kluwer, 20 10) ch 5, 127-71. 
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related misconduct. These included insider trading, 107 manipulation of the securities 
market 108 and fabrication and dissemination of false infonnation. !09 Various 
administrative and criminal liabilities were imposed on companies, and senior 
executives, for certain conduct which breached the Securities Law. 110 
The remedies offered by the 1998 Securities Law to investors who had suffered loss 
were, however, both few and illusory. Securities-related false or misleading disclosure 
was the only cause of action for these investors. Article 63 provided that the 
issuers/underwriting securities companies should be liable for the losses caused by false 
or misleading disclosure to investors, and that responsible directors, supervisors and 
officers in the listed companies/underwriting securities companies should be jointly 
liable. 111 However, as Chapter 7 will further illustrate, following a series of judicial 
opinions issued by the SPC, this action was made available to aggrieved investors only 
where the alleged wrongdoing had been subject to an administrative sanction, or a 
criminal conviction. 112 Shareholder class actions are banned in China due to another 
judicial opinion issued by the SPC in 2002. This will also be discussed below in 
Chapter 7. 
As noted earlier, the CSRC has played the leading role in investor protection since the 
early 2000s. The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed_ Companies issued by 
CSRC, based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, provides a number of 
principles concerning shareholders ' rights and equal treatment of shareholders. In 
response to the prevalence of group affiliation among listed companies, the CSRC Code 
requires that listed companies be separate from their controlling shareholders in 
personnel, assets and financial matters.11 3 The Code also sets some behavioural rules for 
various corporate organs of listed companies, and their controlling shareholders. Unlike 
107 /998 PRC Securities Law arts 67-70. 
,os Ibid art 71. 
109 Ibid art 72. 
110 Ibid arts 175, 177, 202; (( tp~)\[i/J=!;;f~~ifLl~)) [Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China] (People' s 
Republic of China) National People's Congress, 14 March 1997, arts I 60, I 61 , 179, 180, 181 and 182. 
11 1 /998 PRC Securities Law art 63. 
112 (( :$:~ARc~~:l<'f•1H'hjf~jplP.)!2iJJ;ffi®f1d£'ll .'.&(r)Rc:/JJm/tfj!!;~f'ttrJ-B''H.lill'E )) [Several Provisions on 
Trial of Civil Compensation Cases Arising from Misrepresentation on the Securities Market] art 5. 
11 3 CSRC Code of Corporate Governance, above n 4, arts 22-27. 
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Australian corporate law, it also imposes on controlling shareholders a duty of good 
faith to the company, and to other shareholders. 114 
The extent to which the CSRC and the stock exchange listing rules, as mentioned in 
Section 5.2, could provide an effective remedy to injured investors was, however, quite 
limited. First, the administrative regulations issued by the CSRC can be enforced only 
by the agency itself, through administrative sanctions such as warning, fines, suspension 
or termination of listing. 115 Compared to the administrative regulations, the binding 
force of the CSRC Code is even weaker. Similar to a Western code of corporate 
governance, the Code does not detail any penalties for the violation of any compulsory 
rules it contains. 116 Rather it states that the CSRC will use the Code to evaluate the 
governance structure and practice of listed companies, and may direct a company to 
make necessary corrections for any breach of the Code. The stock exchanges, as self-
regulatory bodies, have even fewer sanctioning powers in enforcing the listing rules. 
The above review of the pre-2005 regulatory framework for investor protection showed 
that the framework was far from rigorous. The examination of the underlying practice in 
the Chinese top l 00 listed companies below will suggest that poor investor protection 
was further exacerbated by the overlapping roles of the state as a dominant shareholder, 
a market regulator and adjudicator of securities-related disputes._ 
5.4.2 Features of and problems with governance practices 
As noted in Chapter 2, the muted voice of shareholders was a typical feature of the 
former state-led model of corporate governance. However, this does not necessarily 
imply that shareholders were ill-treated. Indeed, small individual shareholders in pre-
mid- l 990s Japan were depicted by Aoki as passive but placid outside investors, who 
customarily delegated their monitoring role to large and stable shareholders, such as the 
main banks.117 If this depiction can be used as a benchmark, the situation for public 
investors in Chinese listed SOEs pre-2005 appeared to be much worse. 
11 4 [bid art 19. 
11 5 1998 PRC Securities Law ch 12. 
116 Some rules in the Code for Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China arc compulsory and o thers are 
statements of recommended practices. 
117 Masahiko Aoki , 'Monitoring Characteristics of the Main Bank System: an Analytical and Developmental View', 
in Masahiko Aoki and Hugh Patrick (eds), Th e Japanese Main Bank system (Oxford University Press, 1994) I 09, 
I~. . 
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First, poor investor protection was manifested in inadequate information disclosure by 
listed companies. When asked to comment on the effectiveness of the system of 
corporate disclosure in China, references such as 'minimal disclosure' , ' formal 
compliance' and 'lack of material disclosure ' were frequently used by the interviewees. 
For example, a financial investment consultant in Shanghai stated, 'they disclose what 
is asked for and no more. Sometimes they will disclose less' .118 The problem of false 
disclosure was highlighted by a financial journalist in Shanghai : 
There has been progress in information disclosure. Companies know they have to 
disclose regularly. The problem is whether they disclose the right information. 
Sometimes, they hide the true information. Auditors can be bribed. They work with the 
company to give wrong information. You need to have other measures to make it work. 
For some interviewees, the truthfulness of information disclosed by listed companies 
also attracted concern from the stock exchanges. Some statistics given by a corporate 
governance adviser in Hong Kong shed light on the seriousness of the problem: 
PRC is one of the few markets with quarterly reporting. It improves the efficiency of 
reporting and financial s. But how well are these financials checked? Two years ago, 84 
companies were checked and over 80% of these companies and over 70% of the 
auditors had inaccuracies. This makes you think twice about accepting the financials. 11 9 
Second, poor protection of investors was also reflected in the rampant diversion of 
funds by parent SOEs from listed companies. This was consistent with a survey 
conducted by the CSRC in 2002, which found that diversion of funds by controlling 
shareholders occurred in 676, or more than half, of listed companies, with the total 
amount of funds diverted amounting to nearly RMB97 billion (approximately AUDJ 5 
billion).120 This phenomenon led an accounting professor in Shanghai to use the term 
'ATM (Automatic Teller Machine)' to describe the status of listed companies in relation 
to their parent enterprises. 12 1 
11 8 Interview code SH08037. 
11 9 These figures seem to be consistent with a more recent study which found that the CS RC imposed sanctions in 
relation to 49 cases of violation of securities law in 2004 and, 43 in 2005. More than half of these cases involved 
false disclosure. The study further estimated that ' for every one case of penalty or public censure there are as 
many as four cases of violation that have not been revealed or pursued'; Zhong Zhang, above n 28, 754. 
120 
'm.li/lltJtioE;t.' P:li' [Re-establishing the Ecosystem Balance of the Stock market] , China Net News Story (9 
September 2003) <http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/OP-c/400605.htm>. 
121 Interview code SH093 I I. 
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The most common means of diversion of funds, according to some interviewees, was 
through related party transactions. 122 As most listed companies were derived from their 
parents, the upstream and downstream business connections between the parent and 
subsidiary companies necessitated this type of transactions. In the meantime, as the 
parents had injected their most profitable line of business into the subsidiaries for the 
specific purpose of listing, there was also an expectation that the favour rendered would 
subsequently be returned. This rationale was observed by the board secretary of a 
Beijing-based company: 
Those people who were left with the non-performing assets have to make a living. 
Their factories are losing money. This is the problem. They have to use connected 
transactions to channel profits of listed companies to the remaining entity. 123 
Of course not all listed companies and their parent SOEs treated their public investors 
poorly. A large listed company might have provided them with better treatment because 
the company was well-known, and hence 'pays more attention to its reputation' 124 or 
simply that the listed company had a rich parent. For example, when asked to comment 
on how minority shareholder interests were usually protected in Chinese listed 
companies, the board secretary of a power company in Guangdong remarked: 
Generally it needs improvement. However, in our case, the parent company is well off 
and it does not need to siphon funds from the listed company. Sometimes, it even gives 
some extra benefits to the minority shareholders. So the situation (for shareholder 
protection in our company) has been good. 125 
Chinese companies listed on foreign exchanges were also perceived by the majority 
interviewees as having better corporate governance and investor protection. 126 This was 
largely attributed to the stronger discipline provided by foreigner regulators and market 
participants. 127 For example, when asked to comment on the impact of foreign listing of 
122 As an executive of a Shandong-based textile company stated, '[w]e feel that in other companies there are a lot of 
connected transactions. In China, the equity market is used for financing transactions, not for return. We th ink the 
HK market is better in this respect ' (Interview code SH094 l 2). 
123 Interview code BJ01307 (b). 
124 The in-house legal counsel of a listed insurance company (Interview code BJ068 l 2). 
125 Interview code GZ 10212. 
126 As a researcher of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange stated, when asked whether listing of Chinese companies on 
foreign exchanges would improve the quality of corporate governance practices in China, 'That may occur. For 
example, public companies listed in New York improved their corporate governance after listing. Also when they 
list overseas, they come back and list in China. It helps with the improvement of corporate governance here' 
(Interview code SZ04544). 
127 As a Beijing-based partner of an international accounting firm stated, when asked about the impact of foreign 
listing on the impact of corporate governance practices in China, '[b]ecause there are foreign regulators and 
foreign intermediaries. The quality of disclosure is higher a11d reliability is higher'. (Interview code BJ07244). 
113 
Chinese companies on the improvement of the quality of corporate governance 
practices in China, the board secretary of a Qingdao-based company stated: 
It has a positive effect. Overseas stock exchanges have better monitoring systems and 
their rules have to be followed when Chinese companies go overseas. Overseas listing 
also changes the mind/perspectives of the people involved. 128 
However, due in part to the small number of PRC companies listed overseas prior to 
2005, the demonstration effect of overseas listing on the governance of domestically 
listed companies was considered by some interviewees as 'extremely mild'. 129 
Many factors contributed to the poor protection of minority shareholders in listed SO Es 
prior to the 2005 corporate law reforms. These included the concentrated share 
ownership structure in these companies, inadequate shareholder remedies, and the lack 
of resources and experience of the regulators, including the CSRC and Chinese courts, 
in dealing with securities-related claims. The overlapping and conflicting roles of these 
law enforcement bodies have been discussed in section 5.3. During the ARC project 
interviews, the lack of independence of the courts from government was also expressed 
by some interviewees as having contributed to their reluctance to hear securities-related 
claims filed by individuals. 13°For a senior executive of a Guangdong-based power 
company, Chinese courts may distance themselves from cases involving listed 
companies because of concerns about causing social ' disorder'. 13 1 
There were strong sentiments for change manifested in the ARC project interviews. A 
strong dissatisfaction with shareholder protection in listed companies in China was 
expressed by many interviewees, particularly in the regulatory, professional and 
academic sectors. For some interviewees, poor investor protection was the root cause 
for the lack of investor confidence in the Chinese stock market. 132 The latter further led 
to the adoption of a highly speculative approach to investments not only by small 
individual investors, but also by institutional investors, including the QFIIs. For 
128 Interview code JN02344. 
129 Interview code HK05444. 
130 As an official of the CSRC stated, '[c]ourts are not independent from local government or competent in dealing 
with securities litigation' (Interview code SH083 l2). 
131 Interview code GZ I 0242. 
132 As a senior offi cial of the CSRC stated, '[o]f course shareholders hope companies to have good corporate 
governance, but in fact many shareholders have lost their confidence in listed companies' (Interview code 
SH08609). 
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example, when asked to comment on the impact of the QFIIs on corporate governance 
practices in China, the board secretary of a technology company in Shanghai stated: 
Their role is only symbolic at the moment. Firstly, the QF!ls hold only a small fraction 
of domestic shares (US$36million). Secondly, they have adopted the same strategy as 
local funds, i.e. , buying and selling quickly. At present, they cannot be called 'strategic 
investors ' in China. The quotas obtained by QF!ls are subdivided and sold to other 
foreign institutions, so no one has a substantial shareholding. 133 
Some interviewees considered poor investor confidence as a main factor for the long 
bearish market between 2001 and 2005. 134 For example, a corporate governance 
consultant in Hong Kong remarked: 
. You are completely mad to buy in China today. It is a bizarre situation. With the 
economic growth, there is a lot of money available in China. But [the] securities market 
is mediocre. 
Given the widespread public di ssatisfaction, it is of no surprise that investor protection 
became one of the central issues for the 2005 corporate law reforms. 
5.5 Non-shareholder stakeholder protection 
As Chapter 3 discussed, the muted voice of non-shareholder stakeholders, such as 
consumers and local communities in which companies operate, was also a typical 
feature of the fonner state-led model of corporate governance. ·A notable exception in 
this regard was the treatment received by employees. Viewed as corporate insiders, 
rather than outsiders as in the Anglo-American outsider-based corporate governance, 
employees were often the target of state coordination. As the review of the law and 
practice in relation to non-shareholder stakeholder (including employees) protection in 
the top 100 listed SOEs during 2002 to 2004 below will demonstrate, this feature of the 
fonner state-led model was also present in China prior to the 2005 corporate law 
reforms. 
5.5.1 The legal and regulatory framework 
In relation to employee protection, in line with the Chinese sociali st tradition as well as 
the former state-led model, Article 15 of the 1993 Company Law mandated that 'a 
company shall protect the legitimate rights and interests of its staff and workers, 
1J3 Interview code SH09 145. 
134 For example, the company secretary of a Shanghai-based iron and steel company remarked, '[companies] have 
not done enough to protect minority shareholders. Otherwi se the stock market wou ld not remain sluggish for so 
long and there would not be so many scandal s exposed by the med ia' (Interview Code SH092 l 2). 
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strengthen labour protection, and ensure safe production'. 135 Companies were also 
required to improve the productivity of their workers through various means, such as 
undertaking 'vocational education and in job training' .136 Article 16 further stated that, 
' [w]orkers of a company shall organise a trade union organisation in accordance with 
the law to carry out union activities and safeguard worker's legitimate rights and 
interests. A company shall provide the necessary conditions for activities of its trade 
union organisation' .137 
Consistent with the strong representation of employees in traditional SOEs, the role of 
employees was also 'institutionalised' in the structure of corporate governance. 138 For 
example, Article 124 provided that the supervisory board must consist of an 
'appropriate proportion of workers'. Article 121 required companies to consult with 
trade unions and employees when making decisions concerning employee wages, 
welfare, safe production processes and other issues related to the employees' 
interests. 139 Companies were further required to consult with trade unions and 
employees when deciding significant operational issues under Article 122.140 
However, beyond employee protection, the concept of corporate social responsibility 
appeared to have only been 'partially embedded' in the 1993 Company Law. 141 Article 
14 vaguely provided that the company 'shall abide by law, qbserve business ethics, 
promote socialist culture and ethics, and accept the supervision by the government and 
the public '. 142 Citing a leading Chinese corporate law professor, Lin argued that the lack 
of clear emphasis of corporate social responsibility in the 1993 Company Law occurred 
in a context where the government 'vehemently helped SOEs shirk debt and exhicated 
them from the function of social services' .143 It was not until 2002 that the concept of 
'corporate social responsibility' was introduced into China through the Code of 
Corporate Governance issued by the CSRC. The Code broadly requires that 'whi le 
ll5 /993PRCCompany Lawart 15(1 ). 
136 Ibid art 15(2). 
137 Ibid art 16(1 ). 
138 Li-Wen Lin, ' Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Structural Change? ' (20 10) 
28Berkeley Journal of /111ernatio11a/ law 64, 68. 
139 /993 PRC Company Law art 121. 
140 Ibid art 122. 
14 1 Li-Wen Lin, above n l 38, 69. 
142 /993 PRC Company Law art 14(1). 
143 ;l"Llf3t/lijc [Liu JunHai], ((0i§J[l{JU4i'i!Hf )) [Corporate Social Responsibi li ty] :ftJi\'/tW :.liAAt± [Beijing Law 
Press], (1999) 85 -86, cited in Lin, Li-Wen, above n I 38, 69. 
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ensuring sustained growth and maximising shareholder interests, listed companies shall 
be committed to community welfare, environmental protection and charity issues and 
shall pay attention to their company's social responsibilities' .144 
However, as the review of the ARC project interview data below will suggest, similar to 
the former state-led model, the practice of non-shareholder stakeholder protection in 
Chinese listed SOEs rarely went beyond the protection of employees during 2002 to 
2004. 
5.5.2 Features of and problems with governance practices 
From the ARC project interviews, similar to the post-war state-led economies, 
employees were generally treated as important stakeholders in large listed SOEs in 
China. As discussed below, the degree of employee protection offered by state-
controlled listed companies was not seen as very different from the traditional SOEs 
under the planned system. This seems to be an interesting contrast to the widely-held 
view among Western researchers at that time that the model of corporate governance in 
Chinese companies was quickly converging with the Anglo-American model. 
The relatively strong employee protection offered by state-controlled listed companies, 
in comparison to their private-sector counterparts, 145 was attributed by several 
interviewees to the legacy of the traditional SOEs. For example, a Shanghai-based 
auditing partner of an international accounting firm remarked, ' [c]ompanies that used to 
be SOEs have a tradition of protecting people. For a long time, this is a traditional 
morale that employees are very important to company success' .146 For several other 
interviewees, the importance placed by the Party-government on maintaining social 
stability was another important factor. 147 
The need for protecting the interests of employees appeared to have led some insiders 
from the top 100 to take a much broader view of the concept of corporate governance. 
The level of employee protection was seen by these corporate executives as an 
144 CSRC Code of Corporate Governance, above n 4, art 86. 
145 As a company secretary of a Beijing-based oi l company remarked, 'for some private companies, they are using 
workers ruthlessly as labour in China is in oversupply ... There are lots of factories in Southern China with lots of 
labours working in harsh conditions' (Interview code BJO 131 3). 
146 Interview code SH07913. 
147 For example, a Beijing-based law academic remarked, 'for our government the protection of employees is the 
most important thing, as government seeks to keep the society stable and enhance people's living standards' 
(Interview code BJOl913). Similarly, an official from the Shanghai Stock Exchange stated, '[t]he interests of 
employees are very important as government wants to keep social stability' (Interview code SH09613). 
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important indicator of good corporate governance. 148 Several interviewees also believed 
that the level of employee protection offered by state-controlled listed companies far 
outweighed the protection they provided for minority shareholders. 149 
The relatively good protection afforded by state-controlled listed companies to their 
employees is, however, different from a strong voice given to the employees. Indeed, 
compared to their status as 'masters of the enterprises' under the former planned system, 
there was a general trend towards weakening the voice of workers in corporate 
governance during the period of 2002 to 2004. Employee representatives on the 
supervisory board did not play any substantial monitoring role, and the trade unions 
generally served as a tool of the Party to maintain labour peace and unity with the Party. 
This latter point was made by an informant from a Shanghai-based bank: 
Because of differences in social structure, unions in China play a different role 
compared to unions in Australia. In China, unions facilitate company goals. In most 
situations, this benefits employees and does not conflict with management. 150 
According to some interviewees, the coincidence of the interests of the employees with 
those of the Party, and company management, might have played an important role in 
facilitating state goals. This is especially so with the shift in focus of the Party from 
ideology building towards economic growth. This was explained by an informant from 
a Shanghai-based electric company: 
Elements of the old system (like the Party) still exist, but their functions have changed a 
lot. The new role of the Party in listed companies is to facilitate things and to build 
stability of the company. The board is more concerned with the operation of the 
company. Both the Party and the board want the company to run smoothly. Like the 
Party, unions are more in a supporting role in the daily operations. The concept of 
unions in China is different from the West. In China it cooperates with the company. 
Furthermore, consistent with the former state-led model, non-shareholder stakeholder 
protection beyond employee welfare was largely ignored prior to the 2005 Company 
148 As this point was illustrated by the company secretary of a Chongqing-based company: 'The protection of 
employee interests is a fundamental concern for good corporate governance ... Also according to the policy of the 
government and the Party, rights and interests of employees in the state-owned companies must be protected. We 
have entered into a contract with the union in our company which specifies measures the management shall adopt 
to safeguard and enhance employees' interests. As the company's profits have increased in recent years, 
employee welfare has also improved ' (interview code CQI 0313). A Shanghai-based accounting professor and 
independent director also agreed, 'Companies that used to be SOEs have a tradition of protecting people. For a 
long time, this is a traditional morale that employees are very important to the company's success' (Interview 
code SH0791 3). 
149 As a Shanghai·based financial industry advisor remarked, 'Employee interests are so well protected by others, 
like the Party, the Government and the Union ... In the current situation, the protection of interests of employees 
is overweighed at the expense of shareholders' (Interview code SH080 13). 
150 lnterview code SH03416. 
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law reform. When asked to rank company stakeholders, some interviewees noted 
customers and suppliers. However, few corporate insiders identified the interests of the 
local community, or the wider public, as important company stakeholders. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the regulatory environment concerning the governance of 
Chinese listed SOEs prior to the 2005 corporate law reforms. It has also examined the 
law and practice in relation to three sets of company relations (namely, state-manager 
relations, investor protection and non-shareholder stakeholder, including employee 
protection) central to the former post-war state-led model of corporate governance, 
within large Chinese listed SOEs during 2002 and 2004. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, as well as the overall regulatory environment, the regulatory framework 
for those three sets of company relations during the period examined resembled some 
key features of the former state-led model. These included state involvement in 
management decision-making, the muted voice of shareholders and poor non-
shareholder stakeholder protection that rarely went beyond employee welfare. 
While the underlying practice of corporate governance in China largely conformed to 
the former state-led model, some serious problems in this regard may have jeopardised 
the future development of these companies. In relation to state-manager relations, this 
chapter has shown that, backed by state ownership of large companies and Party-state 
appointment of top corporate executives, state intervention in company management 
appeared to be far greater in China compared to the former state-led economies. 
Nevertheless, excessive powers vested in the general meeting and the Chairman of the 
board of directors, coupled with lax internal and external monitoring of the exercise of 
those powers, led to the paradoxical problem of insider control of listed companies by 
their top executives and parent SOEs. In relation to investor protection, compared to the 
former East Asian state-led economies such as Japan, the exploitation of minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholders and corporate managers appeared to be far 
more common and serious in Chinese listed SOEs. Similar to the post-war state-led 
economies, non-shareholder stakeholder protection in these companies was largely 
confined to the protection of employee interests. 
As explained in Chapter 3, institutional, including corporate governance, changes in 
state-led economies face the dual pressures of economic globalisation and the 
pluralisation of interests within domestic society. Under these pressures, subsequent 
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governance reforms carried out in China could have propelled Chinese corporate 
governance to move towards the Anglo-American outsider-based model. However, as 
the review of the theories of state capitalism and institutional change in Chapter 3 
suggested, the state plays an important role in conditioning the trajectory of changes in 
the formulation and enforcement of corporate governance rules in state-led economies. 
A centralised state may choose to respond to these challenges by readjusting its 
relations with key corporate actors and, in the meantime, taking into account other 
interests emerging in companies and the wider society, without necessarily resorting to 
a fundamental systemic change. 
The next three chapters will illustrate this point by examining China's post-2005 legal 
and regulatory reform of the above three sets of company relations concerning listed 
SOEs. Through identifying and interpreting the changes, and continuities thereof, the 
three chapters will illustrate the emergence of a new 'state-led stakeholder ' approach to 
the governance of listed SOEs in China. 
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CHAPTER 6 CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES IN CHINA'S POST-
2005 REGULATION OF STATE-MANAGER 
RELATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
The next three chapters, including this one, examine China's post-2005 legal and 
regulatory reforms of corporate governance in listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
This chapter focuses on state-manager relations, Chapter 7 on investor and other 
stakeholder, including employee, protection. Chapter 8 interprets the changes and 
continuities in the Chinese post-2005 regulation of these three sets of company relations 
through the lens of state capitalism and institutional change. 
Put together, the three chapters wi ll show that China's post-2005 regulatory framework 
has given rise to a new model of corporate governance, which can be called a 'state-led 
stakeholder' approach. On the one hand, the model has moved away from the fonner 
state-led model, which was partly manifested in pre-2005 Chinese corporate 
governance, in three important aspects. First, the state has intensified efforts to 
strengthen monitoring of managers. As discussed in Chapter 5, insider control by top 
executives and parent SO Es was one of the key problems with corporate governance in 
listed SOEs prior to 2005. This chapter will demonstrate that in an effort to strengthen 
monitoring of managers, China has adopted many mechanisms of the Anglo-American 
outsider-based corporate governance. This trend of market-oriented changes is likely to 
accelerate under a new generation of Chinese leaders. Second, compared to the fonner 
state-led model, the new Chinese model represents a far more shareholder-friendly 
approach. As will be shown in Chapter 7, drawing upon Anglo-American corporate 
governance, this model provides minority shareholders with additional protection, at 
least as regards the law-in-the-books. Third, adopting an all -encompassing approach, 
and drawing upon the broader stakeholder model of corporate governance, this model 
attempts to provide a wide range of other non-shareholder stakeholders with far better 
protection than China's pre-2005 regulatory framework. 
On the other hand, despite these extensive changes, the new Chinese model remains a 
state-centric approach. As these chapters will also demonstrate, a large and visible role 
continues to be played by the state in structuring company relations with its internal and 
external stakeholders. In relation to state-manager relations, this chapter will show that, 
taken together with the non-market-based changes and the substantial continuity in the 
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Chinese post-2005 regulatory framework, the various market-based changes have been 
utilised to strengthen the effectiveness of state control over corporate managers, rather 
than to distance the state from SOEs. 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. Section 6.2 provides an 
overview of the 2005 major amendments I to the 1993 Company Law and the 1998 
Securities Law. This is because these two amendments lie at the heart of China's 
corporate governance reforms over the past few years. Section 6.3 outlines the main 
changes to the regulation of state-manager relations in listed SOEs introduced by the 
new Company Law and the Securities Law and related regulatory reforms. Given the 
group affiliation nature of most listed SOEs in China (as Chapter 5 discussed), state-
manager relations within listed companies cannot be separated from those at the parent 
SOE level. Section 6.3 will therefore look at the regulatory changes at both levels. As 
this section will suggest, in regard to the latter, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), as the regulator and state shareholder of central 
government-affiliated SOEs (central SOEs), has played a key role in initiating changes. 
Section 6.4 identifies the continuities in China's post-2005 regulation of state-manager 
relations. Putting together the main findings of this chapter, Section 6.5 summarises the 
key features of Chinese post-2005 regulation of state-manager relations concerning 
listed SOEs. 
6.2 Overview of the 2005 Company Law and Security Law reforms 
Regulation of corporate governance in China has undergone extensive changes since 
around mid-2000s. The key actors in the regulatory environment, as outlined in Chapter 
5, have largely remained the same. However, substantial changes have taken place to 
the regulatory framework, particularly through the 2005 Company Law and 2005 
Securities Law amendments. 
These two long-awaited amendments were driven in part by the development of 
Chinese economy, and partly, popular demands of society.2 As discussed in Chapter 4, 
((cpif-Al'i\~ 'fU000'eJ i$J [Company Law of the People 's Republic of China] (People's Republic of China) 
National People ' s Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2005 (' 2005 PRC Company law' ); (( cpif-A Be~ 
'fU00iiE#i2c)) [Securities Law of the Peopl e' s Republic of China] (People 's Republic of China) National 
People's Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2005 ('2005 PRC Securities Law'). 
mJ,Ef,):; [Zhou Zhengqing], ':¥-er (( cpif-Al'i\;i!i 'fU OOiiE#i22 ( j~i,J :1/i~ ))) 8'JiJI.BJl ' [Explanation of the Draft 
Amendment to the Securities Law of the People's Republic of China] (Deli vered at the 15•h Meeting of the IO'' 
National People's Congress Standing Committee, 24 April 2005) <http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2005-
l 0/27/content_5343 I 16.htm>. 
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the 1993 PRC Company Law and the 1998 Securities Law were drafted to assist 
corporatisation of SOEs without necessarily removing state control. Consequently, both 
statutes were not only fraught with technical deficiencies associated with the early stage 
of the SOE reform, but also strongly favoured the interests of the state. As China's 
economic reform and opening-up progressed, both statutes were widely criticised for 
their failure to provide a corporate law system that would better facilitate development 
of companies in all sectors and the Chinese stock market. 3 
In response to this criticism, both the 2005 Company Law and 2005 Securities Law 
exhibit a broad trend of shifting away from a SOE-centred to a general company law 
statute, and from government control of corporate activities to free enterprise. For 
example, the 2005 Company Law has lowered the statutory capital requirements for 
incorporation, 4 and allowed companies greater discretion to structure their internal 
affairs through constitution or resolutions of shareholders. 5 Moreover, the new 
Company Law has abolished the ceiling for companies to invest in other companies6 
and allowed incorporation of one shareholder/director limited liability companies. 7 
Some major changes introduced by the new Securities Law have also brought the 
Chinese securities regulatory regime more in line with China's WTO commitments and 
international practices. 8 
Strengthening corporate governance was, nevertheless, a key objective of the 2005 
corporate law reforms. In the Explanation of the Draft Amendment to the Company 
Law9 produced by the State Council Legal Affairs Office (which prepared the initial 
3 
'lfiH~, '3<T ((9" ije ,Ai'l:;;t/ifl][;i,]0 1sl i't:' ( j3iJ -1,t~) )) Er-JiRDJl'[Explanation of the Draft Amendment to the 
Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (Delivered at the 14th Meeting of the 10th National People's 
Congress Standing Committee, 25 February 2005) <http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2005-
I 0/27/content_5343120.htm>; 3<'fil' [An Jian], '01sli't:'Er-J ~ ]lljj3i,J;fn~3iTEr-J±~f'l'B'' [The Overhaul of the 
Company Law and the Main Contents subject to Major Revision] in '.';i' filt [An Jian] (ed), (('t' $Ai'lc;t!ifll 00 0 
1sl r!:ff50 [Annotated Company Law of the People's Republic of China) (China Law Press [i't:'1-'ltili!i&t±], 
2005) I; /lil .iI/x [Zhou Zhengqing), above n 2. 
2005 PRC Company Law arts 26, 81. 
5 2005 PRC Company law art IO I; Note to further encourage private investment, amendment to the PRC 
Company Law in 20 I 3 removed the minimum registered capital requirements for incorporation of all types of 
companies in China. See (( 'PiJeAl'lc;Jt'fn 0001sli't:'f3lE~)) [Company Law of the People' s Republic of China: 
2013 Amendment] (People's Republic of China) National People' s Congress Standing Committee, 28 December 
2013. 
6 2005 PRC Company Law art 15. 
2005 PRC Company law ch 2, Section 3 (arts 58-64). 
8 Baoshu Wang, and Hui Huang, 'China's New Company Law and Securities Law: An Overview and Assessment ' 
(2006) 19 Australian Journal a/Corporate Law 229,236. 
9 !fii'i"~ [Cao Qingtai), above n 3. 
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draft of the amendment), a State Council document calling for fostering steady 
development of the stock market through multiple means, including strengthening 
corporate governance, 10 was cited alongside strong public concern for poor governance 
and investor protection in Chinese listed companies. 11 As will be discussed in this 
chapter and Chapter 7, many new provisions have been introduced through the revised 
Company Law and the Securities Law to enhance board accountability and 
effectiveness, as well as to address the various problems faced by minority shareholders 
(such as the lack of shareholders' rights and remedies) under the old framework. 12 That 
said, as illustrated in Section 6.4, the new Company Law has not removed most of the 
avenues for state involvement in corporate decision-making previously available under 
the 1993 Company Law. 
6.3 Post-2005 regulation of state-manager relations: what has 
changed? 
Significant changes have taken place in China's post-2005 regulation of state-manager 
relations. As this section will demonstrate, in an effort to reform this set of company 
relations, various market-based mechanisms based on Anglo-American corporate 
governance have been introduced not only into listed SOEs, but also their unlisted state-
owned parent companies. Viewed in isolation, these changes might suggest that the 
regulation of state-manager relations in China is moving towards the Anglo-American 
outsider-based model. However, as discussed later, this may not be the case should 
these changes be taken together with various non-market-based changes, as well as 
substantial continuities in the Chinese post-2005 regulatory framework. 
6.3.1 Regulatory changes to state-manager relations within listed SOEs 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the governance structure established by the 1993 PRC 
Company Law was highly hierarchical. This structure, comprising the general meeting 
and two subordinate boards, was designed to preserve state control of corporate affairs, 
as it was envisaged that the state would remain the controlling shareholder in most of 
corporatised SOEs. However, with extensive management powers vested in the general 
meeting and the Chairman of the board of directors (the Chairman), and poor internal 
'° The document mentioned in the Expla11ario11 is « OO ,lHii.~-f- ftr i!.tlit :$:$:IJh i&.1/i:if~ .f□ ,r,, )E'./,:}!t(J{] ;//i-f-~ 
_!Al.)) [Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital 
Markets] (People' s Republic of China) State Council , 3 IJanuary 2004 
11 l!fii'l~ [Cao Qingtai], above n 3. 
12 For an overview of the key areas of reform introduced by the 2005 Company Law and 2005 Securities Law, see 
Wang and Huang, above n 8, 232-8. · 
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and external monitoring of the exercise of those powers, this structure contributed to the 
problem of insider control of listed SOEs by their top executives, particularly the 
Chairman, and parent SOEs. 
This overall governance structure has not been significantly altered by the 2005 
Company Law, and as discussed later, has continued to serve as a conduit for state 
intervention in the management of listed companies. Various efforts have, however, 
been made in the new Company Law and subsequent regulatory reforms to improve the 
effectiveness and accountability of corporate managers, including the Chairman. As the 
discussion below will suggest, many of the market-oriented changes are not unfamiliar 
to scholars acquainted with the Anglo-American style of corporate governance. 
First, some changes have been made in the new Company Law to reinforce the role of 
the board of directors in executive decision-making. Under the 1993 Company Law, it 
was impossible for the board to meet and pass resolutions, where the Chairman had 
neither convened a board meeting nor designated the Deputy Chairman or another 
director to do so. 13 The new Company Law makes it clear where the Chairman fails to 
do either, such responsibility may be performed by the Deputy Chairman, or a director 
nominated by more than half of directors. 14 Furthermore, the new Company Law gives 
the power to requisition interim board meetings to a much wjder range of corporate 
actors, including shareholders who hold at least IO per cent of company shares. 15 To 
ensure the equal decision-making power of all directors, the new Company Law also 
specifies the principle of one director one vote over board resolutions.16 As another 
effort to strengthen the role of the board, the new Company Law broadly endorses the 
system of independent directors previously introduced by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for listed companies, and designates the State Council 
to make more detailed rules in the area. 17 
13 2005 PRC Company Law art 114. 
14 Ibid art I I 0(2). 
15 Ibid art 111(2). 
16 Ibid art 112(2). 
17 2005 PRC Company Law art 123. The new Company Law's deferral of its regulatory power in thi s area to the 
State Council has disappointed many of the system's strong proponents, including the China Securities 
Regul atory Commission (the 'CSRC ') who first introduced the system to listed companies in 200 I. According to 
An Jian, given the lack of evidence for the effecti veness of the system at least prior to the 2005 Company law 
refonn (as discussed in Chapter 5), this broadly-drafted provision might serve as a practical solution. It at least 
leaves sufficient room for the CSRC to carry out further refonns in the area. See j;(fi! [An Jian], above n 3, 13. 
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Second, as a corollary to strengthening the role of the board of directors, the powers of 
the Chairman in corporate decision-making have been curtailed. For example, the old 
Article 120 (I) that granted the board the power to delegate part of its functions to the 
Chairman has been deleted. 18 As discussed in Chapter 5, the close involvement of the 
Chairman in the day-to-day operations of the company was also associated with his or 
her role as the company's statutory legal representative. The revised Company Law 
allows companies to appoint their legal representatives from a much broader range of 
senior executives including the Chairman, executive directors and the General 
Manager. 19 Consequently, the old provision that granted the Chairman the power to sign 
the shares and bonds of the company has also been removed.20 
Third, the new Company Law has expanded the powers of the supervisory board m 
monitoring directors. Hence, in addition to their routine powers to inspect company 
financial affairs and audit directors' meetings, the supervisory board is given the right to 
make enquiries and suggestions at the meetings of board of directors. 21 The revised 
Company Law also grants the supervisory board the power to investigate any 
irregularities in company operations.22 In so doing, it may seek help from professional 
advisors such as accountants, with expenses covered by the company.23 Further, under 
the 2005 Company Law, where a director or senior manager fails to rectify an alleged 
wrongdoing upon request, the supervisory board has more options at its disposal. It may 
convene and preside over an extraordinary general meeting to report its findings to the 
shareholders, 24 or propose the general meeting to remove the wrongdoer. 25 At the 
request of shareholder(s) with at least one per cent of shareholding in the company for 
180 consecutive days, the supervisory board may also bring a derivative action against 
the wrongdoer to protect the interests of the company.26 
18 
«cp if}\l'l;;~f0~0 '§'] i'!» [Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (People' s Republic of China) 
National People's Congress Standing Committee, 29 December 1993 (' 1993 PRC Company Law' ), an 120( I). 
19 2005PRCCompanylaw an 13. 
20 /993 PRC Company law art 114(3). 
21 2005 PRC Company Law art 55( I). 
22 Ibid art 55(2). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid arts 119(1) and 54. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid 152(1). 
126 
Fourth, further to strengthening the roles of the board of directors and the board of 
supervisors in corporate governance, the 2005 Company Law has sought to enhance the 
accountability of directors, supervisors and other senior managers by imposing more 
stringent duties on these persons. The 1993 Company Law required directors, 
supervisors and the General Manager to 'perform their functions and responsibilities 
loyally' but omitted a directors' duty of care and diligence. 27 This very weak regime of 
directors ' duties has been considered by some Chinese legislators as contributing to the 
problem of insider control in listed companies. 28 Under a new Chapter entitled 
'qualifications and duties of directors, supervisors and senior managers ',29 the revised 
Company Law specifically subjects directors, supervisors, and senior managers to the 
duty of care and diligence, as well as the duty of loyalty. 30 The new Company Law also 
expands the types of conduct that could constitute a breach of directors ' duty of loyalty. 
Thus, various conflict of interest situations in Anglo-American jurisdictions, from 
usurping corporate opportunity to accepting secret commissions, have been included.31 
As will be discussed in Chapter 7, this revamped regime of directors' duties has been 
further reinforced by the introduction of a number of Anglo-American style 
shareholders' rights and remedies contained in the new Company Law. 
Some other checks and balances have also been introduced by the 2005 Securities Law. 
These include additional duties imposed on directors. For example, Article 68 of the 
new Securities Law requires directors, supervisors and senior managers of listed 
companies to issue their written opinions on company periodical reports and guarantee 
the truthfulness, accuracy, and completeness of any information disclosed by their 
companies. 32 Article 67 extends the definition of 'major events ' that are subject to 
continuous disclosure by listed companies to include pending judicial investigation into 
company crimes.33 
27 1993 PRC Company l aw art 59. 
28 
'l'.cfil' [An Jianl , above n 3, 13. 
29 2005 PRC Company law ch 6. 
30 Ibid art 148(1). 
31 Tbid art 149. Several other provisions of the 2005 PRC Company Law also help to contain managerial 
misbehaviour. For example, Article 1 I 6 prohibits companies from lending money to any of its directors, 
supervisors or senior managers either directly or indirectly. Article 11 7 requires joint stock companies to 
regularl y disclose to their shareholders infonnation about remuneration received by their directors, supervisors 
and managers. 
32 2005 PRC Securities law art 68. 
33 Ibid art 67. 
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Needless to say, the passage of the 2005 Company Law and the Securities Law has 
generated another round of administrative rule-making by CSRC and SASAC. While 
some of these new rules mainly concern the implementation of legislative changes,34 
others have introduced further reforms to modernise Chinese corporate governance. 
One reform that has played an important role in aligning Chinese corporate governance 
with international best practices is the introduction of the Basic Standards for 
Enterprise Internal Control (the Basic Standards). 35 This document has been referred to 
as the 'Chinese version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act' .36 This is because it requires all 
companies listed in China to establish, by July 2009, an internal control system in line 
with the framework adopted in the US Sarbanes- Oxley Act. Listed companies are 
further required to undertake self-evaluation of their internal controls, publish annual 
self-evaluation reports and appoint accounting firms to audit and report on the 
effectiveness of their internal controls. 37 
Moreover, to provide directors and managers with greater incentives to maximise the 
financial performance of their companies, the CSRC has allowed listed companies that 
satisfy prescribed conditions to adopt equity-based incentive plans to reward their 
directors and managers. 38 The 2005 'split share structure refonn' has made the 
implementation of these plans possible. As noted in Chapter 4, the reform has so far had 
limited impact on the concentrated shareholding structure in Chinese listed companies. 
34 For example, L l: ili0EJ :~'if_!i'flii5I )) [Guidelines on Article of Association of Listed Companies] (People' s 
Republic of China) China Securities Regulatory Commi ssion, 16 March 2006, «J:. Jti0El/llt1f-;/;;:¾tJ\llJlLl )) 
[Rules on General Meeting of Listing Companies] (People' s Republic of China) China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, 16 March, 2006. These guidelines and rules brought relevant regulations and guidelines previously 
issued by the CSRC in line with the 2005 Company Law and the 2005 Securities Law. 
35 
«:1£~1'1 llll~1lrLl1!r1J ffl'¥Jll:}Jllm )) [Basic Standards for Enterprise Internal Control] (People' s Republic of China) 
Ministry of Finance, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Audit Office, China Banking Regulatory 
Commission and China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 22 May 2008 (' Basic Standards' ).Three sets of 
supplementary guidelines were further issued in 20 IO to assist the implementation of the Basic Standards. The 
three sets of guidelines are Enterprise Internal Control Application Guidelines No. I to No. I 8, the Enterprise 
Intcmal Control Assessment Guidelines and Enterprise Internal Control Auditing Guidelines. 
36 Xianchu Zhang, 'Company Law Refonn in China ' in John Garrick (ed), Law and Policy for China's Market 
Socialism (Routledge, 20 12) 39, 46 
37 
38 
«;ls'fep)l;t ((:if:~i!JJill~lj;1Jl,Jll: tJllm)) B'J il!i¾J )) [Circular on Release of the Basic Standards for Enterprise 
Internal Control](People's Republic of China ) Ministry of Finance, China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
National Audit Office, China Banking Regulatory Commi ssion and China In surance Regulatory Commission, 22 
May 2008; Basic Standards art I 0. 
(( _l: i\i 0EJ /llt:tx'. iJ!itf;!J~ J!!U/}i'! (ii\h)) [Measures fo r the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed 
Companies (For Trial lmplementation)l (People' s Republic of China) China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
31 December 2005 ; «OO f.f ~/llt .l: r!I 0EJ CJ:IUO :,J;:jIB,JN:tJ.i1!!: lii/J ii\fr;/} $)) [Trial Measures for the 
Implementation of Equity Incenti ve Plans by State-controlled Companies Listed Overseas ) ] (People' s Republic 
of China) State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration, 27 January 2006; ((!'!,lf.f~/llt .t.m0EJ C±!l:i!J ) 
:,J;:!if!iJ!lUJl. i/Jj_ /jj/J \j'\ frJJ-i'!)) [Trial Measures for the Implementation of Equity Incentive Plans by Domestically 
Listed State-controlled Companies] State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and 
Mini stry of Finance , 30 September 2006. 
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However, the unification of previous non-tradeable state (and state legal person) shares 
with tradeable shares through the reform paved the way for the utilisation of stock 
market-based mechanisms, including equity-based director incentive plans, to improve 
corporate governance in listed companies. 
This section has so far reviewed China' s post-2005 legal and regulatory reforms of 
state-manager relations within listed SOEs. The effectiveness of these various market-
based changes would depend on ongoing development of the stock market and the rule 
of law in China. However, by exposing listed SO Es and their managers to the concepts 
and principles of corporate governance in developed market economies, these reform 
measures, at least in theory, would not only help to mitigate the problem of insider 
control within these companies, but also make them 'better equipped to compete and 
develop in an increasingly globalised economy'.39 Nevertheless, to characterise China's 
post-2005 regulation of state-manager relations concerning listed SOEs, these changes 
at the level of listed companies must be viewed together with those at the parent SOE 
level. 
6.3.2 Regulatory changes to state-manager relations in parent SOEs 
China's post-2005 reforms of corporate governance in parent SOEs have been 
associated with the emergence of SASAC as a state-owned a~_sets regulator and state 
shareholder in over 100 central SOEs. Wholly owned by the central government, these 
gigantic enterprises control more than 300, typically largest, listed companies in China. 
As noted in Chapter 2, as China's new generation of leaders came to power in late 2013, 
a new round of SOE reform has been launched. The tasks of reform outlined by the 
Party at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress include the following: to 
encourage mixed-ownership in wholly state-owned enterprises by introducing private 
investments, to strengthen corporate governance through promoting professional 
management, and to further reform the system for managing state-owned assets 
through, among other means, defining the functions of individual SOEs (and setting 
performance targets accordingly) and establishing a number of state-owned capital 
operating companies to hold state shares in central SOEs.40 More detailed plans to carry 
out these refonn tasks are yet to be released. However, as the discussion below will 
39 Wang and Huang, above n 8, 239. 
40 (( 't':Jf::'t'Jc ~'f:i: llil f iH-L i:li:-"i'i :§'-Ffil::i<: loJllii!l{]l}UiD [Deci sion on Several Major Issues Con cerning 
Comprehensively Deepening Refonns], adopted at the . TI1ird Plenum of the I g<h Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party, 12 November 201 3 ('Decision on Deepening Reforms' ). 
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suggest, some of these market-oriented strategies have been set in place by SASAC 
over the past few years. 
Two major initiatives have underlined SASAC's efforts to tum central SOEs from 
traditional enterprises into modem large corporations. These are the 'standardised 
board' reform and the promotion of full listing of central SOEs on domestic and 
international stock markets. Although both reforms only concern central SOEs 
controlled by SASAC, they may be expected to have been replicated, or adapted to 
various extents, at the local levels. This is because as the national state-owned assets 
management authority, SASAC is also charged with guiding and supervising the work 
of local SASACs.41 
Before the creation of SASAC in 2003 , governance reform at the level of central SOEs 
lagged behind their listed subsidiaries. Notwithstanding the passage of the first PRC 
Company Law in 1993, most central SOEs remained registered under the 1988 Law on 
Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People. 42 The governance system 
prescribed by that piece of legislation is the 'factory top manager responsibility system' , 
that is, a single executive in controi.43 
This one-man-in-control system also had strong influence on the central SOEs that have 
been converted into wholly state-owned companies, and registered under the 1993 
Company Law. This was despite the mandate for a board structure by the latter. Given 
the high level of comingling between senior executives in central SOEs and their listed 
subsidiaries, this one-man-in-control model also exacerbated the problem of insider 
control within listed SOEs. The substantial risks associated with this model were 
manifested in several major corporate scandals involving central SOEs and their listed 
subsidiaries. These included the 2004 China Aviation Oil saga which led to the collapse 
of a Singapore-listed subsidiary.44 In another case, a former Chainnan of Sinopec was 
41 (( '.il' '1l'. I'm 1i" !!'tr" llii 1!if ~ Jll! 't/1 fr ;f, {Jj)) [Interim Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of 
Enterprise Siale-owned Assets] (People ' s Republic of China) State Council, 13 May 2003, art 13. 
42 ((~ [Ufi1i"$1JI '1l'.¾'1l'.i'! )) [Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People] (People's Republic of 
China) National People's Congress, 13 Apri l 1988 
43 Ibid art 7. 
44 
'Costly Lessons from the CAO Scandal', . China Daily (online) (23 December 2004) 
<hrtp://www.chinadaily.com.cn/engli sh/doc/2004-12/23/conJent_ 402605.htm>. 
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sentenced to a suspended death penalty, for taking bribes of RMB 196 million 
(approximately AUD32 million).45 
SASAC has undertaken the important step of introducing the so-called 'standardised 
board' reform, in an effort to strengthen the board effectiveness in central SOEs. It 
initiated a pilot program in June 2004,46 and selected seven central SOEs to participate 
in the experiment of the 'standardised board' .47 By the end of 2011 , 42 of the then 121 
SASAC-controlled SOEs had undergone this reform.48 
At the heart of the 'standardised board' is the introduction of SASAC-nominated 
external directors onto central SOEs' boards of directors. The standardised board has 
seven to 13 directors with the majority being external directors.49 SASAC has also set 
out detailed rules concerning the desirable mixture of skills among the external 
directors. For example, the majority of outside directors should have experience in 
managing large enterprises, and at least one of them should have a background in 
accounting. The inclusion of foreign external directors is also stressed for companies 
with substantial business operations overseas. 5° Furthermore, the standardised board 
should establish several sub-board committees, including the nomination committee, the 
remuneration and evaluation committee and the audit committee, to act as advisory 
bodies to the board.51 While the majority of the nomination committee are required to 
be filled by external directors, the latter two committees shall only be filled by external 
directors. 52 
45 
' Busting the Bribe Tribe', China Daily (online) (20 August 2009) <http://www.chinadaily.com. cn/business/2009-
08/20/content_8594794.htm>. 
46 ((~ 'f 'P ::J;,1£~l1 1L -tO :,\il'!} 00 fl 1!l! ~ 0 jjj l'!'ill¾ii':.#. I 1t [J{Jii!HO)) [Notice on Experimenting the 
Establishment and Improving the System of Board of Directors in Wholly State-owned Enterprises] (People's 
Republ ic of China) State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 7 June 2004 . 
41 The seven SASAC-controlled SOEs are Chengtong Group Corporation, Shenhua Group, Baosteel Group 
Corporation, New Technology In vestment Group Corporation, China Pharmaceutical Group Corporation, China 
International Tourism Service Group Corporation and Railway Communications Group Corporation. 
48 
•[E~~-jlj:Cji:9<{£~1,tt.trli, 8 _t .T1]::J;,{£i.!l(~,!ll 9000 1Z. ' [SASAC Continues to Promote the Full Li sting of 
Central SOEs, Funds Raised by Listed Central SOEs Exceeded RMB900 Billion], China Ve111ure (online), 18 
May, 2012 <http://news.chinaventure.com.cn/2/20 12051 8/86 11 9.shtml>. 
" 
«.JE "!i' ¾ii':,#,cj,;lc1£~:li 'J¾f.'\l'i[iE1t'!!/fr,/J-i2')) [Interim Measures for the Standard Operation of the 
Board of Directors of Central State-owned Enterprises under the Pilot Program on Board of Directors] (People 's 
Republic of China) State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 20 March 2009, art 22. 
50 Ibid art 26. 
51 Ibid art 28. 
52 Ibid art 29. 
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To reduce the concentration of management powers within central SOEs, SASAC has 
also required the standardised board to display a clear separation between the role of the 
Chairman and that of the General Manager, and a separation of the role of the board 
from managers involved in the company's day-to-day operations. The Chainnan must 
be responsible for the oversight of the proper functioning of the board, and the General 
Manager for the organisation of company's day-to-day business operations. The two 
positions are required to be separated where possible. Central SOEs are further 
encouraged to appoint their Chairmen from external directors and to appoint legal 
representatives from General Managers. To separate the ro le of the board from senior 
managers, managers other than the General Manager (such as the deputy General 
Manager and Chief Accountant) should not be assumed by directors. 53 A standardised 
board structure, the Baosteel Corporation board, which was the first central SOE to 
have completed the reform, is at Appendix 6-1. 
To further empower the standardised board, SASAC has begun to delegate central 
SOEs that have undergone the board reform the power to appoint, evaluate and 
remunerate some of their senior management positions, including the General Manager, 
the Chief Accountant and the board secretary. 54 In relation to wholly state-owned 
companies, the power to appoint persons to those positions had been conferred on the 
board of directors by the 1993 Company Law 55 However, ·as will be explained in 
section 6.4, prior to the standardised board refonn, these powers were exercised by 
SASAC (and the Party through the Party's Organisational Department). 
At the same time, SASAC has paid considerable attention to improving managerial 
incentives through introducing perfonnance evaluation of SOE managers, and 
strengthening managerial responsibility for preserving enterprise assets. Under the new 
schemes, senior executives, including the Chairman, are required to enter into three-
year performance contracts with SASAC. The contracts outline both annual and three-
year targets. Profits-based performance indicators, such as annual profits and return on 
,
3 Ibid art 23. 
54 ((7<-f-'!lli \li~ ii\'..\':i: 'P :9<::i1':'11'.:l!f$~Jll;iji\' ;Wji;&'i'l'!JllA ff.l I ft fi{JJ'i'i~ ~_1,\1,)) [Guiding Opinion on Recruiting and 
Appointment of Senior Managers for State-owned Enterprises under the Pilot Program of Establi shing 
Standardised Board of Directors] ] (People 's Republic of China) Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, 10 October 2008; (( j'Jl;:$~iil:.¢.i:'t':9<::iE~t~ii&'i!r!JllA !ni&l\l':illJm~ltI1H'ii~t!:!,\l,)) [Guid ing 
Opinion on Evaluating the Operational Performance of Senior Managers in Central Government-affili ated SO Es 
under the Pilot Program on Board of Directors] (People's Republic of China) State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission, IO October 2008. 
55 /993 PRC Company Law art 69. 
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equity, are the key components. In its evaluation of SOE executives at the end of each 
year and the three-year period, SASAC scores the performance of each executive on a 
100-point scale and assigns a grade from A-E accordingly. The grades received by the 
executives are also tied to their incentive pay. 56 Further, to strengthen managers ' 
responsibility for preserving state assets vested in their enterprises, SASAC released the 
Interim Measures for Pursuing Liability for Loss of Assets to Central Government-
affiliated SOEs in 2008. 57 The interim Measures specify various administrative 
penalties that may be imposed on SOE managers, where they have neglected their 
duties thereby causing a loss of enterprise assets. Such penalties range from fines, 
dismissal to disqualification from managing an enterprise for a specific period or 
permanent disqualification.58 
In addition to strengthening the effectiveness and accountability of SOE boards, another 
even bolder step taken by SAS AC has been the promotion of full listing of central SO Es 
on domestic and international stock markets. 59 By the end of 2011, 40 central SOEs had 
listed the whole, or substantially the whole, of their main business on Chinese mainland 
and overseas stock markets, primarily, Hong Kong. 60 However, few of these corporate 
groups have realised the full listing of their parent central SOEs.61 
SASAC previously set the target to achieve the 'full marketisation' of central SOEs 
within IO to 15 years.62 This target apparently needs adjustment in light of the Party's 
56 
57 
«'P9-::1£:;!l'.ft1iit.A!!i;'>'11;,IHJ/isl,:/ii'l!/tr;/J-i'l:)) [Interim Measures on the Evaluation of Operational Pcrfonnance 
of Top Executives in Central Government-affi liated SOEs] (People's Republic of China) State-owned Assets 
Supervis ion and Administration Commi ssion, 30 December 2006. 
«'P 9-:J£:;!l'.Rfi"' tfil:k :!lHl::lg\1c'l!/ff;/}i'l; )) [Interim Measures for Pursuing Liabili ty for Loss of Assets to 
Central Government-affiliated SO Es] (People's Republ ic of China) State Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, 18 August 2008. 
58 Ibid art 32. 
59 ((cJs"f jjjjJrl'fil::/ef~;,\s:if,rl '!\?::fll!'fil::/ef:1£:;!l'.1!HJl.B(JHl~ ;,i'(l'I.)) [Guiding Opinion on Promoting the Adjustment of 
State-owned Capita l and Restructuring State-owned Enterprises] (People' s Republic of China) State Council, 5 
December 2006. This document provides the policy basis for SAS AC's promotion of fu ll listing of central SO Es. 
This document, for the first time, encouraged SOEs to li st the ir assets or, at least, their core business as a whole 
on the stock market. For SOEs that have li sted subsid iaries, the document suggests that the li sted subsidiaries 
should gradually absorb the remaining business within their respective corporate groups. 
60 
'l'fil lif~ j!j rit;is:1£:'!l):11f<J:: $, Bl:r!'i9-:J£:~§!Ml 9000 fZ,' [SASAC Continues to Promote the Full Listing of 
Central SOEs, Funds Raised by Listed Central SOEs Exceeded RMB900 Billion], above n 48. 
61 Two main factors have contributed to the slow process in full li sting of central SO Es. First, many of these parent 
SOEs have some non-performing assets or welfare functi ons that are difficult to be incorporated into the li sted 
companies. This is despite that to improve the efficiency of centra l SO Es, SASAC has, since its establishment in 
2003, helped these enterprises to divest from their non-core businesses and social welfare functions. Second, the 
fu ll listing plans have to be devised and implemented by parent SO Es who naturally have a strong disincent ive to 
go full li sting by all owing themselves to be integrated into their li sted subsid iaries. 
62 
' OO §t ~ !lrJ .ctfflll>'r , ljj,' /WJ !'fil:1£:'!l):{;t( _/:.Tli' [SASAC Deputy Director Shao Ning: Encourage State-owned 
Enterprises lo Go Full Listing], China News Net News Story (8 November 2010) 
<http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2010/ 11-08/2641634.shtrnl>. 
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new vision for the SOE reform. At the Third Plenum of the I 8th Party Congress, the 
Party called for classification of SOEs in accordance with their main business (and 
setting supervision guidelines accordingly). This means that while the majority of 
central SOEs (especially profit-seeking companies) would be transfom1ed into listed 
companies with multiple shareholders, some would remain unlisted with relatively few 
shareholders (such as those in natural monopoly sectors) or even wholly state-owned 
(such as those vital to 'national security'). 63 
It seems that SASAC has adopted the strategy of full listing of central SOEs with the 
Singaporean Temasek model in mind.64 If successful, this strategy could tum SASAC 
(or its investment arm) from an owner-manager of SOEs into a state financial holding 
agency, similar to Temasek which holds major shareholding in large listed companies. 
This is also in line with the Party's new vision to transform the management of state-
owned assets into a system that focuses on the management of state capital rather than 
individual enterprises.65 There seems to be no legal obstacle for SASAC to hold shares 
directly in listed central SOEs. This solution, however, requires that the overlapping 
roles of SASAC as a state shareholder and a regulator of state-owned assets be first 
addressed. Given the large number of central SOEs, the Party has suggested that a 
number of state capital operating companies/state investment companies be established 
(or through re-organisation of some parent central SOEs) under SASAC to hold state 
shares in listed central SO Es. 66 It should be noted that this idea is not entire! y new in 
China. Many of these companies have been set up at provincial and municipal levels as 
part of the state-owned assets management system reform since late 2002 (As chapter 2 
explained). Should this strategy proceed at the national level, there is the prospect that 
some listed central SOEs will become 'parentless ' companies indirectly controlled by 
SASAC through state investment companies in the not-too-far-future. 
SASAC and other commentators have identified several advantages for the full listing 
of central SO Es. First, the integration of the main business of a corporate group into a 
listed group company will help the latter to achieve greater economies of scale and 
63 The detailed classification of central SO Es according to their functions is yet to be released by SASAC. 
64 
'!El\'i?i;it;i!ii.Qjr)_j~J!tlsl'!NoR:1£' [Consensus Reached within SASAC on its Direct Shareholding in Central 
SO Es] Xinhua Net News Story ( 12 June 20 11 ) <http: //news.xinhuanet.com/finance/20 I l-
06/1 2/c_ l 21523643 _3.httn>. 
65 Decision on Deepening Refonns, above n 40. 
66 
'00 l;'i?i; _la ~l\f /llLUIJi~E] B)l !f.!11Gli&:J/2i ' [Possible Breakthrough on SASAC Direct Shareholding in Listed 
Companies in Coming Year], China Net News Story, 7 December 20 12 
<http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2012-07 / \ 2/content_ 25885656. httn>. 
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synergies in business operations. As the capacity of these companies expands, their 
international competitiveness may also be enhanced. Second, an overall listing would 
lead to better liquidity of state-owned assets, thereby providing SASAC with greater 
flexibility in the management of state-owned assets.67 
Corporate governance, nevertheless, plays a dominant role. This is particularly so as 
SASAC has combined full listing with listing SOEs on overseas, especially the Hong 
Kong stock markets. SASAC acknowledged that the practice of partial listing had 
contributed little to improving the governance of central SOEs. This is because the 
listed subsidiary usually only constitutes a small part of a much larger corporate group. 
Therefore, through subjecting the operation of parent SO Es to the discipline of domestic 
and overseas stock market, full listing will help to enhance the overall governance of 
central SOEs.68 
The above review of China's post-2005 reforms concerning state-manager relations 
within listed SOEs and their parent companies showed that, in an effort to solve the 
governance problems of these companies, including the problem of insider control, 
Chinese policy makers have become far more receptive to Western principles and 
structures of corporate governance. Consequently, many governance mechanisms of the 
Anglo-American advanced market economies have been introduced into Chinese 
companies. As this section has demonstrated, while some of these mechanisms place 
more checks and balances on the exercise of powers by top corporate executives, others 
provide directors with stronger incentives to maximise company financial performance. 
Indeed, as Naughton argued, the performance-based remuneration of central SOE 
executives may have contributed to the impressive profit records of these enterprises 
over the past few years. 69 Still other efforts have been adopted to enlist market-based 
institutions, such as external directors, outside investors, and foreign stock market 
regulators to monitor and discipline managers. In this respect, the prospect of 
establishing a number of state-owned capital operating companies will no doubt lead 
state-manager relations in listed central SOEs to further shift away from the traditional 
state-led model which mainly relied upon administrative control and supervision. 
67 
'00 lli~lllJ::t fHW'r , li!iJfj/J 00 :&'!IH1s:J: rn' [SAS AC Deputy Director Shao Ning: Encourage State-owned 
Enterprises to Go Full Listing], above n 62 . 
68 Ibid. 
69 Barry Naughton, 'China' s Distincti ve System: Can it be~ Model for Others? '2010 (19) Journal of Contemporary 
China 437, 453. 
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However, to assess whether this shift would cause a greater convergence of these 
relations towards the Anglo-American model, the various continuities in China's post-
2005 regulation of state-manager relations need examination. As the discussion below 
will suggest, state involvement in the affairs of listed SOEs is likely to continue, despite 
various market-oriented reforms as discussed above. 
6.4 Post-2005 regulation of state-manager relations: what has not 
changed? 
First, the promotion of mixed ownership in central SOEs by new Chinese leaders is 
unlikely to alter ultimate state control of large and strategic listed SO Es. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, one of the main objectives for the Chinese SOE reform, as stressed by 
successive Chinese leaders, is to 'consolidate and develop the public sector' to ' enhance 
its vitality' and ' capacity to leverage and influence the economy'. 70 As long as the state 
retains a major shareholding in listed SOEs, state involvement in corporate affairs is 
likely to be inevitable. Indeed, this point has been shown by Milhaupt and Pistor in their 
analysis of the role of the Singaporean government in the aftermath of the CAO 
scandal. 71 
Second, in addition to ownership links, the ultimate control of the Party/government 
over key personnel appointments in central SOEs has not changed, and is not likely to 
change with the full listing of central SO Es. As noted in Chapter 5, the system of 'Party 
management of cadres' 72 has remained a fundamental instrument for the Party-state to 
retain control over these large companies. Among the 121 SASAC-administrated 
central SOEs by the end of 2011 , the top three leadership positions, namely, the 
Chairman, the Party Secretary and the General Manager, in 53 of the largest ones were, 
and remain, appointed and evaluated by the Organisational Department of the Central 
Party Committee. For the remaining 68 central SOEs, as noted earlier, SASAC has 
authorised those that had undergone the standardised board reform to appoint some of 
their senior management roles such as the General Manager and the Deputy General 
Manager. SASAC, however, retains the power over the appointment, evaluation and 
70 
Decision on Deepening Reforms, above n 40; Full text of Hu Jintao 's Report at the I 8th Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party ( 17 November 2012) <http://ncws.x inhuanet.com/english/special/ l Scpcnc/2012-
l l /17/c_ l 3 198 1259.hnn> . 
71 Curtis Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems 
and Economic Development around the World (University of Chicago Press, 2008) 146. 
72 For a detailed illustration of the system, see John Bums (eel), The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklawra 
System (M.E. Sharp, 1989) 4. 
136 
remuneration of the top two leadership positions in these enterprises, namely, the 
Chairman and the Party Secretary.73 Moreover, SASAC also appoints, evaluates and 
decides the remuneration of other directors, including external directors, and 
supervisors in these large companies.74 Personnel decisions in local SOEs at provincial, 
municipal and county levels are managed by the local branches of the Organisational 
Department of the Party Central Committee and local SASACs.75 
The system of 'Party management of cadres' has operated in a similar fashion in listed 
SOEs in the financial sector. Indeed, most of the Huijin-controlled companies, including 
China's largest four commercial banks, have achieved full listing of parent SOEs. Yet 
the executive directors of these companies, such as the Chainnan and the Bank 
President, remain appointed by the Party's Organisational Department, while most of 
the non-executive directors (except independent directors) in these companies are 
nominated by Huijin.76 Although the new Chinese leadership has called for 'increasing 
the proportion of market-oriented recruitment' as a means to promoting professional 
management in SOEs,77 it has expressed no intention to relinquish Party/government 
control over the appointment of key personnel, including the Chairmen, in large and 
strategic SOEs. As long as this power is to be retained by the Party, corporate 
executives are likely to be ' incentivised' to adhere to the policy goals of the Party and 
government. 78 
Second, whether SASAC is to remain the state shareholder in central SOEs, as a state 
assets regulator, its extensive administrative powers over these companies are unlikely 
to be curtailed. 79 These include the power to approve central SOEs' investments that fall 
outside their respective core businesses which are defined by SASAC. Indeed, the 
73 
.lilfli,J1JE,/$ [Qiu Jing and Liu Siyang], «cpll,lll,l1'[~Jll!:J-m0'aJ B~i'iilll!t;!iltJ,fO 'l!i'~i':;8'1{'Fffl )) [Corporate 
Governance Structure and the role of the Board of Directors in State-controlled Listed Companies in China] 
(China Seri Economic Research Institute, April 2011) 12 <www.serichina.org>; Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole 
Kyle, ' An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China' (U.S. - China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 26 October 20 I I) 75 <http://www.uscc.gov/Research/analysis-state-owned-
enterprises-and-state-capitalisrn-china>. The total number of central SOEs had been reduced to 116 by the end of 
2013 through mergers among Central SO Es. 
74 « 'P ij;i .A. Eiccl¾ ,f!l ll,I :iE'11: 001'f il't r"i'ta)) [Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise State-owned 
Assets] National People's Congress Standing Committee, 28 October 2008, art 22(2). 
75 Szamosszegi and Kyle, above n 73. 
76 The 2011 Annual Reports of relevant li sted companies. 
77 Decision on Deepening Refo,ms, above n 40. 
78 Szamosszegi and Kyle, above n 73 , 48, 77. 
79 For SASAC powers as the central government state-owned assets regulator, see «'P $.A.Eiccl¾,f!l00:if''11:001ill't 
r"1t; )) [Law on Enterprise State-owned Assets of the People' s Republic of China] (People's Republic of China) 
National People's Congress Standing Committee, 28 October 2008. 
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central government has conferred on SASAC broad powers to administer outbound 
foreign direct investment by central SOEs, in an effort to strengthen the supervision of 
the implementation of China 's 'go global ' strategy. 80 Hence, under the Interim 
Measures for Supervision and Administration of Foreign Investment by Central 
Enterprises (the Interim Measures) released by SASAC in March 2012,81 SASAC is 
responsibl e for overseeing the establishment of an internal foreign investment 
management system within all central SOEs, and the preparation of annual investment 
plans by these enterprises.82 Foreign investment projects that fall under a central SOE' s 
core business (as defined by SASAC) must be included in its annual investment plans 
and lodged with SASAC for record keeping. 83 Projects that fall outside the core 
business must be submitted to SASAC for approval. 84 The boards of central SOEs are 
also required to be responsible to SASAC, implement SASAC decisions, accept its 
guidance and maintain transparency in board operations to SASAC.85 
Third, as long as SASAC remains the ultimate controller of listed central SOEs, 
channels for SASAC to be involved in the management of these companies (directly or, 
indirectly through the state assets operating companies) remain available under the 2005 
Company Law. The principle of general meeting supremacy has been preserved by the 
New Company Law, which means the general meeting remains a company's supreme 
organ of authority with a broad range of management powers.86 This is despite the new 
Company Law allowing companies to allocate other powers not specified in the 
Company Law, such as the power to appoint auditors, between the general meeting and 
the board of directors through company constitution. 87 Furthermore, despite the wide 
ranging market-oriented changes, the presence of the Party in Chinese companies has 
been retained and even strengthened. The 1993 Company Law, echoing a relevant 
80 Other central govemrnent agencies, such as the Ministry of Commerce and National Refonn and Development 
Commission are also involved in the regulation of outbound direct investment by Chinese enterpri ses. 
81 « 't' 3<:&~lll;Jf t,l: R[ Jl(i 'll!''i'f l"l[ 'I'/ fr;/}$ )) [Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administrat ion of 
Overseas Investments by Central Government-affili ated SOEs] (People's Republic of China) State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission, Order No 28, 13 August 2012. 
82 Ibid art 8. 
83 Ibid art 6. 
84 Ibid art IO. 
85 Ibid art 30. 
86 This addition is, however, unlikely to alter the current power structure that exists within most state-controlled 
companies. l11is is especially so given that the modificat ion of constitution requires at least two thirds votes cast 
by shareholders participating in the voting. See 2005 PRC Company law an I 04 (2) 
87 2005 PRC Company Law arts 100 and 38(1). 
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provision in the Constitution of the Party,88 provided that a grassroots organisation of 
the Party shall be established in all companies to carry out its activities according to the 
Party's Constitution.89 Article 19 of the new Company Law retains this provision, and 
goes further to require that 'companies shall provide necessary conditions to assist the 
activities of the Chinese Communist Party' .90 This addition followed the release of a 
joint circular issued by the Organisational Department of the Central Party Committee 
and SASAC in 2004,91 which called for establishing the Party's 'core political' status in 
central SOEs.92 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed China' s post-2005 developments in the regulation of state-
manager relations in large state-controlled listed companies. Through examining the 
changes and continuities thereof, this chapter has shown the emergence of a new state-
led approach to the regulation of those relations. On the one hand, this approach has 
significantly moved away from the pre-2005 state-led model by applying extensive 
market-based governance mechanisms to both listed companies and their state-owned 
parents. On the other hand, viewed in conjunction with the various non-marked based 
changes and substantial continuities in China' s post-2005 regulatory framework, the 
various market-based mechanisms that have been, or will be, . introduced are likely to 
strengthen, rather than weaken, the effectiveness of Party-government's control over 
these large entities. 
As this chapter also discussed, further steps along the road of market-oriented reforms 
have been pledged by the Party under its new leadership. However, as the Party has 
expressed no intention to withdraw the state from large and strategic SOEs, a similar 
88 (( 'f' 00::i¾i"':l'i;:l't~)} [The Constitution of the Communi st Party of China], art 29. According to the Constitution 
of the Chinese Communist Party, a grass-root Party organisation shall be established in any organisation that has 
at least three full Party members. 
89 2005 PRC Company law art 17. 
90 Ibid art 19. 
91 ((7<'f/JP1.!il~ ~ill'f' ;R::1E.ill'.:le:Jt ij'),fr,J~,!.\!J [Opinion on Strengthening and Improving Party Building Work 
in Central Government-affiliated SOEs] (People 's Republic of China)The Organisational Department of the 
Central Party Committee and the Party Committee of the State-owned Assets Supervi sion and Adm ini stration 
Commission, 31 October 2004. 
92 Ibid. According to this document, the grassroots Party Committee shall play two main ro les in state-controlled 
listed companies. The first is to ensure the implementation of the Party and the state 's principles and policies 
within their respective companies. Secondly, the Party Committee must participate in company major decision-
making. The long list of decisions that fall under this category include enterprise development strategies, medium 
to long tenn development plans, enterprise production and operational guidelines, annual budget and final 
accounts, major issues in enterprise restructuring and capital operation, the drafting or revision of major 
enterprise refonn plans and management systems, major _personnel arrangements and major issues related to the 
interests of the employees. 
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purpose is likely to be served by these new reform strategies. This approach clearly 
contradicts the popular prediction in the current literature (as discussed in Chapter 2) 
that Chinese corporate governance, is, or should be, gradually converging with the 
Anglo-American outsider-based model. 
How might we interpret these changes and continuities from the perspective of state-
capitalism and institutional change? Before addressing this question, Chapter 7 
examines China's post-2005 legal and regulatory reforms of two other sets of company 
relations central to the former state-led governance model, namely, investor and other 
stakeholder (including employee) protection. The examination of the changes, and 
continuities, in the regulation of these latter two sets of relations will help to illuminate 
the model of corporate governance that has emerged in China since the 2005 corporate 
law refonns. 
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CHAPTER 7 CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES IN CHINA'S POST-
2005 REGULATION OF INVESTOR AND OTHER 
STAKEHOLDER PROTECTION 
7.1 Introduction 
Through examining China's post-2005 reforms of state-manager relations in listed state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), Chapter 6 illustrated the emergence of a new state-led 
approach to the regulation of that set of company relations. While various channels for 
state involvement in corporate decision-making remain in place, many mechanisms of 
the Anglo-American outsider-based corporate governance have been applied to 
strengthen monitoring of managers. 
Interpreting corporate governance in Chinese listed SOEs today also requires an 
examination of China's post-2005 regulation of investor and other stakeholder 
protection within these large entities. As discussed in Chapter 3, although these two sets 
of company relations often receive separate treatment in Anglo-American studies of 
corporate governance, this does not need to be the case. In the fonner post-war state-led 
model, both minority shareholders and other non-shareholder stakeholders (with the 
notable exception of employees) were treated as company outsiders, with their interests 
in the companies largely marginalised or suppressed. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
Chinese corporate governance prior to 2005 closely resembled the former state-led 
model, particularly in relation to minority shareholder and other stakeholder protection. 
Therefore, in examining China's post-2005 regulation of these two sets of relations in 
listed SOEs, a combined discussion will help to illuminate the legal and regulatory 
changes and continuities in both areas. 
This chapter will demonstrate the emergence a new state-led approach in China's post-
2005 regulation of those two sets of company relations. This approach, which can be 
called a ' state-led stakeholder' approach, attaches equal importance to the state 
retaining ultimate control and the coordinative capacity of the state to adjust company 
relations with their investors and other non-shareholder stakeholders. On the one hand, 
compared to the narrowly focused former state-led model, this model presents a far 
more inclusive approach by drawing upon elements from both the Anglo-American 
outsider-based/shareholder-oriented and the broader stakeholder governance models. 
On the other hand, as this chapter will illustrate, few of the Chinese post-2005 reforms 
have led to a transfer of the ultimate control of the state over these two sets of company 
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relations to non-state sectors, such as individuals and private organisations. Instead, 
strong state control over shareholder and other stakeholder activism, especially 
organised activism, has been facilitated by the 'watered down' version of many of the 
transplanted rules, as well as an ongoing reluctance of the courts to handle securities-
related private lawsuits. The latter is particularly the case with shareholder class actions 
against listed companies ( and the state). 
This chapter will proceed as follows. Section 7.2 sets the stage by contrasting the 
former state-led model of corporate governance with the Anglo-American outsider-
based/shareholder and the broader stakeholder models from the perspective of investor 
and non-shareholder stakeholder protection. Section 7.3 discusses the main changes in 
China's post-2005 regulation of those two sets of company relations. Section 7.4 
discusses the continuities. In doing so, relevant provisions of the 2005 Company Law 
and the Securities Law and related administrative regulations and guidelines will be 
examined. By way of conclusion, section 7.5 links these changes and continuities with 
Chapter 6 to highlight the key features of the state-led stakeholder model of corporate 
governance that has emerged in China through its post-2005 reforms of corporate 
governance in listed SOEs. 
7.2 Shareholder, stakeholder, and state-led models of corporate 
governance 
The longstanding debate over the relative merits of the shareholder (stockholder) versus 
stakeholder approach of corporate governance may be traced back to the writings of 
Professors Berle and Dodd in the 1930s. 1 While the shareholder model that coincides 
with the Anglo-American outsider-based corporate governance has remained dominant, 
the broader stakeholder model has gained increasing attention.2 
The two approaches differ in both the conceptions of the corporation and the role of 
corporate governance. Grounded in agency theory of the firm (as outlined in Chapter 2), 
the shareholder approach sees maximising financial return to individual shareholders as 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, The Social Responsibility of Corporations Report (2006) 19-20; 
Adolf Berle, 'Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust' (1931) 44 Harvard law Review 1049; Adolf Berle, ' For 
Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A note' ( 1932) 45 Harvard law Review 1365; £.M errick Dodd, ' For 
Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees' (1932) 45 Harvard la w Review 1145. 
Corporations and Markets A dvisory Comminee, above n I , I. 
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the only relevant function of a corporation. 3 Therefore, corporate managers, as 
Professor Berle argued, should be held accountable only to the shareholders. 4 In 
contrast to this narrowly construed shareholder-oriented view, the stakeholder approach, 
advocated by Professor Dodd, postulated that corporate managers should be allowed to 
take into account the interests of the wider community including, but not limited to, 
shareholders. 5 This approach is reflected, to various extents, in the insider-based 
governance systems in large companies in Germany and post-l 980s Japan. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, these systems place greater emphasis on the interests of certain non-
shareholder stakeholders, such as employees and banks as creditors, apart from large 
shareholders. However, the range of interests encompassed in the stakeholder approach 
is much broader. The notion of corporate social responsibility is therefore closely 
related to this approach. 6 The many definitions of corporate social responsibility, 
according to Ho, converge on two dimensions: (I) how the company conducts its 
business as a 'good corporate citizen', and (2) the company's responsiveness to its 
internal and external stakeholders such as shareholders, employees, local communities 
in which companies operate and the environment. 7 
A number of conceptions about the corporation lend support to the broad stakeholder 
approach to corporate governance. These include the natural entity theory that draws an 
analogy between a company and a natural person, and the communitarian theory that 
sees companies as 'institutions whose conduct can have substantial public 
implications'. 8 Nevertheless, as Dodd suggested , the argument for the stakeholder 
approach is not purely theoretical.9 Indeed, in more recent years, increased attention to 
this approach has been generated by the rapid rise of multinational corporations as 
3 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Srmcture of Corporate law (Harvard University Press, 
1991); Roman Tomasic, Stephen Bottomley and Rob McQueen, Corporations Law in Australia second edition 
(The Federation Press, 2002) 56-57. 
Berle, ' For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A note', above n I, 1367. 
Dodd, above n I, 11 62-3. In one stronger version, directors should not only take into consideration, but also be 
held accountable to those different groups of interests. Margret M. Blair, 'Ownership and Control: Rethinking 
Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century' in Thomas Clarke (eel), Theories ofC01porate Governance: 
The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance (Routledge, 2004) 174, 174-5. 
6 Tomasic, Bottomley and McQueen, above n 3, 63-64. 
7 Virginia Harper Ho, ' Beyond Regulation: A Comparative Look at State-Centric Corporate Social Responsibility 
& the Law in China' (20 13) 46 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 375, 382. 
8 Tomasic, Bottomley and McQueen, above n 3, 60. Other theories in support of a stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance include the 'team production ' theory of the finn. See Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, 
' A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law' ( 1999) 85 Virginia Law Review 24 7. 
Dodd argued that strong support for a stakeholder approach can be found in changing ' attitude of law and public 
opinion' towards the nature of a business corporation. See· Dodd, above n 1, 1163. 
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predominant social economic actors, and increasing public concerns about the adverse 
social and environmental impacts of their business operations. These concerns have no 
doubt been fuelled by campaigns from not-for-profit or non-government organisations, 
as they seek to influence corporate decision-making with regard to their organisational 
goals. 10 Against this background, a business case for corporate social responsibility has 
also been advanced. 11 It is argued that companies that excel in corporate social 
responsibility will also thrive 'as a sustainable business enterprise in society over the 
long run '. 12 Indeed, as Thomas Clarke observed, corporate executives of major 
companies in the US and the UK have increasingly adopted certain elements of the 
stakeholder approach to 'grapple with the need to satisfy the interests of more complex 
constituencies than shareholder theory would suggest'. 13 
The greater public demand for a broader stakeholder approach to corporate governance 
has also spurred a remarkable growth in various corporate social responsibility 
initiatives at both international and national levels.14 In this area, it is worth noting that, 
adopting an 'enlightened shareholder value' view, 15 the UK 2006 Companies Act 
explicitly requires directors to take into account the interests of a broad range of 
company stakeholders in fulfilling their duty to promote the success of the company for 
the shareholders as a whole.16 
From the perspective of shareholder and other stakeholder protection, the former post-
war state-led corporate governance may be distinguished from both the shareholder and 
stakeholder models discussed above. If the state-led model can be viewed as a variant of 
10 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, above n I, 16; David Kinley, Justine Nolan and Natalie Zerial , 
'The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibili ty: Reflections on the United Nations Human Rights Nonns for 
Corporations' (2007) 25 Company and Securities Law Journal 30; Justine Nolan, 'With Power comes 
Responsibility: Human Rights and Corporate Accountability' (2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 581. 
11 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, above n I, 40 
12 Bryan Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 2 f' Century: Debates, Models and Practices Across 
Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 7; also see Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee, above n I, 40-47. 
ll Thomas Clarke, 'The Stakeholder Corporation: a Business Philosophy for the Information Age' in Thomas 
Clarke (ed), Theories of Cmporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Co,pora te Governance 
(Routledge, 2004) 189, 197. 
14 At the international level, since the 1970s, international organisations such as United Nations and the OECD have 
released many guidelines and other policy documents encouraging corporate social responsibili ty, especially for 
multinational companies. Various voluntary standards or systems in this respect have also been developed by 
many non-governmental organisations such as Social Accountability International and International Organi sation 
for Standardi zation. For a review of these guidelines and standards, See Horrigan, above n 12, 8-19. 
15 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, above n I, 103. 
16 UK Companies A ct 2006 s 172. 
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the broader stakeholder model, the state is, arguably, the most important stakeholder of 
all. As discussed in Chapter 3, in the former post-war state-led economies, where state 
involvement in corporate affairs was prioritised as a means to promote national 
development goals, the state played a central role in structuring company relations with 
its internal and external stakeholders through various legal and non-legal means. This 
led to a distinctive divide between corporate insiders and outsiders. The interests of 
large shareholders, managers and employees that are important to the implementation of 
the economic-oriented goals of the state became the targets of state coordination. This 
was, however, at the expense of outsider investors and other non-employee stakeholders 
whose short-tenn demands were not considered as consistent with the long-term goals 
of the companies and the state. 
As Chapter 5 discussed, China's poor performance in shareholder and other stakeholder 
protection pre-2005 resembled some key features of the former state-led model. While 
the voice of the outsider shareholders and stakeholders was largely muted, poor 
protection of minority shareholders was further exacerbated by the overlapping roles of 
the state as an ultimate corporate controller, a regulator and adjudicator of securities-
related disputes. This coincidence of state power with state ownership in Chinese large 
listed companies has not changed to any significant extent post-2005, and as discussed 
in section 7.4, has played a major role in constraining shareholder and other stakeholder 
activism, especially organised activism, in corporate governance. However, as also will 
be shown, China's post-2005 regulation of these two sets of company relations have 
moved towards a far more inclusive approach by drawing upon both the shareholder 
and the broader stakeholder governance models. 
7.3 Post-2005 regulation of investor and other stakeholder protection: 
what has changed? 
7 .3.1 Investor protection 
As noted in Chapter 6, strengthening legal protection of investors was one of the most 
pronounced legislative objectives for the 2005 amendments to the PRC Company Law11 
and Securities Law. 18 By drawing upon international experiences, particularly those of 
Anglo-American jurisdictions, many new provisions have been introduced into these 
17 
«q,$A~,J:Ull000iS]$ )) [Company Law of the People' s Republic of China] (People 's Republic of China) 
National People' s Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2005 (' 2005 PRC Company Law' ). 
18 ((q,$A ~;l=!i;fil !EiiE#fii)) [Securities Law of the People' s Republic of China] (People 's Republic of China) 
National People's Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2005 ('2005 PRC Sec11ri1ies Law'). 
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two corporate Jaw statutes to address problems faced by minority shareholders under the 
former framework. As the examination below will suggest, while some of the legislative 
changes allow minority shareholders greater opportunities to participate in corporate 
decision-making, others provide them with far better protection from abuse of power by 
controlling shareholders and other corporate insiders. In addition, an increased focus on 
strengthening investor confidence has led China's corporate regulators such as the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) to adopt many new initiatives in 
their relevant areas. 
First, enhancing minority shareholder participation in corporate governance has been 
one of the key changes introduced by the 2005 Company Law. The general meeting is 
the primary forum for shareholders to participant in corporate decision-making. 
However, as noted in Chapter 5, by vesting all the powers to convene meetings in the 
board of directors, 19 the I 993 Company Law provided shareholder(s) with no such right 
as to either convene a general meeting or propose a resolution to be passed at general 
meetings. The new Company Law grants shareholders with IO per cent or more 
company shares for at least 90 days the power to convene and preside over a general 
meeting, where both the directors and the board of supervisors have failed to do so.20 
Shareholders with three per cent or more company shares may.also propose resolutions 
to be passed at general meetings.21 
The codification of the system of cumulative voting is another effort made by the new 
Company Law to strengthen minority shareholder participation in corporate governance. 
Cumulative voting maximises the opportunity for minority shareholders to obtain board 
representation by allowing shareholders to multiply their votes by the number of 
directors to be elected and cast all their votes on one or more preferred candidates.22 
The system was previously mandated by the CSRC, for the election of directors in listed 
companies with a more than 30 per cent controlling shareholder.23 The new Company 
19 2005 PRC Company law art I 05(1 ). 
20 Ibid art I 02(2). 
21 Ibid art I 03(2). 
22 Ibid art I 06(2). 
23 ((J:jpf,,;jj]i'(;lfill!IJrn» [Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Compan ies in China] (People' s Republic of 
China) China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Economic and Trade Commission, 7 January 2002 
('CSRC Code of Corporate Governance' ), art 31. 
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Law allows all joint stock companies to adopt the system for the election of directors 
and supervisors through company constitution or resolution of shareholders.24 
Moreover, relevant to shareholder participation in corporate governance, their access to 
company information has been expanded under the new Company Law. In relation to 
joint stock companies, the 2005 Company Law entitles shareholders to inspect a broad 
range of company documents, including general meeting minutes, board resolutions and 
company financial and accounting reports. Based on their inspection of company 
documents, shareholders may also question or make recommendations about company 
operations.25 
Further to shareholder participation in corporate governance, the new Company Law 
and Securities Law have made some efforts to tackle the abuse of power by controlling 
shareholders and other corporate insiders. Hence, in addition to a revamped regime of 
directors' duties as Chapter 6 discussed, the 2005 Company Law, in broad terms, 
imposes a liability on shareholders ( essentially the controlling shareholder) to 
compensate for causing any loss to the company or other shareholders by abusing their 
rights as shareholders.26 
As discussed in Chapter 5, related party transaction was one of the major avenues for 
parent SOEs to exploit minority shareholders of listed companies. Aspects of the regime 
ofrelated party transactions have also been strengthened in the revised Company Law.27 
For example, in response to the widespread practice of provision of guarantees by listed 
companies in favour of their parent SOEs, 28 Article 16 requires the provision of 
24 2005 PRC Company Law an I 06(1 ). 
25 Ibid art 98. Upon request by the general meeting, directors, supervisors and senior managers must make 
themselves available at the meeting to address inquiries from shareholders. See 2005 PRC Company Law art 151 
(!). 
26 Ibid art 20(2). 
27 The term •related party transaction ' is defined as 'any transaction s that involve transfer of benefits or obligation s 
between a listed company or an entity controlled by the listed company and a related pany'. See ((J:.if!Jij£3"'3<:,!,\ 
Jifi)llt~_t 'rti'f.'l!IJ!IJ» [Shanghai Stock Exchange Listing Rules] (People's Republic of China) Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, first became effecti ve in January 1998, has since undergone several revisions with the most recent 
taking place on 7 July 2012. Issues such as the assessment, approval, reporting and disclosure of related party 
transactions involving Chinese listed companies largely remain the sphere of stock exchange rules. ((_tmjcii£3l"X 
,!,I Jifi)jji: j\'!;_t rti!c.'l!IJllj ( 2012 !f.ihT) )) (People' s Republic of China)[Shanghai Stock Exchange Listing Rules 
92012 Revision] (People ' s Republic of China) Shanghai Stock Exchange, 7 July 2012, Rule 10.2.5. (( ili( :IJ!liiE# 
3( ,!,I Jifrlllt~_t rti'f.'l!WJ ( 20 I 2 !f.11iiT) )) [Shenzhen Stock Exchanges Listing Rules (20 12 edition)] (People's 
Republic of China) Shanghai Stock Exchange, 7 July 2012, Section 7.3. 
28 A survey of I 09 li sted companies controlled by central SO Es found that the total amount of this type of 
transactions accounted for about 67 per cent of all related party transactions involving these companies in 2010. 
Lu Fucai [Fii'i\)j-J ( ed), Repon 011 Corporate Governance of Central State-owned Enterprises [ 'P ;R:1£~ 0 ii] fci 
Ji1JH!i· ] (China Economic Publish ing House, 2011) 46. • 
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guarantees by companies for their shareholders, or actual controllers,29 to be approved 
by shareholders in general meeting without any votes cast by the related shareholder(s), 
or shareholder(s) controlled by the actual controller, irrespective of the value of the 
guarantee provided.30 In addition, where a related party transaction is considered by the 
board of directors of a listed company, any director connected to the related party is 
prohibited from participating in the voting, or exercising voting rights on behalf of other 
directors. 31 These specific rules are complimented by a general provision that imposes 
the civil liability of compensation on a broad range of corporate controllers and 
company officers (including controlling shareholders, actual controllers, directors, 
supervisors and senior managers) who cause any loss to the company by taking 
advantage of their ' affiliated relations' . 32 Relevant to the protection of minority 
shareholders from insider control, the 2005 Securities Law has made some efforts to 
strengthen infonnation disclosure by listed companies (as Chapter 6 discussed). 
Nevertheless, of all the investor-oriented reforms introduced by the 2005 Company Law 
and the Securities Law, the adoption of several Anglo-American style shareholder 
remedies has been considered 'arguably the single most important rule of law 
development in China's corporate law system', 33 and representing 'a broader formal 
shift in the Company Law towards a greater emphasis on judicial power and the ex post 
remedies instead of ex ante supervision by administrative agendes' .34 
First, Article 152 introduced a long-awaited Anglo-American style statutory derivative 
action which allows shareholders meeting certain criteria to file a lawsuit for the 
recovery of loss suffered by their company, where the latter has refused or failed to do 
29 
'Actual controller' is defined in the 2005 PRC Company Law as anyone who is not a shareholder but is able to 
exercise actual control of the acts of the company by means of investment relations, agreements or any other 
arrangements. 2005 PRC Company Law art 217(3). 
30 Ibid art 16. 
31 Ibid an I 25. The Article also provides that where the number of connected directors present at the meeting of the 
board is less than three persons, the matter shall be submitted to the general meeting for consideration. 
32 Ibid art 21. 'Affil iated relations' are broadly defined as the relations between these persons and 'the enterpri ses 
under their direct or indirect control, and any other relation s which may result in the transfer of company 
interests'. Note however, 'affiliated relations do not exist among companies controlled by the state despite that 
the state holds shares in all these companies'. 2005 PRC Company Law Article 217(4). 
33 Jiangyu Wang, ' Rule of Law and Rule of Officials: Shareholder Litigation and Anti-Dumping Investigation in 
China' (1l1e Foundation for Law, Justice and Society in collaboration with The Centre for Socio-Legal Stud ies, 
Uni versity of Oxford) 3 <http://www. flj s.org/uploads/documents/Jiangyu%23 I %23.pdt> 
34 Donald Clarke and Nicholas Howson, 'Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the 
People's Republic of China' in D. Puchniak et al. (eds), The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (Cambridge University Press, 20 I 2) 243 , 243. 
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so. 35 Article 150 of the new Company Law requires a director, supervisor or senior 
manager who violates the provisions of laws, administrative regulations or the company 
constitution in their performance of duties, thereby causing a loss to the company to 
bear the liability for compensation. Where a violation referred to in Article 150 involves 
a director or a senior manager, Article 152 allows a shareholder ( or group of 
shareholders) satisfying certain shareholding threshold to request the board of 
supervisors to file a lawsuit with a people's court. Where the board of supervisors 
refuse or fail to do so within 30 days, or in case of an emergency, the aforementioned 
shareholders may file the law suit to protect the interests of the company. 
Several direct actions have also been introduced by the new Company Law and the 
Securities Law to assist aggrieved investors in seeking judicial protection of their 
shareholder rights. For example, Article 153 allows an aggrieved shareholder to file a 
lawsuit against a director or a senior manager, where the interests of the shareholder 
have been damaged by the wrongdoer in breach of any law, administrative regulation or 
the company constitution. Article 22 allows shareholders to apply to the court to set 
aside a resolution of the general meeting or board of directors for certain substantive or 
procedural irregularities. 36 Shareholders may also apply to the court to wind up a 
company where due to serious difficulty in business operations, the continuing 
existence of the company would cause major loss to the interests of the shareholders.37 
These remedies are further complemented by an expanded civil liability regime for 
securities market misconduct. As discussed below, this regime only captured securities-
related misrepresentations under the 1998 Securities Law. The new Securities Law 
extends the liability for compensation to other types of securities market misconduct, 
including insider trading and market manipulation.38 
Extensive legislative changes aside, an increased focus on investor protection in China's 
post-2005 regulatory framework has led to the adoption of numerous regulatory 
initiatives· in this area. 39 For example, the CSRC has taken measures to tackle the low 
dividend payout ratio of Chinese listed companies. In Anglo-American jurisdictions, 
35 2005 PRC Company Law art 152. 
36 Ibid art 22 . 
37 Ibid art 183. Under Anicle 143, shareholders may also require their companies to buy back their shares where 
they disagree with a company resolution on mergers or split-up. 
38 2005 PRC Securities Law arts 76, 77. 
39 As noted in Chapter 6, the CSRC has updated many of it s regul ations concerning various aspects of corporate 
governance following the passage of the 2005 Company LGw and the Securities law. 
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setting dividend policy is usually a matter for the board of directors.40 However, the 
practice of paying very small or no dividends was fairly common among companies 
listed on the Chinese stock market. This not only rendered the stock market a source of 
'free lunch financing' for the controlling shareholders of the listed companies,41 but also 
led many investors to adopt a highly speculative approach to investments on the 
Chinese stock market (as they see little prospect in long-term shareholding in the 
companies). To encourage dividend payments, the CSRC has, since 2008, made the 
'distribution of no less than 30 per cent of annual distributable profits as dividends over 
the past three years' a precondition for additional share issue by listed companies.42 
Under the regulatory oversight of the CSRC,43 the Shanghai Stock Exchange has also 
issued new guidelines to further encourage the payment of cash dividends by companies 
listed on the Exchange.44 According to these guidelines, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
will give companies with high cash dividend payout ratio (no lower than 50 per cent of 
annual distributable profits) preferential treatment in approving their applications for 
further fundraising and takeover activities. By contrast, companies that distribute less 
than 30 per cent of annual distributable profits as cash dividends are required to explain 
the reason in their annual directors ' reports. 45 
Other measures taken by the CSRC to enhance investor protection on the stock market 
have included the following: First, to continue to foster institutional investment, the 
CSRC, in conjunction with other central government regulators, have allowed financial 
institutions, including banks and QFI!s, greater access to the domestic stock market.46 
As part of these efforts, foreign strategic investors have also been allowed to invest in 
Chinese listed companies.47 Second, under the regulatory oversight of the CSRC, the 
40 For example, this is provided in Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 254U as a repl aceable rule. 
4 1 Shanghai Stock Exchange, China Corporate Governance Report (2003) 21 
42 
43 
<http: //rru.worldbank.org/Discussions/Openf ile.aspx?id- 1284, 21 >. 
«~'fiti:ll:J::.r!Ji;jj]fj\\~:5)-IT;s''r/iJ\\)EtF-J ~)E)) [Decision on the Revision of Several Provisions Concerning 
Cash Dividend Distribution by Listed Companies] (People ' s Republic of China) China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, 7 October 2008. 
<Cti&ii£#)<"$',p)i J::. r!H;jj] ~~:5l-trm~I)) [Shanghai Stock Exchange Guidelines on Distribution of Cash 
Di vidends by Listed Companies] (People 's Republic of China) Shanghai Stock Exchange, 7 January 201 3. 
44 Ibid art 13. 
45 Ibid art 8. 
46 
''\'Bf,IJii'l , :!1)l;IJQ:IJLflJ-!Jt~1'Htm. \tt)JJ7Jiff~~Arli' [Guo Shuqing: Increasing Institu tional Investment by 
Encouraging Social Security Funds to Entre into the Market] , Chinese Economic Weekly (online) (2 February 
2012) <http://www.ceweekly.cn/html/zbscpd/20 l 202024273509386.html>. 
47 U fOO-!Jt ~;/j-x.fJ-.rJH;-jj] liJGWl\ -!Jtl/! ',;l',i1J,;it)) [Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investment in 
Listed Companies by Foreign Investors] (People 's Republic of China)Ministry of Commerce, China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Taxation, State Administration for Industry and Commerce and 
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Shanghai and the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges have released rules to tighten China's 
largely non-existent delisting system. It was anticipated that with poor-performing 
companies being removed from the market in a timely fashion, the overall quality of 
listed companies would be significantly improved.48 Furthermore, in an effort to tackle 
the excessively high share issue prices, the CSRC has recently restated its intention to 
undertake further reforms of procedures for initial public offering and listing of 
company shares.49 
To enhance investor protection in listed SOEs, SASAC has also issued various rules and 
guidelines post the 2005 corporate law reforms. For example, in a 2009 policy 
document entitled Several Opinions on the Standardisation of Behaviour of State 
Shareholders in Listed Companies,50 SASAC requires all state shareholders to 'provide 
a role model in maintaining the healthy development of the capital market' by, among 
other things, ' abiding by law and good faith , standardising operations, fulfilling 
corporate social responsibility and supporting their listed subsidiaries to become better 
and stronger companies' .51 Although a policy document is not legally enforceable, the 
binding force of this document is lent by SASAC's extensive decision-making powers 
over central SOEs (as discussed in Chapter 6). Other regulations and guidelines issued 
by SASAC deal with a wide range of issues relating to shareholder protection in listed 
SOEs. These include the prohibition of state shareholders from competition with their 
48 
49 
50 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 31 December 2005 . A foreign strategic investor is defined by the 
Measures as a forei gn entity that has an equity interest of at least IO per cent in a Chinese li sted company for at 
least three years. 
« =" T % ff J: #if iiE 'ff 3'.i:. JiJliJT J: ITT 0 "1 iii! ITT :t,1)/)Ufl 1:f ~)) [Plan on Improving the Delisting System of 
Companies Listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange] (People' s Republic of China) Shanghai Stock Exchange, 28 
June 2012 ; «="T~it!:,t0% 'l! /J1UJ1i ij£ ,)',s3'.i:. }'/,/i)T:t -l&, cp ,} {e ~-l&J:ITT0 "1 ili! rfilt,IJ J3!' ft,]1:f~ )) [Plan on 
Improving the Dclisting System for Companies Listed on the Main board and the Medium to Small Enterpri ses 
Board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange] (People ' s Republic of China) Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 28 June 2012. 
(( ="ri!r~zv~ .1iLfU %'i/Hii !llt ~ffj,t;fj; 1J □!Jfil.@;@:Jli', )) [Guiding Opinion on Further Reforming and Improving 
the System of Initial Public Offering] (People' s Republic of China) China Securities Regu latory Commission, IO 
June 2009. 
«="r t~mJ:ni0"1 1!1fl°Jllt1HfTJ81'fFf :\ii: Jli'. )) [Several Opinions on Standardising the Practices of State-
owned Shareholders in Listed Companies] (People ' s Republic of China) State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission , 3 July 2009. 
51 Ibid. 
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listed subsidiaries,52 reorganisation of assets between listed companies and their state 
shareholders and the handling of inside information by state shareholders. 53 
Indeed, by drawing upon mechanisms of corporate governance from the Anglo-
American outsider-based model, China ' s post-2005 regulation of investor protection 
presents a far more investor-friendly approach compared to its pre-2005 framework. 
Nevertheless, increased shareholder protection does not necessarily mean that the 
governance of listed SOEs in China post-2005 is moving towards the Anglo-American 
shareholder-oriented model. As the review of China's post-2005 regulation of non-
shareholder stakeholder protection below will demonstrate, China's recent move 
towards an all-encompassing approach to those two sets of company relations 
distinguishes the Chinese model from the Anglo-American model. 
7.3.2 Other stakeholder protection 
As noted in Chapter 3, Ho distinguished three models of corporate social responsibili ty 
based on the role of the state in promoting corporate social responsibility in the US, 
Europe and China. These are the market-driven model represented by the US , the 
relational model represented by member states of the European Union and the state-
centric model that applies to China. 54 
China's post-2005 reform of non-shareholder stakeholder -protection reflects the 
emergence of a state-centric approach as postulated by Ho. In this model, rather than 
acting through (as in the market-driven model) or in partnership with (as the relational 
model) civil society organisations, the state plays a leading role in advancing corporate 
social responsibility through legislation and regulatory enforcement. 55 As discussed 
next, with the legal foundation for corporate social responsibility provided in the 2005 
Company Law, many administrative regulations and guidelines have been issued to 
assist in its implementation. Through these regulations and guidelines, mandatory 
52 
53 
(( ;):c'ftil'z;/J001'f!llUf-.!ajJifij,;,Jll1:J:TJJ0 'ii'J/WJ!IR l51-fr:l"t'/l- r.\\liTI:;):cllJ'x!J.irt-Jffi.\J":i!.ll!.» [Guiding Opinion on the 
Resolution of Competit ion between State Shareholders and their Controlled Listed Subsidiaries and 
Standardisation of Related Party Transactions] (People's Republic of China) State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, 20 August 20 13. 
((;):c 'fJiJ;lru001'f)Jlt)'j,.!ajJ-_11J-,;'ii'JillfrJ?.tr"mJJl.:(if;):c~Jjj!Ll',JiiljjsQ)) [Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning the 
Regulation of Assets Reorganisation between State-owned Shareholders and Listed Companies] (People's 
Republic of China) State-owned Assets Supervision and Admini strat ion Commission, 24 June 2009; ((;):c'f;/JQ5,ll 
J: ip 0 'ii'] 00 fl )ll1: Jr; fl'] i} ffi .@!. ~ J_!R fl;)(; fc] ~ Jl{] ii!i isQ)) [Notice on Issues Concerning Strengthening the 
Management of Insider Information by State-owned Shareholders of Listed Compan ies] (People's Republic of 
China) State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 28 October 20 11. 
54 Ho, above n 7, 423-6. 
55 ibid 424-5 . 
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disclosure of social and environmental information has also been imposed on certain 
categories of listed companies (including state-controlled listed companies) and central 
SOEs. As noted by Ho, the proliferation of state-led initiatives on corporate social 
responsibility has placed China a leader among 'many of its emerging market peers and 
even many Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries in the level of government support for CSR [ corporate social 
responsibility]' .56 Indeed, as will be illustrated with the case study on the 2008 tainted 
milk scandal in Chapter 9, Chinese state-led initiatives on corporate social responsibility 
post-2005 are not limited to formal legal means. Many administrative, and often ad hoc 
means, have been utilised by the central and local governments to mitigate conflicts 
between companies and their outsider stakeholders, including tort victims and trade 
creditors. 
The first most noticeable change in this regard has been the institution of corporate 
social responsibility in the 2005 Company Law. There are many mechanisms outside 
the corporate law regime that may play an important - although indirect - role in 
promoting corporate social responsibility. For example, in the Anglo-American 
countries, the choices made by managers in corporate decision-making are shaped by 
legislation in many areas, such as industrial relations, environmental protection, 
competition law and public procurement law.57 China is no exception in this regard .58 
However, state mandating corporate social responsibility through the system of 
corporate law distinguishes China's post-2005 regulation of stakeholder protection from 
both the former state-led and the Anglo-American models. Article 5 of the revised 
Company Law states that in their business operations companies shall : 
[c]omply with the provisions of laws and administrative regulations, uphold social 
morality, business ethics, honesty and trustworthiness, accept supervision of the 
government and the public, and bear social responsibility [emphasis added) .59 
56 Ibid 379. 
57 Adam Winkler, ' Corporate Law or the Law of Busi ness?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of 
Hi story ' (2004) 67 Law and Contemporary Problems I 09, 111 
58 In the Chinese context, the National People ' s Congress has issued many laws including the Employment Contract 
l aw, the Renewable Energy Resources l aw, the Law on the Preservation of Energy Resources and the law on 
Promotion of Sustainable Economy. These laws set forth requirements relating to various corporate social and 
environmental responsibilities. In addition, China 's post-2005 regulation of corporate socia l responsibili ty has 
been ass isted by a plethora of 'soft tools' to elicit compliance, such as the MEP 's 'green fi nance programs' that 
tie tax incentives and direct subsidiaries to company environmental compliance. See Ho, above n 7, 40 1-4 ; Li-
Wen Lin, 'Corporate Social Responsibili ty in China: Window Dressing or Structural Change?' 20 10 (28) 
Berkeley Journal of International l aw 64, 79-8 1. 
59 2005 PRC Company Law art 5. 
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As noted by Hawes, in the absence of any stipulation as to the scope of corporate social 
responsibility and the relevant consequences of non-compliance, the enforceability of 
Article 5 is unclear. 60 Nevertheless, the message promoted by Article 5 is clear. 
Companies should strive for more than merely maximising shareholder wealth. 
The general principle of Article 5 is supplemented by a number of provisions that 
provide better protection of specific groups of company stakeholders. For example, to 
enhance the legal protection of creditors, the 2005 Company Law, in broad terms, 
adopts aspects of the Anglo-American doctrine of 'piercing the corporate veil' .6 1 Article 
20(3) provides that 
Where a shareholder of a company evades debts by abusing the independent status of 
the company as a legal person or the limited liability of shareholders, and thus seriously 
damages the interests of company creditors, it shall assume joint liability for the debts 
of the company. 
Employees are also better protected under the new Company Law. In an effort to 
strengthening employee representation on the supervisory board of joint stock 
companies, Article 118 sets out the one-third minimum ratio for supervisors elected by 
employees. 62 The roles of the trade union and employee representative congress in 
corporate decision-making have also been reinforced. While reiterating the legal 
presence of unions in companies, Article 18 entitles them to ·represent employees to 
enter into collective employment contracts with their companies. Article 18 further 
requires companies to solicit opinions from their unions and employees, when making 
major decisions concerning business operations or formulating important internal 
rules.63 
With the statutory basis laid in the new Company Law, corporate social responsibility 
has quickly become an important subject for administrative regulations and stock 
exchange listing rules and guidelines. As noted in Chapter 6, five central government 
agencies, including the CSRC, jointly issued the Basic Standards for Enterprise 
6° Colin Hawes, ' Interpreting the PRC Company Law through the Lens of Chinese Political and Corporate Culture' 
(2007) 30 Un iversity of New South Wales law Journal 813, 813; Also see ;lli~/jj( [Pan Xuemin], ((r:J!;j[r~Ji; 00 0 
i,J □it±¾Jlrff )) [A brief Examination of Corporate Social Responsibility in Our Country] (2012) 6 its'fci ~ t±¾ 
law and Society 78, 78. 
61 2005 PRC Company law art 20. 
62 2005 PRC Company law art 118(2). The 1993 Company Law provided for employee representation on the 
supervisory board but did not specify the minimum ratio. (('f'$Afic:J1;JU000i,J its'» [Company Law of the 
People's Republic of China] (People's Republic of China) National People's Congress Standing Committee, 29 
December 1993, art 124. 
63 2005 PRC Company law art 18. 
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Internal Control (Basic Standards) in 2008. 64 The Basic Standards treat corporate 
social responsibility as an integral component of enterprise internal controls,65 which 
must be established in all listed companies.66 Further, the Application Guideline No. 4 
issued by the five government agencies to assist the implementation of the Basic 
Standards sets out four categories of corporate social responsibility-related risks that 
should be managed by all listed companies. 67 These include work safety, product 
(including service) quality, environmental protection and resource efficiency, promotion 
of employment and protection of employee rights and interests. The Application 
Guideline No.4 also requires listed companies to fulfil their social and public 
obligations by 'caring for socially disadvantaged groups and supporting philanthropic 
activities '. 68 Furthermore, the Application Guideline No.5 requires listed companies to 
build a 'corporate culture' that contributes to better corporate image and greater 
employee cohesion.69 Under the regulatory oversight of the CSRC, the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges have also released guidelines on corporate social 
responsibility for companies listed on their respective exchanges.70 
For central SO Es (most of which are parent SOEs of state-controlled listed companies), 
SASAC has also issued corporate social responsibility guidelines. Particularly, the 
Guiding Opinion on the Implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility by Central 
Government-affiliated SOEs (Guiding Opinion) requires all central SOEs to integrate 
64 (( :u':.ill'. f'l Im ~,t,rJ 11,rJ/l l;;,fs: J<Jj] m)) [Basic Standards for Enterprise Internal Control] (People's Republic of 
China) Ministry of Finance, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Audit Office, China Banking 
Regulatory Commission and China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 22 May 2008 ('Basic Standards' ). 
65 Ibid art 18. 
66 
67 
(("''f fP!.i< ((:IJ':.ill'.f'J /fll~,r,1),!ili;,fs:J<!jlm )) (I(Jif!H:11 )) [Circular on Release of the Basic Standards for Enterprise 
Internal Control] (People's Republic of China) Ministry of Finance, China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
National Audit Office, China Banking Regulatory Commission and China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 22 
May 2008. 
«:u':.ill'. i:IJ/fll ~,t, rJ S flH~'ll~ 4 1%-:/±il:Jlt{f)) «it':.ill'. f'Jlfll~ ,t,uB fflt:;J'J I~ 4 ¥,-Uil::vi1f )) 
[Enterprise Internal Control Application Guideline No.4 - Social Responsibility] (People 's Republic of China) 
Ministry of Finance, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Audit Office, China Bankfog Regulatory 
Commission and China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 15 April 20 I 0. 
68 Ibid art 21. 
69 
70 
((it':.ill'.rl-J/tll~/lirJBffl J'iel'll~ 5 1%-- it':.ill'.x ft )) [Enterprise Internal Control Application Guideline No.5 -
Corporate Culture] (People's Republic of China) Ministry of Finance, China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
National Audit Office, China Banking Regulatory Commission and China Insurance Regulatory Comm ission, 15 
April 20 I 0, art 2. 
((iJilJJlliit)'j, x:,!,'i /i)i _b il' 0Ei:/±il:~1f-lil'll )) [Guidelines on Social Responsibili ty of Companies Listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange] (People's Republic of China) Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 25 September 2006. ((;l(c'f 
!J□ l.!\..t. TIT 0EJU¾m1f1M !!I f'l'~.ii<:fff <J:ifiJ iiE#x:""1/iJi ..t. TIT 0EJJ.fJ:IW: .!l!.'l!¼JlHtl'il> (I(Jifil ~il)) [Notice 
on Strengthening Listed Companies' Assumption of Social Responsibility and the Release of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange Guidelines on Disclosure of Environmental lnfoT111ation by Listed Companies] (People's Republic of 
China) Shanghai Stock Exchange, 14 May 2008. • 
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corporate social responsibility 'into corporate governance and business strategy, and 
implement it on all levels of their daily operations'. 71 For financial sector SO Es that fall 
outside SASAC's control, a similar guiding opinion has been issued by the China 
Banking Supervision Commission.72 
SASAC's Guiding Opinion sets out eight categories of social responsibility that should 
be asswned by central SOEs. Interestingly, in addition to the four categories contained 
in the Application Guideline No.4 discussed above, these include some shareholder-
oriented objectives such as improving the sustainability of company profit-making, 
innovation and technology. 73 
The Guiding Opinion also sets out some measures that should be adopted by central 
SOEs to strengthen their corporate social responsibility. For example, the Guiding 
Opinion requires central SOEs to 'identify a department to deal with corporate social 
responsibility affairs; gradually build a statistical index and assessment system for 
corporate social responsibility'. 74 It further encourages central SO Es to 'exchange 
concepts and experience in fulfilling corporate social responsibility with other 
enterprises at home and abroad' and to 'engage in more dialogues and communication 
with relevant international organisations ' .75 Importantly, the Guiding Opinion requests 
central SOEs to 'give full play to the core role of the company-b_ased Party committees ' 
in the implementation of corporate social responsibility and encourages other Party-
sponsored organisations, such as the trade unions and the women's federation, to 
contribute to the efforts of improving corporate social responsibility. 76 
71 
72 
«~'fcp :!J< fi" '11'. Jili.ff1±%i!tfffrlnl-ll\ :iii: A', )) [Guiding Opinion on the Implementation of Conporate Social 
Responsibili ty by Central Government-affiliated SOEs] (People's Republic of China) State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Comm.i ssion, 29 December 2007 ('Guiding Opinion on Corporate Social 
Responsibility' ), art 17. 
«~ 'f/Ja1U lH f '11'.1il:lltl!.t/Lt!H±% :vi ffO~ :@: A', )) [Opinion on Strengthening the Social Responsibility of 
Banking Financial Institutions) (People's Republic of China) China Banking Supervis ion Commi ssion; 5 
December 2007; {cp 00Wlff'11'.1il:lltl!.f/L.fl:Jii"'11'.:/±%i!t1H1:l ~I )) [Guidelines on Social Responsibility of Banking 
Financial lnstiturions in China] (People' s Republic of China) China Banking Industry Association, I December 
2009. 
73 Guiding Opinion on Corporate Social Responsibility, arts 8-1 5 
74 Ibid art 17. 
75 Ibid art 19. 
76 Ibid art 20. Similarly, to 'fully utilise the role of the grass-roots Party organisations and mass organisations' is 
also a strategy provided in the 'Guiding Opinion on Strengthening the building of corporate culture in centrally 
controlled entenprises' issued by SASAC in 2005. See «~ 'f!.Ja1!l\'P:R:ii"'11'.ii" '11'.X ftl! i&t □1 ti:i -ll\~A',)) 
[Guiding Opinion on Strengthening the Building of Corporate Culture in Central Government-affiliated SOEs) 
(People's Republic of China) State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 16 March 2005, 
art 16. · 
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In addition to increased requirements for compliance, there has been a growing trend of 
mandatory disclosure on corporate social responsibility. Although widely considered an 
effective tool in promoting corporate social responsibility, 77 corporate social and 
environmental disclosure has largely remained voluntary in most Anglo-American 
jurisdictions. 78 However, post-2005, more and more Chinese listed companies have 
been required to issue corporate social responsibility reports under administrative 
regulations and stock exchange rules. For example, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange has 
made the issue of annual corporate social responsibility reports compulsory for 
companies included in the SZSE (Shenzhen Stock Exchange) 100 Index, while 
encouraging all other companies listed on the Exchange to do so.79 These reports must 
disclose company performance of social responsibility in several prescribed areas, 
including protection of the interests of minority shareholders, creditors, clients and 
consumers, environmental protection and sustainable development. They also need to 
describe how corporate social responsibility is managed in the listed company.80 
Three categories of companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange have also been 
required to issue annual corporate social responsibility reports. These include 
companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Index, companies 
that have issued shares overseas in foreign currency, and financial companies. 81 In 
addition to the items required in the corporate governance guidelines issued by the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, companies that fall under these three categories are required 
to disclose their 'social contribution value per share' (representing the values a 
company created for its shareholders as well as non-shareholder stakeholders including 
employees, clients, creditors, community and society) in their corporate social 
responsibility reports and have the reports verified by independent practitioners. 82 
Furthermore, as a result of a series of efforts made by the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, formerly the State Environmental Protection Administration, disclosure of 
77 Corporation s and Markets Advisory Committee, above n I, 115-6; Li-Wen Lin, a~ove n 58, 74. 
78 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, above n I , 125-35. 
79 ((;1c'f il/dl'f_t1j10'a] 2008 if:if:/Ull. '6If\, (J~:il119ill)) [Notice on the Preparation of the 2008 Annual Reports 
by Listed Companies] (People' s Republic of China) Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 31 December 2008. 
so Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
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environmental information has also become compulsory for companies on the 'high 
polluting companies' lists' maintained by central and local environmental agencies. 83 
For central SOEs, SASAC had required them to publish periodical social responsibility 
reports or sustainability reports to disclose their performance, systems and future plans 
in managing corporate social responsibility by the end of 2012. 84 
Indeed, with the introduction of the Basic Standards, corporate social responsibility 
disclosure may well become mandatory for all listed companies in China. The Basic 
Standards require the board of directors of listed companies to issue their annual self-
evaluation reports and independent auditors' reports on the effectiveness of their 
internal controls, of which corporate social responsibility is an essential component as 
noted earlier. 85 As the first batch of listed companies earmarked to implement these 
requirements, listed SOEs were mandated to issue their first self-evaluation reports with 
the release of their 2012 annual reports. 86 
7.4 Post-2005 regulation of investor and other stakeholder protection: 
what has not changed? 
This chapter has so far reviewed changes in China's post-2005 regulation of shareholder 
and other stakeholder protection in listed SOEs. The regulation stands as a remarkable 
contrast with the Chinese pre-2005 state-led model in two important aspects. The first is 
the level of emphasis placed by the state on the protection of minority shareholders and 
non-shareholder stakeholders, and the second, the range of non-shareholder 
stakeholders that are brought under protection. 
83 « :F.f lll: ffi .\\!. 0 ff 1/} it ( mfr ) )) [The Measures on Environmental Information Disclosure (for Trial 
Implementation)] (People's Republic of China) State Environmental Protection Administration, 11 Apri l 2007. 
Pursuant to the Measures, the Shanghai Stock Exchange has also released relevant guidelines for li sted 
companies. See ((J:ifiJ iil:CffX £ Ji!i .1:. rtr 0'aJ J.flftf]§ .~.Jl/iil\Hi'l 51)) [Shanghai Stock Exchange Guidelines on 
Disclosing Environmental lnfonnation by Listed Companies] (People' s Republic of China) Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, 14 May 2008; (( J: rir0 'aJ:F.fJ:llfe, ,~.tliiillHi'li¥i (jjf;;JU1.!l\,l/li) )) [Guidelines for Environmental 
Information Disclosure by Listed Companies (Draft for Comments)] (People's Republic of China) Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, 14 September 2010. 
" State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, ' 201 1 ~ 'P :91:iblH.1:~~1HIH';·-t'.llfil5HfiW. 
85 
86 
~·' [Analysis of201 I Social Responsibility Reports Issued by Central Government-affiliated SOEs] 
<www.sasac.gov.cn/n 11 80/n 13307665/n 13307681 / .. .In 14452725.doc>. 
((~ 'f-Ep;lt «ibll'.l'Jll!il£11iHlli;.fs: tJi!m)) B'Jiiliffi)) [Circular on Release of the Basic Standards for Enterprise 
Internal Control](People's Republic of China ) Ministry of Finance, China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
National Audit Office, China Banking Regulatory Commission and China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 22 
May 2008; Basic Standards art IO. 
«~r 2012 !:f .t:t&J: l!r0'aJ 5l-~5l-ttt :;l;h1!iie:~l'l lllll£11iLli.!i!m{;1\]\0~ii!i'Afl )) [Notice on the Implementation 
of the System of Enterprise Internal Control by Companies Listed on the Main Board under Different Categories 
and Groups from 2012](People's Republic of China) ~ini stry of Finance and China Securities Regu latory 
Commission, 14 August 2012. 
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Yet, despite significant changes, the dominance of the state in structuring these two sets 
of company relations distinguishes the current Chinese approach from both the Anglo-
American and the broader stakeholder governance models, and continues to align this 
approach with the former state-led model. In relation to shareholder protection, the 
ongoing dominance of the state has meant that unlike the Anglo-American outsider-
based model, unbridled shareholder activism has not been encouraged under the new 
framework . As the discussion below will suggest, ongoing control of shareholder 
activism, especially organised activism, has been facilitated by the 'watered down' 
version of many of the transplanted rules in the company law, as well as a persistent 
reluctance of the courts to handle securities-related private lawsuits. As the discussion 
of the continuities in Chinese post-2005 regulation of non-shareholder stakeholder 
protection below will further suggest, in this regard, non-shareholder stakeholders are 
not in a stronger position than shareholders. Various obstacles remain within both 
within and outside the corporate law to hold non-shareholder stakeholder activism in 
check. As discussed in Chapter 8, the ongoing centrality of the state in China's post-
2005 regulation of investor and other stakeholder protection means that, similar to the 
former post-war state-led model, this approach serves as an instrument of the state to 
promote policy goals. 
7.4.1 Investor protection 
First, as discussed in the previous section, the 2005 Company Law has introduced 
various mechanisms to strengthen shareholder participation in corporate governance. 
These mechanisms, however, might not help to increase the voice of minority 
shareholders to a great extent. This is particularly so with the very high shareholding 
thresholds for invoking those mechanisms and the dispersed nature of minority 
shareholding in Chinese listed companies. The average shareholding for the largest 
shareholders in all listed companies was about 39 per cent in 2009. This figure was even 
higher for larger listed SOEs.87 With this level of ownership concentration, neither the 
IO per cent threshold for convening a general meeting, nor the three per cent for 
proposing a shareholder resolution, can be easily met by any single institutional 
investor, let alone small individual investors. 88 
87 )IJJtjz, [Liu Wenda], «iliiH/a ;J(: z.1tJ.!!Ll.!Ri',J;l\frW)) [Exploring Agency Theory on Demand for Auditing] 
(201 I) 7 ~H~ !'I flj Financial and Accounting Monthly 72, 73. 
88 5ld,Hl.l '1'¥ [Zhu Ciyun et al], '~ ,Is: lp tjry ji1J !\fr ti<:)!{ !\fr tt /al !a « 0 i'i] ~)) 8') f~ iT ',\; fi' ' [Innovation and 
Development of the Capital Market and Future Reforn1 of the Company Law ] (201 2 J:iiEUJ<i:-liJl'1.i-l- :li)J 
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Nor has the system of cumulative voting for board election proved to be very effective 
under this shareholding structure. There have been few reported cases of successful use 
of the system in Chinese listed companies. This is despite the fact that cumulative 
voting for the election of directors has been mandated by the CSRC since 2002, for 
listed companies with a more than 30 per cent controlling shareholder.89 In the 2012 
board election of Gree Electric Appliances Inc., several institutional shareholders 
replaced a local government nominee with one of their preferred candidates by 
combining their cumulative voting powers.90 This event has been hailed as a milestone 
in the development of corporate governance in China. However, the 20 per cent 
shareholding held by its state-owned parent in Gree is relatively low compared to the 
average shareholding of the largest shareholders in listed companies in China which is 
discussed above. 
Second, there are significant legal and judicial obstacles for minority shareholders to 
overcome when seeking to rely upon any of the new shareholders' remedies. At the 
outset, it should be noted that the shareholder derivative action is not widely used even 
in many Anglo-American jurisdictions including Australia. 91 This is, in part, due to the 
inherent economic disincentive associated with this particular type of action. 92 A 
derivative action means that should the applicant shareholder win the case, any benefit 
recovered accrues to the company, not the shareholder personalfy. However, should the 
applicant lose the case, in jurisdictions where the English rule as to costs is applied, 
they bear the additional risk of having to pay the costs of the defendant.93 
[Shanghai Stock Exchange Joint Research Program 
<http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/research/plan/plan20 120523a. pdf> 
89 CSRC Code of Corporate Governance art 31. 
20 12) No.22) para 3.2 
90 1.Hl, :tU:xlI [Peng Yong and Liu Dajiang], 'f1'rjJet\il§ "S".~!ll':>Ji'"i'li'.S l:.rl'i0jjjitfi!El'Diw~U-H~' 
[" Descending from Heaven Director" Rejected by Gree--- The Arrival of a New Era for Governance of Listed 
Companies], Xinhua Net News Story (28 May 20 I 2) <http://gd.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2012-
05/28/conrent_ 25309 136.htm>. 
91 Ian M Ramsay and Benjamin B Saund, ' Lit igation by Shareholders and Directors: an Empirical Study of the 
Statutory Derivative Action' (Melbourne Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 250, 12 August 2005) 
<http://ssm. com/abstract=9l 4465>. In the US, these economic disincentives have, in part, been countered by 
method for awarding attorney fees. The ' lodestar' method, which all ows attorneys to be compensated for their 
work done where no monetary relief has been awarded from an act ion, drives lawyers to function more like 
"entrepreneurs," using the applicant' s name only as a key to the courtroom. Lang Thai , 'How Popular are 
Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia? Comparisons with United States, Canada and New Zealand' (2002) 30 
Australian Business Law Review 11 8, 124; Cindy Schipani , 'Corporate Governance and Shareholder Remedies: 
The US Experience and Australia's Proposals for Reforrn ' ( 1994) 6 Bond law Review 28. 
92 Robena Romano, 'The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?' (199 1) 7 Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization 55 , 55-56; Ian Ramsay, 'Corporate Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospect for a 
Statutory Derivative Action' (1992) IS UNSW law Journal 149, 163. 
93 Ramsay, above n 92, 163. 
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Economic disincentive aside, minority shareholders in Chinese companies are 
confronted with significant legal and judicial obstacles in commencing a statutory 
derivative action under the 2005 Company law. To name a few, unlike an Anglo-
American style derivative action that allows an applicant shareholder to sue in the 
name of the company, Article 152 of the new Company law only allows the 
shareholders to sue in their own name. This limitation raises the doubt as to the very 
existence of a derivative action under the new Company Law. 94 Further, unlike the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 that grants all shareholders (and even non-
shareholders under certain circumstances) a right to bring a derivative action with the 
leave of a court,95 the 2005 Company law, in relation to joint stock companies, only 
allows shareholder(s) holding more than one per cent company shares for at least 180 
consecutive days to sue.96 Given the highly dispersed nature of public shareholding in 
listed companies in China, this minimum shareholding requirement can be extremely 
difficult to meet. 97 The cost of litigation is another burden faced by shareholders 
considering a derivative action.98 Under the Chinese civil litigation system, the plaintiff 
who files a lawsuit is generally required to pay upfront a filing fee calculated on a 
sliding scale in accordance with the amount claimed. 99 As pointed out by Tan and 
Wang, in the absence of any provision for the indemnification of legal costs out of 
company funds, most shareholders would not attempt an exp~nsive derivative action 
which might not result in benefits to the shareholders personally. 100 This is particularly 
94 One might argue that sl52 is intended as a personal act ion, which could strengthen the position of the 
shareholders. However, the s152 action can be brought only where the company has suffered a loss due to 
conduct of a director or senior manager and the board of supervisors refuses to take legal proceedings against the 
wrong doer after receiving written request from the applicant shareholder. The action must also be brought by the 
applicant in the ' interest of the company' instead of the applicant shareholder personally. 
95 Corporations Act 200/ (Cth) ss 236,237. 
96 2005 PRC Company law an 152. 
97 Lay Hong Tan and Jiangyu Wang, 'Modelling an Effective Corporate Governance System for China 's Listed 
State-Owned Enterpri ses: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy' (2007)7 Journal of Corporate law 
Studies 143, 163. 
98 Hui Huang, 'The Statutory Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and Recommendations for Refom1' 
(2007) 4 Berkeley Business Law Journal 227, 248. 
99 The sliding scale is from 2.5 to 0.5 per cent depending on the amount of the claim. (( iffi',:il1/f!lx:J1lJ;/J,it)) 
[Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs] (People's Republic of China) State Council , 19 December 2006, 
art 20. 
100 This can be contrasted to the Australian regime wh ich grants the court wide discretion in making cost orders. 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 242; Tan and Wang, above n 97, 162-3. 
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so where they have to bear the costs of litigation (albeit excluding lawyers' fees) of the 
other side following an unsuccessful suit. 101 
The usefulness of the direct suit introduced by Article 153 as a shareholders' remedy 
may also be easily overstated. Under that Article, the right of a shareholder to bring a 
direct suit is premised upon a wrongdoing of a director or senior manager in breach of 
laws, administrative regulations or company constitution. In other words, even where a 
loss has been suffered by a shareholder as result of the above persons' conduct, such an 
action cannot be maintained without the shareholder also establishing a clear breach of 
any of the above three sets of rules by the relevant director or senior manager. This 
latter precondition renders the Article 153 remedy much narrower, compared to an 
Australian-style statutory oppression remedy that focuses on the nature, rather than the 
legality, of the conduct in question. 102 
In addition to significant legal obstacles, the reluctance of the courts to hear securities-
related litigation creates a further disincentive for minority shareholders to rely upon 
any of the newly introduced shareholder remedies. As noted in Chapter 5, this 
reluctance has been manifested in the Supreme People's Court (SPC)'s interpretation of 
private lawsuits concerning loss caused by securities-related misstatement. Although 
these actions were created by the 1998 Securities Law, 103 they ._were made available to 
investors of listed companies only where the alleged wrongdoing had been subject to an 
administrative sanction or a criminal conviction.104 It is true that in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions such as Australia, private proceedings are often delayed until after 
regulatory action, as the costs of private proceedings are high. 105 However, as explained 
in Chapter 5, for various reasons, such as local protectionism and the dual role of the 
CSRC as a regulator and stock market developer, enforcement activity by the CSRC has 
been low, which inevitably limits shareholders ' access to the judicial system. However, 
in the absence of any contrary provisions introduced by the 2005 Securities Law, this 
restrictive interpretation by the SPC has remained in force. 
101 ((iJi:i'tlll/ffl'll:M;/J-i'!)) [Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs] (People's Republic of China) State 
Council, 19 December 2006, arts 6 and 29. 
102 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 232. 
103 ((<piJ'<A ~cl=Ui!liiiE~i'! )) [Securities Law of the People 's Republic of China] (People 's Republic of China) 
National People's Congress Standing Committee, 29 December 1998, art 63. 
104 
«f&iCi A~i'!IIJf.:¥: r illJ;11,iiE~ r!Hml!l.!lilfl'lll!f-i2£'l l2it(JiJ~~M!iH\!1~1'ffrJ:i'i'H .!l!J.E)) [Several Provisions on 
Hearing Civil Cases Related to Securities Market Misrepresentation] (People' s Republic of China)Supreme 
People's Court, 9 January 2003, art 5. 
'°
5 Conversation with Professor Peta Spender, ANU College of Law, 13 May 201 3. 
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Moreover, the difficulty faced by shareholders in seeking judicial redress has been 
exacerbated by the prohibition of shareholder class action in China. In many common 
law jurisdictions, despite various controversies surrounding its relative merits, 106 class 
action has served as an increasingly popular means for large groups of shareholders to 
obtain relief for their similar claims arising from the same or similar circumstances. 
This is particularly so 'where the claim is so small as to be individually untenable ' .107 In 
Australia, a remarkable growth in these actions in recent years has further generated a 
popular perception that a shareholder class action can be ' likened to a sheriff in 
deterring corporate misconduct. 108 
However, shareholder class actions are banned in China. The 1991 Civil Procedure 
Law109 provides for two types of collective actions where either party involves a large 
number (defined as ten or more persons) of litigants. The first type, the Article 54 
action, concerns 'representative suits with fixed number of litigants ' .11 0 The second, the 
Article 55 action refers to representative suits where the number of litigants comprising 
one party is not fixed at the commencement of the action. 111 While Article 54 is 
modelled on the Japanese style representative action, Article 55 draws upon the US-
style class action. 112 Through a notice issued in 2002, the SPC made it clear that 
plaintiffs of securities-related civil action can adopt 'representative suits with a fixed 
number of litigants, but not 'collective law suit with non-fixed number of litigants ' 
(Jituan Susong) . 11 3 
It is unlikely that this prohibition of shareholder class action will be lifted in the 
immediate future, in view of the more recent introduction of stricter control over 
106 For arguments for and against class actions, see Peter Cashman, Class Action Law and Practice (The Federation 
Press, 2007) 22-25. 
10
' Peta Spender, 'The Class Action as Sheriff: Private Law Enforcement and Remedial Roulette' (ANU Coll ege of 
Law Research Paper No. 08-24) 7 <http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id= l224642>. 
108 Ibid 3. 
109 
«'PileAfic;J:ti;fll§lll'l';~i/Fil,;i':t; )) [Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China] (People's Republic 
of China) National People ' s Congress, 9 April 1991 , arts 54 and 55. 
110 Ibid art 54. 
11 1 Ibid art 55. 
112 Michael Palmer and Chao Xi, 'Collective and Representati ve Actions in China' National Report to the University 
of Oxford Centre for Social Legal Studies and Stanford Law School Joint Project on the globalisation of class 
actions, 4 
<ttp:/ /prod. law. stanford.edu/si tes/default/fi les/event/261 32 1 /media/sl spu bl ic/China _National_ Report .pdf> 
113 ((~~Afici'tl&t;)::'f'.iZ:!!!l iiE!/f.$Jm ~J;lii@. !%i£5[ ,'/Jt(J{Jl'l'; {!J&:\x'.t~?'Jt~f1f1'f x (cJ/l.lin0miisQ )) [Notice on 
Relevant Issues concerning Acceptance of Civil Tort Disgutes Arising from Misrepresentation on the Securities 
Market] (People's Republic of China) Supreme People' s Court, 15 January 2002. 
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plaintiff lawyers acting for mass litigation cases. II4 The new rules introduced by the All 
China's Lawyers' Association (ACLA), the Chinese government-sponsored legal 
professional body, include a system for reporting mass litigation cases by plaintiff 
lawyers. Under the system, the plaintiff lawyer, upon acceptance of a mass litigation 
case, must file the details of the case with ACLA and be subject to its monitoring and 
guidance during the handling of the case. Should the case display any signs of 'conflict 
escalation' , thereby potentially causing social unrest, the lawyer must immediately 
report the case to the local government. 115 Further, the plaintiff lawyers are encouraged 
to settle mass litigation cases through mediation, rather than litigation, so as ' to 
facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts' .116 
It is therefore not surprising that the various shareholders' remedies introduced by the 
new Company Law have not been utilised to any great extent by minority shareholders 
in Chinese listed SO Es. For example, based on a dataset of Chinese judicial opinions 
arising in over 50 cases from 1994 to 2010, Clarke and Howson found a 'virtually 
complete absence of' shareholder derivative suits involving joint stock companies. 11 7 
Further, Howson' s review of over 1000 company law-related disputes reported by 
courts in Shanghai from 1992 to 2008 11 8 found a striking absence of cases relating to 
joint stock companies. 1I9 
This section has so far reviewed the continuities in China' s post-2005 regulation of 
investor protection. While increased shareholder rights and remedies have provided 
public investors with considerable comfort, the real chance for them to exert a strong 
voice about corporate governance, either through participation in the general meeting or 
undertaking private law suits, remains quite limited. 
114 ((~rW/ifi;!J.l'._l]j'llf-t,1(1'1;$, 11ftl'i~ :@:J,\!.)) [Guiding Opinion on Lawyers Handling Mass Litigation Cases] 
(People's Republic of China) All China Lawyers Association, 20 March 2006. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 ClarkeandHowson, aboven34, 275. 
118 These cases involve a broad range of areas such as directors' fiduciary duties, veil-piercing, shareholder 
derivative action , the contribution of capital and dividend distributions. See Nicholas Howson, 'Corporate Law in 
the Shanghai People's Courts, 1992-2008: Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State' (2010) 5 
East Asia Law Review 303 , 345. 
11 9 Ibid 400. Of course these studies should also be recei ved with some caution. This is mainly because of difficulties 
associated with collecting the relevant data. As a civil law country, judicial decisions, except judicial opinions 
issued by the Supreme People's Court, do not carry the force of binding precedents. Chinese courts are therefore 
not required to report cases they have dealt with. However, some higher level courts, such as the Supreme 
People's Court, have increasingly publi shed a selection of cases to guide the application of law by lower courts. 
Cheng Wei-qi, ' Protection of Minority Shareholders aftei: the New Company Law: 26 Case Studies' (2010) 4 
International Law and Management 283, 288-9. 
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7.4.2 Non-shareholder stakeholder protection 
In terms of exerting a voice in corporate governance of listed SOEs, non-shareholder 
stakeholders (except employees) are even in a weaker position than shareholders. First, 
unlike their counterparts in the West, civil society organisations are not the main 
suppliers of corporate social responsibility rules and standards in China. Some industrial 
associations, such as the China National Textile and Apparel Council and China 
Electronics Enterprises Association, have contributed to the rule-making process by 
releasing industry-specific corporate social responsibility standards. 120 These 
associations, however, cannot be treated as equivalents of their Western counterparts. 
With their establishment and operations closely controlled by the state, these 
organisations mainly exist to facilitate state policy goals. 121 
Second, compared to shareholders, non-shareholder stakeholders have even fewer 
avenues to enforce their corporate law interests through private lawsuits. As noted 
earlier, in the absence of any provision regarding the scope of corporate social 
responsibility and the consequences of non-compliance, the enforceability of Article 5 
of the 2005 Company Law is not clear. 122 A recent amendment to the PRC Civil 
Procedure Law has allowed 'relevant bodies and organisations prescribed by the law' to 
commence legal proceedings against 'such acts as environmental pollution, harm of 
consumer interests and other acts that undermine the social and·public interest' .123 The 
persons who may have standing to sue under this amendment are however vague, and in 
any event do not include individuals. In this regard, it is worth noting that a recent draft 
amendment to the PRC Environmental Protection Law only allows the All-China 
Environment Federation (ACEF) and its local branches to commence proceedings in 
relation to environmental pollution incidents that have caused major damage to ecology 
12° China Nat ional Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC), «cr §!ltJii'R'.i'l': '11'.t±ifj]t{f')fl'JlHi<ffi CSC9000T )) 
[China Social Compli ance 9000 for Textile & Apparel Industry]. The CNTAC has also required its member 
enterprises to release social responsibility reports since 2006. With the Help of th e CNTAC, China Electronic 
Enterprises Association (CEEA) is preparing its own industrial specific standards CS9000E. See Speech given by 
Sun Ruize, Deputy Chairman of CNTAC, at the 20 121naugural Ch ina-Holland Corporate Social Responsibility 
Summit <http://www.siccsr.org/Newslnfo.aspx?Nld~2 I 33> 
121 Ho, above n 7, 426. 
122 Hawes, above n 60; Also see ii~/®: [Pan Xuemin], above n 60. 
123 « 9"$ A 1',c;l¾;f11 [jj l',c:Jl]: iffil.H!)) [Civil Procedure Law of the People ' s Republic of China] (People's Republic 
of China) Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 3 1 August 2012, art 55. 
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and public interests. 124 Although registered as a not-for-profit organisation, the ACEF 
is directly affiliated to the Ministry ofEnvirorunental Protection. 125 
Indeed, the ongoing centrality of the state in China's post-2005 regulation of non-
shareholder stakeholder protection raises doubt about the applicability of the Western 
concept of corporate social responsibility in China. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Guidelines on Social Responsibility for Listed Companies define corporate social 
responsibility as: 
' the responsibilities that shall be undertaken by a listed company towards the 
comprehensive development of the state, society, natural environment and resources, as 
well as responsibilities towards its shareholders, creditors, employees, clients, 
consumers, suppliers, communities and other stakeholders ' . 126 
Many other guidelines and policy statements on corporate social responsibility issued 
by various government and semi-government agencies tend to use the term 'corporate 
social responsibility' without providing a definition. The categories of stakeholders 
covered in those documents, however, tend to be similar. 
Note that this definition is different from the Western concept of corporate social 
responsibility in two important aspects. First, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's definition 
put ' the comprehensive development of the state' ahead of all __ other stakeholders that 
should be looked after by the companies. The dominance of the interest of the state in 
this definition is also reflected in Article 5 of the 2005 Company Law. As shown earlier, 
the Article states 'accept[ing] the supervision of the goverrunent and the general public' 
ahead of 'bear[ing] social responsibility' by corporations. In other words, companies 
should fulfil social responsibilities beyond those owed to the shareholders, but those 
responsibilities must operate within the frame of the state. Second, as further discussed 
in Chapter 8, despite the broad range of stakeholder interests encompassed in the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange's definition of corporate social responsibility, those 
categories tend to coincide with the prevailing international and domestic pressures 
faced by the Chinese state in maintaining its current form of state-led economic 
development. 
124 ((J;f!Jifiif'i2'ftIE~ (J'/i~=l~elai.51.~) )) [Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China 
(Draft Amendment for Second Deliberation by the Standing Committee of the Nat ional People's Congress) 
(People 's Republic of China)Legislative Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress, 7 July 
2013)<http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/20 13-07/ 17/content_ 1801189.htm> 
125 ACEF website<http://www.acef.eom.cn/about/in troduction/ index.shtml> 
126 (( /Jil jjll ij£'fl'3( 1'/,Ji)i _t ]p 0EJ :/1¾:lHl:l1'i ',I )) [Guidel ines on Social Responsibil ity of Companies Listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange] (People's Republic of China) Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 25 September 2006, art 2. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the changes and continuities in China's post-2005 legal and 
regulatory reforms of investor and other stakeholder protection in listed SOEs. Taken 
together with those concerning state-manager relations discussed in Chapter 6, the two 
chapters illustrate the emergence of a new state-led stakeholder model in the regulation 
of corporate governance in listed SOEs. 
This model may be distinguished from the Chinese pre-2005 state-led model in three 
main aspects. These are (I) increased state monitoring of SOE managers through both 
administrative and market-based means, (2) enhanced shareholder protection through 
both legal and regulatory mechanisms, and (3) expansion of other stakeholder 
protection that goes beyond the interests of the employees. 
On the other hand, the central role played by the state in monitoring corporate 
managers, and mediating competing interests among different types of corporate actors, 
distinguishes this model from both the Anglo-American shareholder and the broader 
stakeholder approaches to corporate governance. As this chapter has demonstrated, few 
of the Chinese post-2005 legislative and regulatory changes have Jed to a transfer of the 
ultimate control of the state over those company relations to individuals or private 
sector organisations, due to various mechanisms in place within-both corporate law and 
the judicial system. How might we interpret these changes and continuities in China's 
post-2005 regulation of the governance of listed SOEs from the perspective of state 
capitalism and institutional change? Chapter 8 addresses this question. 
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CHAPTER 8 INTERPRETING CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES IN 
CHINA'S POST-2005 REGULATION OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
8.1 Introduction 
The foregoi ng two chapters have illustrated the emergence of a state-led stakeholder 
model of corporate governance in China through changes and continuities in its post-
2005 regulation of the governance oflisted state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This model 
has not been contemplated in the literature. As discussed in Chapter 2, three main 
analytical approaches, namely, agency theory of the finn-based analysis, path 
dependence analysis and the interest group politics approach, have been employed in 
existing studies on Chinese corporate governance. A popular assumption underlying 
each of these three approaches is that corporate governance in China is, or should be, 
progressing towards the standard Anglo-American outsider-based model presented by 
Hansmann and Kraakman. 1 
How then, can we interpret the rise of this new state-led stakeholder model through 
those changes and continuities? As discussed in Chapter 3, national models of corporate 
governance are closely associated with their economic development models. Rather 
than maximising the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders, corporate 
governance in a state-led economy is often an instrument of the state to promote 
economic development through intervention in or coordinating with large businesses. 
This fundamental role of corporate governance led to a number of distinctive features in 
the governance of large companies in the former post-war state-led economies. Despite 
country-specific variations, these common features included close state-manager 
relations, the muted voice of minority shareholders and poor protection of stakeholders 
except employees. 
However, this former state-led model has very limited application to state-led 
economies including China today. As Chapter 3 illustrated, the narrowly focused 
former state-led model cannot be isolated from the international and domestic 
enviromnents in which that model operated. Internationally, as the trend of economic 
globalisation has accelerated only since the early 1990s, the fonner state-led model 
1 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (200 I) 89 Georgetown Law 
Jo11ma/ 439, 449. 
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worked largely within the bounds of the nation state during much of the early post-war 
period, free from major outside pressures. 2 Domestically, the state-led stakeholder 
model was typically grounded in a corporatist state-society relationship characterised by 
a strong and centralised state and weak civil society, which allowed the state to forge 
close ties with large businesses while containing other societal groups whose short-term 
demands might not be consistent with the long-term economic-oriented goals of the 
state.3 
Nevertheless, studies of comparative capitalism, including theory of the developmental 
state, have also suggested that state capitalism is not static. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
it intersects and interacts with major international and domestic forces for change. The 
intensification of these forces may eventually narrow the scope for state intervention in 
institutional change, including changes in the national system of corporate governance. 
Nevertheless, a strong and centralised state may utilise a variety of tools, such as 
limiting the contestability of the formulation and implementation of law or substituting 
the demand for law with extra-legal means, 4 to enhance its coordinative capacity to 
maintain the state-led system, at least up to a certain point. The employment of these 
tools, as well as other tools, such as market forces, will inevitably lead to a degree of 
system hybridisation, but not necessarily a fundamental systemic change. 
Drawing upon this frame of state capitalism and institutional change, thi s chapter will 
show that the rise of the state-led stakeholder model in the governance of Chinese listed 
SOEs post the 2005 corporate law reforms has not been a mere indication of China's 
greater embrace of any prevailing international corporate governance models. Rather, it 
has been driven by China's efforts to maintain the Chinese current form of state-led 
economic development, while grappling with the increasing demands made on the state 
for protection by investors and other stakeholders with economic globalisation and the 
pluralisation of interests within domestic society. 
2 Vivien Schmidt, The Fu111res of E11ropeon Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2002) 107-9; Vivien Schmidt, 
' French Capitali sm - Transformed, Yet Still a Third Variety of Capitalism' (2003) 32 Economy and Society 526, 
530; Gregory Jackson and Richard Deeg, ' How Many Varieties of Capitalism? Comparing the Comparative 
Institutional Analyses of Capitalist Diversity' (MP!fG Discussion Paper No. 06/2, 11 Apri l, 2006) 5 
<http: //ssm.com/abstract=c896384>. 
3 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (Princeton University Press, 1992) 27. 
4 Curtis Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about legal Systems 
and Economic Development around the World (University of Chicago Press, 2008) 3 1-39. 
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This chapter will proceed as follows. Section 8.2 outlines the international and domestic 
challenges faced by policy makers in China in maintaining the Chinese form of state-led 
economic development, and their response to those challenges at the broad policy level. 
Drawing upon, but extending, Milhaupt and Pistor's analysis of the sets of tools that can 
be used by the state to condition the interaction between legal and economic changes,5 
section 8.3 explains the changes and continuities in Chinese post-2005 regulation of 
state-manager relations, and investor and other stakeholder protection from the 
perspective of state capitalism and institutional change. Section 8.4 concludes by 
summarising the main arguments of this chapter. 
8.2 Challenges faced by the state in retaining state-led economic 
development 
Economic globalisation and the pluralisation of interests within domestic society are 
some of the key challenges for all forms of state-led economies (as Chapter 3 
discussed). China has faced unprecedented challenges in both aspects since the early 
2000s. This is not only because of its rapid economic development and gradual 
integration into the world economy, but also the specific fonn of state capitalism 
engaged by Chinese leaders, that is, government ownership and control of large profit-
seeking enterprises. 
8.2.1 Economic globalisation 
First, with China' s gradual integration into the international community, it is no longer 
immune to economic globalisation and competition. China's WTO accession in 2001 
had both benefits and costs. Overall, this event was viewed by Chinese policy makers as 
an instrument for furthering economic reform and development. The WTO membership 
not only meant potential growth in foreign trade and investment, but also the 
opportunity for Chinese enterprises, including SOEs, to improve efficiency through 
participating in international competition and exchanges.6 
However, with WTO accession, the challenges faced by Chinese policy makers were 
imminent and multifaceted. On the one hand, China had to improve its market access 
through not only reducing trade barriers and opening important service sectors (such as 
5 Ibid. 
6 
'9' ll,l c&.!jl::lfJll(itt t¥9'Jl.lf }Jj 5e ;~5/.(y.J - f'f ::k:<l> --- ~51.:!Jl'.~OO:IJQ,,\ ttt l'l-m ~ tlHW [Congratulat ions on Our 
Country's WTO Accession---a Historical Event in China ' s Reform and Opening up], People's Net Editorial (I I 
November 200 1) <http://www.people.eom.cn/GB/1 23869/1 23883/ I 5373/2391 74/ 17144 I 26.html>; Nicholas 
Lardy, lntegra1ing China into the Global Economy (Brookings Institution Press, 2002) 20. 
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banking and finance industries) to foreign businesses, but also by altering the regulatory 
framework to meet international standards and practices. 7 Indeed, as pointed out by 
Tomasic, the WTO commitments forced China to carry out an ongoing modernisation 
of its economic laws including company law and securities law.8 On the other hand, 
poor corporate governance of SOEs meant that they were ill-adapted to international 
competition, especially competition emanating from multinational corporations. 9 
Indeed, despite their surging accounting profits and international profile, the average 
efficiency of SOEs lagged behind Chinese private sector, let alone multinational 
corporations from the developed market economies. By the end of 2012, 54 of the 
central government-affiliated SOEs (central SOEs) had entered the list of the Fortune 
magazine World Top 500. However, a disproportionate share of the profits ofSOEs was 
contributed by less than ten gigantic groups in state monopoly sectors such as 
petrochemical and telecommunications. 10 The persistent lack of efficiency of the state 
sector has led many commentators to continue to attribute the improved overall 
financial position of the SOEs to their monopoly status and government policy 
supports. 11 
8.2.2 Diversification of interests within society 
Economic globalisation aside, the diversification of interests within Chinese society has 
become another challenge faced by Chinese policy makers-- to maintain state-led 
economic development. Similar to the former East Asian developmental states, the 
Chinese state-led model of economic development used to be supported by a corporatist 
type of state-society relationship, described by Frolic as a 'state-led civil society' . 12 
China's economic reform and opening up over the past thirty years has seen 
considerable growth in the number of not-for-profit or non-governmental organisations, 
7 Doug Guthrie, China and the Globalisation (Routledge, 2006) 300-1. 
8 Roman Tomasic, 'Preface' , in Roman Tomasic {ed), Corporate Governance Challenges for China (China Law 
Press, 2006) 1, 2; Al so see Chao Xi, ' In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model: Board Refonns and the 
Political Economy of Corporate Law in China' (2006) 22 Con11ecticut Journal of international Law I, 35-36. 
Peter Nolan, China and the Global Economy: National Champions, industrial Policy, and the Big Business 
Revolwion (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 11. 
10 The World Bank, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmo11io11s, a11d Creative High-income Society (2012) 25 
<http://www. worl dbank. org/ en/news/f eature/20 I 2/02/27 /ch ina-2030-executi ve-summary>. 
11 Ibid; {oJ{t [He Wei], ';)c{Ejgt!Jffi,±ill;"',l!:jt}\_! j: El' [Central SOEs' Withdrawal from the Property Market-only 
a Sham] (2010) 13 i;li: 1jt l"l ~ Reform Internal Reference 42 <http://www.caijing.com.cn/2010-05-
l 8/ l 1044151 7_1.html>; Wang Yong, ' Progress on SOEs Means Answering Political Questions' Caixi11 O11/ine 
(22 May 2015) <http://english.caix.in.com/2013-05-22/1 005 31336.html>. 
12 B. Michael Frolic ' State-led Civil Society' in Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic (eds), Civil Socie7 in Chi11a 
(M .E. Sharpe, 1997) 46, 56; Tony Saich, Governa11ce and Politics of China (Palgrave Macmillan , 2" ed, 2004) 
228. 
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such as industrial and trade associations. However, as pointed out by Unger and Saich, 
unlike their counterparts in Western pluralist society, interest groups in China influence 
government policymaking mainly through retaining strong links with the government. 13 
This state-led state-society relationship, arguably, enabled the state to focus resources 
on the large SOEs relatively free of strong opposition from the private sector and 
general public. 
This situation is, however, rapidly changing. Alongside globalisation and rapid 
domestic economic development, there has been a growing awareness among Chinese 
citizens of their self-interest, as well as a far greater desire to voice their opinions on 
every aspect of the social, economic and political life in China. In recent years, this 
trend has been particularly fuelled by the commercialisation of media and the arrival of 
the internet. 14 Government censorship remains strong after the commercialisation of 
media. However, fierce competition for audiences has provided newspapers and internet 
websites with a strong incentive to 'break' news stories, despite risks of censorship 
penalties being imposed. 15 In addition to the commercial press, internet social networks 
have become another important source for exposing scandals and expressing individual 
ideas. China had 384 million internet users and 145 million bloggers in 2010. 16 As 
pointed out by Shirk, fo llowing decades of strict Communist Party (Party) control of 
media, the Chinese people have 'a voracious appetite for news' .1"1 
One important aspect of this trend towards pluralisation of interests has been a much 
stronger voice from public investors on the Chinese stock market. These investors were 
largely a silent group in the early years of market development, when a fast growing 
economy and limited avenues for private investment fuelled a generally booming stock 
market. However, as the bearish market has become more of a norm than exception 
since the early 2000s (due, in part, to the frequent exposure of corporate scandals and 
other forms of market abuses, and in part to increased liquidity pressures on the market 
13 Jonathan Unger, 'Chinese Association, Civil Society, and State Corporatism: Disputed Terrain ', ln Jonathan 
Unger (ed), Associations and the Chinese state: Contested Spaces (M.E. Sharpe, 2008) I; Tony Saicl1 , 
Governance and Politics of China (Palgrave Macmillan, 2"' ed, 2004) 226-32. 
14 Susan Shirk, Chang ing Media, Chang ing China (Oxford Uni versity Press, 2010) 2; Zi Xue Tai , The internet in 
China: Cyberspace and Civil Society (Routledge, 2006); Chri stopher R. Hughes and Gudrun Wacker (ed), China 
and the Internet: Politics of the Digital l eap Forward (Taylor & Francis Group, 2003). 
15 Shirk, above n 14. 
16 China Internet Network Information Centre, the 251h Statistical Report on the Development of China 's Internet 
(January 20 I 0) <http//www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfi les/pdf/201015/l /15/101600.pdf> . 
17 Shirk, above n 14. 
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following the 'split share structure refonn '), 18 poor investor protection in listed 
companies has attracted fierce criticisms from the public. 19 The lack of investor 
confidence has no doubt exacerbated the dismal prospect of the stock market in China 
as an important source of equity financing for SO Es. 
Nevertheless, increased diversification of interests within society is not only reflected in 
the growing dissatisfaction of public investors . Mounting social tensions have posed 
further challenges to the policy makers in maintaining the Chinese form of state-led 
development. These tensions are generally interpreted as a side effect of the Chinese 
development-first approach adopted since the late l 970s.20 The approach has produced 
near double digit economic growth for over thirty consecutive years. It is, however, at 
the expense of rapidly widening wealth gaps in urban and rural areas, serious 
envirom11ental pollution and corruption. Taking the widening wealth gaps for example, 
the Gini index (or Gini ratio) has been widely used as a measure of inequality in 
national income distribution. Analysts suggest that a Gini coefficient of 0.4 on a zero to 
one scale indicates significant income inequality. China's Gini coefficient reached 0.47 
in 2005 from 0.412 in 2000,21 approaching the levels of Nigeria and Brazil. Both these 
countries are well known for their wealth disparity. 22 Increasing public unrests caused 
by these problems have further led to a sharp increase in government expenditures on 
social management over the past few years.23 
18 Yuwa Wei , 'China's Capital Market and Corporate Governance: the Promotion of the External Governance 
Mechanism ' (2007) 4 Macquarie Journal of Business law 325, 337; Jenny Fu, 'Corporate governance of listed 
companies in China: between State-owned Corporate Groups and Public Investors' (2006) 19 Australian Journal 
a/Corporate law 114, 128 
19 For example, widespread illegal activities in the Chinese stock market led Wu Jinglian to describe China 's stock 
market as ' worse than a casino' . See !fl:l/&lil' [Wu Jinglian] , (( -J-iJ:i!!Hiijlj)Nrp )) [Ten Years of the Stock 
Market] (J:i/1fiii;:!f;tl:J/1&H [Shanghai Fast East Publishing House], 200 1) 8-9. 
20 Wen Jiabao, Government Work Report delivered during at the Third Plenum of the I I'" National People's 
Congress (March 5, 20 10) <http://www.chinada ily.com.cn/china/20 1Onpc/2010-03105/content_954 I 766.htm>. 
21 These fi gures are estimates of the United Nations and the Chinese Academy of Social Science. Caixin Magazine, 
a highly regarded financial media in China, suggested that Chinese government did not release any official Gini 
ratio figures from 2001 to 2011 , claiming that it was too difficult to calculate due to incomplete data on high 
income groups. See Fang Xuyan and Lea Yu, 'Gov't Refuses to Release Gini Coefficient ' Caixin (online), 18 
January 20 12 <english.caixin.com/20 12-01-1 8/100349814.html>. 
22 Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the Stare (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 256; 'Inequality: Gini out of the Bottle' , The Economist (online), 26 January 20 13 
<www.economisr. com/news!china/215 70 749-gini-our-bottle> . 
23 Ai Guo Han, ' Building a Harmonious Society and Achieving Indivi dual Harmony' (2008) 13 Journal of Chinese 
Political Science 143, 144-8; Angang Hu, Economic and Social Transformation in China: Challenges and 
Opportunities (Routledge, 2007) 226; Chih-Jou Jay Chen, ' Growing Social Unrest in China: Rising Social 
Discontents and Popular Protests' in Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne (eds), Socialist China, Capitalist 
China: Social Tension and Political Adaptation under Economic Globalisation (Routledge, 2009) 10; Tan Kong 
Yam, 'China's I Ith Five-Year Plan: A Critical Perspective', in John Wong and Wei Liu (eds), China 's Surging 
Economy: Adjusting /or More Balanced Development (World Scientific, 2007) 253. 
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The increasingly wealthy and politically powerful SOEs have often been at the centre of 
these social tensions. 24 Despite significant contribution to tax revenue, the extent of 
their contribution to the life of ordinary citizens, the ultimate owners of state-owned 
assets vested in these large enterprises, 25 has been widely questioned. 26 This is 
exacerbated by the frequent exposure of various forms of extravagance and corruption 
involving these privileged corporate groups and their managers. With the growth of 
online media and social networks, any item of negative information concerning SOEs 
(such as lavish monopoly profits, excessive executive remuneration, and environmental 
pollution incidents) often spreads quickly, generating significant public resentment 
towards not only the enterprises concerned, but also central and local governments as 
their dominant shareholders. Indeed, these controversies surrounding central SOEs have 
led Li Rongrong, former Director of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), to express his well-known dilemma in the 
following way, 'I was criticised when these SOEs were making losses. Now they are 
making profits, I am still criticised' .27 
While maintaining state control of large SOEs, the Party responded to the growing 
social and environmental tensions in China by outlining a vision to build a ' harmonious 
society' through adopting a 'scientific approach to development' . 28 'Harmonious 
society' has been defined as a 'people-centred ' approach baseo on 'the rule of law, 
equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality'. 29 'Scientific development' emphasises 
coordinated development of the economy, society and natural environment. 3° First 
24 F'ffil;;f [ Lu Fucai] (ed), ((q,:9<:if:_ill:-z}jjjfcjJJHll.\!i')) [Report on Corporate Governance of Central State-owned 
Enterprises] (9"00i'£itft±l/l&U [China Economic Publishing House], 2011) 2 
25 ((q, $ ./\1'1': ;iH1l 00:if:.ill'.OOfil!if'i'! )) [The Enterprise State-owned Assets Law of the People' s Republic of 
China] (People's Republic of China) National People' s Congress Standing Committee, 28 October 2008, art 3. 
26 Wang Yong, above n 11. 
27 
'**~' tJff l9l 8n"ifOO:if:J6-;fJ6-'ili.ffll'll!*'.l'i' [Li Rongrong: I am Always Blamed, Whether SOEs are 
Making Profits or Not], Xinhua Net News Story ( 12 December 2009) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-
12/ 12/content_ l 26349\ 5.htrn>. 
28 (( 9" :Ps 9" ;k ;)sf- :/JO 5/ll :le: 81 II\!$:~~ )J lJ1 i9: (t] 1:lc )E)) [Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party on Strengthening the Governing Capacity of the Party], Adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the 
16th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 19 September 2004 (' Decision on Strength ening Party 
Governing Capacity'); ((q,;f!iq,;J;,;)sf-f/;JlJ1U ¾cl::.5/.;fll i\!i:il¾ii'f.i: :kfiiJ~(tj /Jc)E)) [Decision of the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communi st Party on Several lmportant Issues Concerning the Establishment 
ofa Socialist Harmonious Society] , Adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the 16"' Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party, 11 October 2006 ('Decision 011 Establishmel1l ofa Harmonious Society]. 
29 
' Building Harmonious Society Crucial for China's Progress' , Peop/e "s Net News Story (27 June 2005) 
<htrp:/ Ieng\ ish. people. com.cn/200506/2 7 /eng20050627 _ 192495. lrnnl>. 
30 Decision 011 Establishmem of a Harmonious Society, above n 28. 
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introduced by former President Hu Jintao in 2004, 31 the concepts of 'hannonious 
society' and 'scientific development' have since become the Party's guiding principles 
in directing all aspects of socioeconomic life in China. 32 As discussed next, these 
principles have also formed a key policy foundation for China's post-2005 regulation of 
corporate governance, including corporate social responsibility. While bearing the 
imprints of international and domestic pressures for change, the rise of the state-led 
stakeholder model of corporate governance in China resonates with the Party-state's 
response to those pressures at the policy level. 
8.3 How can we interpret the changes and continuities in China's post-
2005 regulation of corporate governance? 
In state-led economies, the fundamental role of corporate governance is to facilitate 
economic-oriented goals of the state. In that sense, the state-led stakeholder model of 
corporate governance that has emerged in China is still conforming to the former state-
led model. As discussed in the previous two chapters, China has adopted many market 
and non-market-based legal and regulatory changes post-2005, in an effort to improve 
monitoring of managers, and strengthen the protection of investors and other non-
shareholder stakeholders. However, none of these changes, as shown below, has been 
an end in itself. Put together, they form an integral part of the policy tools of the state to 
promote economic development and the symbiotic sociaf stability, amid rapidly 
changing international and domestic dynamics. 
From the perspective of state capitalism and institutional change, these changes and 
continuities in China's post-2005 regulation of corporate governance present an 
alternative path for the evolution of state-led corporate governance. Faced with strong 
international and domestic forces for change, rather than converging into any of the 
prevailing international models of corporate governance (including the Anglo-American 
outsider-based model), the former state-led model may evolve into a hybrid state-led 
stakeholder approach, by readjusting its relations with key corporate actors, as well as 
taking into account other emerging interests, without necessarily relinquishing state 
control. 
31 Decision on Strengthening Party Governing Capacity ', above n 28. 
32 Li-Wen Lin, 'Corporate Social Responsibili ty in China: Window Dressing or Structural Change?' 20 10 (28) 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 64, 88 
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In this regard, China's shift in the approach to corporate governance post-2005 also 
provides a ready example of the variety of tools that may be used by a centralised state 
to resist a fundamental systemic transformation. 33 First, state limitation of the 
contestability of the law is one set of such tools identified by Milhaupt and Pistor.34 As 
discussed in Chapter 3, this set of tools can be utilised in not only the fonnulation but 
also the implementation of law. The employment of this set of tools in both processes 
has been manifested in China's post-2005 regulation of investor and other stakeholder 
protection. As Chapter 7 demonstrated, the various legal and regulatory refonns in these 
two areas have not resulted in a transfer of state control over those two sets of company 
relations to non-state sectors such as individuals and or civil society organisations. On 
the one hand, most of the improved rules in those two areas have been fonnulated by 
the state without significant input from non-governmental organisations. On the other 
hand, while increased regulation may lead to better protection, the extent to which those 
rules can be taken up by minority shareholders and other stakeholders to exert a strong 
voice about corporate affairs remains rather limited. Significant obstacles exist both 
within the system of corporate law and the judicial system, to hold shareholder and 
stakeholder activism, especially organised activism, against their companies (and the 
state) in check. 
Non-l egal substitutes for law (as the second set of tools identified by Milhaupt and 
Pistor35) have also been extensively utilised in China's post-2005 reforms of corporate 
governance. As shown in Chapters 6 and 7, many extra-legal means, such as the system 
of 'Party management of cadres ', numerous Party policy statements and administrative 
guidelines have operated alongside fonnal regulation. While providing, arguably, a 
cheaper means to address various problems with listed SOEs, these non-legal means 
also help to preserve the dominance of the state over company relations. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, for effective state-business collaboration to take place, the state 
bureaucracies need to have sufficient flexibility supported by broadly-drafted laws. 
Indeed, as the case study on the 2008 China tainted milk scandal in Chapter 9 will 
suggest, many other administrative, and often ad hoc means, have also been utilised by 
the Chinese state to substitute demand for law from private actors, as well as to 
maintain the discretionary power of the state. 
33 Milhaupt and Pistor, above n 4. 
34 Ibid 7. 
35 Ibid 38-39. 
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However, as argued in Chapter 3, focusing on these traditional instruments of an 
interventionist state, Milhaupt and Pistor seemed to have overlooked one other set of 
tools that may be utilised by the state to increase its coordinating capacity. This is to be 
found in market forces, including principles and structures of corporate governance in 
developed market economies and international best practices. Indeed, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the flexible adaptability of the state through combining state power with 
market forces is one of the important features of the Chinese form of state capitalism. 
Two main purposes can be deduced from the adoption of these forces by policy makers 
in China's post-2005 regulation of corporate governance. The first is to strengthen the 
effectiveness of state control over corporate managers, and the second, to improve the 
coordinating capacity of the state to maintain a pro-growth environment through 
mitigating the conflicts between companies and their minority shareholders and other 
non-shareholder stakeholders. 
In relation to the first purpose, as discussed in Chapter 6, viewed in isolation, the 
various market-based changes in the Chinese post-2005 reforms of state-manager 
relations within listed SOEs appear to indicate China's greater embrace of the Anglo-
American outsider-based corporate governance. However, taken together with other 
non-market-oriented changes, and persistent state control in corporate decision-making, 
the various market-based changes can be seen as tools to improve the efficiency, and 
hence international competitiveness, of SOEs without necessarily removing state 
control. Indeed, this pragmatic approach has been summarised by Li Rongrong, former 
Director ofSASAC, in the following way: 
We will actively foster and develop a group of large corporations and enterprise groups 
of international competitiveness among central SOEs. We will support qualified large 
and medium-sized SOEs through restructuring, going public, entering into partnership 
with foreign enterprises and various other ways to accelerate the development of major 
businesses so as to enhance their influence and driving power.36 
The rapid growth of Chinese state-owned investment overseas in recent years has 
generated a heated debate about whether Chinese SOEs are commercially-oriented 
enterprises or instruments of the state. 37 The flexible adaptability of the Party-state in 
36 Li Rongrong, ' Continuously Adjusting the Layout and Structure of China's State Economy, Propelling Chinese 
SOEs to Participate in International Compet ition and Cooperation ' (Keynote Speech delivered at the International 
Merger & Acquisition Summit Beijing 2003, 19 November 2003) 
<http://www. sasac. gov.cn/n2963340/n2964 712/3049656. hnnl>. 
37 Many issues in this area were canvassed by participants.of the Australia-China Investment Relations Conference 
held in University of Canberra, 30 and 3 1 July 20 12. 
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China' s post-2005 regulation of state-manager relations appears to suggest that they can 
be both. This is because, the Party-state itself has taken on a more market-oriented 
aspect in pursuing policy goals. 
Viewed in this light, China's recent efforts in strengthening investor and other 
stakeholder protection have served a similar objective. Where 'investor protection' and 
'corporate social responsibility' have become widely championed by investors of the 
globalised market, it is desirable to equip Chinese companies with the same or similar 
set of concepts and norms. Indeed, this mentality is manifested in the Guiding Opinion 
on the Implementation of Co1porate Social Responsibility by Central-government 
Affiliated SOEs ('Guiding Opinion' )38 issued by SASAC. Outlining the content of 
corporate social responsibility and the strategies for how to fulfil it (as discussed in 
Chapter 7), the Guiding Opinion states that strengthening corporate social responsibility 
will help central SOEs to achieve sustainable development by enhancing innovation, 
transfonning patterns of growth, improving corporate branding and image, and the 
quality of employees and corporate cohesion. Furthermore, compliance with corporate 
social responsibility by central SOEs will help them to 'participate in international 
economic exchange and cooperation' . 39 
Second, further to an instrument to improve the international competitiveness of listed 
SO Es, China's strengthening of investor and other stakeholder protection post-2005 can 
be seen as policy tools to increase the coordinative capacity of the state to maintain a 
pro-growth environment through alleviating social tensions surrounding listed 
companies. This is especially so with the greater propensity for the state to be 
implicated in these tensions due to state ownership of enterprises. 
On the one hand, globalisation of markets aside, increased legal protection of 
shareholders in China post-2005 has been driven by an urgent need to restore investor 
confidence in the domestic stock market. As noted in Chapter 6, this intention has been 
best manifested in the Explanation of the Draft Amendment to the Company Law40 
38 ((;)s'f 't':9<'.it:.ill'.iil!fr t±4t:r/HEOiti:l-la< ;i;i: !iil, )) [Guiding Opinion on the Implementation of Corporate Social 
Responsibility by Central Government-affiliated SOEs] (People' s Republic of China) State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission, 29 December 2007 ('Guiding Opinion on Co,porate Social 
Responsibility ') . 
39 Ibid. 
,o 11'fii'r~ [Cao Qingtai] , ' :ls 'f ((< q,$ .A. 1'1:J:i;f□ J;El0;;'J~ )) (111!: iT:1/i~ ) 1¥J i#.BJl' [Explanation of the Draft 
Amendment to the Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (Deli vered at the 14'" Meeting of the 10'" 
National People' s Congress Standing. Committee, 25 February 2005) 
<http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2005- I 0/27 /content_5343 I 20.hnn>. 
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produced by the Legal Affairs Office of the State Council. In the Explanation, a State 
Council document 41 calling for fostering steady development of the stock market 
through multiple means, including strengthening corporate governance, was cited 
alongside widespread public concern for poor investor protection in in Chinese listed 
companies.42 Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 7, most of the investor protection-oriented 
rules adopted in China post-2005 have been to improve investor confidence in the stock 
market through addressing the various problems faced by them under the pre-2005 
regulatory framework. Since a bearish stock market has become more of a norm since 
the 2000s, strengthening investor protection is likely to continue to dictate the reform 
agendas of Chinese stock market regulators, such as the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and the stock exchanges. 
On the other hand, China's increasing mandating of corporate social responsibility post-
2005 is in line with the Party-state's response to growing social and environmental 
tensions at the broad policy level. As noted earlier, the interests of minority 
shareholders, no matter how important, are not the only source of domestic pressures 
for change faced by Chinese policy makers. As the establishment of a 'harmonious 
society' through 'scientific development ' became the Party's chief policy response to 
mounting social and environmental tensions, this policy has also underpinned most 
corporate social responsibility-related policy statements and guidelines issued by 
various government or semi-government agencies. For example, the Guiding Opinion 
issued by SASAC is explicitly aimed to ' comprehensively implement the spirit of the 
17th CCP National Congress and the theory of Scientific Development', and to give 
central SOEs the impetus to fulfil corporate social responsibilities ' so as to realise 
coordinated and sustainable development of enterprises, society and environment in all 
respects ' .43 To implement ' scientific development' is also specified in the regulatory 
aims of the corporate social responsibility guidelines issued by the Shenzhen and the 
Shanghai Stock Exchanges.44 
41 ((J;i,lg\-ilJt3'-'ft!Eill~:;$:rli"tPJi&ljl:ff/i!Of1l;!Z)Y£.'&:JlHriiFf-!:JJI,)) [Some Opinions of the State Council on 
Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capi tal Markets) (People's Republic of China) State 
Council, 3 IJanuary 2004. 
42 11!/fli* [Cao Qingtai], above n 40. 
43 Guiding Opinion on Co rporate Social Responsibility, above n 38, art 19. 
44 ((/JiHJlliiE'l'f3c¼l\fofeJ: $ 0 EJ :/±¾~1ffir5I )) [Guidelines on Social Responsibili ty of Companies Listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange](People's Republic of China) Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 25 September 2006 
('Shenzhen Stock Exchange Guidelines on Co ,porat~ Social Responsibility'). «~-'fJJ05!iL/-.$0EJ1±¾:iJt1fjji: 
1!!If'l'~,'/,i:;/fi<J:i/iioiiE'l'f3c¼l\fo)T_l:. $ 0 EJ :EfJ:l!f,!L\l!.J)!i ~ fir5I > iliiffii:11 )) [Notice on Strengthening Listed 
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Indeed, the Party-state's response to increasing social pressures at the policy level has 
influenced the definition of corporate social responsibility in China. As noted in 
Chapter 7, despite the broad range of stakeholder interests captured in the definition 
offered by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange,45 those categories tend to coincide with the 
prevailing domestic and international pressures faced by the Party-state in maintaining 
the Chinese economic development model. On the one hand, the inclusion of the 
shareholders in the definition seems to be outside the scope of corporate social 
responsibility for most other comparators. This is, however, consistent with strong 
public concern for poor investor protection on the Chinese stock market. Indeed, as 
these domestic and international pressures continue to grow, further response has been 
made by the new Chinese leaders. In addition to strengthening investor protection and 
corporate social responsibility, SO Es are required to increase the share of profits paid to 
public finance to 30 per cent (from current five to 15 per cent) by 2020, which will be 
used to 'ensure and improve the livelihood of the people' .46 On the other hand, other 
issues such as human rights and gender equality, which are often discussed in the 
context of the Western concept of corporate social responsibility, are not included in the 
definition.47 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has interpreted the changes and continuities in China's post-2005 
regulation of corporate governance of listed SOEs from the perspective of state 
capitalism and institutional change. The regulatory framework has given rise to a new 
hybrid state-led stakeholder model of corporate governance which is not contemplated 
in existing literature. 
From the perspective of state capitalism and institutional change, this chapter has shown 
that the rise of this new approach to the governance of listed SO Es cannot be separated 
from China's efforts to maintain its state-led economic development amid international 
and domestic pressures for change, particularly economic globalisation and the 
Companies' Assumption of Social Responsibility and the Release of the Shanghai Stock Exchange Guidelines on 
Disclosure of Environmental Information by Listed Companies] (People's Republic of China) Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, 14 May 2008. 
45 Shenzhen Stock Exchange Guidelines on Corporate Social Responsibility, above n 44, art 2. 
46 (( 9' :I¾ 9' :'Re~ T :'I': llfi il+Ht ~ .1iL!s' 'f _!I,: :X fP] II] (fJ ~ JE)) [Decision on Several Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms], adopted at the Third Plenum of the Is"" Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party, 12 November 2013; Yao Jing, ' More SOEs to be Going Private: Official' People's 
Net News Story (20 December 2013) <http://english.people.eom.cn/business/8490679.htrnl>. 
47 Lin, above n 32, 66 
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diversification of interests within Chinese society. In the Chinese fonn of state 
capitalism, these pressures have been particularly exacerbated by state ownership of 
large companies. These complex and dynamic pressures have led to extensive changes 
in China 's post-2005 regulation of three sets of company relations central to the former 
state-led model of corporate governance. Yet, a paramount objective of retaining 
control over large listed SOEs (as the Chief economic foundation of the Chinese form 
of state capitalism) has led the Party-state to adopt several sets of tools to increase its 
coordinating capacity, as well as to refract pressures from shareholders and other non-
shareholder stakeholders, including the wider society, for a more fundamental systemic 
change. As this chapter discussed, largely overlooked by Milhaupt and Pistor, one 
particular set of tools employed by Chinese policy makers has been corporate 
governance mechanisms from the Anglo-American developed market economies and 
international best practices. 
To what extent has the rise of this state-led stakeholder model influenced the reality of 
corporate governance in listed Chinese SOEs post the 2005 corporate law reforms? 
Chapter 9 examines the changes and continuities in the governance practice in these 
companies post-2005, and explores some of the reasons behind them. 
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CHAPTER 9 CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES IN THE 
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN LISTED SOES 
POST-2005 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has so far analysed the evolution of regulation of corporate governance in 
state-controlled listed companies in China from the former state-led to its current state-
led stakeholder model. This chapter considers to what extent this shift has been 
reflected in the reality of corporate governance within these large companies. Many 
factors may have contributed to the changes, or the lack thereof, in the latter respect. In 
exploring some of the reasons behind them, this chapter wi ll focus on the role of the 
state which remains at the core of this new state-led model. In doing so, this chapter 
helps to illuminate the relative advantages and disadvantages of this model. 
The main argument of this chapter is that the state-led stakeholder model has both 
advantages and disadvantages. While its strong capacity to facilitate economic 
development and social stability is evident, there are some inherent dangers associated 
with overreliance on the state as essentially the sole guardian of this model. As 
discussed below, these dangers, or disadvantages, of the state-led stakeholder model 
have contributed to the lack of substantial changes in the reality of Chinese corporate 
governance post-2005. Despite extensive legal and regulatory reforms over the past 
few years, the various governance problems associated with listed SOEs prior to the 
2005 corporate law reforms, including insider control of companies by managers and 
controlling shareholders, poor protection of investors and non-employee stakeholders, 
have continued to various extents. Hence, despite the significant policy goals it serves, 
the long term viability of this model is likely to hinge on the balance between the will 
and capacity of the state in coordinating and adjusting diverse interests within listed 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the risk of lax internal controls that persists at the 
corporate level. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 9.2 discusses the governance 
practices in Chinese listed SOEs post-2005 by drawing upon several recent studies. To 
provide some further insights into this area, section 9.3 conducts a case study of the 
central and local governments' involvement in the lead up to and the aftennath of the 
2008 melamine-tainted milk scandal. As discussed in Chapter 1, a case study of the 
milk scandal is appropriate for this purpose for a number of reasons. Firstly, although a 
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single case study often runs the risk of being unrepresentative, the scandal provides us 
with rare insights into state involvement in corporate governance within a particular 
Chinese industry. Secondly, due to its large scale and profound social, economic and 
political implications, the scandal provides a remarkable platform to examine the 
interaction of state power and forces of globalisation and the diversification of interests 
within Chinese society at corporate level. Finally, as Milhaupt and Pistor pointed out, 
although a corporate scandal may not be representative of the everyday governance 
practices in listed SOEs, it may better expose the features and weaknesses of corporate 
governance than when the company functions smoothly.1 
Drawing upon Chinese central and local governments' involvement in corporate affairs 
as reflected in the milk scandal , as well as Ho 's analysis of state-led corporate social 
responsibility,2 section 9.4 explores in what ways the state-led stakeholder model of 
corporate governance may have contributed to the lack of more significant changes in 
the reality of corporate governance post-2005 . Section 9.5 concludes by highlighting the 
main argument of this chapter. 
9.2 Changes and continuities in the governance practices in listed 
SOEs post-2005 
At the outset, it should be noted that listed SOEs in China have been seen as making 
steady progress in corporate governance in several evaluation reports produced by 
Chinese mainland and Hong Kong researchers. However, as discussed below, these 
reports should be received with some caution. 
First, the Centre for Corporate Governance of the China Academy of Social Science 
(CASS) (later joined by the international business consulting firm Protiviti) has 
conducted an annual assessment of corporate governance in Chinese top 100 listed 
companies, ranked by market capitalisation, since 2005 (the CASS Studies) . The CASS 
Studies are led by Professor Lu Tong. 3 As noted in Chapter 2, most of these companies 
are controlled by central or local governments. In line with the OECD Principles of 
Curtis Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems 
and Economic Development around the Wo rld (University of Chicago Press, 2008) I 0-11 . 
2 Virginia Harper Ho, ' Beyond Regulation: A Comparative Look at State-Centric Corporate Social Responsibili ty 
& the Law in China' (2013) 46 Vanderbilt Jou rnal of Transnational Law 375. 
3 Prori viti and China Academy of Social Science (CASS), «20 12 Assessment Report of Corporate Governance of 
Top JOO Chinese Listed Companies )) [2012 'P [;!;I J: TIT 0 ff] ~ B l!i\ iE, l! W 1ft tll. 'E;· ] 2 
<http://www.protiviti.com/zh-CN/Pages/zh-CN-Corporate-Govemance-Assessment-Summary-Report-on-the-
Top-l 00-Chinese-Listed-Companies.aspx >. 
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Corporate Governance, 4 the CASS Studies evaluate governance performance of the 
Chinese top I 00 in six areas. These are: shareholders rights, equitable treatment of 
shareholders, roles of stakeholders, information disclosure and transparency, 
responsibilities of the board of directors and responsibilities of the board of 
supervisors. 5 In doing so, the CASS Studies developed a complex index comprising 
about 80 assessment indicators/questions concerning each of these governance areas. A 
numerical score was assigned to each indicator, with a total of 100 points.6 
As the composite diagram in Appendix 9-1 shows, the CASS Studies suggest a general 
trend of improvement in the governance of China's top 100 from 2005 to 2011.7 This 
improvement is most evident in the areas of shareholders' rights, roles of stakeholders 
and information disclosure and transparency. This is despite the average scores for most 
of the governance areas remaining quite low. At the end of 2011, four out of the six 
governance areas mentioned above, except equitable treatment of shareholders and 
infonnation disclosure and transparency, scored between 50 and 60 points. 8 
Similar results have been reported by researchers of the Hong Kong Baptist University 
in their 2012 evaluation of corporate governance in 121 listed companies from four 
major Hong Kong stock indexes, including the Hang Seng Index (the Hong Kong Listed 
Companies Report). 9 Using a methodology similar to the CASS Studies, the Hong Kong 
Listed Companies Report suggested significant improvements made by Hong Kong-
listed mainland SOEs in their corporate governance practice over the past few years. 
According to the Report, six mainland companies, five of which controlled by the 
central government, ranked among the top 10 Hong Kong-listed companies with best 
' OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004 edition). The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
cover five areas: The rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of shareholders, the ro le of stakeholders, 
disclosure and transparency and the responsibilities of the board. 
5 Protiviti and CASS, above n 3, 4. 
6 Ibid. For example, in relation to the responsibilities of the board of directors, the CASS Studies adopted over 20 
indicators concerning four areas, namely, the operations of the board, conflicts of interests, board composition 
and directors training. 
7 Ibid 28. 
8 Ibid 7. 
9 The other stock indexes are HK Large Cap Index, Hang Seng China-Affiliated Corporation Index and Hang Seng 
Ch ina Enterprise Index. See Hong Kong Institute of Dii:ectors and Hong Kong Baptist University, Report on the 
H KJoD Corporate Governance Score-card 2012 (The Hong Kong Institute of Directors, 2012), Forward. 
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corporate governance performance in 20 I 1.10 This can be contrasted with the bottom 
ranking of most mainland companies on a similar list in 2003 .11 
Recent development in corporate social responsibility in the Chinese top l 00 SO Es has 
also received some positive appraisal. The Corporate Social Responsibility Centre of 
CASS released its 2012 Report on Corporate Social Responsibility of Chinese 
Enterprises. 12 In addition to a general trend of improvement, the Report found that the 
top I 00 SO Es outperformed their counterparts in the private sector and the top 100 
foreign enterprises in China. This was attributed by the authors to the more stringent 
government regulation imposed on SOEs in this area. 13 Nevertheless, the 40.9 per cent 
average score received by the top I 00 SO Es for their corporate social responsibility 
performance in 2011 was quite low. 14 
Such evaluation reports on Chinese corporate governance should always be treated with 
some caution. First, rather than empirical work, these studies were mainly based on 
publicly available information, primarily, company reports. For example, the main data 
sources for the CASS Studies are company annual reports, company constitutions, 
websites, and websites of Chinese stock exchanges. 15 These studies therefore only 
assess the self-reported governance practice of these companies, which may or may not 
be in accordance with their real governance practice. This is -particularly so with the 
widespread overemphasis of form than substance in corporate reporting in China. 16 
Second, the assessment indicators relied upon by the CASS Studies and Hong Kong 
Listed Companies Report may be problematic. The OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance were based on the work of US and UK corporate governance advocates 
10 Ibid 9. The six companies are Bank of China, China COSCO, China Life, CNOOC, ICBC and Lenovo Group. 
11 Toh Han Shih, 'Corporate Governance of Hong Kong Fim1s Better Now, Survey Found ', South China Morning 
Post (online) (2 1 Nov 2012) <http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/ l 086984/corporate-govemance-
hong-kong-finns-better-now-survey-found>. 
12 ll*'iiJ;'t~ [Chen Jiagui et al] , ((cpl;!,IJblH± ¾:i/tffliJl:fi'J!l. a ( 2012) )) [Research Report on Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report of China (201 2)] (U¾'H,;i: ::!Cili/Ul::/llH± [Social Sciences Academic Press], 20 12); Al so 
see i.'F*rf, 3(1Jif!J9'i [Xu Jialin and Liu Haiying], ((j£j;!,j:9<{ttl¾~iHeL\\'!,jJlJUJAlif(liJl :1i'..¥'f 2006~ 2010 '9' 
['ll] 100 15H±¾~1Hll.1!r(r,J:5J- j-Jr)) [Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure of Centra l SOEs: Evidence from 
100 CS R Reports Released between 2006 and 20 10] (2010) 6 'P l¥fW:t~2jjj(iicj;:$$16! Journal of Zhong11a11 
University of Economics and Law 77, 84. 
13 !i-fi:o,:~ [Chen Jiagui et al] , above n 12, 20-23. 
14 Ibid 3 1. 
15 Protiviti and CASS, above n 3, 4. 
16 Shanghai Stock Exchange Research lnstitute, 't'000 EJ itr!Hfl.a , i2l!Jl/f.!cjjl§,filJ1/i~ [Chinese Companies 
Corporate Governance Report: Transparency and In formation Disclosure] ;li[ Q j;: 'ji:::J::JWi.'i±([Fu Dan University 
Press], 2008) 48. 
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and international investor groups, and have been widely considered as reflecting 
governance practices in the Anglo-American large widely-held companies. These 
companies are of 'a different kind of corporate entity to China' s state controlled and 
largely state owned listed companies' .17 Therefore, the various indicators utilised in the 
above evaluation reports which are based on the OECD Principles, may not capture 
some governance mechanisms distinctive to Chinese companies, nevertheless having a 
crucial bearing on their governance practice. For example, neither the CASS Studies nor 
the Hong Kong Listed Companies Report contains any indicator to assess the role of the 
Chinese Communist Party (the Party) and the Chairman of the board of directors, two 
most important actors in the governance of listed SO Es. 
Indeed, also based on the analysis of company annual reports and other publicly 
available information (but with greater attention paid to the unique corporate 
governance practices in China), some other studies have found more limited changes in 
the reality of corporate governance in listed SOEs post-2005 . For example, in a case 
study of corporate governance in the first nine Chinese mainland companies listed in 
Hong Kong, De Jonge found that overseas listing has not resulted in any dramatic 
changes in the day-to-day governance practice in these companies. As the author 
concluded, 'what these case studies most obviously reveal is the pervasive influence of 
the state in almost every aspect of business decision-making over the 12 years since the 
nine firms were listed' .18 
A 20 I 1 report on corporate governance in 109 listed companies controlled by central 
SOEs produced by Lu Fucai and his colleagues (the Listed Central SOEs Report) 
further highlights various problems with large listed SOEs. 19 For example, the Listed 
Central SOEs Report suggested that abuse of insider control by top corporate 
executives, a typical governance problem in listed SOEs prior to the 2005 corporate law 
reforms, has continued to exist. According to the authors, this has been manifested in 
the widespread existence of executive grey income, reckless business expansion and 
diversification, and various forms of 'on the job consumption' by SOE leaders that 'has 
17 Roman Tomasic, ' Looking at Corporate Governance in China's Large Companies: Is the Glass Half Full or Half 
Empty? ' in Guanghua Yu (ed) The Development of the Chinese Legal System Change and Challenges 
(Routledge, 2010) 182, 195. 
18 Alice De Jonge, Co,porate Governance and China 's H-Share Market (Edward Elgar, 2008) 7. 
19 F'¾IT [Lu Fucai] (ed) , « cj, :91::&ill:~jj'j ii'illl!tll. 'a-)) [Report on Corporate Governance of Centra l State-owned 
Enterpri ses] (China Economic Publishing House, 20 11 ). 
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sometimes reached an uncontrollable state' . 20 The weak internal control in listed 
central SOEs has, in part, been caused by the persistent high level of comingling of 
senior executives in listed companies and their state-owned parent companies. In the 
I 09 listed companies studied by Lu Fucai and his colleagues, 80 per cent of the 
Chainnen's roles were held by senior executives of the companies' state-owned 
parents.2 1 In addition, 35 per cent of other non-independent directors in these companies 
coincided with senior executives in their state-owned parents. As Appendix 9-2 
suggests, this phenomenon of overlapping senior executives in the listed companies and 
their state-controlled parents is even more prevalent in China' s top 15 financial and 
non-financial listed companies. 
Other problems suggested by the Listed Central SO Es Report include poor protection of 
minority shareholders and the lack of substance in the corporate social responsibility 
reports issued by listed central SOEs. In relation to the poor protection of minority 
shareholders, the authors noted that, due in part to the increased regulation and 
intervention from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC), exploitation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders through 
outright stripping of listed companies' assets has significantly reduced. However, 
diversion of company funds through indirect means, such as related party transactions, 
remains fairly common. 22 This has been, in part, reflected. · in the lack of detailed 
disclosure of related party transactions, particularly the relevant pricing mechanisms 
and payment methods, in many listed SOE's annual reports. 23 
In relation to corporate social responsibility, the Listed Central SOEs Report found that 
despite the rapid increase in the number and volume of corporate social responsibility 
reports issued by listed central SOEs, their real improvement in this area is 
20 Ibid 121. 
21 Ibid 55. 
22 Ibid 43, 84. Illegal diversion of listed companies' funds was found by Lu Fucai and his colleagues to have 
occurred to 27 per cent of the controlling shareholders. Sixty-three per cent of the I 09 listed companies 
controlled by central SOEs had related party transactions with their controlling shareholders. Trading contracts 
accounted for the largest percentage of the total number of these transactions (30.2 1 per cent) . Provision of 
guarantee by listed SOEs for their controlling shareholders or other group companies accounted for 66.87 per 
cent of the total amount involved in the transactions. 
23 Ibid 114-6. 
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questionable. This is because most companies have apparently treated these reports as 
promotional documents, and disclosed little negative information in them.24 
Concerning corporate governance practice in central SOEs, the audit reports of the 
China National Audit Office (NAO) provide another valuable source of information. 
The NAO conducts annual audit of selected central SOEs including their listed 
subsidiaries. In June 2012, the NAO released its audit results of the financi al revenues 
and expenditures of 15 major central SOEs, including China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC, parent company of PetroChina), China Petrochemical Corporation 
(Sinopec Group, parent of Sinopec Corporation) and Sinosteel Corporation. All 15 
companies were found to have 'problems of lack of standardisation and stringency' in 
financial management and internal controls.25 As a result of the 2012 audits, 83 officials 
from these companies were charged with various offences including overstating profits 
and illegal distribution ofoff-the-book income.26 
In May 2013 , the NAO released its audit results on another 13 central SOEs, including 
ten controlled by SASAC and three state-controlled banks. 27 The NAO noted some 
moderate improvement in corporate governance within some of these companies. 
However, many of the problems suggested in the 2012 audits remained . These include 
understating or overstating of earnings, misapplication of company funds, failure to 
invite bids for major company contracts and projects, tax evasion and excessive staff 
benefits and bonuses.28 For example, China Mobile was found to have understated large 
amounts of profits through forging transaction records, and have provided staff and 
employees with excessive benefits in the forms of gym memberships, commercial 
24 Ibid 126-7. This view was also held by Dr. Wang Xiaoguang, director of the Beij ing Rongzhi Institute for 
Corporate Social Responsibility. According to Wang, only about IO per cent of the corporate social responsibili ty 
reports issued by Chinese companies have been prepared according to the international standards. Speech given 
by Dr. Wang at the Second Australia-China Investment Relations Conference in Beijing, 18 September 201 3. 
25 These companies include China National Petro leum Corporation; China Petrochemical Corporation, China 
Telecommunications Corporation; China Coal Group Corporation, Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation, 
Baosteel Group Corporation; Wuhan Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation and China Merchants Group Limited 
etcetera. 
26 Daniel Ren, ' 83 SOE Officials Caught out by Audits', South China Morning Post News Story ( 15 August 2012) 
<http://www.scmp.com/article/I 002767/83-soe-offi cials-caught-out-audits>. 
27 The 13 companies are State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation, State Development and Investment 
Corporation, China Publishing Group Corporation, Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, Ltd., China Grain 
Reserves Corporation, China National Aviation Holding Company, China Mobile Communications Corporation, 
China Minmetals Corporation, China Guadian Corporation, China Huaneng Group, China Construction Bank, 
Agriculture Bank of China and China Import and Export Bank. 
28 For example, China Minmetals Corporation was found to have understated RMB300 million (approximately 
AU D50 million) of profits from 2005 to 2011 , and RMBI00 million in 201 I alone. No.5 of 201 3 (General Serial 
No. 147): Audit Results of the Financial Revenues and Expenditures of China Minmetals Corporation for the 
Year 2011. 
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insurance and supplementary pension schemes. Furthermore, the group parent of China 
Mobile Limited was found to have spent RMB5.3 billion on computer rentals during 
2005 to 2011, while the total value of the computers was less than half of the rental 
fees. 29 The release of the 2013 NAO audits inevitably led SOEs to 'once again find 
themselves in the midst of an image crisis' .30 A number of executives of central SOEs, 
including the former Chairman of CNPC and several senior executives of China Mobile 
have been investigated for corruption. 31 
The lack of more dramatic changes in the overall governance practice of listed SOEs 
may have been caused by a number of factors. The first is the path dependent nature of 
corporate governance. This is particularly the case given the short history of the 2005 
corporate law reforms. Substantial changes to the formal law may be introduced swiftly 
in response to pressures. Non-legal rules, such as conventions and norms are culture 
specific and will not change quickly in response to changes in the formal rules,32 and 
may therefore continue to shape the practice of corporate governance. 
Another factor is the technical deficiencies in the amended laws, including the lack of 
detailed and workable rules. Chinese legislation has been described as 'vague, 
contradictory and lacking clear enforcement mechanisms'. 33 For example, the 2005 
company law amendment has introduced many new concepts and principles on 
corporate governance, such as director's duties of care and loyalty. However, the lack of 
clear definition of these concepts and principles, and the relevant criteria for assessing 
breach, not only provides the courts with little guidance in their application, but also 
encourages negotiated compliance or even non-compliance. 34 
29 No.6 of 2013 (General Serial No. 148): Audit Results of the Financial Revenues and Expenditures of China 
Mobile Communications Corporation for the Year 2011. 
30 Li Huiru, ' Audits reveal SOE malpractice' China Net News Story (4 June 2012) 
<http:/ /www. china. org.cn/busi ness/20 12-06/04/ content_ 255 59722. htm>. 
3 1 
' Jiang Jiemin: China Corruption Probe into Top Official" BBC News Story (I September 2013) 
<http: //www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-23918880>; ' Another China Mobile Exec Investigated on 
Suspicion of Corruption ', Caixin (on Line) News Story (19 August 2013) < http://english.caixin.com/2013-08-
19/100571515.html>. 
32 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Pe,fomwnce (Cambridge University Press, 
1990) 45. 
33 Ho, above n 2, 433. Also see Donald Clarke, ' the Ecology of Corporate Governance in China ' (GWU Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 433; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 433 , 29 August 2008) 14 
<http://ssm.com/abstract=l 245803 ,4> . 
34 Nicholas Howson, 'Corporate Law in the Shanghai People's Courts, 1992-2008: Judicial Autonomy in in a 
Contemporary Authoritarian State' (20 I 0) 5 £as/ Asia Law Review 303, 397. 
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Milhaupt and Pistor' s theorisation of the role of the state in conditioning legal changes 
with economic changes in state-led economies may serve as an additional explanation.35 
As discussed in Chapter 3, according to these authors, a strong and centralised state may 
utilise various tools, such as the limitation of the contestability of the law and 
substitution of law for norms, to retain control over the legal, including corporate law, 
system. Importantly, these tools may be employed not only in the process of 
formulation of law, but also in the implementation of law. As such, although substantial 
changes to the formal law may be introduced by the state in response to the pressures of 
globalisation and interest group politics, the state may continue to use these tools in the 
implementation of the legal changes, which renders changes in the law-in-practice much 
less substantial than formal legal changes.36 Nevertheless, as the case study on the 2008 
China milk scandal below will suggest, there is another factor that may have contributed 
to the lack of substantial changes in the reality of corporate governance in Chinese 
listed SOEs post-2005. This is the strong involvement of the state in various sets of 
company relations involved in the new state-led stakeholder model of corporate 
governance. 
9.3 Internal working of the state-led stakeholder model of corporate 
governance in China: looking through the milk scandal 
In the absence of large scale and detailed empirical work on the governance practices of 
Chinese listed SOEs, the central and local governments ' involvement in the affairs of 
the companies implicated in the 2008 tainted milk scandal provides additional insights 
into the internal working of the Chinese state-led stakeholder approach to corporate 
governance. Although Sanlu, the group of companies at the epicentre of the scandal, 
was an unlisted privately-controlled corporate group converted from a fonner SOE, a 
number of other companies implicated in the scandal, including the one that was used 
by the government to rescue Sanlu, were listed SOEs. 
9.3.1 An overview of the scandal and its main players 
Despite the fact that corporate scandals are not rare in China, none had reached the 
degree of intensity and magnitude as the milk scandal. In September 2008, beginning 
with Sanlu, 22 companies, including almost all of the large and medium-sized producers 
in the Chinese dairy industry, were found by the State Administration of Quality 
35 Milhaupt and Pistor, above n I, 31 -39. 
36 As illustrated in Chapter 5, the 2005 Company law in troduces many new shareholders rights and remedies. 
However, minori ty shareholders face significant legal and judicial obstacles to resort to those rights and remedies 
for protection. 
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Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (SAQSIQ), China's food safety authority, to be 
using melamine at various levels in their products.37 By December 2008, the scandal led 
to six infant deaths and near 300,000 suffering from 'urinary problems ' including 
kidney stones, according to the Chinese Ministry of Health. 38 Melamine, known as 
'protein powder', is an industrial chemical used in producing plastics and fertilisers. 
Sustained consumption by human beings may cause kidney stones and kidney failure, 
particularly among infants for whom kidney stones are rare. 39 
It is convenient to set out the four leading dairy groups implicated in the scandal at the 
outset. These are Sanlu (as mentioned earlier), Yili, Mengniu and Guangrning Dairy. 
Sanlu was the group at the epicentre of the scandal. Indeed, most of the baby victims 
were fed Sanlu's lower-end infant fonnula by their middle to low income parents.40 
Headquartered in the northern city of Shijiazhuang, Hebei province, Sanlu used to be 
the largest infant formula producer, as well as one of China's top 500 enterprises. The 
predecessor of Sanlu was a cooperative of local dairy farmers, which, under the Chinese 
Constitution, is a special form of state ownership.41 The cooperative was then converted 
into a joint venture, although it continued to be widely perceived as a SOE in the 
market. Immediately prior to the scandal , 56 per cent shares in Sanlu were held by its 
management and employees through a company called Sanlu Limited.42 Another 43 per 
cent were held by the New Zealand dairy giant Fonterra, which appointed three of the 
seven directors on Sanlu board.43 The remaining one per cent shares in Sanlu were held 
by several small shareholders. 44 Public listing of Sanlu was sought prior to the 
establishment of the joint venture. Commentators suggested that if not for the exposure 
37 
'China Seizes 22 Companies with Contaminated Baby Milk Powder' Xinh11a Net News Sto1y ( 17 September 
2008) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/ l 7/content_ I 0046949.htm>. 
38 
'Two Executed in China over Tainted Milk Scandal ' Xin/111a Net News Story (24 November 2009) 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-1 1/24/content_ 12530798.htm>. 
39 World Health Organisation, 'Melamine-contaminated Powdered Infant Formula in China - Update 2 ' (29 
September 2008) <http://www.who.int/csr/don/2008 _ 09 _ 29a/ert/>. 
40 
'Two Executed in China over Tainted Milk Scandal', above n 38. 
41 (( 9,fj;, _A. l'\';;P.i'tll 00 3\;itc )) [Constitution of the People's Republic of China] art 6. 
42 *IW. [Zhang Xu], 'iE/ll': .:=:Jl1llltrt!t<'>;-!,t' [An Overview ofSanLu 's History], China Times (on line) (22 September 
2008) <http://www.chinatimes.cc/huaxia/pages/ l 59/morelnfo.htm>. 
43 Richard Spencer and Peter Foster, 'China Milk Scandal Threatens Giant Dairy Firm', The Telegraph (online) (24 
September 2008) <http: / /www.telegraph.co. u k/news/worldnews/asi a/chi na/3073998/Ch i na-m i I k-scandal-
threatens-gian t-dai ry-firm. html>. 
44 The ownership of Sanlu became a controversial issue at the exposure of the scandal , as many people believed 
Sanlu was a state-owned enterprise. At a press conference held on 13 September 2008, Mr. Yang Chongyong, 
Vice-governor of Hebei Province denied any government ownership in Sanlu. See 'iiiJ~ t'€,' /;;rJ'€,' * :i(l(JfftE.=~ 
WJfl:(;H!.0jjjcpi9:ffJlltfil' [Hebei Vice-Governor: Government Does not Own Shares in Sanlu], China Central 
Television News (online) (1 3 September 2008) <http://news.cctv.com/china/200809 13/ 103040.shtml>. 
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of the scandal, Sanlu could have been listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange by 2008.45 
Yili is a company based in Inner Mongolia and listed on the Shanghai stock exchange. 
Yili's largest shareholder, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region government, owned 
about 10 per cent shares in the company in 2007. The balance was distributed among 
public investors including securities investment funds. Mengniu, another Inner 
Mongolia-based dairy giant, is a Hong Kong-listed company. The ultimate controllers 
of Mengniu were its founders, primarily the Chairman who was also the General 
Manager. Guangming Dairy is a listed company controlled by the Shanghai municipal 
government through two local SOEs.46 
Sanlu was placed into liquidation in December 2008, following failed negotiations for 
the group to be taken over by Sanyuan Foods. The latter is a listed SOE controlled by 
the Beijing municipal government. By January 2009, a number of former Sanlu senior 
executives and other persons involved in the scandal had been convicted of different 
criminal offences. Work on the compensation for tort victims had also been finalised, 
with most of the victims' families accepting a compensation scheme put forward by the 
dairy companies and backed by the central and local governments. Sanlu was declared 
insolvent and forced into bankruptcy in February 2009. In March 2009, the assets of the 
bankrupt Sanlu were purchased by Sanyuan through public auction, with the bidding 
terms tailor-made to Sanyuan, who also took over responsibility for Sanlu' s employees. 
The Sanlu bankruptcy case was concluded on 22 November 2009, within IO months 
following the issue of the bankruptcy order.47 
As illustrated below, the central and local governments' involvement in corporate 
affairs in the lead up to the scandal reflected some key features of the Chinese pre-2005 
state-led model of corporate governance, such as close state-manager relations and poor 
protection of outsider stakeholders, including consumers. By contrast, the handling by 
the governments, especially the central government, of the aftermath of the scandal 
resonates more with the new state-led stakeholder approach to corporate governance 
that has emerged in China post-2005. Indeed, the way in which the scandal was handled 
45 ;/tilll [Long Li], '-=Jcll ffi ,1U;Jt4Btll. tttlf ii:l 2008 $:l);lj\\ A lllLt rll' [Application Submitted, Sanlu Hopeful of 
Getting Listed in A Share Market in 2008] , 21 Century Economic Report (online) (I 7 September 2008) 
<http://news.hexun.com/2008-09- l 7 I I 08945053.html>. 
46 The 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports of Yili Industrial Group Co Ltd, China Mengnui Dairy Co Ltd and 
GuangminglBright) Dairy Shareholding Co. , Ltd. 
47 Yan Wang, 'Compensation Lawsuit over Tainted Milk Postponed' , China Daily (online) (9 December 2009) 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2009- l 2/09/content_9 l 44184.htm>. 
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suggests that the Chinese state has many more informal tools, apart from formal 
regulation, to give effect to such an approach. In the scandal aftermath, the central 
government remained mindful of promoting economic development through business 
growth and expansion. However, it assumed a far more proactive and inclusive role in 
pursuing that objective. Consequently, a number of tools were adopted to strike a 
balance among competing corporate stakeholder interests affected by the scandal. 
Nevertheless, as discussed below, this far more proactive and inclusive role played by 
the state has paradoxically contributed to the lack of dramatic changes in the 
governance practice in Chinese listed SOEs post-2005. 
9.3.2 State involvement in the lead up to the scandal and the pre-2005 state-led model 
of corporate governance 
In its aftermath, the 2008 milk scandal has been widely attributed to a combination of 
the relentless self-interest of the milk station operators and poor internal controls of 
dairy companies in sourcing raw milk. However, at a deeper level, an important cause 
for the scandal was the extremely close state-manager relations in promoting business 
expansion, at the expense of the interests of company outsider stakeholders including 
the consumers. 
The milk station operators added melamine to diluted raw milk to artificially raise its 
protein levels. 48 However, the self-seeking behaviour of the milk station operators 
cannot be separated from lax internal controls of the dairy companies in sourcing raw 
milk. As a report provided by Xinhua News Agency stated: 
The testing and quality check personnel can' t have been completely ignorant or 
innocent. An explanation is that the milk company's rapidly expanding business scales 
led to a shortage of milk sources, which forces them to collect milk loosely, turning a 
blind eye to poor quality raw milk.49 
Indeed, the dairy companies' overreliance on milk station operators to collect raw milk 
in itself, suggests poor internal controls. Dairy companies in China used to run their 
own dairy farms, where quality control over raw milk supply was less problematic. 
However, with the Chinese diary industry growing at an average annual rate of 23 per 
cent since 2000, so fierce competition for raw milk became industry-wide. In a quest to 
expand milk sources in the most 'cost effective' ways, most large dairy companies, 
48 Yang Jianxiang, 'Survivor Leads China 's Mi lk Industry', Xinhua Net News Story (15 November 2008) 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008- I I/ 15/contenl_ I 036 1534_3 .htm>. 
49 Ibid. 
50 
'!¥L:t;1J,ll,T ill:r"ill:ifJ1ji'i:l,:;/fi' [Chinese Dairy Industry Policy Released] , China Economic Net News Story ( 17 
June 2008) <hnp://finance.ce.cn/macro/gdxw/200806/17/t200806 I 7 _ 13226765 .shtml>. 
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including Sanlu, Mengnui and Yili , turned to privately-run milk collection stations to 
purchase raw milk from small dairy farmers. Consequently, due to the poor quality 
controls of the dairy companies and the extremely low prices they set for raw milk, 
'spiking raw milk with all sorts of additives, such as melamine' became a ' public 
secret' in the industry, at least within Hebei province. 51 
Poor internal controls aside, the Sanlu's case presented an example of outright disregard 
for corporate social responsibility. The company had been receiving complaints about 
babies who had become ill after drinking Sanlu's infant formula since December 2007. 
However, during the eight months that followed, the management of Sanlu took 
extensive measures to cover up the scandal, leaving the number of infant victims to 
continue to grow. This was until early August 2008, when tests reluctantly carried out 
by Sanlu with an outside agency confirmed melamine contamination in Sanlu's infant 
formula. 52 
In Sanlu's case, a close local government-business relationship was manifested in the 
farmer's extensive delay in reporting Sanlu 's milk contamination incident to the Hebei 
provincial government. It took the Shijiazhuang government 38 days to forward Sanlu's 
report to the provincial government, rather than within two hours as required by a 
relevant central government regulation.53 This meant that the .central government was 
not informed of the incident until 9 September, nine months since the first sign of the 
melamine tainted milk.54 When asked to explain the extensive delay, a spokesperson of 
51 
~jijj [Xu Chao], ' C::: ~i\/Nii®l/m' [Tracing the Source of Melamine], Caijing Magazine (online) (29 September 
2008) <http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/20080928/77700.shtml>. The practice of spiking source milk with 
melamine was traced back to Apri l 2005 by the Deputy Governor of Hebei Province. See 'iiiJ~l/i!filiWii'*i1I~ , 
,Gi'tH!r-'f 2005 1f:c:if~(<i] 4Jvl!i:::::wi'iiit!lti' [Deputy-Governor of Hebei: Law Offenders Stan ed to Add 
Melamine to Raw Milk from 2005], 21 Century Economy Reports (online) (1 8 September 2008) 
<http://news.cnfol.com/08091 8/I O I, 1280,4 78 1164,00.shtrnl>. 
52 Spencer and Foster, above n 43 ; '.=}!t$f'tJ'(.ffi;J;;:,J,le:J'(;' (Truth of Sanlu Incident Revealed] Xinhua Ne, News 
Story ( I January 2009) <http: //news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-01 /01 /content_ I 0587575.htrn>. 
53 ((li~'m:;J;;:tl'&'"'ii' :i:$/&/§Z;j(j.fi)l~)) [National Emergency Plan for Handling Major Food Safety Accidents] 
(People's Republic of China) State Council (27 February 2006), s3.2.2. 
54 
'jt 'fl 1' Ii g\-[l)t,/"J,l\f/Z!:.f!ll.=J!tj,J)~,JJ: fHB ;)s::i/fff)d'i' [Central Pany Committee and State Council Dealing 
with Persons Involved in the Sanlu Milk Scandal Seriously] Chinese Central Government Website News Update, 
22 September 2008 <http: //www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-09/22/content_ l 102256.htm>. There have been different 
explanations regarding how the scandal was exposed. Sanlu 's New Zealand partner Fonterra claimed that it was 
infonned by its Chinese partner of the milk contaminat ion on 2 August, 2008, the same day on which the 
Shijiazhuang city government was in formed. After three unsuccessful meetings with the Shijiazhuang health 
officials to raise the alam1, the company reported the incident to the New Zealand Foreign Affa irs Department on 
22 August, which led to the issue finall y being brought to the attention of the Chinese central government by the 
former New Zealand Prime Minister on 9 September. Sec Spencer and Foster, above n 43. 
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the Shijiazhuang government referred to 'support for local businesses', 55 and cited a 
letter from Sanlu that pleaded the government to 'increase control and coordination of 
the media, to create a good environment for the recall of the company's problem 
products .. . to avoid whipping up the issue and creating a negative influence in 
society'. 56 The relationship between Sanlu and the Shijiazhuang goverrunent was so 
close that it even 'convinced' Fonterra, the New Zealand joint venture partner of Sanlu, 
to 'work within the system' to effect an official product recall. When informed of the 
milk contamination by its Chinese partner, Fonterra went public only after three failed 
meetings with the Shijiazhuang municipal authorities.57 
It might be argued that, as an individual case, the close relationship between 
Shijiazhuang government and Sanlu management should not be generalised. However, 
as noted in Chapter 2, with China's adoption of economic growth as a policy priority, 
the Chinese government has often assumed the role of a business promoter. This role 
also applies to local governments, as their officials were rewarded and punished by 
higher authorities primarily on economic performance, measured in GDP terms. 58 As 
such, in a similar circumstance, one can expect the adoption of a similarly protective 
approach by another local government, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Indeed, as the milk scandal revealed, close state-business relations were not limited to 
the local levels. Public criticism focused on the central government's excessively 
business-friendly approach to regulating a fundamental area of food safety. SAQSIQ 
introduced a system of exemption for quality inspection in 2000, to 'ease the burden for 
companies that otherwise would undergo repeated inspections' .59 The system allowed 
many companies including dairy giants like Sanlu to enjoy the quality inspection-free 
" :E a)l a'/; [Wang Minghao], '1=i * I± ITT il& /(if ,¥,ii P1l '};_ a A: -= "1\ -'!J'. 1473 1iiJ ils ils ::f 'l!l.' [Spokesperson for 
Shijiazhuang Government: Why Repon of Sanlu Incident was Delayed], People's Net News Story (1 October 
2008) <Http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2008-10/01 /content_ l !2000.htm>; 'China Dairy 'Asked for 
Cover-up ' ', BBC News (on line) (1 October 2008) <http: i/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7646512.stm>. 
56 :EDJlBJ'; [Wang Minghao], above n 55. 
57 Spencer and Foster, above n 43; Also see Shanshan Wang, 'Fonterra CEO Reflecting on Investing in China' , 
Caijing Magazine (online) (5 December) 2008<http://www.caijing.corn.cn/2008- l 2-05/ I I 0035012.html>. 
58 Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, 'Political Turnover and Economic Performance: the Incenti ve Role of Personnel 
Control in China' (2005) 89 Journal of Public Economics 1743, 1744. 
59 Yang Binbin , 'Food Product Inspection Waivers Revoked ' Caijing Magazin e (online) (18 September 2008) 
<http://english.caijing.com.cn/2008-09-1 8/I I 0013644.html>. 
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status. This was despite alarms on food safety in China repeatedly raised by a series of 
major scandals.60 
The 2008 tainted milk scandal revealed many of the dangers associated with the former 
state-led model of corporate governance. As state association with companies to 
promote economic growth and business expansion became a common objective, other 
governance issues such as monitoring of managers and protection of investor and other 
stakeholder interests were simply ignored. 
On the other hand, as the discussion of the handling of the scandal aftermath below will 
suggest, while close state-manager relations continued to underpin this latter process, 
the central government took on a more inclusive approach towards the protection of 
company outsider stakeholders such as tort victims and trade creditors. Nevertheless, 
while this all-encompassing approach was pivotal in putting a major corporate scandal 
to a quick end, its effect on the governance practices within Chinese companies remains 
questionable. 
9.3.3 The handling of the scandal aftermath and the state-led stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance 
The state-led stakeholder approach adopted by the central government in the scandal 
aftermath was obviously driven by multiple pressures. Apart fr.om its effect on hundreds 
of thousands of infant victims, the exposure of the scandal threw the fast-growing 
Chinese dairy industry, accounting for about 30 per cent of the Chinese food industry, 
into a major crisis. While the Sanlu group of 30 subsidiaries and entities became 
hopelessly insolvent, other dairy groups, including Yili and Mengniu, were also deeply 
affected, as their sales plummeted with lost consumer confidence and worldwide bans 
on Chinese dairy products.61 Furthermore, as state involvement in corporate affairs was 
an important cause of the scandal, the legitimacy of the Chinese form of state-led 
economic development was also at risk. 
State involvement in corporate affairs to promote economic development and business 
growth remained a major theme in the handling of the demise of Sanlu. Placing Sanlu 
into liquidation would be a good test case for the new Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy 
60 These included a separate incident in 2004 where about ten babies were reportedly killed by fake or defective 
infant fonnu la sold in Anhui Province. See Di Fang 'Milk Powders Kill Babies in Anhui Province' , China Daily 
(onlinc) (20 April 2004) <http://www.chinadaily.eom.cn/english/doc/2004-04/20/content_324727.htm>. 
61 
.:E t,'ll [Wang Jin) ''t' OO 'l'L~fe;;j/1,ff~j,\;)\!lCfoJ ii',!~' [Crisis of Chinese Diary Industry: Restructure Inevitable], 
China Securities Net News Story (22 September 2008) • 
<http://www.cs.corn.cn/xwzx/05/200809/t20080922 _ 159 166 l .htm>. 
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Law. 62 Drawing heavily from the US bankruptcy law regime, the new Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law was introduced in August 2006 to replace an old piece of legislation 
that only applied to industrial SOEs.63 
Although Sanlu did not escape a court-ordered liquidation eventually, this fate was not 
intended by the government in the first place. This can be seen from the refusal of the 
Shijiazhuang Intermediate Court to hear an earlier bankruptcy application filed against 
Sanlu by one of Sanlu's sales agents. The refusal was given with no clear reason.64 
However, as discussed below, the same court subsequently heard Sanlu's bankruptcy 
case when all efforts to rescue Sanlu failed. 
The idea of having Sanlu taken over by another company was preferred by the central 
and local governments for various reasons. The famous 'Sanlu ' brand became 
worthless. However, other 'intangible assets' accumulated by Sanlu (ranging from 
advanced production and marketing systems to extensive network for sourcing milk) in 
its 20 years of history could be better preserved through a takeover. 65 In addition, 
should Sanlu be allowed to stay in business, there would be a greater chance for Sanlu 
to repay its debts and retain its over I 0,000 employees. All these liabilities posed a 
serious threat not only to the local Shijiazhuang government, but also to economic 
development and social stability at the national level. 
The takeover plan emerged on 26 September, when shares in the Beijing-based Sanyuan 
Foods were suspended, and the company announced that it 'had received a notice from 
the government to consider a Sanlu merger plan' .66 Industry experts said San yuan was 
chosen to takeover Sanlu for two main reasons: first, the company was the only 
relatively large Chinese dairy company that was not implicated by the scandal, and 
62 « 'P $ A Ra ol¾ 'fl] 00 '.i£ \fr liilif" ft )) [The Enterpri se Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republ ic of China] 
(People's Republic of China) National People's Congress Standing Committee, 27 August 2006. 
63 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was introduced to replace an old statute that had operated on a trial basis and 
appl ied only to the industrial SOEs. Drawing upon international experience in insolvency law and practice, the 
new legislation provides for bankruptcy procedures including liquidation, compromise as well as an American 
style reorganisation. 
" ' .= /mliilif"~ , :!Vil o!ciERc/!i!~' [Sanlu Bankruptcy Case, Death or Rebirth?) Xinhua Net News Story (5 
January 2009) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-0 I /OS/content_ I 0604233.htm>. 
65 Ibid. 
66 
'i<attA-J.:i#. .=:n; ,iH!!J-=cJ!ll , -=.:n;!il':T-l±!c. ' [Insiders Comment on Sanyuan Sanlu Merger, not Sanyuan's 
Will] , Xinlwa Net News Story (4 January 2009) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune//2009-
0i /04/content_ l0598930.htm>; Wang Qian, 'Sanyuan May Take over Tainted Mi lk Brand Sanlu ', China Daily 
(on line) (27 September 2007) <http: //www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-09/27/content_7064279.htm>. 
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second, Sanyuan is a state-controlled company, which 'makes it easier for the 
government to manipulate'. 67 
The proposed Sanyuan takeover of Sanlu was, however, widely considered 'an 
impossible mission'. 68 The differences in size and scale between San yuan and Sanlu 
were enormous. Sanlu was one of the leading Chinese dairy groups with businesses 
around the country. Sanyuan, with its annual sales amounting to only about 10 per cent 
of Sanlu, was largely unknown to consumers outside Beijing. San yuan claimed that the 
acquisition would raise its market share by adding to its liquid milk operations an extra 
line of business in powdered milk. Industry experts, however, suggested that problems 
such as business integration and cash flow, particularly with the indeterminate amount 
of tort liabilities faced by Sanlu, could drag Sanyuan into bankruptcy. Further, the 
fundamental problem that had caused the demise of Sanlu, i.e., its heavy reliance on 
milk dealers for raw milk, could pose a significant threat to Sanyuan's branding. The 
Sanyuan takeover plan did not eventuate, and was followed by an order of the 
Shijiazhuang Intermediate Court placing Sanlu into liquidation (on the application of a 
local branch of a state-owned bank, a Sanlu creditor). However, with the backing of 
Beijing and Hebei governments, the takeover negotiations went on for months before 
the bankruptcy order was issued.69 
The Sanlu liquidation case turned out to be another politically manipulated process, due 
to similar considerations that had underlined the government-backed takeover plan. 
Sanyuan became 'perhaps the greatest winner' in Sanlu's demise.70 Sanlu was declared 
insolvent on 12 February 2009. On 4 March 2009, Sanyuan acquired Sanlu's assets in 
insolvency at a public auction with the bidder criteria tailor-made to Sanyuan: the 
auction was only open to Chinese domestic dairy producers that had not been 
implicated in the milk scandal. 71 As some core enterprises in the Sanlu group had 
already resumed production under lease agreements with Sanyuan before the auction, 
67 
'l<U't'/iA±iJ/i_=::,71;3tW;J_=:: ,re, _=::51;5t:;fEl3 c '[Insiders Comment on Sanyuan Sanlu Merger , not Sanyuan 's 
Will], above n 66. 
68 Zhan Xu, ' -=cMl , %itw:'l;'x]_=::5i;]JJ(;-f/l\J<hli!li ftll ' [Wandashan Onlooking Sanlu Takeover: Sanyuan Likely to 
Struggle Alone', Xinhua Net News Story (5 November 2008) 
<http://cs.xinhuanet.com/cqzk/05/2008 11 /t20081120_ 1659972.htm>. 
69 
'-=5G:ifW:J _=:: /11l::!t:*~ffil?B~ftlltp fill' [San yuan Taking Over Sanlu, A Sensitive Case] Xinhua Net News Story (2 
January 2009) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-01 /02/content_ I 0590487.htm>. 
70 Lauren M Katz, 'Class Action with Chinese Characteristics: the Role of Procedural Due Process in the Sanlu 
Milk Scandal' (2010) 2 Tsinghua China Law Review 421,466. 
71 
'Sanyuan Buys Scandal-hit Sanlu Dairy Company aJ Auction', People's Daily (online) (4 March 2009) 
<http: //english.peopledaily.com.cn/9000 l/90783/91300/6606135.html>. 
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commentators said that the 'government-led bankruptcy' of Sanlu probably worked 
even more favourably for Sanyuan, as it provided the company with an opportunity to 
acquire Sanlu's assets without its liabilities.72 The Sanlu bankruptcy case was concluded 
on 22 November 2009, within 10 months following the issue of the bankruptcy order.73 
The swift handling of the bankruptcy case could not have been achieved without 
Sanlu' s out-of-court settlements with its tort victims and trade creditors. The carefully 
coordinated and government-backed settlement plans, particularly for the tort victims, 
not only played a crucial role in directing the tort claims away from the courts, but also 
demonstrated the all-encompassing approach adopted in China' s state-led stakeholder 
model of corporate governance. 
The compensation for the tort victims was one of the most contentious issues in the 
aftermath of the milk scandal. Had the scandal occurred in a Western market economy 
such as Australia, one would expect a slew of lawsuits, or more likely, class actions 
being launched on behalf of the tort victims against the dairy companies, as well as the 
Shijiazhuang municipal government (should the government be found to have played a 
part in the loss or injury suffered by the victims). If this situation is permitted, the 
associated bad publicity would not only lead the local and central governments into 
disgrace, but also jeopardise economic development and social-stability. 
Curiously, in the aftermath of the scandal, no single tort claim against either Sanlu or 
any other dairy companies was reportedly heard in any Chinese court. It is not that the 
Chinese law failed to provide any redress for these victims. To the contrary, the 1986 
General Principles of Civil Law (which sets out a basic framework for Chinese civil and 
commercial legislation) imposes on manufacturers, as well as sellers, the liability for 
economic loss and physical injury caused by defective goods.74 This general provision 
has been reinforced by at least two pieces of legislation on consumer protection, namely 
the Law on the Protection of Consumers' Rights and Interests (the 'Consumer 
Protection Law') and the Product Quality Law.75 Article 35 of the Consumer Protection 
72 
'.=Jlli:\(J. '.l;)'. 'EfliBir ft1'f crLl~t-=5L ~li:9ltJ' [Sanlu to be Declared Bankruptcy: Rumoured in Favour of Sanyuan 
Takeover' Xinhua Net News Story (23 December 2008) <http: //news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-
12/23/content_ I 0547631.htm>. 
73 Yan Wang, above n 47. 
" «'f'if.}d.i'; ,J=HllOO~,Jl:i)fil~r! )) [Ci vil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China] (People' s Republic 
of China) National People's Congress, 9 April 199 1, art 122 . 
75 
«'fl$ A I'<!: :l¾ Cfil 00 ii'J llh't tl1. ~ f~ 11" ¥t )) [Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of 
Consumers' Rights and Interests], (People's Republic of China)National People's Congress Standing Comminee, 
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Law, echoed in Article 31 of the Product Quality Law, allows a "consumer or other 
victim" who suffers economic loss or physical injury as a result of defective goods to 
claim compensation from both the seller and the manufacturer. The heads of damages 
include 'medical expenses, nursing expenses during medical treatment, and the reduced 
income for loss of working time and other expenses'. 76 Should a consumer or victim be 
'disabled' by the defective product, the compensation should also include 'the victims' 
expenses for self-help devices, living allowances, compensation for disability and the 
necessary Ii ving cost of the persons supported by the disabled'. Further, should death be 
caused by defective goods, the defendant will also be liable for 'funeral expenses, death 
compensation and the necessary living cost of the persons supported by the deceased 
during their lifetime'. 77 Although Chinese legislation does not provide for compensation 
for pain and suffering ('mental loss' in Chinese terms) or exemplary damages, it is not 
rare for the court to award such compensation in practice, under either the heads of 
'compensation for disability', 'compensation for death' or a judicial opinion issued by 
the SPC on 'mental and spiritual loss' in civil claims.78 
In relation to the forms of litigation, as discussed in Chapter 7, the Chinese Civil 
Procedure Law provides for individual actions, 'representative suits with fixed number 
of litigants', 79 as well as 'representative suits where the number of litigants comprising 
one party is unfixed at the commencement of the action ' .80 The SPC has disallowed the 
second type of collective action, which accords with the US-style class action, for 
securities-related civil claims. It, however, has not banned the action for other tort 
claims including consumer claims. 
Nevertheless, despite availability of the legal remedies, the central government opted 
for extra-legal mechanisms to achieve 'better justice' to the tort victims, as well as for a 
31 October 1993; ((cp$Al'l:. :l¾!fll00t" o'l.}9! :!il:i'i:)) [ Product Quality Law of the People's Republic of China 
(People's Republic of China) National People's Congress Standing Committee, 22 February 1993. 
76 (( 't' $ A l'I:. :Ji< !fll 00 #l 'II! 'll-:tl<'. ;ld{j( jf' i'i: )) [Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of 
Consumers' Rights and Interests) art 4 I ; (( cpif-A l'l:.:l¾!fll 00t"o□o}9!-i:i'i;)) [Product Quality Law of the People's 
Republic of China] art 32. 
77 ((cpif- Al'l:. :l¾!fll OO#l'll!'ll-tl<fil1!i<Jf' $)) [Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of 
Consumers' Rights and lnterests] , above n 76, art 42. 
78 
«o1<'fli/iilEl'l:.$f,':tl<'.:/ii1~t/il1l;'.li!l'i1~J/HEii'rioiJll2!Q{J/(Jiit$)) [Explanation of Several Issues Relating to The 
Assessment of Mental Losses in Civil Litigation] (People 's Republic of China) Supreme People's Court, 8 March 
2001. 
79 ((cp <JeAl'l:. ;J:ii!fll ll,Jl'l:.:jfl:iffif,;i'i;)) [Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China) (People's Republic 
of China) National People's Congress, above n74, art 54. 
80 Ibid art 55. 
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quick resolution of the scandal. The compensation plan emerged on 30 December 2008, 
one week after Sanlu was issued the bankruptcy order. The state media China Daily 
announced that the 22 dairy companies implicated in the milk scandal, including Sanlu, 
had committed RMB900 million (US$! 31 million) as 'one-off compensation ' 81 to all 
tort victims. Hence, each victim family would receive an amount ranging from 
RMB2,000 (US$292) to RMB30,000 (US$4,400), depending on the degree of sickness 
of their babies, or a payment of RMB200,000 (US$29,000) in case of death. In addition, 
a RMB200 million fund was to be established by the companies to 'cover medical bills 
for any lingering problems related to the tainted milk' .82 The fund would also allow the 
tort victims to access insurance coverage with a leading state-controlled insurance 
company for the ' full amount of medical bills related to the tainted milk incurred before 
they turn 1 8 years of age'. 83 
This arrangement was not, as it appeared to be, a purely voluntary act of the dairy 
companies. As early as 10 December 2012, following three months of contention 
surrounding the issue of victim compensation, the Ministry of Health issued a media 
release stating that ' relevant departments are now considering a compensation plan for 
the Sanlu infant milk powder incident' , and ' the Ministry was compiling information 
about the victims who may receive compensation' .84 No further details of the plan were 
subsequently released. As a corollary to the government's sil~nce, there was, however, 
sporadic media exposure of victim claims being rejected by several Chinese courts, as 
the courts were waiting for ' instructions from the government', or 'a compensation plan 
to be released by the government '. 85 News reports also suggested that the RMB902 
81 Zhe Zhu and Xiaohuo Cui, ' 22 Dairy Finns to Pay $ 160m in Compensation ', China Daily (online) News Story 
(30 December 2008) <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2008- l2/30/content_735 1554.htm>. 
82 Ibid. 
83 
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to be heard by Courts? Explained by Hebei Lawyers Association] Xinhua Net News Story (7 January 2009) 
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84 /lllM1.3i. [Zhou Tingyu] , ' 'POOt§ ~fl!Hl .iEtEt-Ji{); r,~ll!iJl)J;(J)l!fr8JJlfirf~;i,~' [Relevant Chinese Departments 
Considering a Compensation Plan for Probl em Powdered Milk Victims], Xinhua Net News Story ( IO December 
2008) <http: //news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-12/ I 0/content_ I 0484532 _ I .him>. 
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'Courts Compound Pain of Chinese Tainted Milk', New York Times (online) (17 Oc1ober 2008) 
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million contributed by Sanlu to the compensation plan, one week before it was declared 
bankrupt, was raised "with the assistance" of the Shijiazhuang government.86 
The implementation of the compensation plan has been generally considered a 
successful example of government-led resolution of mass dispute, despite controversies 
surrounding the inadequacy of the compensation proposed. 87 The extremely high 
acceptance rate by the tort victims' families was not surprising. 88 Firstly, for those 
victims who suffered minor injuries, free medical treatment and a small one-off 
compensation payment may be seen as adequate.89 Secondly, for the victims' families 
that suffered major loss, there was no guarantee that they could receive more than what 
the plan had offered. These families were ranked equally with other unsecured creditors 
at the bottom for distribution of the bankruptcy assets. 90 And thirdly, given the 
background of the tort victims' families, many with a low economic status, poor 
education and limited travel experience, the difficulties faced by them in bringing a 
complex law suit before the Shijiazhuang Court were insurmountable. As such, a 
government-coordinated compensation scheme is arguably a more effective means to 
' maximise substantive justice for the greatest number of victims in a practical 
manner'.91 
Indeed, in Sanlu's case, state coordination of company relations with their outsider 
stakeholders was not limited to dealing with tort victims. The swift conclusion of the 
Sanlu bankruptcy case was also facilitated by a government-backed debt repayment 
86 
':i:i*El:~;IJ%,11H~1il&Jtt;/,JJt~ C::: /lM1\ Jiix'ffli:.bl, 1J' ' [Shijiazhuang Official Dismissed Alleged Government 
Assistance of Sanlu to Repay Debt by Mortgaging Government Office Buildings] Xin lwa Net News Story (8 
January 2009) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-0 I/OS/content_ I 0625612.htm>. 
87 Zhu and Cui , above n 81. According to Zhu and Cui, many parents found the 2000 yuan for ' the minor kidney 
problems' is too inadequate to accept. Other criticisms on the inadequacy of compensation plan related to the 
scope and lhe period of the insurance coverage and the lack of involvement of the families of the ton victims in 
the formulation of the scheme. 
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Have Accepted Compensation Voluntarily], Xinhua Net News Story (24 January 2009) 
<http: //www.he.xinhuanet.com/news/2009-0 I 124/content_ 155435 16.htm>. 
89 Katz, above n 70, 466. 
90 The order of distribution of bankruptcy assets provided in Art icle 113 of the EBL is as follows: (I) bankruptcy 
expenses and common benefits debts (certain debts incurred by the debtor company after the commencement of 
the bankruptcy proceedings such as those arising from agency by necessity or personal loss or injury caused by 
the company property; (2) unpaid wages and other welfare payments; (3) unpaid social insurance premiums and 
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plan reached between Sanlu and its unsecured trade creditors. The agreement was 
signed by Sanlu Trading Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sanlu on its behalf.92 
It was finalised on 23 December, when the Shijiazhuang court's delivery of the 
bankruptcy order to Sanlu Jed over 300 Sanlu's sales agents, most unsecured creditors, 
to gather at the Sanlu headquarters and in front ofHebei Provincial government. On the 
same day, following a meeting between 'the Hebei Provincial Communist Party 
Committee, the Provincial government, and the Shijiazhuang city Party Committee and 
the government', the Hebei and Shijiazhuang governments agreed to 'guarantee the co-
ordination of the full repayment should Sanlu have difficulties in repaying the debts ' .93 
The validity of the separate debt repayment agreement is dubious. Under Article 16 of 
the Chinese Bankruptcy Law, once a court has accepted an application for bankruptcy, 
any repayment of debts by the debtor company to individual creditors should be void. 
However, in the Sanlu bankruptcy case, it appeared that neither the Court nor the 
bankruptcy administrator (headed by an official of the Shijiazhuang State-owned Assets 
Supervision Commission) 94 exercised their power to set aside the agreement. 
Furthermore, Sanlu Trading Company, the wholly-owned subsidiary of Sanlu, which 
had signed the agreement on behalf of Sanlu with its trade creditors, was excluded from 
the liquidation process.95 
Indeed, the Chinese central and local governments' involvement in the handling of the 
2008 milk scandal reflected the state-led stakeholder model of corporate governance 
arising from China' s post-2005 corporate law reforms. Strong state involvement in 
corporate affairs to promote economic development remained the priority. However, 
compared to the pre-2005 state-led model, the state assumed a far more active role in 
coordinating competing interests of different corporate stakeholder groups affected by 
the scandal. Government involvement in corporate failures with mass effects may occur 
in all systems. However, the type of state involvement in the milk scandal aftermath, for 
example, government orchestration of the bankruptcy and the compensation scheme 
92 2°j>' iijl [Li Jing], '-=iffili11U"'m# :i£iiltfi'iii" ::=: /ffi,i,l.fft illi:ili 20 {Z,71' [Sanlu to be Sold through Bankruptcy Auction: 
Total Debts Estimated Nearly RMB2 Billion] Xinhua Net News Story (25 December 2008) 
<http:/ /news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-12/25/content_ I 0555709.htm>. 
93 lc,%tt lll i!&Jffi.i!itll. ::=: /ffi :i!Hlllillir~'i'lil.5t(~ Y ) [Shijiazhuang City Government Report on Sanlu Bankruptcy 
Case (full text)] Xinhua Net News Story (25 December 2005) <http: //news.xinhuanet.com/fortunc/2008-
l 2/25/content_ I 0557898.htm>. 
94 
'-=iffililliriiUf1J,tJl.+ llll}d.ll.n'l: ' [ Fourteen-Member Sanlu Bankruptcy Liquidation Team Formed], Dongfang 
Daily (online), 31 December 2008 <http://www.dfdaily.com/html/ 113/2008/ l 2/31 /35 I 068.shtml>. 
95 2j>'iijl [Li Jing], above n 92. 
203 
before the court became involved, is unusual in Anglo-American jurisdictions. As 
discussed next, this model has played an important role in maintaining China's rapid 
economic development and social stability. Nevertheless, the inherent disadvantages 
associated with this model also help to explain the limited success achieved by China's 
post-2005 legal and regulatory refonns of corporate governance. 
9.4 How can we interpret the changes and the lack thereof? 
State-led corporate governance has both advantages and disadvantages. As noted in 
Chapter 3, focusing on state-led corporate social responsibility, Ho argued that one of 
the greatest advantages of the state-led model is the capacity of the state to bring 
together a variety of formal and informal tools to promote legal compliance and 
corporate commitment to social responsibility. 96 Some of these tools, such as the 
formulation and enforcement oflaw and regulation and other state-sponsored programs, 
are not commonly available to private sector organisations. Further to the 
resourcefulness of the state, an important advantage of this model lies in its 'inherent 
communicative effect ' .97 State-led or sponsored initiatives may send a strong signal to 
the business community about government's endorsement of corporate social 
responsibility, and may therefore play a major role in guiding the fonnation of norms 
about the importance ofrespect for law and social responsibilit_!'-
Nevertheless, the state-led model has some important disadvantages. An obvious 
disadvantage is that where a pervasive role is played by the state in monitoring and 
disciplining corporate social responsibility, the scope for law and market-based 
mechanisms, such as civil society organisations and the business community, to play a 
part in this area is narrowed. 98 
Further, where the state is left as the single most important determinant in this model, 
the advantages of the state-centric approach as outlined above may tum out to be its 
disadvantages. Firstly, because the various state-led initiatives depend on the will and 
capacity of state agencies and government officials for implementation, the lack of 
either detracts from the effectiveness of the model.99 Secondly, although state-backed 
initiatives may send a strong signal about the importance of compliance with corporate 
96 Ho, above n 2, 43 1-2. 
97 Ibid 434 
98 Ibid 437. 
99 Ibid 432. 
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social responsibility, the formation of the relevant norms among business community, 
as well as the wider society, depends on the 'consistency of the message and the 
legitimacy of the state itself as a CSR [ corporate social responsibility] supporter' . 100 A 
lack of consistency in the message, for example, due to the conflicting goals of the state 
in promoting economic development through preserving social stability and maintaining 
good corporate governance, may lead businesses into misconceptions about the content 
and standard of responsibilities expected of them by the state. 101 This is particularly the 
case where the legitimacy of the state, as a supporter of corporate responsibility, is 
undermined when the government, or government-endorsed corporate responsibility 
leaders, 'tum out to be the culprits in a compliance-related scandal' .102 Although these 
advantages and disadvantages were postulated by Ho in relation to state-led corporate 
social responsibility, they may be applied to the state-led stakeholder model of 
corporate governance in China, given the blurred boundary between the two spheres on 
this model. 
China's new state-led stakeholder approach to corporate governance has certainly 
reflected some of the positive aspects of the model articulated by Ho. As the review of 
the literature on the more recent governance practices in listed SOEs in section 9.2 
suggested, the areas that have achieved greater formal and structural changes, such as 
corporate information disclosure, tend to coincide with increased government regulation 
in those areas. 
The strong capacity of this model to bring about rapid formal and structural changes 
was also reflected in the government's handling of the milk scandal aftermath. At the 
exposure of the scandal, the central government responded quickly by utilising a 
multitude of formal and informal tools to strengthen the governance of the dairy 
companies and to enforce their 'social responsibilities' towards their injured 
stakeholders, such as the tort victims and trade creditors. Indeed, apart from the 
measures discussed in this chapter, many other mechanisms, ranging from swift 
criminal conviction of melamine producers, milk station operators and the Sanlu 
executives, to tightening up food standards, have been adopted by the central 
JOO Ibid 434. 
IO I Ibid 435-6. 
IOl Ibid4l4 . 
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government to achieve these purposes. IOJ Nor did the 10,000 Sanlu employees miss out. 
As the Party Secretary of Sanlu declared, "whoever wants to buy Sanlu must also take 
Sanlu's employees". 104 Hence, with the decisive and prompt response of the state, the 
various stakeholder interests were accommodated in the scandal aftermath. As such, 
social stability was maintained, and disruption to economic growth was kept to the 
mm1mum. 
However, the disadvantages of the state-led stakeholder approach to the fostering of 
good governance practice in China were also quite evident in the central and local 
government's handling of the milk scandal. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, strong state 
involvement in corporate affairs may limit the role played by market forces, including 
private sector organisations, in monitoring corporate governance. As the previous three 
chapters have argued, these forces have been introduced by the state to reform corporate 
governance in listed SOEs in China. Unfortunately, strong state intervention motivated 
by other higher ranking policy goals in the handling of the scandal did not allow the 
benefits of those forces to be exploited. This was despite the extensive coverage of the 
scandal in the commercial media and social websites, which probably contributed to the 
government's adoption of the compensation plan for tort victims. While the early 
response from Fonterra to Sanlu's contaminated milk incident was cooperative, the 
silence maintained by the Chinese semi-government, semi-not-for-profit organisations, 
such as the stock exchanges and consumer protection associations, was rather striking. 
Secondly, the competing policy goals of the state in promoting economic development 
and maintaining social stability and good corporate governance may render it a less 
rigorous guardian of corporate governance. As the examination of the governance 
practices in large listed SOEs prior to 2005 in Chapter 4 suggested, the overlapping 
roles of the state as a controlling shareholder, corporate regulator, and promoter of stock 
market h~d played a major part in the lack of internal and external monitoring of the 
exercise of corporate powers by senior executives and parent SOEs. These overlapping 
and conflicting ro les of the state have arguably become more complex under the new 
state-led stakeholder model of corporate governance, given the much wider range of 
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interests it attempts to accommodate. In the aftermath of the scandal, the Chinese 
governments, at both central and local levels, were clearly mindful of their overriding 
roles in driving China's economic growth and social stability, and appeared to have 
been swayed by those considerations in dealing with issues of corporate governance 
including corporate social responsibility. As such, many laws, such as those in relation 
to consumer protection, enterprise bankruptcy, civil procedure and the company law 
were left unenforced, which inevitably undercut their rigor in deterring corporate 
misconduct. In relation to the executives of the dairy companies implicated in the 
scandal, so far, only the Chairperson and several other executives of Sanlu have been 
prosecuted. They were convicted for 'producing and selling fake or defective products ' 
(rather than the more serious charge of 'producing and selling poisonous food products' 
for which the maximum penalty is death) under the PRC Criminal Law. 105 In the 
absence of a special investigation similar to an Australian-style royal commission 
inquiry, questions regarding the adequacy of internal controls in those companies and 
the attribution of fault to the persons involved will remain unanswered. 
Nevertheless, among all the disadvantages associated with the state-led model, 
diminishing public trust in the importance of the rule of law and corporate social 
responsibility is probably most dangerous. The mixed message sent by the state in its 
administrative handling of the scandal aftennath has obviously contributed to this 
mishap. The expansive measures adopted by the central and local governments in 
rescuing Sanlu and other dairy companies, ranging from government-negotiated 
takeover of Sanlu to the state-sponsored media campaign to restore consumer 
confidence in domestic dairy products, do not signify the importance of compliance 
with the minimum requirement of the law, let alone corporate social responsibility that 
often goes beyond the limits oflaw. 
Indeed, the Chinese government's swift handling of the 2008 milk scandal has not 
helped to reduce the number of corporate scandals in China. A series of other dairy 
incidents (such as the 'leather milk scandal', 106 and the aflatoxin Ml-tainted milk 
105 
'/m.=/lll:ti<clil'lii:~·L'=EEY$- i!a"tBi!/CLlJd:5'c)lJljtJfti ' [Former Sanlu Chairwoman Tian Wenhua Sentenced to Life 
Impri sonment], Xinhua Net News Story (22 January 2009) <http: //news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-
01 /22/content_ I 0701439.htm>; ((q,$ }1. [1/J=tln~Jflj~)) [Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China) 
(People 's Republic of China)National People's Congress, 14 March 1997, arts 141 , 144. 
106 Peter Foster, 'Top 10 Chinese Food Scandals', The Telegraph (online), 27 April 20 11 
<http://www.telegraph.co. uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/84 76080ff op- I 0-Chi nese-F ood-Scandals.html>. The 
scandal, exposed in February 201 I , involved dairy companies using leather-hydrolysed protein which, like 
melamine, artificially boosts the protein-content of milk . The scandal led the authori ty to close almost half of 
Chinese dairy companies in a bid to clean up the industry. 
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incident 107 ) have since occurred, exacerbating the lack of consumer confidence in 
Chinese infant formula. 108 In the meantime, food safety issues outside the dairy industry 
have become a central concern among Chinese consumers. 109 With the frequent 
exposure of food and other type of corporate scandals, such as corruption and major 
environmental pollution incidents, corporate social responsibility has remained a highly 
contentious issue in China. 110 If allowed to grow, this type of public mistrust in 
corporate governance is not conducive to sustainable economic development and social 
stability. 
The frequent exposure of scandals involving SOEs in recent years has also generated a 
new round of heated debate about future reform of the Chinese state sector. Various 
reform strategies have been proposed by commentators. These include depoliticising 
executive appointments in SOEs by recruiting top corporate executive from the market, 
increasing SOE transparency by bringing their budgets under the framework of the 
national budget, and reducing the monopoly of SOEs by shifting state-owned 
investments to not-for-profit sectors. 111 An even bolder strategy has been proposed by 
Professor Wang Yong, who suggests that to reinstate the concept of the 'SOEs-owned 
by the whole people' rather than by 'vested interests' , revenues of SO Es should be put 
into designated pension funds to benefit the mass. 11 2 However, should China retain its 
current state-led model of economic development and the basic functions of SOEs 
under this model, future changes in the governance of SOEs are likely to take place in 
an incremental fashion at best. 
107 
'Questions Remain over Mengniu Mi lk Scandal, Experts Say' , Caixin (online) (27 December 20 11) 
<http://english.caixin.com/20 11 -12-27/1 00343210.hnnl>. On December 2011 , Mengniu Dairy Company Ltd. 
issued an announcement on its website, apologizing to consumers for aflatoxin M I - contaminated milk, which 
was spotted by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine in a recent sample 
survey of dairy products. Aflatoxin MI is a liver cancer-causing agent. 
108 Rahul Jacob, ' Hong Kong Arrests Baby Mi lk Smugglers', Financial Times (on linc) (4 March 2013) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d6a35a8-84bb- l I e2-aafl -00 I 44feabdc0.hnnl#axzz2NxOY nQgm>. 
109 Foster, above n 106 . 
11 0 7J%.>(,:,tlj l[ [I~ [Wang Shouyi and Liu Zheng Yang] , '5i:Y.J:rn0'aJt±~:ry[jfij/Hi\Wiii\'iB{]ilit3J&@' [M arket 
Response to Disclosure of Breach of Corporate Social Responsibility by Cross-listed Companies] (2012) I 'P 00 
A Q fit"i]l,i.!:j'If~ China Population, Resources and Environment 62, 62. 
11 1 li/ltl'J'L [Hu Suli], 'f,,;-jj] fclJJll;Jj!,Jil'jj!ff' [Corporate Governance is the Way] Caixin (onl ine) (19 September 2013) 
<http://opinion.caixin.com/20 13-09-22/1 00584491.html> : Wang Yong, 'Taking SOEs Back to Their Roots' 
Caixin Magazine (online) IO September 20 13 <http://english.caixin.com/2013-09-I 0/ 100580456.html>. 
112 Wang Yong, ' Taking SOEs Back to Their Roots: , Caixin Magazine (online) ( 10 September 20 13) 
<http://english.caixin .com/20 13-09-10/1 005 80456.html>. 
208 
9.5 Conclusion 
By contrast with the extensive changes in China' s post-2005 regulatory framework for 
the governance of listed SOEs, changes to the underlying practices in these companies 
have been more limited. One important factor for the lack of substantial changes 
concerns the role of the state in the new state-led stakeholder model of corporate 
governance. As the literature on more recent governance practices in these companies 
and the involvement of the state in the handling of the 2008 milk scandal has suggested, 
this model has two main strengths. First, it enables the state to bring rapid fonnal or 
structural changes to Chinese corporate governance. Second, at times of major 
corporate crisis, it may serve as an efficient conflict management tool in support of 
economic growth and social stability. Nevertheless, these benefits are likely to be 
countered by the disadvantages of this model in fostering good governance practices in 
China. 
As explained in this chapter, these disadvantages include the limited role played by non-
state institutions in disciplining corporate governance, the potential lack of will and/or 
capacity of the state to maintain good corporate governance and the mixed messages it 
sends to the companies and society about the importance of compliance with law and 
corporate social responsibility. The competing goals of the state in promoting economic 
development, through preserving social stability, and in maintaining good corporate 
governance have underlined most of these disadvantages. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, in practice, a great deal of corporate governance in China may continue 
to rest upon the balance between the will and capacity of the state to balance its 
competing goals and the diverse interests within listed SO Es and the risk of lax internal 
controls that persists at the company level. 
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CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis has demonstrated the emergence of a state-led stakeholder model of 
corporate governance through China's 2005 corporate law reform and the subsequent 
regulatory reforms. This chapter sununarises the main findings of previous chapters, 
and reflects on their implications. It will begin with a summary of how the main 
research question has been addressed, through reviewing the answers to each set of 
subsidiary research questions developed in Chapter I. The chapter will then link this 
study to the literature review (Chapter 2) to outline its contribution to knowledge. The 
limitations of this study, and directions for future research, will also be considered. This 
chapter will conclude by highlighting the main arguments of the thesis. 
This chapter will show that this research makes a significant contribution to our 
understanding of not only Chinese corporate governance, but also comparative 
corporate governance and comparative capitalism more broadly. This is because it is the 
first comprehensive study of the governance of Chinese listed SOEs from the 
perspective of state capitalism and institutional change, and has articulated the state-led 
stakeholder model as a new state-led model of corporate governance. 
10.2 Research questions and findings 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the aim of this research was to offer a (re)interpretation of 
China' s post-2005 legal and regulatory reforms concerning governance of listed SOEs, 
which constitute the main force of companies listed on the Chinese stock market. More 
specifically, it investigates and interprets the impact of state-led economic development 
on the evolution of law and practice in relation to three sets of company relations, 
namely, state-manager relations, investor protection and non-shareholder stakeholder 
(including employee) protection, in relation to listed SOEs prior to and after the 2005 
corporate law reforms. As discussed in Chapter 3, these three sets of relations were 
central to the state-oriented or state-led model of corporate governance described by 
Hansmann and Kraakman 1 and the comparative capitalism literature (referred to as the 
Henry Hansmann andReinier Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2001) 89 Georgetown Low 
Journol 439, 446-7. 
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'former state-led model ' in this thesis).2 The model was commonly adopted in the post-
World War II state-led economies until the 1980s. As Chapter 5 discussed, this model 
was also reflected in the governance oflisted SOEs in China prior to the 2005 corporate 
law reforms. 
This research has been inspired by a perceived gap between two rapidly growing bodies 
of literature on China, namely, corporate governance and the Chinese model of 
economic development. On the one hand, China has been increasingly labelled as state 
capitalism, or a state-led economy, in political economic studies. On the other hand, 
despite the proliferation of analytical approaches, most existing studies on Chinese 
corporate governance have continued to use the Anglo-American outsider-based model 
as the benchmark to assess the governance of listed SOEs. In this second body of 
literature, China's 2005 overhaul of its decade old Company Law3 and the Securities 
Law4 was widely commended as having taken the Chinese systems of corporate law and 
corporate governance one step closer to the Anglo-American model. A systemic and in-
depth analysis of the law and practice concerning the governance of listed SOEs, from 
the perspective of the Chinese state-led economic development, remains largely absent. 
The analytical framework adopted in this research was state capitalism and institutional 
change. As discussed in Chapter 3, the framework was constructed by drawing upon 
(and extending) three interrelated strands of literature. These are comparative 
capitalism, comparative corporate governance, and law and capitalism, particularly, 
Milhaupt and Pistor's theorisation of the role of the state in shaping the interaction 
between changes in law, particularly the formulation and implementation of corporate 
law, alongside economic changes.5 
2 See, eg, Nahee Kang and Jeremy Moon, ' Institutional Complementarity between Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Social Responsibi li ty: a Comparati ve Institutional Analysis of Three Capitalisms' (2012) 10 Socio -
Economic Review 85 , 93-95 ; Jeremy Moon, Nahee Kang and Jean-Pascal Gond, 'Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Government in Western Europe and Northeast Asia from a National Governance Systems perspective' 
(International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility Research Paper Series No. 56-2010) 11-13 
<http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/ lCCSR>; Dirk Matten and Jeremy Moon, "'Implicit" and "explicit" 
CSR: a Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility' (2008) 33 
Academy of Manageme/11 Review 404, 408. 
«'f' i):;J... ~;J:c:¥Ollil0a'Jit)) [Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (People' s Republic of Chi na) 
National People' s Congress Standing Committee, 29 December 1993. 
«'f'$J...~;J:c :¥ollil iif}f$)) [Securities Law of the People's Republic of China] (People' s Republic of China) 
National People' s Congress Standing Committee, 29 December 1998. 
5 Milhaupt and Pi stor, law and Capitalism: What Co,pocate Crises Reveal abow Legal Systems and Economic 
Development around the World (University of Chicago Press, 2008) 28. 
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10.2.1 The main research question and subsidiary research questions 
The main research question of the thesis was whether the law and practice concerning 
the governance of listed SOEs in China through the 2005 corporate law reforms and the 
relevant regulatory reforms suggest the rise of a new model of corporate governance. 
To address this main research question, four sets of subsidiary research questions were 
also developed in Chapter 1: 
1. Why did Chinese policy makers embrace the notion of corporate governance? 
What was the concept of corporate governance embraced by them? 
2. What were the main features of and problems with corporate governance in 
listed SOEs prior to the 2005 corporate law reforms? 
3. What are the major changes, and continuities, in the regulation of state-
managers relations, investor protection and non-shareholder stakeholder 
protection since the 2005 major corporate law reforms? How can we interpret 
those changes, and continuities, from the perspective of state capitalism and 
institutional change? 
4. What are the major changes, and/or the lack thereof, in relation to the underlying 
practice of corporate governance in listed SO Es post-2005? How can we explain 
the changes and/or the lack thereof? 
Through addressing these subsidiary research questions in Chapters 4 to 9, this thesis 
argued that rather than China being a way station to the Anglo-American outsider-based 
model of corporate governance, a new model has emerged through hybridisation 
between the former state-led and prevailing international governance models, namely 
the Anglo-American outsider-based/shareholder model and the broader stakeholder 
model. This new model , which may be called a 'state-led stakeholder model ' , remains a 
state-centric one. It has, however, significantly moved away from the narrowly focused 
former state-led model. While state involvement in corporate decision-making remains 
at the core, it has intensified efforts to strengthen monitoring of managers, as well as to 
provide better protection to minority shareholders and other non-shareholder 
stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers and the community in which 
companies operate. 
As expounded in this thesis, this shift, driven by the interaction between state power and 
strong international and domestic forces for change, has been better reflected in the law-
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in-the-books, than the reality of corporate governance in listed SOEs post-2005. 
However, as long as China maintains its current form of state-led economic 
development, this new state-led stakeholder approach is likely to remain the dominant 
model of corporate governance in China for a long time to come. The answers to each 
set of the subsidiary research questions are summarised below, to illustrate these 
arguments of the thesis. 
10.2.2 The first set of subsidiary research questions: the adoption of the concept of 
corporate governance in China 
Comparative capitalism suggests that national systems of corporate governance are 
shaped by the economic purposes they are intended to serve. Hence, through examining 
the early stages of Chinese SOE reform, Chapter 4 analysed the purpose behind the 
official adoption of the concept of corporate governance in China, and the actual 
content of the concept embraced by Chinese policy makers. 
As shown in Chapter 4, unlike in Anglo-American jurisdictions, where the purpose of 
corporate governance is to maximise financial returns for the shareholders, the official 
adoption of the concept in China was mainly driven by a need to improve the efficiency 
of SOEs through better management. The notion was officially introduced into the 
country through a document of the Chinese Communist Party (the Party) on the reform 
and development of SOEs in 1999,6 when a number of other ~easures to improve SOE 
performance (running from expanding decision-making rights of SOE managers, 
corporatisation and partial listing to the formation of large corporate groups) had been 
implemented, but achieved only limited success. 
Chapter 4 also highlighted that the actual content of the concept, as contained in the 
1999 policy document,7 was quite different from the standard Anglo-American version. 
The concept was of two two-fold. First, it was not aimed at removing state control of 
corporatised SOEs, particularly the large ones considered to be strategic by the state. 
Second, the concept was mainly concerned with improving the management of SOEs 
through solving the agency problem between the state, as the controlling shareholder, 
and corporate managers. In contrast, it paid scant attention to other agency problems 
which underpin the Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, such as those 
«'f';l¾ 'P :9< :kTl!i~¾'frc':1(1jLf1J;l,:Jll!:6' "Fm:;i;: l•J/lli(JiJl/c)E )) [Decision of the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party on Several Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of State-owned 
Enterprises], Adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the I 5•h Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 22 
September 1999. 
Ibid. 
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between the managers and shareholders as a whole and between the controlling and 
minority shareholders. 
China's post-2005 regulation of corporate governance in listed SOEs, as examined in 
Chapters 6 to 8, suggests that this concept has evolved over the years since its first 
adoption. The concept has been enlarged with the introduction of more investor and 
stakeholder-friendly rules and guidelines into the Chinese regulatory framework on 
corporate governance. However, the fundamental role of corporate governance as a tool 
to promote economic development has largely remained unchanged, and continued to 
align the governance of!isted SOEs to a state-centric approach. 
10.2.3 The second set of subsidiary research questions: features of and problems with 
governance of listed SOEs prior to 2005 
These questions were designed to serve two main aims. The first was to test the 
applicability of the comparative capitalism theory on the interrelationship between 
state-led capitalism and state-led corporate governance to listed SOEs in China prior to 
its 2005 corporate law reforms. Second, it is believed that the various problems with 
corporate governance in listed SOEs during this period would infonn subsequent legal 
and regulatory changes in the area. The latter were the subject of examination in the 
ensuing chapters. The examination of governance practice in listed SOEs prior to 2005 
was based on original data collected from an Australian Research Council (ARC)-
funded project, which focused on the corporate governance of China's top I 00 listed 
companies. The overwhelming majority of these companies were, and remain, listed 
SOEs. 
Chapter 5 found that China's pre-2005 regulation of corporate governance in listed 
SOEs resembled some key features of the former state-led model. Similar to that model, 
the Chinese framework emphasised the preservation of state control over corporate 
decision-making, but at the expense of the interests of minority shareholders and other 
non-shareholder stakeholders (except employees whose firm-specific skills and long-
term commitments were considered as valuable assets to their companies). Indeed, the 
pre-2005 framework provided the state with multiple avenues to intervene in corporate 
affairs, but few enforceable rights and remedies to shareholders and other non-employee 
stakeholders. 
Still conforming to the former state-led model, the governance practice in Chinese listed 
SOEs pre-2005, however, had some chai:acteristics of its own. First, extensive 
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management powers vested in the general meeting and the Chairman of the board of 
directors, coupled with lax internal and external monitoring of the exercise of those 
powers, caused a dual problem of corporate governance in listed SOEs. That is, strong 
state intervention in corporate affairs co-existed with insider control by senior corporate 
executives and parent SOEs. As discussed in Chapter 5, this latter problem was 
manifested in the widespread presence of the 'key man' (or top executive in control) 
model of corporate governance in listed SOEs. This model not only led to managerial 
inefficiency, but also undermined the effectiveness of state control over listed 
companies. 
Second, the exploitation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders and senior 
managers appeared to be far more common and much worse in Chinese listed SOEs, 
compared with large companies in the former state-led economies such as Japan prior to 
the 1990s. The lack of investor protection was particularly manifested in poor 
information disclosure and rampant diversion of company funds by controlling 
shareholders through, among other means, related party transactions. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, a number of factors had contributed to these problems. These include the 
highly concentrated shareholding structure in listed SOEs, and the extremely weak 
regulatory regime on investor protection. The adverse impact of these factors was 
further exacerbated by the overlapping and conflicting roles of the state as the 
controlling shareholder, a regulator of the stock market and adjudicator of securities-
related private lawsuits. 
Similar to the former state-led model, stakeholder protection in listed SOEs was largely 
confined to the promotion of employee welfare. Prior to the 2005 corporate law 
reforms, the concept of corporate social responsibility was hardly embedded in the 
governance practice in these companies. 
10.2.4 The third set of subsidiary research questions: changes and continuities in the 
regulation of state-manager relations, investor and other stakeholder protection 
post-2005, and how to interpret them 
This set of subsidiary research questions lies at the heart of this research. Still focusing 
on the regulation of the above three sets of company relations in listed SOEs, and 
through examining the changes and continuities in China's post-2005 regulatory 
framework, Chapters 6 and 7 identified the emergence of a new state-led stakeholder 
model in the governance of listed SOEs. 
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This model can be distinguished from the former state-led model in the regulation of 
each of those three sets of relations. First, the state has intensified efforts to strengthen 
monitoring of managers. In doing so, many governance mechanisms of the Anglo-
American outsider-based model have been introduced into not only listed SOEs, but 
also their parent SOEs. As Chapter 6 has demonstrated, some of these mechanisms 
place more checks and balances on the exercise of powers by top corporate executives. 
These include the board reform introduced through the 2005 Company Law and 
Securities Law and the 'standardised board' reform carried out by the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) towards central SOEs, 
the wholly state-owned parents of over 300, typically largest, listed companies in China. 
Other mechanisms provide directors with stronger incentives to maximise company 
financial performance (such as the introduction of equity-based incentive plans in listed 
companies and the performance-based executive remuneration schemes in central 
SOEs). Still other efforts, such as full listing of parent central SOEs, have been made to 
enlist outside investors and foreign stock market regulators to monitor and discipline 
SOE managers. In this respect, further steps along the lines of market-oriented reforms, 
such as establishing a number of state-owned capital operating companies to hold state 
shares in listed central SOEs, will no doubt lead state-manager relations in listed SOEs 
continue to shift away from the traditional state-led model w:~ich largely relied upon 
administrative control and supervision. 
Second, in relation to the regulation of investor protection, this new state-led 
stakeholder model represents a far more investor-friendly approach than the Chinese 
pre-2005 framework, at least in regard to the law-in-the-books. This has been achieved 
mainly through drawing upon Anglo-American outsider-based corporate governance. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, while some of the marked-based changes introduced by the 
2005 Company Law and the Securities Law provide minority shareholders with greater 
opportunities to participate in corporate decision-making, others afford them with far 
better protection from abuse of power by corporate executives and controlling 
shareholders. In addition, an increased focus on investor confidence in the Chinese 
stock market has led the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and SASAC 
to adopt many regulatory reforms in this area. 
Third, increased monitoring of managers and legal protection of minority shareholders 
are, however, not all the changes that have taken place in the regulation of governance 
of listed SOEs post-2005. This new model draws upon the broader stakeholder model of 
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corporate governance. The level of emphasis on stakeholder protection/corporate social 
responsibility placed by China has, however, far exceeded their counterparts in most 
developed market economies. As discussed in Chapter 7, in addition to mandating 
corporate social responsibility through the 2005 Company Law, China has introduced 
many administrative regulations and guidelines in this area. These include compulsory 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility performance for certain types of listed 
companies and all central SOEs. 
Nevertheless, rather than moving towards any of the prevailing international 
governance models, an equally striking feature of the Chinese post-2005 regulation of 
corporate governance is the ongoing state control over all three sets of company 
relations. First, the various market-oriented refonns on state-manager relations 
described above are unlikely to extinguish state control over corporate affairs. Various 
channels for state involvement in the management of listed companies are likely to 
persist, notwithstanding these market-oriented changes. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
these channels include ongoing ownership control of large and strategic SOEs by the 
state, Party/government control of key personnel appointments in SOEs, SASAC' s 
extensive administrative powers over listed SOEs and other legal channels for state 
involvement in companies that remain available under the new Company Law. 
Further, state control of company relations with their shareholders and other non-
shareholder stakeholders has been manifested in ongoing state restraint of shareholder 
and other stakeholder activism, especially organised activism, in corporate governance. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, few of the post-2005 legislative and regulatory reforms have 
led to a transfer of the ultimate control over corporate affairs from the state to 
individuals and private sector organisations. While there are various restrictions on the 
exercise of shareholders ' and other stakeholders' rights introduced by the 2005 
Company Law, their access to the judicial system is significantly limited by various 
obstacles that exist both within the corporate law and the court system. 
Chapter 8 interpreted these changes and continuities in China's post-2005 regulation of 
corporate governance in listed SOEs as summarised above from the perspective of state 
capitalism and institutional change. As discussed in the chapter, rather than a greater 
embrace of any of the prevailing international governance models (including the Anglo-
American outsider-based model), the rise of the state-led stakeholder model in China 
post-2005 was primarily driven by an urgent need to improve the coordinative capacity 
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of the state to maintain the Chinese form of state-led economic development amid 
changing international and domestic environments. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the former state-led model of corporate governance was 
closely associated with a state-led model of economic management and development, or 
state capitalism. Note however, state capitalism is not static. Institutional change, 
including corporate governance change, in state-led economies is shaped by the 
interaction between the role of the state and international and domestic forces for 
change, such as economic globalisation and the pluralisation of interests within 
domestic society. 
As illustrated in Chapter 8, such pressures faced by China had become particularly 
intense by the early to mid-2000s. Globalisation and China's integration into the world 
economy with its accession to the WTO membership aside, mounting social tensions in 
domestic society have posed an additional threat for the Party-state to retain the Chinese 
state-led economic development model. These tensions were manifested in the rapidly 
widening wealth gaps among Chinese citizens, increasing environmental degradation, 
and corruption. They had grown out of the development-first approach China adopted 
since the late 1970s, and were further fuelled by a growing awareness of self-interests 
among ordinary Chinese citizens, due to a combination of factors such as economic 
globalisation, rapid domestic economic development and the arrival of the internet. 
Needless to say, SOEs, as the chief embodiment of the Chinese form of state-led 
economic development, are positioned at the centre of these tensions. 
These internal and external pressures have been behind the various changes and 
continuities in China's post-2005 regulation of corporate governance in listed SOEs. As 
explained in Chapter 8, the ongoing state control over the regulation of all three sets of 
company relations is consistent with the centrality of the state in the Chinese form of 
state-led economic development. Meanwhile, the various international and domestic 
pressures for change have led the Party-state to adopt various tools to increase its 
coordinating capacity to a pro-growth environment, as well as to refract pressures from 
shareholders and other non-shareholder stakeholders for a more fundamental systemic 
change. Two sets of these tools have been highlighted by Milhaupt and Pistor in their 
analysis of the role of the state in conditioning legal changes with economic changes in 
state-led economies. These are the limitation of the contestability of the formulation and 
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enforcement of the law by outsiders (namely, groups less favoured by the state) and 
substitution of demand for legal change with extra-legal means, such as norms.8 
Drawing upon, but extending Milhaupt and Pistor' s analysis, Chapter 8 illustrated a 
third set of tools that have been utilised by Chinese policy makers in China' s post-2005 
reform of corporate governance. This set is found in market forces, including 
mechanisms of corporate governance in the Anglo-American outsider-
based/shareholder model and international best practices, particularly the broader 
stakeholder model. The adoption of these forces has led the governance of listed SOEs 
to move from the former narrowly-focused state-led to its current state-led stakeholder 
approach, without a full convergence into any of the prevailing international governance 
models. 
Indeed, as illustrated in Chapter 8, this shift in the regulatory approach to the 
governance of listed SOEs is consistent with Chinese policy makers ' response to the 
increasing international and domestic pressures for change at the policy level. That is, 
the Party's vision to create a 'hannonious society' through a 'scientific development ' 
approach that emphasises coordinated development between economy, society and the 
natural environment. 
10.2.5 The fourth set of subsidiary research question: changes and the lack thereof in 
the governance practices post-2005 and how to interpret them 
The examination of the changes and continuities in China's post-2005 regulation of 
corporate governance also requires us to consider the impact of those changes on the 
reality of corporate governance in these companies and the reasons behind the changes, 
and/or the lack thereof, in relation to the latter. 
The review of more recent literature on the governance practices in Chinese listed SOEs 
in Chapter 9 suggested that China's extensive legal and regulatory reforms over the past 
few years have had only limited influence on the reality of corporate governance in 
these companies. Despite increased government regulation, the various pre-2005 
governance problems associated with these companies, such as lax corporate internal 
controls, poor investor and other stakeholder protection, have continued to various 
extents. These findings in the literature were also confirmed by the case study of the 
government' s involvement in the 2008 China melamine-tainted milk scandal. 
8 Milhaupt and Pistor, above n 5, 27-31 , 38-39. 
219 
Many factors may have contributed to this failure to achieve more dramatic changes. 
Drawing upon Ho 9 and the Chinese central and local governments' handling of the 
aftermath of the 2008 milk scandal, Chapter 9 highlighted the various advantages, and 
more importantly, disadvantages of the state-led stakeholder model of corporate 
governance. In relation to the advantages, Chapter 9 showed that by using a multitude 
of tools, including compulsory regulation, this model has enabled the Party-state to 
bring about rapid formal and structural changes to the regulation of corporate 
governance in China. Furthermore, the state-led stakeholder model may serve as an 
effective and efficient conflict management tool in support of economic growth and 
social stability, particularly in times of major corporate crisis. 
Nevertheless, these benefits of the state-led stakeholder model are likely to be 
compromised by a failure to foster good corporate governance practice. This failure, as 
illustrated in Chapter 9, is shown by the limited room allowed for non-state actors to 
play a role in monitoring corporate governance, the potential lack of will and/or 
capacity of the state in disciplining managers, and the mixed message it may send to the 
companies, and the wider society, about the importance of compliance with law and 
corporate social responsibility. The multiple and conflicting goals of the state in 
maintaining economic development, social stability and good corporate governance 
underpin most of this failure. As such, while this new state-led stakeholder model has 
served significant policy goals, a great deal of corporate governance in China continues 
to hang on the balance between the will and capacity of the state to adjust its competing 
goals and the increasingly diverse interests involved in SOEs, and the risk of lax 
internal controls that persists at the company level. 
10.3 Contribution to knowledge 
As the first study of corporate governance in Chinese listed SOEs from the perspective 
of state capitalism and institutional change, the articulation of the state-led stakeholder 
governance model in this thesis contributes to three areas of research, which are 
outlined below. 
Virginia Harper Ho, 'Beyond Regulation: A Comparativf Look at State-Centric Corporate Social Responsibili ty 
& the Law in China' (2013) 46 Vanderbilt Journal ofTra11sna1ional Law 375. 
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10.3.1 Contribution to studies of Chinese corporate governance 
First, the state-led stakeholder model provides an alternative framework to interpret not 
only the various contradictions as manifested in the governance of Chinese listed SOEs, 
but also its future trend of development. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the governance of listed SOEs in China has been seen as 
being riddled with contradictions in current studies of corporate governance. Although 
the formal law is quickly converging towards the Anglo-American outsider-based 
model, the underlying practice has remained an insider-based system, with state-
appointed top corporate executives exercising the real control over these companies. In 
relation to the future trend of development, a popular assumption underlying most 
current studies is that the governance of Chinese listed SOEs is, or should be, 
converging with the Anglo-American model. For many of these researchers, China' s 
2005 revision of its decade-old Company Law and the Securities Law represents a major 
step forward along this path. The various deficiencies/impediments both within and 
outside corporate law (such as political, ideological and cultural factors) have, however, 
prevented China from moving towards the Anglo-American model at a faster pace. 
The state-led stakeholder model expounded in this thesis may be used to explain these 
contradictions between the law and practice in relation to the gQyernance of listed SOEs 
in China. This study has shown that changes in the regulation of governance of listed 
SOEs post-2005 have been extensive and multi-dimensional. They however remain a 
state, rather than shareholder-oriented focus . Taken together, these changes have been 
introduced to strengthen, rather than to weaken, the effectiveness of state control over 
these large companies. 
As discussed in Chapter 9, this new model has not achieved all of its intended purposes, 
particularly the purpose of strengthening internal control in listed SOEs. However, as 
long as China maintains its currerit form of state-led economic development and the 
basic functions served by SOEs, 10 the state is likely to continue to assume a dominant 
role in the future development of this model. 
As such, foreign companies and investors dealing with Chinese SOEs should take note 
of the emergence of this model in China, and be prepared to interact closely with all 
actors involved in this model, especially the state as the leading actor. 
10 This is likely given the emphasis placed by successive Chi riese leaders on reform ofSOEs as a way to enhance the 
state sector's vitality and capacity to leverage and influence the economy as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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10.3.2 Contribution to comparative corporate governance research 
By presenting new evidence on the resilience of state-led corporate governance, the 
articulation of a hybrid state-led stakeholder model of corporate governance in China 
also contributes to research on comparative corporate governance. According to 
commentators such as Hansmann and Kraakman, 11 strong forces of globalisation and 
competition and the rise of the shareholder class (as the predominant interest group) 
will compel world corporate governance models, including the former state-led model, 
to converge onto one single best model , namely the Anglo-American outsider-
based/investor-oriented model. 12 
The rise of the state-led stakeholder model in China through its post-2005 regulation of 
corporate governance in listed SOEs, however, suggests an alternative path for the 
evolution of the former state-led model. Faced with strong international and domestic 
forces for change, this model may choose to respond by readjusting its relations with 
pre-existing key corporate actors, as well as taking into account the interests of other 
emerging actors, rather than converging into any of prevailing international governance 
models. 
This state-led stakeholder model is far from an ideal model to researchers acquainted 
with the Anglo-American outsider-based corporate governaq_ce. This is despite the 
increased legal protection it offers investors compared to the former state-led model. 
The all-encompassing approach this model adopts inevitably increases the uncertainty 
for public investors as minority shareholders of listed companies. These investors now 
have to compete with a plethora of other vested interests in Chinese listed SOEs, and 
they can never be certain where theirs are located in the government/company's list of 
priorities in a given circumstance. As the case study on the central government's 
handling of the 2008 milk scandal suggested, instead of investors alone, the relevant 
importance attached by the state to each type of company stakeholder interests is often 
dictated by the prevailing pressure(s) faced by the state. 
However, comparative corporate governance researchers should perhaps accept this 
new model as it is , and be more prepared to grapple with the diverse purposes served by 
corporate governance in different economic systems. This is especially so in the light of 
the rethinking of corporate governance triggered by the recent Global Financial Crisis 
11 Hansmann and Kraakrnan, above n l, 449. 
12 Ibid 450-3. 
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(GFC). As pointed out by Clarke, the GFC has not only rendered the prospect of 
convergence in national corporate governance systems rather uncertain, but also 'called 
into question many of our traditional ways of thinking about corporate governance and 
the relationship between business enterprises and the state'. 13 Indeed, the need to 
understand better the diverse purposes served by corporate governance has also been 
highlighted by a number of recent studies that reflect on corporate governance 
implications of the fast expansion into foreign markets, particularly markets for 
corporate control, by sovereign investment funds and SOEs including Chinese SOEs. 14 
10.3.3 Contribution to state capitalism literature 
Through examining the impact of the Chinese form of state-led capitalism on the 
governance of large listed SOEs in China, this thesis contributes to the varieties of 
capitalism literature in two aspects. First, by contextualising the recent evolution of 
Chinese corporate governance law and practices in its state-Jed economic development, 
this thesis has presented new evidence of the interrelationship between national models 
of corporate governance and economic models. As discussed in Chapter 3, in relation to 
state-led economies, this strand of analysis has been mainly based upon experiences of 
the former post-war state-led economies, such as France and the East Asian 
developmental states. 
Second, by identifying an alternative analysis of the evolution of state-led corporate 
governance that is taking place in China, this thesis may further inform research on 
comparative capitalism and institutional change. As illustrated in Chapter 3, with its 
emphasis on 'institutional complementarities' and 'comparative institutional 
advantages' , the varieties of capitalism, represented by Hall and Soskice, 15 has been 
criticised for its failure to provide a satisfactory account for institutional change. 16 
" Donald Clarke, 'Nothing but Wind? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance' (20 I I )59 
American Journal of Comparative l aw 75, 76-77. 
14 See, eg, Larry Cata Backer, "Sovereign investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, State Owned Enterprises and the Chinese Experience' (20 10)19 Transnational law & Contempormy 
Problems 3; Ronald Gilson and Curtis Milhaupt, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A 
Minimalist Response to the New Mercanti lism' (2008) 60 Sw,,jord law Review 1345 ; Geoffrey Nicoll , Gerard 
Brennan and Keni Josifoski, 'The New Mercantilism? - Direct Investment by State-owned Enterpri ses in 
Australian Public Companies' (2012) 40 Australian Business law Review I 05. 
15 Peter Hall and David Soskice, ' An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism' in Peter Hall and David Sosk:ice (eds), 
Varieties of Capitalism: the institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 
200 1)1 
16 Gregory Jackson and Richard Deeg, 'How Many Varieties of Capitalism: Comparing the Comparative 
Institutional Analyses of Capitalist Diversity' (MPlfG Discussion Paper No. 06/2, April 11 , 2006) 
<http://ssm.com/abstract=896384,5>; Nick Wailes, Jim Kitay and Russell D. Lansbury, ' Varieties of Capitalism, 
Corporate Govemance and Employment Relations Under Globalisation ' in Shelley Marshall , Richard Mitchell 
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Drawing upon, but extending Milhaupt and Pistor's law and capitalism analysis, 17 this 
thesis has revealed system hybridisation as a possible pattern for the evolution of state-
led corporate governance, as a particular set of institutions, in state-led economies. 
While providing a theory on state capitalism and institutional change is not an objective 
of this study, the analysis in this thesis of the evolution of law and practice concerning 
the governance of listed SOEs in China over the past ten years may help to prompt 
further research into this subject. 
10.4 Limitations of this study and directions for further research 
This thesis has aimed at exploring a conceptual model of corporate governance, as 
reflected in the evolution of law and practice concerning the governance of Chinese 
listed SOEs, before and after the 2005 major corporate law reforms. This focus 
necessitated that the study mainly focused on the principles and arrangements of 
corporate governance at national level, rather than at local levels. Furthennore, in 
considering the governance practices of listed SOEs, this thesis has focused more on 
broad trends rather than detailed discrepancies in individual companies across different 
industries and localities. Given the large number of listed SO Es and significant sectoral 
and regional differences in China, it is understandable that corporate governance 
arrangements and practices in each listed SOE are likely to b~_more dynamic than the 
stylised account provided in this thesis. 
The articulation of the state-led model of corporate governance in China, as well as the 
limitations of this study, may inform research into three areas. First, future research can 
be directed to test the applicability of this state-led stakeholder model within individual 
listed SOEs in China. This may be carried out through case studies involving a number 
oflisted companies from various industries and localities in China. 
Second, future research may be directed towards the application of this model to 
overseas subsidiaries of Chinese SOEs. This thesis has focused on corporate governance 
of SOEs listed on the Chinese domestic stock market, although a growing number of 
these companies have also become cross-listed overseas, including Hong Kong. In view 
of the vast differences in the systems of corporate law and corporate governance in 
different jurisdictions, future research into the governance of the overseas subsidiaries 
and Ian Ramsay (eds), Varieties of Capitalism, Co,porate Governance and Employees (Melbourne Uni versity 
Press, 2008) 19, 27. 
17 Milhaupt and Pi stor, above 5, ch 2. 
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of Chinese SOEs, will help to provide some insights into the interaction between the 
Chinese state-led stakeholder model and other corporate governance models, 
particularly the Anglo-American outsider-based model. In this respect, the increased 
presence of Chinese SOEs in the Australian corporate landscape in the past few years 
provides a valuable ground for empirical research. In view of the fast growing trade and 
investment relations between the two countries, research into this area will have not 
only academic, but also practical, significance. 
Finally, future research could also be directed to test the applicability of the state-led 
stakeholder model to corporate governance in large Chinese listed companies in the 
private sector. The state-led stakeholder model articulated in this thesis has been based 
on the law and practice concerning corporate governance in listed SOEs or state-
controlled listed companies. However, this model may have some relevance to 
privately-controlled listed companies in China due to at least two reasons. First, most of 
the post-2005 legal and regulatory changes discussed in this thesis, including the 
strengthened presence of the Party within companies, 18 apply to all Chinese companies 
irrespective of ownership types and structures. Second, as shown in Chapter 2, the 
Chinese form of state capitalism has been mainly reflected in state ownership and 
support of large SOEs. There is, however, some evidence of state promotion of 
economic development through supporting large privately--controlled companies, 
especially at local government levels. 19 Indeed, the relationship between the Chinese 
government and private companies has become a rather sensitive issue, which was 
reflected in the recent US congressional investigation into Huawei and ZTE 
Corporation, two large Chinese private telecommunication companies tapping into 
international markets.20 This trend of the state association with private businesses is 
likely to continue. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the recent slowing down of the 
Chinese economy has prompted policy makers to look for new areas of economic 
growth. Empirical studies into the applicability of the state-led stakeholder model to the 
governance of these companies will , therefore, help to explore the role of the state in the 
governance oflarge private companies in China. 
18 (( q,$}\~;l!;;filll,10jj'ji'E)) [Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (Peopl e's Republic of China) 
National People' s Congress Standing Committee, 27 October 2005, art 19. 
19 See , eg, Alex i us A. Pereira, State Collaboration and Development Strategies in China: The Case of China-
Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (I 992-2002) (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Margaret Pearson, China's New 
Business Elite, The Political Consequences of Economic Reform (Uni versity of California Press, 1997) 
20 Jim Wolf, ' U.S. Law Makers Seek to Block China Huawei, ZTE U.S. Inroads' Reuters (online), 8 October 
20 12<http: //www.reuters.com/artic1e/2012/1 0/08/us-usa-china-huawei-zte-idUSBRE8960N H20121008>. 
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10.5 Conclusion 
Consistent with the widely assumed supremacy of the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance, at least until the recent GFC, studies of Chinese corporate 
governance have mainly focused on how that model could be emulated to improve 
governance of Chinese companies. Instead of China moving towards the Anglo-
American model, this thesis has articulated the rise of a state-led stakeholder model of 
corporate governance in Chinese listed SOEs. This has been undertaken through 
examining the changes, and continuities, in the Chinese post-2005 regulation of three 
sets of company relations, namely, state-manager relations, investor protection and 
other stakeholder (including employee) protection, in listed SOEs through the prism of 
state capitalism and institutional change. 
Similar to the governance of listed SOEs pre-2005 (which reflected some key features 
of the former state-led model of corporate governance commonly adopted in the early 
post-World War II state-led economies), state control of corporate affairs remains at the 
heart of this new state-led model. This model has, however, been considerably modified 
towards a broader stakeholder approach that pays equal attention to ultimate state 
control and the coordinative capacity of the state to adjust company relations with their 
internal and external stakeholders including, but not limited to, minority shareholders 
and employees. This model has both benefits and disadvantages to the promotion of 
economic development and good corporate governance in China. However, due in part 
to its general congruence with the Chinese fonn of state-led economic development, the 
continued evolution of the model is likely to be incremental at best. As such, the 
articulation of this new governance model makes a significant contribution to our 
understanding of not only corporate governance in Chinese listed SO Es, but also studies 
of comparative corporate governance and comparative capitalism more broadly. 
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Appendix 1-1 Fortune Magazine sample of top 100 Chinese 
listed companies (2001-2004) 
Rank 
Listed company 2004 2003 2002 2001 2012 
China Petroleum & Chemical 1 1 1 1 1 
PetroChina 2 2 2 2 2 
China Mobile (Hong Kong) 3 3 3 3 3 
China Telecom 4 4 15 
China Life Insurance Company Limited 5 10 
China Unicom 6 5 4 6 18 
PICC Property and Casualty Company Limited 7 25 
Minmetals Townlord Technology 8 8 11 16 
Baoshan Iron & Steel 9 6 5 4 17 
CNOOC 10 9 8 20 
China Resources Enterprise 11 7 7 9 46 
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical 12 11 9 8 39 
Sinopec Zhenhai Refining & Chemical 13 12 10 7 
TCL Corporation 14 76 
CITIC Pacific 15 10 12 10 54 
Legend Group 16 13 6 5 21 
Huaneng Power International Holdings 17 15 15 14 26 
Aluminum Corp. of China 18 17 14 24 
Sinopec Yangzi Petrochemical 19 18 17 11 
Jilin Chemical Industrial 20 24 19 13 
Bank of China Hong Kong Holding 21 14 12 
Sinotrans Limited 22 113 
China Southern Airlines 23 16 13 12 43 
Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel 24 32 42 56 37 
UTStarcom 25 44 67 
TCL International Holdings 26 21 22 21 76 
Shenzhen Zhongxing Telecom 27 28 26 62 49 
Maanshan Iron & Steel 28 29 23 27 48 
Beijing Shougang 29 23 18 15 293 
AviChina Industry & Technology Company 30 278 
Limited 
COFCO International 31 26 47 72 
Angang New Steel 32 31 25 19 44 
Chongqing Chang'an Automobile 33 33 36 38 164 
Digital China Holdings 34 20 27 85 
Tangshan Iron & Steel 35 36 31 35 
Sichuan Changhong Electric 36 22 24 18 92 
China Eastern Airlines 37 19 16 17 50 
Beiqi Futian Vehicle 38 55 79 90 93 
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Rank 
Listed company 2004 2003 2002 2001 2012 
China International Marine Containers Group 39 37 43 25 160 
Guangdong Midea Holding 40 30 21 26 42 
China Merchant Bank 41 25 38 
Konka Group 42 47 44 23 237 
Hunan Valin Steel Tube & Wire 43 34 29 45 61 
Handan Iron & Steel 44 51 37 46 
China Minsheng Banking 45 59 68 53 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 46 43 38 48 71 
China Aviation Oil (Singapore) 47 45 71 
Qingdao Haier Holdings 48 27 20 57 62 
Shanghai Friendship Group 49 54 58 106 
Sinopec Beijing Yanhua Petrochemical 50 35 55 28 
Bengang Steel Plates 51 81 64 34 100 
BOE Technology Group 52 87 284 
Great Wall Technology 53 40 57 42 40 
Jinzhou Petrochemical 54 39 28 22 
Sinochem International 55 50 48 50 82 
Shanghai Construction 56 38 32 29 52 
Laiwu Steel 57 74 70 61 
Ningbo Bird 58 72 
Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Unicom 59 70 59 117 
Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre 60 49 33 24 203 
Torch Investment Co., Ltd. 61 
Brilliance China Automotive Holdings 62 57 53 44 484 
Gree Electric Appliances of Zhuhai 63 62 46 43 51 
Beijing Datang Power Generation 64 48 49 49 63 
Shanghai Pharmaceutical 65 58 65 59 84 
FAW Car 66 91 97 95 140 
Qilu Petrochemical 67 60 40 33 
Anyang Iron & Steel 68 67 56 152 
Panzhihua New Steel & Vanadium 69 53 35 31 89 
Xiamen C&D 70 56 54 54 57 
Yanzhou Coal Mining 71 46 50 58 103 
Beijing Enterprises Holdings 72 63 45 51 172 
Huaxia Bank Co., Ltd. 73 137 
Sinopec Kantons Holdings 74 68 52 20 241 
China Overseas Land & Investment 75 71 41 39 121 
Huadian Power International Corporation Limited 76 52 39 37 358 
Shenzhen Kaifa Technology 77 73 85 73 60 
Tsingtao Brewery 78 65 63 85 183 
Hangzhou Iron & Steel 79 82 77 70 189 
Henan Shuanghui Investment & Development 80 90 125 
SGIS Songhan 81 84 . 89 185 
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Rank 
Listed company 2004 2003 2002 2001 2012 
Nanjing Textiles Imp & Exp Corp. , Ltd. 82 
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical 83 75 62 67 
Harbin Pharmaceutical Group 84 69 61 41 269 
Shanghai Automotive 85 89 92 8 
Shanghai Material Trading Center 86 98 56 
Nanjing Iron & Steel 87 92 82 88 123 
Amoisonic Electronics 88 97 
Wuhan Steel Processing 89 66 51 36 35 
Tsinghua Tongfang 90 80 69 91 
Lianyungang Ideal Group 91 95 143 
Guangzhou Iron & Steel Co. , Ltd. 92 
Weiqiao Textile Company Limited 93 245 
China Vanke 94 94 74 71 64 
Yibin Wuliangye 95 76 72 69 202 
Inner Mongolia Yili Industry Group Co., Ltd . 96 128 
Guangdong Kelon Electrical Holdings 97 86 73 72 218 
Guangdong Electric Power Development 98 78 60 65 255 
Shijiazhuang Refining-Chemical 99 88 66 47 
Shenzhen Development Bank 100 79 76 153 
TCL Communications Equipment 41 388 
Eastem Communications 42 30 30 
Guangdong Investment 61 34 53 
Dongfeng Automobile 64 75 86 194 
Hisense Electric 77 88 64 218 
People's Food Holdings 83 78 
Hainan Airlines 84 165 
Shanghai Bright Dairy & Food 85 306 
SVA Electron 93 80 55 
Shanghai Founder Yanzhong Sci. & Tech.Group 96 93 498 
Shanghai Electric 99 90 77 70 
Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings 100 223 
China Railway Erju 81 79 
Shanghai Tunnel Engineering 83 261 
Guangzhou Development Industry Holdings 86 83 333 
China Shipping Development 87 93 295 
Shanghai Shenhua Industrial 89 340 
Chongqing Iron & Steel 91 75 180 
Ningbo United Group 94 
China Resources Land 95 154 
Guangzhou Investment 96 80 366 
Gansu Jiugang Group Hongxing Iron & Steel 98 97 83 
Shanghai Industrial Holdings 99 96 277 
Qingling Motors 100 63 399 
229 
Source: Roman Tomasic and Neil , Andrews, 'Minority Shareholder Protection in China's Top 100 Listed 
Companies' (2007) 9 Australian Journal of Asian Law 88, 94; The 2012 ranking of these companies is 
from Fortune Magazine (Chinese edition) China's Top 500 Listed Companies in 2012. 
<http://www.fortunechina.com/fortune500/node_ 4302.htm > 
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Appendix 1-2 The ARC project interviews-numbers of 
interviews by position of interviewees and 
location 
Executives of Professionals 
City listed companies and academics Regulators 
Beijing 17 12 3 
Shanghai 19 8 5 
Hong Kong 7 7 6 
Shenzhen 7 3 
Qingdao 4 
Jinan 3 
Chongqing 2 
Nanjing 2 
Guangzhou 2 1 
Subtotal 63 27 18 
Subtotal 
32 
32 
20 
10 
4 
3 
2 
2 
3 
108 
Source: Roman Tomasic and Neil, Andrews, 'Minority Shareholder Protection in China's Top 100 Listed Companies' 
(2007) 9 Australian Journal of Asian Law 88, 94 
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Appendix 1-3 The ARC project interview schedule 
CONCEPTS 
1. Corporate governance means different things to different people; what would you 
see as being at the heart of this idea?* 1 
2. Why is corporate governance so important in your view? 
3. Generally speaking, corporate governance is increasingly seen as an important issue 
for listed companies; of the top 10 issues that are important to your company, where 
would you place corporate governance?* 
4. In regard to the controllers of Chinese listed companies, in your experience, would 
you say that they would generally see corporate governance as being as important as 
you do? 
5. Within a Chinese listed company there are different levels of understanding of 
corporate governance principles; how well do you think that Board members of 
these listed companies understand such principles?* 
6. How would you describe the understanding of corporate governance principles held 
by others such as: 
a) the Chairman? 
b) the General Manager? 
c) Members of Supervisory Boards* 
7. In your experience are directors able to assess: 
a) what information needs to be disclosed? 
b) what related party transactions are? 
c) what would be an unacceptable level of risk? 
Questions marked with an asterisk(*) are questions directiy relevant to the research in this thesis. 
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STAKEHOLDERS 
8. In regard to PRC Listed companies, what would you see as being their most 
important stakeholders (from most important to least)?* 
9. How much interest do you think shareholders in PRC listed companies have in 
corporate governance principles?* 
I 0. Would you say that any particular class of shareholders has a disproportionately 
strong belief in the importance of good corporate governance? 
If so, why?) 
(PROBE: 
11. Some would say that the protection of minority shareholders is an important feature 
of good corporate governance. Would you agree with this? (PROBE: If so, 
why?) 
12. How have minority shareholder interests usually been protected in PRC listed 
companies, if at all?* 
13. It is often said that the protection of the interests of employe~s is also a fundamental 
concern of good corporate governance. Would you say that this is true in most PRC 
listed companies? (PROBE: If it is, in what way?)* 
14. The 16th Party Congress of the CCP recently welcomed entrepreneurs into the Party; 
do you think that this decision will have a significant effect on corporate governance 
practices in PRC listed companies? 
15. How do you see the old practices of governance being reconciled within PRC listed 
companies? (some speak of the system of three vs three) 
16. In Australia, unions have sometimes played an important role in protecting the 
stakeholder interests of employees of listed companies (eg Ansett Airlines); would 
you say that Chinese unions have had a noticeable impact on the corporate 
governance practices of China' s listed companies? (PROBE: If so, could you please 
illustrate)* 
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SHAREHOLDERS 
17. It is well known that the State is a dominant shareholder in PRC listed companies. 
How, if at all, do you see this as affecting corporate governance practices in these 
companies?* 
18. Would you say that the size of the majority shareholder's position in the company 
affects the degree of transparency that exists in such listed companies? (PROBE: 
could you please elaborate?)* 
19. State owned shares are not generally readily transferable on the market (in China); 
in your experience, does this affect the degree to which managers and directors are 
responsive to issues that are not of concern to the dominant shareholder? 
20. In Australia, directors are required by law to be concerned primarily with the 
interests of the company as whole (i.e. of all shareholders and other interests). 
Would you say that this occurs where a single shareholder owns 80 or 90% of a 
listed company's shares?* 
21. In your experience of the annual general meeting of PRC Listed Companies are 
shareholders: 
a) given adequate information? 
b) able to place appropriate matters on the agenda? 
c) able to vote on appropriate issues?* 
DIRECTORS AND OTHERS 
22. What corporate governance role, if any, would you see "independent" or "outside" 
directors playing on the boards of PRC listed companies?* 
23. Would you say that Board members of PRC listed companies are aware of their 
potential liability as directors of listed companies? (PROBE: would this also be the 
case with "independent" or "outside" directors?)* 
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24. In your experience, how easy is it for directors of PRC listed companies to take 
advantage of their positions as directors to make use of inside information? 
(PROBE: is this common?)* 
25 . In your experience, how aware would board members of PRC listed companies, that 
you know of, be of the financial and operational details of their companies? 
26. Audit committees are often seen as an important means of monitoring company 
accounts; what role do you see such committees playing in the corporate governance 
practices of PRC companies that you know of?* 
27. The recent collapse of Enron in the US showed that company financial officers play 
a crucial role in regard to the corporate governance fabric of companies; to what 
extent would this be so in PRC listed companies? 
28. The company secretary is sometimes seen as the guardian of corporate governance 
within a company; how do you see the company secretary operating in the listed 
companies that you know? 
REGULATION 
29. In your experience, is the Stock Exchange an effective monitor of corporate 
governance practices?* 
30. How might this regulatory role be improved, if at all? 
31. Have the Stock Exchange Listing Rules affected practices of PRC Listed 
Companies? (PROBE: in what way?)* 
32. In contrast, what effect would you see the CSRC's Code of Corporate Governance 
having on the day to day operations of listed company boards and their directors?* 
33. We note that the CSRC has issued many rules and guidelines for companies. Do 
you think that China has an excessively legalistic approach to corporate 
governance?* 
34. How flexible do you see the CSRC being in the application of its rules and 
regulations?* 
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35. Does the CSRC have the skills and knowledge to effectively regulate the corporate 
governance practices of PRC listed companies?* 
36. Do you think that PRC listed companies can be trusted to apply corporate 
governance principles without strong external oversight from the CSRC or the Stock 
Exchange? 
DISCLOSURE 
37. Disclosure is often seen as a basic tool of good corporate governance as it fosters 
transparency and accountability; in your experience, how effective is the current 
system of corporate disclosure in regard to China's listed companies?* 
38. In your experience, in what kinds of situations has the Stock Exchange expressed 
most concern about inadequate disclosure by PRC listed companies?* 
39. Keeping shareholders and the market informed has been an important goal of 
disclosure. What difficulties do PRC listed companies face in being able to achieve 
this goal?* 
ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES 
40. In Australia, the regulator has frequently taken legal action against directors who 
have breached their legal duties; what obstacles to the adoption of a similar 
regulatory approach exist in China?* 
41. Are directors who are appointed by the majority shareholder in China in a better 
position to protect themselves from such potential regulatory action?* 
42 . The absence of effective compensation and civil remedies against directors who 
bre_ach their legal obligations may inhibit the availability of adequate accountability. 
Is this a problem in PRC companies, in your experience?* 
43 . Would the level of accountability within PRC listed companies increase if 
shareholders were able to bring actions in the name of the company against the 
company's own directors (ie derivative suits)?* 
44. In your experience, does the listing of Chinese companies on foreign exchanges 
improve the quality of corporate governance practices in China? (PROBE: If so 
could you please illustrate?)* 
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45. Has the entry of foreign investors into the Chinese "A" share market (through the 
QFJI program) lead to changes in corporate governance practices in Chlna?* 
46. Does listing on foreign exchanges, or the need for PRC Listed Companies to raise 
foreign capital, mean that PRC Listed Companies will have a similar governance 
structure and principles to foreign listed companies? (PROBE: If so could you 
please illustrate?)* 
47. ln your experience, do professional advisers (such as accountants, lawyers, etc) play 
an important role in corporate decision in PRC listed companies? (PROBE: could 
you please explain?) 
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Appendix 2-1 Top 100 Chinese listed companies in 2012 
(ranked by market capitalisation) 
Ranking 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Company name 
Petrochina Company Limited 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited 
China Construction Bank Corporation 
Agricultural Bank of China Limited 
Bank of China Limited 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation 
China Shenhua Energy Company Limited 
China Life Insurance Company Limited 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited 
Bank of Communications Company Limited 
China Merchants Bank Co. , Ltd . 
Kweichow Moutai Co.,Ltd. 
China Pacific Insurance (Group) Company Limited 
China CITIC Bank Corporation Ltd . 
Yanzhou Coal Mining Company Limited 
SAIC Motor Corporation Limited 
China Minsheng Banking Co. , Ltd. 
Aluminum Corporation of China Limited 
Industrial Bank Co., Ltd. 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co. , Ltd . 
China Everbright Bank Co. ,Ltd. 
China Coal Energy Company Limited 
CITIC Securities Company Limited 
China Shipbuilding Industry Company Limited 
Air China Limited 
Jiangxi Copper Company Limited 
Daq in Railway Co., Ltd . 
China State Construction International Holdings Limited 
China Yangtze Power Co., Ltd. 
China United Network Communications Limited 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Co.,Ltd. 
Zijin Mining Group Company Limited 
GF Securities Co. , Ltd . 
Anhui Conch Cement Company Limited 
Vanke Co. , Ltd . 
Sany Heavy Industry Co ., Ltd. 
Changsha in the Heavy Industry Technology Devleopment Co. , Ltd . 
Suning Appliance Co. , Ltd. 
Shanghai International Port (Group) Co ., Ltd . 
Shanghai Electric Group Company Limited 
Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-earth (Group) Hi-tech Co., Ltd . 
China Railway Group Limited 
China COSCO Holdings Co. , Ltd. 
China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Corporation Ltd. 
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Ranking 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
BB 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
Company name 
ZTE Corporation 
China Oilfield Services Limited 
China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd. 
Shanxi Xishan Coal and Electricity Power Co. , Ltd. 
Weichai Power Co ., Lid . 
Shanxi Lu'An Environmental Energy Development Co.,Ltd 
Metallurgical Corporation of China Ltd. 
China Railway Construction Corporation Limited 
Haitong Securities Company Ltd. 
Huaneng Power International Co. , Ltd . 
Huatai Securities Co., Ltd . 
Datang International Power Generation Co., Ltd. 
Gree Electric Appliances, Inc. of Zhuhai 
China Merchants Securities Co., Ltd. 
Shandong Gold Mining Co. , Ltd 
Pangang Group Vanadium Titanium and Resources Co., Ltd . 
Luzhou Lao Jiao Co.,Ltd . 
Guangzhou Media Co ., Ltd . 
Jinduicheng Molybdenum Co.,Ltd. 
Bank of Beijing Co. , Ltd. 
Shenzhen Development Bank Co., Ltd . 
China Eastern Airlines Corporation Limited 
Jizhong Energy Resources Co., Lid . 
China International Marine Containers Group 
Yangquan Coal Industry (Group) Co. , Ltd. 
Jiangsu Yanghe Brewery Joint-stock Co., Lid. 
China CNR Corporation Limited 
Hua Xia Bank Co., Ltd . 
Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Union Co. ,Ltd . 
Yantai Chang Yu Pioneer Wine Company Limited 
XCMG Construction Machinery Co., Ltd. 
Dongfang Electric Corporation Limited 
Poly Real Estate Group Co., Ltd. 
Angang Steel Company Limited 
China CSSC Holdings Limited 
Everbright Securities Company Limited 
Guanghui Energy Co. , Ltd. 
Tsingtao Brewery Co., Ltd. 
GD Power Development Co., Ltd . 
Qinghai Salt Lake Industry Co., Ltd . 
China National Chemical Engineering Co., Ltd . 
China Shipping Container Lines Company Limited 
China Gezhouba Group Co. , Ltd. 
Ningbo Port Company Limited 
Xinjiang Goldwind Science and Technology Co., Ltd . 
Henan Shuanghui Investment and Development Co., Ltd . 
Chongqing Water Group Co ., Ltd. 
Yunnan Baiyao Group Co., Ltd. 
Zhongjin Gold Corp., Ltd . 
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Ranking 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
Company name 
Industrial Securities Co. , Ltd . 
Qingdao Haier Co. , Lid. 
Minmetals Development Co., Lid . 
Guizhou Panjiang Refined Coal Co., Lid . 
Western Mining Co. , Ltd. 
Meihua Holdings Group Co., Ltd . 
CSG Holding Co., Lid . 
Source: Protiviti and Chinese Academy of Social Science, « 2 012 'l'IJ:I J·.'rlI0 l'iJ- ,Bffiiallti.'l'iMRis' )) [Corporate 
Governance of Chinese top 100 Chinese Listed Companies 2012 Report] 30-31 <http://www.protiviti.com/zh-
CN/Pages/zh-CN-Corporate-Governance-Assessment-Summary-Report-on-the-Top-100-Chinese-Listed-
Companies.aspx>. 
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Appendix 4-1 
July 1979 
December 1986 
April 1988 
1990-1991 
November 1993 
December 1993 
October 1995 
September 1997 
December 1998 
September 1999 
November 2001 
November 2002 
March 2003 
April 2005 
June 2004 
October 2005 
SOE reform timeline 
State Council Issued Regulations on the Expansion of Operational and 
Managerial Autonomy of SOEs. Several other regulations were passed thereafter 
to grant more operational rights to SOE managers. 
State Council issued Several Decisions on Deepening Enterprise Reform and 
Invigorating Enterprise Vitality, which launched the 'enterprise contract 
responsibility system' among large and medium-sized SOEs. 
Passage of the Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People which 
created the legal person status for SOEs and required a 'factory top manager 
responsibility system' to be implemented in all industrial SOEs 
Establishment of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
Third Plenum of the 14th CCP Central Committee passed Decision on Several 
Issues Concerning the Establishment of the System of Socialist Market Economy, 
which set the establishment of the modem enterprise system as the direction for 
future SOE reform. 
Promulgation of the 1993 PRC Company Law 
Fifth Plenum of the 14th CCP Central Committee called for the strategic 
adjustment of the layout of the state sector by following the principle of 'grasping 
the large and letting go of the small'. 
First Plenum of 15th CCP National Congress called for turning the majority of 
medium to large-sized SOEs from loss making to profit-making businesses within 
three years, and establishing the modern enterprise system within majority of 
large and medium-sized SOEs by 2000. 
Promulgation of the 1998 PRC Securities Law 
Fourth Plenum of the 15th CCP Central Committee passed Decision on Several 
Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of State-owned 
Enterprises, which called for deepening the shareholding reform in large and 
medium-sized SOEs and adopted the concept of corporate governance. 
China's accession to the WTO 
16th CCP National Congress put forward guiding principles for the reform of the 
system for management of state-owned assets vested in industrial and 
commercial SOEs. 
Establishment of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) 
China Securities Regulatory Commission issued Notice on Relevant Issues 
concerning the Pilot Reform of Split Share Structure in Listed Companies, and 
initiated the reform to convert all previously non-tradable state and state legal 
person shares into tradeable shares. 
SASAC issued Notice on Experimenting the Establishment and Improving the 
System of Board of Directors in Wholly State-owned Enterprises, which initiated 
the 'Standardised board reform' in central SOEs. 
Promulgation of the 2005 G_ompany Law and the 2005 Securities Law 
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December 2006 
December 2007 
November 2012 
November 2013 
State Council issued Guiding Opinion on Promoting the Adjustment of State-
owned Capital and Restructuring State-owned Enterprises, which laid the policy 
basis for SASAC to promote full listing of central SOEs. 
SASAC issued Guiding Opinion on the Implementation of Corporate Social 
Responsibility by Central Government-affiliated SOEs. 
18th CCP National Congress called for deepening of the consolidation and reform 
of SOEs to enhance their vitality and capacity to leverage and influence the 
economy. 
Third Plenum of the 18th CCP National Congress called for further reform of SOEs 
through expanding ownership diversification, strengthening corporate governance 
and improving the system for the management of state-owned assets. 
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Appendix 6-1 The Baosteel Corporation board prior to and 
after the 'standardised board' reform 
The Baosteel Corporation board, the first central SOE board that completed the standard 
board reform, has often been recommended by SASAC as an example for other SOEs to 
follow. Prior to the 'standardised board' reform, the Baosteel Group Corporation had 
seven directors, comprising a Chairwoman who was also the General Manager, a deputy 
Chairman and other five directors who were either senior managers of the Baosteel 
Group Corporation or its listed subsidiary, Baosteel Limited. Immediately after the 
reform, the Baosteel Group Corporation board comprised of nine directors including 
four (inside) executive directors and five external directors. The four executive directors 
were made up by the Chairwoman, a Deputy Chairman who was also given the role of 
the company Party Secretary, the General Manager, and an employee representative 
acted by the head of the company trade union. The five external directors consisted of 
two retired top executives from other Central-SOEs (China Petro Chemical Corporation 
and China United Telecommunications Group Corporation), the President of National 
Accounting Institute affiliated to the State Council and two foreign executives. One of 
the foreign executives was the former Chairman of Singap9re Port Authority and the 
other was the Chairman of the Hong Kong-based Li&Fung Group, a world leader in 
supply chain management. According to commentators, the standardised board reform 
introduced into the Baosteel Corporation not only a better mixture of expertise, but also 
more checks and balances on the exercise of management powers.2 
2 tL~i ~ [Sun Weichun] , !j'j p\Jtj; [Guo Fenlin] , ' 'i'ffl:!/.,[1l:,ll::$~/tl::fz: : 9 i',Jtl:jjlcjcljrlfflli'll'25 5 Iii\' [New 
Board Formed in Baosteel, Five of the Nine Directors from External] People's Net News Story (1 8 October 
2005) <http://finance.people.com. en/GB/ I 039/3 778693 .html>. 
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Appendix 9-1 
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Appendix 9-2 Ownership and governance structures in 
Chinese top 15 non-financial and top 15 
financial listed companies 
Categorie Largest 
s Shareholder (LS) 
Top 15 SASAC-controlled 
non- SOEs (11) 
financia l Local SASAC-
companie control led SOEs 
s (3) 
Ministry of 
Rai lway(1) 
Average 
Shareholdin 
g by LS 
54.37% 
Top 15 Central Huijin 25.99% 
financia l (5)Ministry of 
companie Finance 
s Ministry/Bureau (2) 
SOEs(6) 
Private/foreign 
institutions (2) 
Average Size 
and 
Composition of 
Board of 
Directors 
Total 10.6 
directors, 
executives 5 
(47%), non-
executives 1.6 
(15.09%) 
independent 4.2 
(39%) 
Total 15.53 
directors, 
executives 3 .46 
(21.89%), non-
executives 5 .4 
(34.77) 
independent 5.4 
(34.77) 
Position of Position of Non~ 
Chairman in LS independent 
Directors in LS 
1 O are Chairman 12 companies have all , 
(with 9 also Party or all but 1 non-
Secretary) of LS, 4 independent, directors 
are General from LS. Other 3 
Manager of LS , 1 companies have 
held by head of majority of executive 
Local rai lway directors from LS 
authority 
5 held by senior Most non-independent 
executives of directors are from 
parent SOEs as LS major shareholders. 
Where company is 
control led by Huijin, 
Huijin appoints all non-
executive directors 
Source: Compiled from the 2011 Annual Reports of relevant listed companies and the websites of their parent SOEs. 
The list of China's top 15 Non-financial and Top 15 financial companies (ranked by capita lisation) is from Protiviti and 
Corporate Governance Research Centre of China Academy of Social Science, «2012 'cf 'P lllJ: m 0 JiJ -l'f i!ilii'i1filVl'-lfr 
,~'a )) [Assessment Report of Corporate Governance of Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies 2012] 30-31 
<http://www.protiviti.com/zh-CN/Pages/default.aspx>. 
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